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 I  
Abstract 
This thesis contributes to geographies of secularity and postsecularity by examining 
Christianity and the experiences of migrant workers in Shenzhen, China. In the post-
reform era, China appears to be caught in a contradictory dual process – the entrenchment 
of the secular values and, simultaneously, the notable revival of all forms of religiosity. I 
argue that this dual transition has opened up new possibilities for examining the relations 
between secularity and religion beyond the Western trajectory of modernization. This 
thesis first provides a dialectical analysis of secularity and postsecularity, which views 
them as distinctive yet mutually constituted epistemologies and conditions of being. I 
argue that geographers can significantly advance the understanding of secularity and 
postsecularity by offering geographical knowledge on: (1) the political-ideological 
project of secularity and how it is inhabited by individuals in the specific process of place-
making; (2) what and how new postsecular subjectivities are engendered by, and co-
constituted with, secular conditions of being; and (3) the wider socio-spatial conditions 
where variegated forms of secularity and postsecularity may be re-configured. To address 
these efforts, this thesis also engages with neoliberalism and intersectionality as analytical 
tools to explore the complex social and power relations from which secularity operates 
but also from which new religious subjectivities and agency may emerge.  
 
These inquiries are examined by in-depth ethnographic research with Christian migrant 
workers in Shenzhen. I elucidate how migrant workers constitute their religious 
subjectivities by drawing on Christian resources and ethics, which enable them to come 
to terms with, but also sometimes to reframe and counteract, the neoliberal secularity that 
normalises them as productive, docile, governable, yet alienated, subjects. In particular, 
I focus on how migrant workers’ negotiations of religion, class, gender and adulthood 
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mutually shape one another in such a way that postsecular subjectivities and agency are 
engendered. Although workers’ intersectional religiosity is integral to, and indeed 
constitutive of, the way in which secularist state developmentalism, autocratic power, and 
neoliberal labour relations are legitimated, lived and reinforced, it nonetheless also 
implies a possibility of postsecular reflexivity, which sets an affective condition on the 
ways that secular powers and normalised subjects actualise as a part of migrant workers’ 
everyday life. Above all, this thesis not only sheds lights on the specific configurations 
of secularity and postsecularity in China, but also establishes an intersectional approach 
to secularity and postsecularity.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1 China in neoliberal transition: entrenched secularity and the 
possibilities of postsecularity  
In the post-reform era, China appears to be caught in a contradictory dual process, with 
the entrenchment of secular values and state-sanctioned neoliberal-capitalist ideologies 
and, simultaneously, the notable revival of all forms of religiosity and faith (Yang 2004; 
Szonyi 2009; Gao & Qian 2019).  China has been considered as an avowedly atheist and 
communist state and, in Casanova’s (2013: 42) words, as “one of the most secular 
societies on earth.” Religion seems to retain a very marginal place in Chinese public life 
under the governance of a totalising party-state that fundamentally builds on secularist 
and communist ideologies. Although liberal reform since the early 1980s has enabled 
China to switch from a “militant  atheism” that  views religion as “spiritual opium” to be 
eradicated from public life to a less coercive secularism that allows limited freedom for 
religious expression (Potter 2003; Yang 2010), secularist ideologies do not appear to be 
in decline but rather have become increasingly entrenched and hegemonic amidst China’s 
pursuit of modernization. Some scholars have pointed out that the secular values of reason, 
efficiency, progress and development, alongside the triumph of the market economy, 
have become part of an overwhelming consensus among both state officials and ordinary 
Chinese people in the post-reform era (Wang 2009; Qian and Zhu 2016; Gao, Yin & Zhu 
2019).   
 
In particular, the Chinese state’s effort to build a secular and modernised society has been 
fuelled by the neoliberal transition facilitated by Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern tour” in 
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1992 and subsequently the legitimation of the “socialist market economy” as the goal of 
China’s economic reform. Many scholars argue that the post-reform China has been 
undergoing neoliberal reform, notwithstanding the discrepancies between China’s reform 
and ideal neoliberal restructuring (Harvey 2005; Kipnis 2007; Ong 2007; He and Wu 
2009; Pun & Lu 2010; Wu 2010; Zhang 2012; Qian and Guo 2018; Zhou et al. 2019). 
This neoliberal transition is characterised by: the market as a dominant mechanism in the 
optimization of capital accumulation; the state’s creation and promotion of a flexible 
labour regime; the dismantling of the “work unit” as the primary location of welfare 
distribution; the production of spatial class differentiation; and the state-propagated 
norms of self-improvement, individual responsibility, competition, and the work ethic. In 
particulary, Harvey (2005: 1) describes China’s market-oriented reform as “neoliberalism 
with Chinese characteristics”: with the embrace of neoliberalism, China has been 
transformed “from a closed backwater to an open centre of capitalist dynamism with a 
sustained growth rate unparalleled in human history”. Yet Harvey (2006: 34) also 
critically points out that China is essentially an outcome of a “particular kind of neo-
liberalism interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control”. In this sense, 
neoliberalism is deployed as an exception to the authoritarian regime in China, which 
articulates global capitalism with situated disciplinary technologies (Ong 2007). 
Therefore, as I show in this thesis, unlike in liberal and pluralist societies in the West, 
China’s trajectory to secular modernity is characterised by a combination of  neoliberal 
governance, state developmentalism, and autocratic rule which work hand-in-hand to 
produce productive, docile and governable subjects.  
 
One of the most remarkable results of China’s neoliberal transition is the emergence of 
massive rural-to-urban migration. According to the report of the National Bureau of 
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Statistics of China, there were approximately 281.71 million rural migrant workers in 
20171. However, these rural migrant workers constitute not only the key actors in China’s 
rise as “the workshop of the world” but also the most marginalised group in contemporary 
China (Chan and Pun 2009). Over the past four decades, drastic industrialisation and 
urbanisation in China have precipitated class inequality, precarious and disciplined labour 
regimes, and vulnerability to exploitation for the large numbers of rural migrant workers 
(Zhang 2001; Pun and Smith 2007). This phenomenon is particularly evident in Shenzhen, 
China’s first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as the epitomic city undergoing the 
country’s neoliberal experiment. In Shenzhen, the alliance of the state and capitalism 
enforces the economy- and profit-centred governance of migrant workers. For example, 
the local government has encouraged the expansion of the “factory dormitory regime,” 
which accommodates large numbers of migrant workers yet simultaneously minimizes 
their consumption of urban welfare. Shenzhen’s migrant workers, on the one hand, 
experience the institutional discrimination inflicted by China’s urban–rural duality and 
the hukou (户口) household registration system2 (Chen 1999; Zhang 2001). On the other 
hand, they suffer from a sense of uncertainty and uprootedness, disembeddedness from 
social networks, and the discontinuity between urban and rural lifeworlds (Qian & He 
2012). In 2010, 18 young workers attempted suicide at the production facilities of the 
Taiwan-owned Foxconn company, the world’s largest electronics manufacturer, and 14 
of them died. The Foxconn episodes can be interpreted as the apex of long-term 
depression wrought by exploitation and alienation among young workers. This thesis 
therefore provides critical reflections on the secularist-neoliberal project in China.  
 
 
1 http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/buneiyaowen/201705/t20170502_270286.html 
2 In China, hukou is a household registration system that differentiates between rural and urban populations 
in different management and welfare systems.  
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On the other hand, however, alongside the social and human costs of the advance of 
secular neoliberalism in China is an astounding religious revival and, in particular, the 
unlikely “Christianity fever” which has taken place over the last three or four decades. A 
2012 survey conducted by the China Family Panel Studies programme suggests that the 
number of Chinese Protestants is approximately 26 million, making up 1.9 per cent of the 
total population (China Family Panel Studies 2012). According to another report entitled 
“Global Christianity” released by the Pew Research Centre (2010), there were at least 58 
million Protestants in China in 2010, having increased almost tenfold over a period of 30 
years. It is noteworthy that these figures have possibly been highly underestimated, as a 
large number of underground Christian practitioners make it hard to calculate total 
numbers (Yang and Yang 2017).   
 
In the past two decades, massive rural-to-urban migration in China in conjunction with 
the nationwide religious renaissance has given rise to a distinctive religious group of 
Christian migrant workers3. Although the majority of Christian evangelical movements 
in China thrive in rural areas which it is difficult for the state’s surveillance to reach, this 
scenario is now beginning to be re-mapped, as tens of millions of rural Christians have 
thronged into cities in search of better incomes and livelihoods, and as urban churches 
increasingly see migrant workers as important targets for mission work and social 
services (Huang 2014, 2015). In Shenzhen, especially since the 2010 Foxconn suicide 
event, many migrant workers have sought spiritual shelter in the Christian faith in 
response to the exploitative labour regime. My fieldwork in Shenzhen indicates that 
migrant workers represent an estimated 80 per cent of attendance in some churches 
 
3 In this thesis, the term “migrant workers” refers to people of rural hukou travelling to the city to work, 
while “Christian migrant workers” refers to migrant workers who are baptized Christians or claim to be 
Christians. They can be differentiated according to whether they were converted before (roughly two-
thirds among our informants) or after migrating to the city (the other one-third). 
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located in or around manufacturing-concentrated urban areas. Rather than being 
dismissed by secular neoliberalism, the flourishing of Christianity among migrant-worker 
communities has become a vivid scene in Shenzhen.  
 
Multiple explanations have been proposed to interpret China’s religious revival, including 
those citing moral and spiritual crises caused by drastic social change (Bay 2003; Yang 
2005; Hunter and Chan 2007), the renewal of traditional practices (Chao 1999; Jing 1996), 
changing state–society relations (Feuchtwang 2000; Yang 2008), and the religious market 
(Yang 2011). This line of inquiry casts light on what religion means in reform-era China 
by underscoring two points of view: first, it implies an anti-secular and antihegemonic 
sensibility that sometimes uncritically associates China’s modernisation with the 
domination of secular and capitalist ethics; second, religiosity is therefore analysed as a 
backlash against secular modernity. These perspectives have resulted in specific 
theoretical difficulties for the conceptualisation of religion in an era of transition. Religion 
is read in reductive terms as a preconceived system of meanings and cosmologies that 
cuts against hegemonic state–capital coalition. What has been left largely unanswered, 
however, is how religion partakes in the constitution and consolidation of new socio-
economic relations, values and experiences, and what new religious subjectivities are 
engendered in this process.  
 
In response to these inquiries, one of the aims of this thesis is to open up a new paradigm 
in China’s studies of religion by bringing existing research on religious revival in China 
into dialogue with the emerging scholarship of secularity and postsecularity. Over recent 
years, human geography (or more broadly social sciences) has witnessed a debate 
between those who argue for a more careful reformulation of theories of secularisation 
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and secularity (Kong 2010; Wilford 2010; Tse 2014; Dora 2018; Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018) 
and those who accept the analytical value of the concept of postsecularity that critically 
challenges secularist ethics and epistemologies  (e.g. Beaumont & Baker 2011; Cloke & 
Beaumont 2012; Holloway 2013; Olson et al. 2013; Gökarıksel & Secor 2015; Williams 
2015; Bartolini et al 2017; Cloke et al. 2019). On the one hand, instead of dismissing the 
theory of secularisation altogether, the former approach acknowledges the “overly facile 
understandings of secularity in geographies of religion” (Tse 2014: 202). Therefore, they 
have sought to re-conceptualise secularisation and secularity as grounded and context-
contingent processes, providing accounts of how the secular is lived and performed by 
modern subjects in different social, economic and political contexts (Tse 2014; Dora 2018; 
Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018). This approach is deeply inspired by Charles Taylor’s (2007) 
account of secular conditions of belief – that is, how modern individuals inhabit secularity, 
and how the individuated quest for spiritual realisation and the formation of new religious 
subjectivities co-exist with the secular condition of being. Moreover, influenced by 
Casanova’s (2009; 2013) call for global comparative studies of secularisation and 
secularity, this approach also engages with the geo-historical patterns and fusion of 
secularity in various institutional contexts (Wilford 2010;Tse 2014).  
 
On the other hand, in the spirit of the postsecular turn in social theory, religion has been 
re-theorized as an ethical and self-reflective project that supplies key building blocks for 
the values and ideologies of secular modernity (Cloke et al. 2019). As Habermas (2006; 
2010) suggests, modern society cannot flourish by simply resting on the moral stance 
supplied by secular reason; in fact, religious ways of life play an important role in 
addressing the malaises of modern society, such as issues of social injustice and the 
shrinking of welfare and public service in an age of neoliberal precariousness. In response 
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to Habermas’s postsecular critiques, the geography of postsecularity has emerged as a 
burgeoning field over recent years (Beaumont & Baker 2011; Cloke & Beaumont 2012; 
Olson et al. 2013; Gökarıksel & Secor 2015; Williams 2015; Cloke et al. 2019). This line 
of scholarship argues that there is a mutually reflexive transformation of religion and the 
secular. In particular, recent research into faith-based organisations (FBOs) in human 
geography suggests that religion does not only negotiate the neoliberal economy and 
governance, but also co-constitutes the latter (Beaumont 2008; Beaumont & Baker 2011; 
Cloke & Beaumont 2012; Williams 2015; Cloke, Sutherland and Williams 2016; 
Sutherland 2017; Cloke et al. 2019). Religion provides ethical impulses that subvert, 
resist and rework neoliberal forms of care, thus restoring ethics and hope beyond the 
logics perpetuated by the secular logics of the state and market.  Nevertheless, central to 
the scholarship of secularity and postsecularity is the common concerns approach about 
how new religious subjectivities, ethics and agency are made possible under the secular 
condition of being.   
 
In light of the theories mentioned above, the central aim of this thesis is to establish a 
cross-fertilising research agenda between scholarship on China’s religious revival and the 
geography of secularity and postsecularity. In this thesis, I suggest that the contradictory 
dual transition in China – the entrenchment of secularity and simultaneously the possibly 
postsecular religious revival – provides an important social niche to ground and advance 
a discussion on secularity and postsecularity in a non-Western context.  In response to 
Casanova (2009, 2013) and Taylor’s (2011) call to move beyond a Eurocentric 
understanding of secularisation as the normative knowledge and general trajectory of 
modernisation, I pay attention to the specific configurations of secular modernity in China. 
This effort is discussed in chapter 3, which gives a historical account of China’s secularity 
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as well as in the empirical chapters about how secularity and neoliberalism are inhabited 
by migrant workers in Shenzhen. In particular, I investigate how religious ethics and 
subjectivities articulate, and co-evolve with, secular conditions of being (Taylor 2007) 
and especially neoliberal governance in Shenzhen. As I highlight in the empirical chapters, 
at the specific historical juncture of Shenzhen’s rise as an epicentre of China’s industrial 
modernity, Protestant Christian faith and institutions are integral to, and indeed 
constitutive of, the way in which state developmentalism, the ethos of the market 
economy, and neoliberal labour relations are legitimated, lived and reinforced, both 
individually and collectively.  Echoing Taylor’s (2007, 2011) arguments, people’s 
courting of religion in the reform era as described in this study is not so much about 
whether the society is becoming “more” or “less” religious. Faith is not always 
synonymous with the pursuit of a transcendental spiritual domain aloof from, even 
superseding, everyday life experience in the secular world. Stories of migrant Christians 
in Shenzhen illustrate vividly that new religious interpretations, ethics and subjects are 
formed at the interstices of capitalist economy, state power and spiritual pursuit.  
 
However, I also argue that political and economic transformation in China has indeed 
catalysed new desires for religiosity and the possibilities of postsecularity in which the 
individual can claim an alternative way of life beyond the personhood normalised by state 
power and secular-neoliberalism. In response to the emerging scholarship of 
postsecularity in human geography and beyond (e.g. Beaumont & Baker 2011; Cloke & 
Beaumont 2012; Holloway 2013; Olson et al. 2013; Gökarıksel & Secor 2015; Williams 
2015; Bartolini et al 2017; Cloke et al. 2019), I therefore pay special attention to an 
examination of the way these postsecular subjectivities, ethics and agency are made 
possible. As I show in chapter 5, the lived enactment of Christian theo-ethics (Cloke 2010; 
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Williams 2015) in the everyday praxis of care and justice among marginalised migrant 
workers can open an ethical space that reconstitutes the subjectivities normalised by 
autocratic and neoliberal agendas. Yet, religious ethics and discourse are not simply 
manoeuvred by migrant workers or religious institutions as tactical response to 
exploitative labour regimes, and in chapter 6 I emphasise the importance of the embodied 
knowledge of theologies and the affective presence of transcendence in the formation of  
the faithful subjectivity of migrant workers. Also, embodied theology enables a more 
hopeful, self-valued and morally superior subject for migrant workers.  
 
Yet notwithstanding that the existing scholarship of postsecularity in human geography 
has presented substantial contributions to the grounding of Habermas’s ethical critique of 
secularism and cross-over narratives of religion in public life (e.g. Beaumont & Baker 
2011; Cloke & Beaumont 2012; Williams 2015),  in-depth research is rare which links 
religious subjectivities and agency (Mahmood 2005; Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016) to 
the discussion of intersectionality. In other words, instead of presupposing postsecularity 
as an ontological condition, I carefully examine the spatial conditions and multiple layers 
of power relations, lived experiences and identities in which new religious subjectivities 
and agency are conditioned and engendered. In this thesis, I argue that the intersectional 
approach provides a vigorous analytical tool to address and advance the understanding of 
secular and postsecular subjectivity by acknowledging how different forms of powers and 
lived experiences mutually constitute (McCall 2005; Collins and Bilge 2016; Hopkins 
2017). Firstly, the intersectional approach emphasizes different systems of oppressions 
and social inequalities, so that migrant workers’ subjectivities are not shaped by a single 
axis of social division (for example, class, religion or gender) but by multi-layered lived 
experiences and power relations (Collins and Bilge 2016). Secondly, therefore, 
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postsecular agency and subjectivities cannot be captured by simply examining the 
relevant religious experiences alone; instead, I focus on how religion affects and is 
affected by other lived experiences such as of class, gender and the specific life course in 
such a way that may enable the formation of new religious subjectivities. In general, I 
highlight in this thesis that it is through a careful examination of intersectional 
experiences that we can acquire situated knowledge regarding how postsecular 
subjectivities emerge in a relational world. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in this thesis therefore 
deploy an intersectional approach to explore how secularity, neoliberalism and 
postsecularity are inhabited and negotiated in interactions among religion, class, gender 
and youth.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The following research questions are examined in an effort to address the overall 
research aims of this thesis:  
(1) How do religious (Christian) subjectivities and ethics articulate and co-evolve with 
secular conditions of being in the context of the neoliberal transition in Shenzhen?  
(2) What are the specific configurations of secularity and postsecularity in contemporary 
China?  
 (3) In what ways do migrant workers constitute their religious subjectivities and how 
may postsecularity emerge from this process?  
(4) How can an intersectional approach provide new understandings of both secularity 
and postsecular subjectivity ? 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
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This thesis contains ten chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents 
a theoretical outline concerning the geography of secularity and postsecularity. Chapter 
3 then provides reflections on the spatial conditions of secularity and postsecularity in 
China. The methodology and research area are subsequently considered in Chapter 4. The 
following empirical chapters are organised according to the themes of neoliberal 
secularity and theo-ethics (Chapter 5), embodied theologies and technologies of the self 
(Chapter 6), Christianity and masculine subjects (Chapter 7), women’s religious agency 
(Chapter 8), and the Christian trajectory to working-class adulthood (Chapter 9). Each 
empirical chapter can be read independently with a specific theoretical register, but 
overall they represent a comprehensive picture of migrant workers’ religious lives. 
Chapter 10 concludes with a summary of the research findings and a discussion of the 
contributions of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 delineates a grounded dialectic of secularity and postsecularity and provides 
an analysis of its geographical implications. This dialectical agenda is achieved by 
reconciling critical theories of secularity that highlight both secular governmentality and 
the existential lived conditions of the secular (Asad 2003; Taylor 2007, 2011; Casanova 
2009, 2013) with postsecular critiques that emphasize not only the mutually reflexive 
transformation of religion and the secular but also ethics and epistemologies beyond 
secularism (Habermas 2006, 2010; Cloke & Beaumont 2012). In general, this chapter 
considers secularity and postsecularity as distinctive but mutually constitutive domains 
of knowledge, conditions of being, and epistemologies. In the light of this, I argue that 
human geography can advance the understanding of secularity and postsecularity by 
engaging with three lines of inquiries that examine: (1) the political-ideological project 
of secularity and its epistemic knowledge regime, and simultaneously how secularity is 
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felt and inhabited by individuals in the specific process of place-making; (2) how new 
postsecular subjectivities are engendered by, and co-constituted with, secular conditions 
of being; and (3) the wider spatial conditions where variegated forms of secularity and 
postsecularity may exist and be re-configured. This chapter therefore addresses these 
theoretical registers by developing two approaches to the grounding of geographical 
studies of secularity and postsecularity. First, I engage with neoliberalism as a form of 
social order and governmentality in which not only does the political-ideological project 
of secularity operate but religion also persists. Second, I develop an intersectional 
approach to secularity and postsecularity that emphasises the multi-layered nature of 
power and the ways different subjectivities (concerning, for example, religion, gender 
and class) shape and form one another. I argue that both secularity and postsecularity are 
multi-layered, hybrid, and intersectionally constituted; therefore, an intersectional 
approach enables geographers to capture the complex socio-spatial relations from which 
postsecular subjectivities and agency may emerge.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the geo-historical conditions of secularity and postsecularity in 
China. This chapter responds to Casanova (2009, 2013) and Taylor’s (2011) call for a 
global comparative study of religion that moves beyond dominant stereotypes about the 
trajectories of modernization in the United States and Europe. On the one hand I provide 
a brief genealogy of secularity and secularism in the history of China. Secularity and 
secularism are not simply latent functions and by-products of the inevitable project of 
modernization, but are more likely to reflect a state-led strategy and ideology to enhance 
state-building and social governance. On the other hand, I then discuss the possibility of 
postsecular transformation evident in China’s remarkable religious revival in the post-
reform era. The individual’s quest for “moral reconstruction” and spiritual flourishing 
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amidst market-oriented reform, along with the increasing role of religion in addressing 
the malaises of neoliberal transition, have constituted a social niche for religion to persist 
in China. Overall, this chapter offers important contextual knowledge for understanding 
the malleable and hybrid religiosity of migrant workers in China.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the research context and methodology of this thesis. Firstly I 
contextualise Christianity and migrant workers in Shenzhen by situating them in local 
history and political-economic conditions and explain why the emergence of “Christian 
migrant workers” has become a salient phenomenon in Shenzhen. This chapter then offers 
a discussion of the conduct of a reflexive ethnography of religion in China, with a 
particular focus on the production of situated knowledge and the researcher’s 
positionality.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the connections between the secularist-neoliberal governance of 
migrants and Christian theo-ethics. The regulation of migrant labourers has been one of 
the primary mechanisms of the state’s secular and neoliberal governance. This chapter 
therefore focuses on the “actually existing” workings of this neoliberal migrant regime 
and in particular its everyday encounters with locally-based ethical agents. On the one 
hand, I draw attention to how neoliberal subjectivities are materialised in the disciplinary 
migrant labour regime in Shenzhen, where the reconciliation of neoliberalism and 
autocratic power has resulted in the hyper-exploitation of migrant workers. On the other 
hand, I explore how the lived enactment of Christian theo-ethics in the everyday praxis 
of care and justice for marginalised migrant workers can open up an ethical space that 
reconstitutes the subjectivities normalised by autocratic and neoliberal agendas. I argue 
that theo-ethics not only negotiates but also co-constitutes secular-neoliberal governance 
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by either ameliorating neoliberal subjectivity or drawing on neoliberal logics per se; 
regardless, it creates possibilities for more hopeful spaces and hybrid subjectivities 
beyond secularist ethics. 
 
Chapter 6 further explores how Christian migrant workers constitute their religious 
subjectivities and religious bodies through theologies-by-praxis. This chapter responds to 
the postsecular critique which argues that religion should not be reduced to social 
dynamics falling outside the domains of self-interpretation and theological knowledge. 
This chapter contributes to this critique by examining how the knowledge of faithful 
subjectivities can be informed by more nuanced understanding of theology and 
postsecular ethics (Holloway 2013; Sutherland 2016). On the one hand, by analysing the 
preaching, sermons, and rituals of both house churches and TSPM (Three-self Patriotic 
Movement) churches I suggest that religious institutions offer migrant workers a locally-
sensitive regime of embodied knowledge through which transcendent and faithful 
sensibilities are corporeally felt. On the other hand, these embodied theologies have been 
reflexively adopted by migrant workers as “technologies of the self” to constitute a 
desired way of being. Although migrant workers’ self-transformation often overlaps with 
the state/capitalist agenda of producing docile and productive migrant bodies, it 
nevertheless enables a more self-valued and morally superior subject that conditions or 
reframes neoliberal subjectivation.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the formation of Christian and moral masculinity by focusing on the 
intersections of religion, class and gender among rural migrant workers in Shenzhen. 
Theoretically, this chapter analyses how postsecular subjectivity may emerge through the 
intersectional constitution of masculinity by bringing postsecularity into dialogue with 
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critical geographies of masculinity. It explores how Christian migrant workers tactically 
deploy religious discourses to construct their masculine moral subjectivity in rural 
churches, urban workplaces and the family and thus transform and come to terms with 
(and sometimes reinforce) different hegemonic masculinities normalised by the 
hierarchical labour regime, traditional patriarchal culture, and secular values. I suggest 
that migrant workers’ performance of moral manhood is itself hegemonic, as it is 
conditioned by a set of normative religious moralities and conduct. Nevertheless, it serves 
as a tactical alternative for migrant workers to reframe their marginal experiences and to 
claim a meaningful way of being men that may psychologically empower them. In this 
sense, Christian migrant workers’ masculinity formation can be understood as a process 
of autopoiesis or self-cultivation as pious subjects beyond the secular-humanist account 
of autonomous and emancipatory personhood (Mahmood 2005).  
 
Chapter 8 focuses on the constitution of women Christian migrant workers’ religious 
subjectivity and agency.  In particular, I draw on recent debates about postsecular 
feminism regarding the extent to which women’s subjectivity and agency can be 
conveyed through and supported by religious ethics and piety and the rethinking of 
women’s agency beyond the limitations of Eurocentric and secular humanist theorizing 
(Mahmood 2005; Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016). This chapter therefore advances this 
discussion by investigating women migrant workers’ intersectional experiences of 
religion, gender, migration, and familial relation. I situate Christian migrant women’s 
subjectivity within the intersectional “matrix of domination” in which subaltern 
femininity is created and within which new religious agency may arise. Firstly, women 
migrants’ emphasis on the authority of feeling, emotion, and experience not only offers 
them a “comfort zone” to negotiate with labour alienation, but also redefines the male-
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dominated religious sphere. Secondly, the agency of women migrants also manifests in 
their efforts to Christianize family relations. However, this is not achieved through  
practices of resistance, but by performing docile, hardworking, tolerant Christian 
femininities in the family.  
 
Chapter 9 researches young Christian migrant workers’ transition to working-class 
adulthood and the possibilities of postsecular subjectivity and agency that emerge within 
the process of youth transition. By re-invigorating the concept of “spiritual capital”, this 
chapter examines how postsecular subjectivities are mediated by and embodied as 
resourcefulness and the sino-knowledge of sociability in young people’s navigation of 
adulthood. On the one hand, I analyse how the state’s secular-neoliberal project operates 
through the creation of an educational-economic regime that reduces young rural 
migrants to cheap labour and deprives them of aspiration, hope, and upward mobility. On 
the other hand, I elaborate on how “spiritual capital” can produce hopeful geographies of 
adulthood for rural migrant youth, in terms of forming religious networks and a system 
of jiazhiguan (value). Young migrant workers also manoeuvre spiritual capital (in the 
form of what they call “Christian wisdom”) to establish guanxi or interpersonal networks 
of influence beyond the social spaces normalised by the neoliberal labour regime.  
 
Chapter 10 concludes by summarising the key research findings, central arguments and 
contributions of this thesis. I critically rethink secularity and postsecularity in terms of 
the reflexivity and spatial conditions, religiosity, and intersectionality affecting the lives 
of migrants. In particular, the intersectional approach to secularity and postsecularity 
developed in Chapter 2 is re-examined 
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Chapter 2  Geographies of secularity and postsecularity 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, discussions of secularity and religion have re-entered centre stage 
in inquiries in the humanities and social sciences, making significant contributions to new 
understanding of our modern “condition of being” and how common goods of social 
justice and human flourishment may be achieved (Asad 2003; Habermas 2006, 2010; 
Taylor 2007; Casanova 2009; 2013; Asad, Brown, Butler & Mahmood 2013; Berger 
2017). This is particularly the case in the emerging scholarship of postsecularity that calls 
for a rethinking of the persistence, reformulation, and new visibility of religion in the 
public sphere and how alternative ways of life and politics beyond secularist ethics can 
be imagined (Habermas 2006; 2010; Beckford 2012; Beaumont 2019). In human 
geography, the notion of postsecularity or postsecularism has been widely adopted as an 
analytical frame to capture new spatialities and practices of religion and to challenge the 
categorical assumption of the secularisation thesis (e.g. Cloke & Beaumont & Baker 2011; 
Beaumont 2012; Olson et al. 2013; Gökarıksel & Secor 2015; Williams 2015; Cloke et 
al. 2019). Drawing primarily from the postsecular narratives enriched by the works of 
Jürgen Habermas (2006; 2010), this line of research emphasises the mutually reflexive 
transformation of secularity and religion, and the emerging spaces of rapprochement in 
which religion serves as an ethical and reflective project of neoliberal governance in 
addressing issues of welfare and social justices (Williams 2015). In particular, 
postsecularity has recently been examined as a space of possibility in which the formation 
of new ethical subjectivities and hopeful geographies may emerge in place-making and 
faith-based praxis (Cloke et al 2019). Following this lead, one of the aims of this chapter 
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is to explore the formation of ethical subjectivities, agency, and conditions of being that 
emerge in and through the possible spaces of postsecularity.  
 
However, instead of uncritically accepting the analytical values of postsecularity, some 
other geographers argue that the postsecular approach in geography has exhibited overly 
facile understandings of secularity, with a lack of attention to the geohistorical 
contingencies and complexities of secularity (Kong 2010; Wilford 2010; Tse 2014: 202; 
Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018). Also, as Tse (2014) argues, secularisation and secularity can 
themselves be understood as theologically constituted and as part of a process whereby 
homo religiosus remains robust. Therefore, they have sought to re-conceptualise 
secularisation and secularity as grounded and context-contingent processes, providing 
accounts of “how the secular is lived and performed by modern subjects at different levels 
of social, economic and political organisation” (Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018: 554). This 
approach is deeply influenced by Taylor’s (2007) phenomenological account of the 
secular condition of belief, which argues that secularity remains a real, tangible condition 
under which not only religions evolve and thrive but individuals form everyday 
subjectivities in modernity (Taylor 2007, 2011; Casanova 2013).  In this chapter, I argue 
that the postsecular turn in human geography needs to consider how postsecular ethics 
and subjectivities articulate, and co-evolve with, secular conditions of being in the world.  
 
This chapter therefore provides a grounded dialectic of secularity and postsecularity and 
an analysis of its geographical implications. In general, I consider secularity and 
postsecularity as distinctive but mutually constituted domains of knowledge, conditions 
of being, and epistemologies. As Taylor (2007) notes, modern individuals are facing a 
“cross-pressure” situation, a lived experience in which we desire to create new modes of 
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being through, or even out of, the immanence frame. In this sense, the prevalence of 
individualised spiritualities can be viewed as an outcome of Taylor’s (2007) ‘nova effect’: 
the co-existence of individual quests for spiritual realisation, and new religious 
subjectivities made possible by the cross-pressure of secular condition of being (Tse 
2014). That is why Taylor (2007) emphasises that how one inhabits secularity and 
immanent order hinges on how one interprets the meanings of transcendence. Building 
on these insights, a more nuanced understanding of postsecularity is presented in this 
chapter, where it is better understood as a condition and possibility in which individuals 
inhabit secularity and transcendence in such a way that new, multiple, and hybrid 
religious subjectivities emerge.  
 
Above all, this chapter argues that human geography can advance the understanding of 
secularity and postsecularity by engaging in three lines of inquiry. Firstly, geographers 
need to examine the political-ideological project of secularity and its epistemic 
knowledge regime, and simultaneously how secularity is felt and inhabited by individuals 
in the specific process of place-making. Secondly, researchers need to answer questions 
concerning what and how new postsecular subjectivities are engendered by and co-
constituted with secular conditions of being. Thirdly, research also needs to interrogate 
the wider spatial conditions where variegated forms of secularity and postsecularity may 
exist and be re-configured, especially beyond the Eurocentric understanding of secularity 
as the normative knowledge and general trajectory of modernisation.  
 
This chapter therefore addresses these theoretical registers by introducing two approaches 
to the grounding of geographies of secularity and postsecularity. First I engage with 
neoliberalism as a form of social order and governmentality in which not only does the 
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political-ideological project of secularity operate, but religion also persists. In this thesis, 
I will show the ways in which neoliberalism operates as a secular-ideological project that 
moulds the subject-forms and affective life of individuals (Anderson 2016) and 
simultaneously opens up spaces for new religiosities and faith-based praxis.  Second, I 
develop an intersectional approach to secularity and postsecularity that emphasises the 
multi-layered nature of power and the ways different subjectivities (for example, related 
to dimensions of religion, gender and class) shape and form one another. I argue that the 
secular and neoliberal project is often actualised and materialised through the 
normalisation and categorisation of intersectional subjects. This chapter also highlights 
the fact that postsecularity is multi-layered, hybrid, and intersectionally constituted; 
therefore, an intersectional approach enables geographers to capture the complex power 
relations from which postsecular subjectivities and agency may emerge.  
 
2.2 Rethinking secularity: politics, space and conditions of being 
Rethinking secularity requires the analytical differences between “secularity”, “the 
secular”, “secularisation” and “secularism” to be distinguished. All four concepts are 
interconnected, referring to a regime of knowledge related to religion; therefore, they are 
sometimes used interchangeably in various academic disciplines. However, in this thesis, 
I see secularity as a broader concept that describes the condition of being in a modern 
secular age, encompassing the secular as a modern epistemic category (Casanova 2009), 
social-historical processes of secularisation, and the worldview and ideology of 
secularism (Asad 2009). This treatment can avoid reifying the concepts as referring to 
different realities while maintaining analytical distinctions. As Casanova (2011: 54) 
suggests, the secular is often understood as a residual category, “the other of the religious”. 
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The secular is therefore largely a modern epistemic tool utilised to capture the master 
narrative of modern transformation:    
 
The secular has become a central modern category — theological-philosophical, legal-
political, and cultural-anthropological — to construct, codify, grasp, and experience a 
realm or reality differentiated from “the religious”. Phenomenologically, one can 
explore the different types of “secularities” as they are codified, institutionalized, and 
experienced in various modern contexts and the parallel and correlated transformations 
of modern “religiosities” and “spiritualties” (Casanova 2011: 54).  
 
Despite being a discursively constituted category vis-à-vis “religion” (Asad 2009), the 
secular as “modern social imaginaries” (Taylor 2004) may exist in most societies that 
have been inescapably involved in the project of modernisation, implicating different 
cultural politics and political-economic projects of governmentality. That is why 
Casanova (2011) encourages us to explore the multiple forms of secularities. This thesis 
therefore addresses this effort by looking at how secularity is embodied in the context of 
China.  
 
However, secularity is often imagined in the historical processes of secularisation, 
actually existing or alleged empirical-social patterns of transformation in which religions 
increasingly lose their hold in modern society. The classic theories of secularisation 
anticipate the declining significance and presence of religion in the realms of individual 
lives, societies, and states, and argue for the individualisation of religion (Luckmann 1967; 
Berger 1969; Brown 2001; Bruce 2002). As Bruce (2002) points out, secularisation is the 
result of the holistic transformation of modern society, including the economic processes 
 22  
of industrialisation, the social processes of individualism and rationalisation of social 
organisation, and the geographical processes of urbanisation and globalisation that 
dismantle place-based communities where religion persists. Bruce (2002) essentially 
posits a strong connection between secularisation and modernisation, following the neo-
orthodox tradition established by Max Weber, who asserted that modernisation 
necessarily leads to disenchantment. However, for Bruce, the disenchantment of society 
does not replace religion altogether, which may continually function as a means of 
“cultural defence or integration”: religion persists if, and only if, “it finds work to do other 
than relating individuals to the supernatural” (Bruce 2002: 269).  
 
However, theories of secularisation have been critiqued for their Eurocentric roots and 
overgeneralisations which overlook the geographically and historically uneven processes 
of secularisation (Casanova 2008; Gao et al. 2018). The classical theories are therefore at 
odds with the complexities of empirical reality; for instance, the flourishing of religion in 
the United States and “global South” (particularly Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, 
China and Korea) and the worldwide Islamic revitalisation. As Beaumont and Baker state 
(2011: 5), “Globalized societies on all continents find themselves caught in a series of 
contradictory dynamics, including simultaneous and dialectical processes of 
secularisation alongside the growing deprivatization of faith and its re-emergence as a 
shaper of cultural, political, economic processes”.   
 
Instead of abandoning the secularisation theory altogether, some scholars have sought to 
reformulate it, arguing that secularisation retains explanatory value and therefore is still 
an actual process (Casanova 1993, 2008, 2013; Martin 2017; Wohlrab-Sahr and 
Burchardt 2012). In general, this line of research rejects secularisation as a process with 
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ultimate telos occurring in a unilinear way independent of geo-historical contingencies. 
Overall, they accept that the social significance of religion has declined to varying degrees 
as society modernizes, but do not see this as a homogeneous process. Instead, as Casanova 
(2011: 54) argues, “‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ are always and everywhere mutually 
constituted”: they are mutually competitive in some cases and reinforce each other in 
others. For Casanova (1993, 2008, 2013), secularisation includes three interconnected 
dimensions: the decline of religious beliefs and practice in modern societies; the 
privatisation of beliefs, which serves as a normative condition for modern liberal 
democratic politics; and the differentiation of religious institutions and norms from other 
social spheres.  Because modernity may not necessarily result in the decline and 
privatisation of religion, as documented in many social contexts, Casanova (2006: 9) 
endorses the position that an understanding of secularisation as “a process of functional 
differentiation and emancipation of the secular sphere – primarily the modern state, the 
capitalist market economy, and modern science – from the religious sphere” is still an 
uncontested thesis in social science.  
 
In recent years, human geographers have expressed growing interests in debates around 
secularisation and secularity (Wilford 2010; Tse 2014; Bartolini et al. 2017; Beaumont, 
Eder and Mendieta 2018; Gao, Qian and Yuan 2018; Gao, Yin and Zhu 2018), and have 
sought to reconceptualise secularisation as a grounded, reflexive, and spatially contingent 
process. Adopting a scalar perspective, Wilford (2010) emphasises the contingency and 
tension existing between structural forces of secularisation and secularism and the 
actually existing practices of human agents. He therefore reconciles the grounded and 
place-making process of secularisation with institutional differentiation and 
fragmentation. As Wilford (2010: 355) argues, secularisation poses “new problems and 
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opportunities, restrictions and openings to religion in advanced differentiated societies”. 
Rather than merely being conceived as a threat to religion and the sacred, secularisation 
is also “left open for sacralization in countless ways”: macro-level differentiation 
provides a range of possibilities for the resurgence of religions in public spheres and new 
spiritual practices and aspirations at the meso- and micro-scales (Wilford, 2010: 343).  In 
general, Wilford (2010: 344) suggests that religion and spirituality are always 
differentially scaled, “confined to scales where their expression does not encroach on 
secular subsystems such as law, government, and the market”. He therefore uses the 
metaphor of “sacred archipelagos” to describe the condition of religion in modern society, 
in which religion is relocated to relocated to fragmented spatialities of lived spiritualities. 
In other words, social differentiation and modernization simultaneously establish proper 
scales or niched spaces at which religions continually flourish, since they continue to 
function as sources of value, meaning and reflectivity that modernity cannot offer people.  
Yet Wilford also recognises that the “agent in place” is not a liberated, free-floating space, 
but is conditioned by macro-level secular institutions and ideologies, and therefore 
geographical research needs to address the “embodied, material, and local responses to 
abstract, large scale forces imputed by secularization theory” and how individuals make 
sense of and interpret religious and secular meanings in specific contexts. Wilford’s 
arguments are echoed in Gao, Duo and Zhu’s (2018) research at a Chinese ancestral 
temple in one “urban village” in Guangzhou. They focus on the state‐enforced 
secularisation imposed on the ancestral temple, the spiritual centre of the village, which 
aimed to mute religion-enabled resistance to the project of urban regeneration. However, 
the project of secularisation at the micro‐scale does not achieve its aim, because it also 
opens space where “the formation of new religiosities as new legitimising religious 
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thoughts and discourses of the sacred arose within villagers’ embodied practices of 
resistance”(Gao, Duo and Zhu 2018:1). 
 
Wilford’s argument is criticised by Bartolini et al. (2017: 338) due to its clear-cut 
separation of different public spheres that have distinctive spatialities and functions, thus 
seeking to map out and differentiate “spheres/places where the spiritual is present or not, 
legitimate or not and/or authoritative or not”. Rejecting any clear-cut distinction between 
processes of secularisation and those of re-sacralisation, Bartolini et al. (2017) argue that 
secular modernity is always-already co-produced with the enchantment of religions. 
Hence, instead of asking which scales, niched spaces/spheres offer more affordances for 
religious practices and expression, it is better to see modernity as “centrally engaged with 
questions of faith and religious values”. Likewise, as Tse (2014) point outs, secularisation 
can itself be understood as theologically constituted and as a process whereby homo 
religiosus remains robust. Tse’s (2014) “grounded theologies” or “secular theologies” are 
valuable theoretical innovations in exploring geographies of religion in a secular age. 
Consonant with Wilford (2010), Tse also argues for a more critical re-examination of 
secularisation and secularity. Yet Tse advances Wilford’s arguments by asserting that “to 
be ‘secular’ is in fact an inversion of Christian theology”, modern concepts of the state 
largely reflect a “theopolitical imagination”, and secularisation itself originates from the 
processes by which theologies and the transcendent are implicated in society and religious 
practitioners constitute their private senses of the transcendent. By grounded theologies, 
Tse (2014) refers particularly to processes in which narratives regarding divine action and 
transcendent presence are addressed in the performative practices of place-making. In 
this sense, grounded or secular theologies are not so much about “the codification of 
religious propositions to which religious adherents give cognitive assent, but rather to the 
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performative practice of narratives about metaphysical divine action in relation to the 
immanent world” (Tse 2014: 204). He therefore highlights “the secular” as referring to 
the social implications of theologies and how religions relate to this-worldly concerns.  
 
Instead of becoming tangled in debates over whether our societies are more or less 
religious, some key thinkers have moved the focus from secularisation to secularity or 
secularism per se, and especially to multiple configurations of secularities and conditions 
of being in secular modernity (Asad 2003; Taylor 2007; Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and 
VanAntwerpen 2011; Casanova 2011, 2013; Wohlrab-Sahr 2012; Asad, Brown, Butler 
& Mahmood 2013). The knowledge of “the secular” is closely associated with the context 
of Western culture, especially the history of Christian Europe. As Charles Taylor (2007) 
suggests, the ideology of the secular might return in the Third Republic in Europe, the 
regime which was primarily founded on the ideologies of the self-sufficiency of the 
secular in order not to be subordinate to the church. Yet, it was not until the Protestant 
Reformation and the Enlightenment that secularism emerged as a form of rational 
morality – for example, in the theological rationalities in Kant’s philosophy that intended 
to restrain religion within the regime of rationality – in the pursuit of liberalization (Taylor 
2011). In 19th-century liberal Europe, secularism started to become a political and 
governmental doctrine, implicated in the project of normative-ideological state projects 
and the cultural programme of modernity that “brings together certain behaviours, 
knowledges and sensibilities in modern life” (Asad 2003: 25). For Taylor (2007), the 
history of the secular in the West is the foundation of a clear epistemic distinction between 
the immanent (this-worldly and self-sufficient spheres) and the transcendent (often 
identified as “religious” or supernatural).  
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However, it is not the intention of this chapter to elaborate on the genealogies and 
historical formations of secularity and secularism, which have already been 
systematically surveyed in the works of Talal Asad and Charles Taylor. Instead, I  explore 
how knowledge of secularity can be applicable to wider spatial conditions and how 
different contexts reformulate understandings of secularity beyond Western societies. It 
is noteworthy that both Taylor and Asad agree that secularism – particularly as an ethics  
independent of religious conviction – is applicable throughout the world and societies 
that have been involved in the project of modernization (see Asad 2003: 2). I agree with 
Casanova’s (2011:55) argument that secularity, as a political-ideological or cultural 
agenda, may be “viewed as an epistemic knowledge regime that may be held 
unreflexively or be assumed phenomenologically as the taken-for-granted normal 
structure of modern reality, as a modern doxa or an ‘unthought’”. In other words, the 
unreflective assumption or “unthought” of secularism that defines what it is to be modern 
and what is “the good life” (Taylor 2011) might exist in different institutional 
arrangements and cultural politics across the world. Overall, I define secularity as a broad 
regime of knowledge normalised by political-cultural agendas as an unreflective 
condition of being in modern society. This definition highlights not only the historical-
discursive formation of secularity in the regime of knowledge/power (Foucault 1988) but 
a phenomenological condition in which secularity is embodied – that is, how secularity 
is lived by modern individuals.  
 
In order to further illustrate this definition, I need to further elaborate on Charles Taylor’s 
(2007) phenomenological account of secularity and his thesis of modernity as “a secular 
age”. Taylor’s question is not whether our society is less or more religious, nor does he 
intend to claim a historical switch from an “age of belief” to an “age of reason”. Instead, 
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Taylor is interested in providing a phenomenological account of the condition of belief – 
what it feels like to live and what is believable in a modern secular age. For Taylor, 
previous debates about secularisation mislead us in our understanding of modern society, 
as they are obsessed with expressions of belief rather than the conditions of belief. The 
problematics of the modern secular should concern questions about what is believable. In 
this way of framing the inquiry, Taylor thinks that “the secular” is not necessarily about 
the decline of belief but rather the default assumptions about what is believable (among 
various values, faiths, spiritualties, significances, ideologies, and so on). The overall 
thrust of Taylor’s thesis is to explain the structural constellation of the social, moral, and 
cosmic orders that constitute what he calls the immanent frame within which modern 
social actors interpret the meanings of themselves and make sense of religion (Casanova 
2010; 2013). Taylor’s analytical project starts from his unique definition of “the secular”. 
Overall, Taylor (2007; 2011) and Casanova (2010; 2013) have devised four taxonomies 
of “the secular” and secularity:  
 
(1) In the broadest possible sense, the “secular” amounts to a time and space, or the 
realm of “earthly” politics. It derives from medieval Christian theologies that view 
the “secular” as the other of “sacred” or “religious”, under the sacred/secular 
divide (Taylor 2007).  Taylor (2007) calls categorical secularity. 
  
(2) Influenced by the Enlightenment, “secular” started to refer to a neutral, areligious, 
and non-sectarian space that all worldviews, religious or non-religious, can share 
and compete for. It was first used by Augustine to describe how Christians and 
pagans come together to peruse their common interests in civil spheres (Casanova 
2013). According to Taylor (2007), the normative sense of secularism often shares 
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this notion of secular, which posits a realm governed by neutral and universal 
rationality that can be shared by all people. Taylor refers this to mere secularity.  
 
(3) Taylor’s (2007) third definition of the secular, which he refers to as self-sufficient 
secularity, that most helpfully contributes to the comprehension of religion in a 
secular age. A society is secular insofar as belief in God is one but not the only 
source of meanings that constitute our life (Taylor 2007). In this sense, belief and 
faith are reflective and contestable. For Taylor, it is the emergence of the “secular” 
in this sense that gives rise to an “exclusive humanism”, a vision of life in which 
human beings flourish within the frame of immanence: “A purely self-sufficient 
humanism came to be a widely available option. It means a humanism accepting 
no final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else 
beyond this flourishing” (Taylor 2007: 18). For Casanova (2013), self-sufficient 
secularity means the naturalisation of “unbelief” or “non-religion” as the normal 
human condition as an assumption of modern living.  
 
However, as Casanova (2013) suggests, self-sufficient secularity may develop into a more 
secularist ideology that considers the absence of religion as the natural consequence of 
modernization. This is particularly evident in countries that utilise the ideologies of 
secularism to promote state-led modernization, such as China. Therefore, Casanova (2013) 
articulates a fourth sense of the “secular”:  
 
(4) In this sense, being “secular” means the phenomenological experience that 
disengaged belief and immanent consciousness are not only passively free but 
mean “having been liberated from ‘religion’ as a condition for human autonomy 
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and human flourishing” (Casanova 2013: 33). Casanova calls this secularist 
secularity. In this respect, secularist secularity emphasises the superiority of our 
present secular modernity over supposedly earlier or less-modernised societies. 
That is, in Casanova’s (2013:34) words, “to be secular means to be modern, and 
therefore, by implication, to be religious means to be somehow not yet fully 
modern”.  
 
In general, while mere secularity and secularist secularity may serve as different cultural-
political projects, self-sufficient secularity exists as a secular mode of being. Taylor (2007) 
argues that we are living within the “immanent frame”, in which individuals make sense 
of the world entirely or mainly based on a secular worldly order, devoid of transcendent 
knowledge and values. Rationalisation, democracy, market economies and disassociation 
from religious authority together create new cosmic, social and moral orders. Modern 
subjects – religious or otherwise – are constrained by a “stadial consciousness”, focused 
on rational calculation and this-worldly concerns. Therefore, secular modernity gives rise 
to a system of phenomenological conditions under which people, including religious 
people, are disposed to non-transcendental mindsets, values, rules and practices.  
 
However, a society of mere secularity or secularist secularity could simultaneously 
undergo religious revival, where vast swathes of the populace continually engage 
religious beliefs as sources of significance. People are obviously not neatly divided into 
the realms of immanence or transcendence. Instead, as Taylor (2007) notes, modern 
individuals face a “cross-pressure” situation, a lived experience in which we try to forge 
new modes of being through, even out of, the immanence frame. While the world is 
disenchanted, modern individuals nevertheless also experience the malaise of modernity 
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– a sense of loss inflicted by such disenchantment.  In such a secular age, religions do not 
perish, but flourish in the form of what Taylor calls the “nova effect” – individuated 
quests for spiritual realisation and proliferating religious subjectivities that exist in 
fragmentation.  
 
To sum up, Taylor and Casanova’s accounts of secularity offers important theoretical 
registers for geographers of religion. Firstly, “the secular” is inescapably exists in modern 
social imagineries, influencing the ways we make sense of the world; therefore, studies 
in geographies of secularity can significantly contribute to new understandings of how 
different configurations and knowledge of secularities come into being and are 
contextualised. As Taylor (2011) recently noted:  
 
What to do? We might think of starting again with another term, one less identified 
with a particular civilizational trajectory. But that is probably utopian. The word 
“secular” is much too entrenched in all sorts of discussion, historical and normative, 
to be displaced … Obviously, we need a great deal of close study of other, non-
Western contexts in order to help here, and I find myself very ill equipped to offer 
further useful contributions (2011: 36, emphasis in original).  
 
This coincides with Casanova’s (2006; 2009) advocacy that research needs to adopt the 
global comparative study of religion and secularity in order to historicise and 
contextualise all epistemic categories. A proper rethinking of secularisation and secularity 
will “require a critical examination of the diverse patterns of differentiation and fusion of 
the religious and the secular and their mutually constituted across all world religion” 
(Casanova 2006: 10). In this sense, geographers can contribute significantly to this project 
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by providing grounded examinations of the performative practices of place-making 
informed by the politics and ethics of “the secular” (Tse 2014) in different political 
regimes and different cultural conditions of being. This thesis therefore represents such 
an attempt, in response to Casanova (2009; 2013) and Taylor’s (2011) call to move 
beyond Eurocentric understanding of secularity as the normative knowledge and general 
trajectory of modernisation. I focus here on how secularity is configured, embodied, and 
lived by individuals in the context of China.  As shown in this thesis, unlike in liberal and 
pluralist societies in the West, China’s trajectory to secular modernity in the post-reform 
era is characterised by a combination of neoliberalist governance, state developmentalism, 
and autocratic rule, which work collaboratively to produce a hegemonic regime of 
knowledge and particular subject forms.  
 
Secondly, the immanent frame remains a real, tangible condition under which not only 
religions evolve and thrive but individuals form everyday subjectivities in modernity. In 
this sense, Taylor’s work provides a nuanced “reconciling of the secularizing agent-in-
place” (Wilford 2010) with macro-level societal secularism. Taylor’s (2007) thesis 
recognises the tension between and contingency of secularity as macro-social process or 
individual consciousness or as actually existing ways of living by individuals.  As I show 
in the empirical chapters, secularism operates as a macro-social force and mechanism of 
governmentality that shapes migrant workers’ subjectivities. It is pervasively felt, 
performed and negotiated at the level of the local and the everyday, in the domains of 
embodiment (Chapter 6), gender identities (Chapter 7 and 8) and adulthood (Chapter 9).   
 
Thirdly, Taylor’s (2007; 2011) work has switched our focus from questions about how 
“religious” modern society is to how new religious subjectivities/ethics are made possible 
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by secular conditions of belief. As Smith (2014) suggests, Taylor’s thesis of the secular 
age concerns not whether or not modern individuals inhabit the immanent frame, but how. 
Most importantly, as Taylor (2007) argues, how one inhabits the self-sufficient immanent 
order hinges on how one interprets the meaning of transcendence. As Tse (2014) suggests, 
the emergence of individualised spiritualities is essentially indicative of the nova effect 
of grounded theologies.  Under this nova effect, what is really at issue is the individual’s 
quest for fulfilment and ethical concerns about what counts as “fulfilment”. Therefore, 
we can either inhabit the immanent frame as an open space where we feel the cross-
pressure of secular being and recognise the alternative; or we are enclosed in the self-
sufficient, self-contained spheres of secularity within which we cannot imagine being 
otherwise (Taylor 2007). In this sense, geographers of religion should be attentive to the 
contestability and cross-pressure of variegated modes of being secular in specific contexts 
and power relations.  This thesis also responds to this theoretical concern by looking at 
how migrant workers inhabit both secularity and religion. As I show in this thesis, the 
ways migrant workers inhabit and interpret conditions of being impact on the formation 
of new understandings of transcendence. The migrant workers constitute new religious 
subjectivities/ethics as a reflexive response to circumstances in which they feel the cross-
pressure of the secular condition.  
 
2.3 The possibility of postsecularity in secular conditions of being: 
neoliberalism and new religious subjectivities/ethics  
If modernity is interpreted as a secular age, one must ask what modern postsecularity 
might mean? In which ways might modern and secular individuals be considered to be 
“postsecular” subjects? In this section, I elaborate on how “the postsecular” in secular 
conditions of being can be possible. In particular, I engage with the context of secular 
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neoliberalism as an “ontological condition-of-being” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000) and 
a new social order in which not only do ordinary people constitute their subjectivities, but 
religious institutions also operate.  
 
2.3.1 Postsecular critique and geography 
Over the past decade or so, debates on postsecularity or “the postsecular” have become 
one of the central concerns in social, cultural and spatial theory. This emergent approach 
has commendably contributed to analysing the increasing significance of religion in 
shaping both public politics and individual subjectivity. In general, postsecular assertions 
question both the “secularist self-understanding” (the self-sufficient and secularist 
secularities outlined above) and the validity of claims of religious deprivation. Although 
the term “postsecular” was first used by Andrew Greeley (1966) to describe a new type 
of Gemeinschaft-like community within the church (Beckford 2012), it is Jürgen 
Habermas (2006, 2010) who substantially initiated a newly emerging discourse of 
“postsecular” society. Habermas’ utilisation of “the postsecular” is built on his theories 
of secular modernity, and especially of societal rationalisation and the rationalisation of 
the lifeworld which offer vigorous insights into the modern public sphere. As Habermas 
(2006) suggests, modern society cannot flourish by simply resting on moral stances 
supplied by secular reason characterised by an anthropocentric understanding of the 
“disenchanted” world and functional differentiation of social subsystems; in fact, 
religious ways of life play an important role in addressing the malaises of modern society. 
The thesis of postsecular society is empirically supported by the phenomena of 
desecularisation or resacralisation, such as in the flourishing of religion in the United 
States and the “global South” (particularly Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, China, 
and Korean), and the worldwide Islamic revitalisation (Berger 2017). Yet, resacralisation 
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cannot describe a global change indicating a new epochal shift where religions re-enter 
modern society or replace the secular. Therefore, for Habermas (2006, 2010), instead of 
arguing to what extent religion has persisted, the postsecular present signals a general 
shift towards the re-emergence of a public, collective consciousness of religiosity in the 
public sphere; that is, they way citizens understand themselves in relation to religion. 
Habermas (2006) observes that this changing public consciousness is evident among 
European citizens who increasingly lost hope in the secularist dogmas that are dominant 
in public opinion and ethical issues. Moreover, the increasing inflows of immigration by 
guest-workers and refugees have forged a pluralist way of life in which religion remains 
crucial in integrating different communities and achieving tolerant co-existence in city 
spaces.  
 
As opposed to Taylor’s emphasis on the immanent frame, Habermas (2006) does not 
consider immanence and transcendence as so mutually exclusive (Qian and Kong 2018). 
Instead, the postsecular essentially articulates a dialogical space between religion and the 
secular and crossover narratives in which religious and secular ethics can be mutually 
translated. For Habermas (2008), such crossover narratives may result in a process of 
learning in which secular and religious mentalities can be reflectively transformed, 
leading to the reconstruction of political/ethical orientations, collective behaviours and 
universes of knowledge. On the one hand, secular reason must absorb the ethos of religion 
as social integration and reflective recourse, resisting secularity itself as the judge 
presiding over the truth of faith (Habermas 2010; see Cloke and Beaumont 2012). On the 
other hand, religious actors are also exposed to cross-pressure between secular and 
religious worldviews and ways of being, and hence face the need to cultivate an epistemic 
stance reconciling both religious and secular knowledge, leading to “a more reflexive 
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form of religious consciousness” (Habermas 2010: 28). Here, I agree with Cloke et al.’s 
(2019: 28) argument that Habermas’s ideas of postsecularity in essence reflects an ethical 
politics and “a normative desire to bring religion and spirituality back into the centre of 
social concerns”, directed towards developing the public and common good. 
Habermasian postsecular theories do not presuppose the end of secularisation, but 
emphasise that secularist ideologies and the secularisation paradigm need to be 
thoroughly revisited in order to account for new religious realities and moral landscapes. 
In other words, the postsecular approach serves as a self-reflective, critical rethinking and 
reformulation of self-confident secular modernity rather than merely a clarion call for the 
revival of religious practices. 
 
Yet, despite Habermas developing grounds for postsecular analysis, postsecularism is 
“best understood not as any kind of clear position, but as a spectrum of concerns and 
possibilities” (McLennan 2010: 4). In other words, postsecular critiques include 
variegated sets of thoughts and desires, imbricated with radical-orthodox theology (Smith 
2004), Leftist theory (Dews 2008; Eagleton 2009), and feminist debate (Braidotti 2008; 
Butler 2008). Habermas’s liberal account of postsecularity has also extended deep into 
radical orthodox theology, as notably represented by the theologies of John Milbank 
(2008) and Phillip Blond (2010). Instead of seeking to transform theologies and faith into 
secular enactment, radical orthodoxy re-emphasises the socio-political role of biblical 
truth and the church in opposition to secularised capitalist society (Cloke et al. 2019). 
Radical orthodoxy not only seeks to revitalise the frame of Christian tradition in which 
human nature is understood, but also to encourage the social participation of a “theurgy” 
and religious communitarianism based on true Christian virtues. In this sense, radical 
orthodoxy is a form of theology in response to the failure of secularism which, as Smith 
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and Whistler (2010: 14) suggest, seeks to cure the ills of secularism by establishing “a 
new imperialism” that returns to pre-secular Augustinian and Thomist theology. The 
postsecular perspective also receives wide purchase in studies of literature, art and 
popular culture (Bradley, Carruthers and Tate 2010; Beckford 2012). The last decade has 
witnessed the re-enchantment of culture, manifested not only in the “creative and artistic 
sensibilities that are moving away from secular themes to explore a realm of enchantment 
and magic” (Beckford 2012: 6) but in the burgeoning of spiritual, mystical, supernatural 
and superstitious ideas in popular culture (Partridge 2006; Bartolini et al. 2017). Some 
commentators therefore highlight the re-enchantment of popular culture with “alternative” 
spiritualities as the self-reflective mentalities of secular modernity and particularly of the 
hegemony of scientific reason (Partridge 2006) and as a new visibility of religion and 
spirituality in the public sphere (Moberg and Granholm 2017).  
 
The postsecular ideas outlined above are dominated by Habermas’s critique of rational 
secularism where postsecularity is “primarily a matter of legal, ethical, and political 
adjustments to the persistence – or re-entry – of religious forces in the public sphere” 
(Beckford 2012:9). However, these approaches are also subject to various criticisms. First, 
the postsecular discussion is argued to be largely driven by an anti-secular thrust that 
treats secularism as a “unitary system” (McLennan 2010). Similarly, as Justin Wilford 
(2010:1) points out, recent postsecular scholarship is characterised by an anti-secular 
impetus and the idea that “theories of secularization, secularist ethics, and sociopolitical 
secularity are all intimately bound to a modern, neoliberal, imperialist ethic of domination, 
and that postsecular ethics can provide a pivotal energy for political resistance, something 
that secular liberalism has failed to do”. McLennan (2010) argues that postsecular critique 
needs to carefully differentiate the epistemological and political dimensions of secularism 
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rather than seeing secularism as a homogeneous system. Through a re-examination of 
Asad’s genealogy of secularism, McLennan (2010: 6) calls for a move beyond the trap of 
“ideological critique” that view secularity in a doctrinal way; instead, secularity is better 
conceived of as “congeries of variously cohering sensibilities, attitudes, embodiments and 
‘way of being’”. McLennan’s (2010) critique of postsecular approaches appears to accept 
Taylor’s immanent frame, as he suggests that postsecularity remains thoroughly intra-
secular in character. Therefore, instead of seeing the postsecular as a corrective to the 
malaise and failures of secularism, some thinkers of postsecularity tend to consider it as 
the co-production of both religion and secularism (Knott 2010; Goh 2011). As Knott 
(2010: 21) argues, postsecular mentalities need to build on “secular values such as the 
importance of the self, human flourishing and human destiny, diversity, choice, and 
freedom”.  
 
Second, critics also suggest that Habermas’s analysis primarily considers religion as a 
strategic reason for cultivating “the health of public politics and morality” (Beckford 
2012:10; Cloke et al. 2019). For example, Beckford offers a critique of Habermas’s 
reading of religion:  
 
Indeed, there are grounds for thinking that Habermas adopts the idea of postsecularity 
partly for strategic reasons in addition to recognizing that the contributions of 
religion—as a cultural resource—may enhance debate and decision making in the 
public sphere (Beckford 2012: 9). 
 
In other words, religion in Habermas’s analysis appears to be read in reductive terms as 
a preconceived system of meanings and cosmologies or moral recourse that serves as a 
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complementary part of secular modernity by contributing to ideas of justice and human 
flourishing. Beckford’s argument resonates with Holloway’s (2013) recent critique of the 
epistemological violence implied in the Habermasian account of postsecularity. 
Holloway (2013) reveals that religion and belief are subject to a functionalist gaze which 
“tend[s] to reduce religious understandings of the absolute to functions of fulfilment of 
ulterior social dynamics that categorically fall outside of the horizons of the self-
descriptions of the participants” (Harrington 2007: 546).  
 
In general, two points can be draw from this line of critique. On the one hand, postsecular 
analysis should move away from a Western liberal democratic assumption of public 
spheres in which a cross-narrative of religion and the secular is expected to healthily take 
place. Therefore, what Habermas leaves unanswered is how ideas of “public” and “state” 
interconnect (Cloke et al. 2019) and how postsecularity exists in different political-
economic conditions of secularity. In this respect, this thesis provides an alternative 
context of power relations beyond Western liberal democratic spheres and explores how 
postsecularity is possible under authoritarian or autocratic regimes. As I show in chapter 
5, despite the crossover presence of Christian theo-ethics and humanist ethics in offering 
care and social service for psychologically vulnerable migrant workers, it nevertheless 
does not take place in a democratic civic sphere but is rather implicated in both the state’s 
regulatory power and a neoliberal labour regime.   
 
On the other hand, postsecular critique should be unleashed from a functionalist reading 
of religion, with more effort to explore what religion and religiosity mean in modernity 
rather than merely criticising secularity. This is also related to Latour’s (2005: 223) 
questioning of the prevailing paradigm of religion studies: “Why is it that when faced 
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with religion, we tend to limit our inquiry to its ‘social dimensions’ and take it as a 
scientific virtue not to study religion itself?” (see Holloway 2013: 204). Therefore, as 
Holloway (2013) argues, an engagement with theological and faithful sensibilities can 
contribute to the movement of postsecularism. This thesis systematically responds to 
Latour’s and Holloway’s arguments: religion in this study can be understood both as a 
form of capital, recourse or strategy reflexively utilised by migrant workers in response 
to lived circumstance (see chapter 9 regarding spiritual capital), and as theologies and 
ethics that migrant workers inhabit and practice as a meaningful way of life (see chapters 
6, 7 and 8).  
 
The third line of criticism comes from Casanova’s (2013) argument that postsecularity 
needs to seriously engage with the geo-historical patterns of secularity and differentiation 
and fusion of the various institutional spheres from a global comparative perspective. For 
Casanova (2013), Habermas’s use of the “postsecular” as a change in consciousness, “an 
altered self-understanding of the secularized societies”, is based on the meaning of 
secularist secularity. That is, the postsecular implies reflexively questioning the modern 
secularist “stadial consciousness”. However, Casanova’s concern is:  
 
[W]hether Habermas’s postsecular correction has gone far enough or whether his 
position is still tied to European (mis-)understandings of processes of secularization 
which irremediably tend to link intrinsically contingent patterns of European Christian 
secularization with general processes of modernization (Casanova 2013: 34). 
 
For Casanova (2013), secular modernity across the world is not the diffusion of Christian-
secular European developments. In the history of many global South countries, the issue 
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is not about the return or re-creation of tradition but rather a recombinant transformation 
of becoming simultaneously both more “secular” and more “religious”. It is through 
globalisation that the Western Christian binary system of classification of religious-
secular reality gradually accepted in non-Western cultures. In this sense, the “postsecular” 
needs to be critically deployed in non-Western contexts, since the religious and the 
secular are tightly imbricated. Chapter 3 therefore addresses this in terms of multiple 
secularities and postsecularities in China.  
 
Overall, notwithstanding the merits of the Habermasian approach to the postsecular 
narrative, more  research should delve into how postsecular ethics and subjectivities 
articulate, and co-evolve with, secular conditions of being rather than simply critiquing 
secularity. In this respect, religion is better understood as a way of being, theological 
sensibilities, disposition and embodiment rather than cultural/ethical resources to be 
enlisted in the politics of public spheres.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Moreover, a global comparative perspective is crucial to an analysis of the extent to which 
discourses of postsecular are appropriate to capture the religious landscape in non-
Western cultures.  
 
In recent years human geographers have increasingly engaged with the conceptual 
umbrella of postsecularity, exploring the situated, embodied constitution of the 
postsecular subject and the emergence of various spaces of postsecularity (Beaumont 
2008; Beaumont & Baker 2011; Cloke & Beaumont 2012; Olson et al. 2013; Gökarıksel 
& Secor 2015, 2017; Williams 2015; Cloke, Sutherland and Williams 2016; Bartolini et 
al 2017; Sutherland 2017; Gao and Qian 2018; Qian and Kong 2018; Cloke et al. 2019; 
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Gao and Qian 2019). Yet, geographical research into postsecualrity is building on but not 
limited to the Habermasian critique of secular modernity and the crossover narrative in 
public spheres, and postsecularity has also been applied to the analysis of how religion 
constitutes everyday subjectivity, the meanings of lived, embodied experiences (Olson et 
al. 2013; Gao et al. 2019), and faithful and hopeful sensibilities (Holloway 2013).  
 
One thread of scholarship represented by Paul Cloke (2010; 2012; 2019), Justin 
Beaumont (2012), Andrew Williams (2015) and Callum Sutherland (2016) has engaged 
in grounding Habermas’s theories empirically and exploring postsecular rapprochement 
in the city. This stream of research primarily investigates the increasingly salient role of 
faith-based organisations (FBOs) as a sign of emerging postsecualrity, charting “how the 
arenas of care, welfare, and justice have proved to be fertile ground for faith-motivated 
groups and individuals to forsake privatised forms of religion and to engage in more 
public advocacy and action on behalf of socially and economically marginalised people” 
(Cloke et al 2019: 37). For Cloke and Beaumont 2012: 41), faith-based practices have 
opened the spaces of postsecular rapprochement, moving beyond both secularist 
fundamentalism and faith-based fundamentalism, so that “shared citizenship, mutual 
tolerance, reflexive transformation and crossover ethical narratives” are made possible.  
 
Postsecular rapprochement is particularly evident in the emerging partnerships in which 
religious people and those of no faith put aside ideological and moral differences and 
come together to provide social care and welfare for excluded and marginalized people 
(Cloke 2010; Williams 2015). These collaborative spaces of rapprochement indicate that 
religious ethics are becoming increasingly malleable and flexible vis-à-vis secular 
concerns, moving from a practice of faith-by-dogma to faith-by-praxis in order to address 
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this-worldly concerns and engage in public engagement (Cloke and Beaumont 2012). 
Following Habermas, Cloke et al. (2019) argue that postsecularity can be grounded in 
geographical research in two ways: examining religion as a community of interpretation 
contributing to moral and ethical issues in the public sphere and a community of service 
and care in response to neoliberal austerity. In particular, Cloke’s (2010, 2011) notion of 
theo-ethics, which refers to a theological shift in Christianity from orthodox theologies 
towards a more socially engaged faith, is used to investigate how religious ethics work 
out in the practice of care and service. In chapter 3, I offer an in-depth discussion and 
empirical examination of Cloke’s notion of theo-ethics so as to explore how 
postsecularity actually operates.  
 
A second thread of scholarship in the geography of postsecularity aims to disrupt the 
spatial and categorical assumptions of secularization theory by examining how 
embodiment, everyday life, and alternative spiritualities allow a variety of spaces for the 
persistence and flourishing of religion (Olson et al. 2013; Tse 2014; Bartolini et al. 2017; 
Gökarıksel & Secor 2017; Gao et al. 2019). Influenced by McGuire (2008) and 
Ammerman’s (2006) research on lived religion or everyday religion, this line of studies 
de-emphasises the institutional, doctrinal and belief-centred approach to religion. Rather, 
they highlight the ways in which religion is lived and practised in the realms of everyday 
life, in terms of embodiment, affect, emotion, and spirituality, and emphasises the 
materiality and relational spaces through which people constitute and make sense of their 
religiosity (Holloway 2013). Spirituality is analysed as alternative and individually 
selected assortments of beliefs and practices devoid of institutionalised religious 
expression. For example, so-called “alternative spiritualities” such as New Age, yoga and 
tai chi, along with experiences of the occult and paranormal, have cut across the 
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boundaries of the religious and the secular (Bartolini et al. 2017). Therefore, some critical 
commentators argue that secular modernity is itself theologically constituted, always-
already enchanted by transcendence and religious impulses (Tse 2014; Bartolini et al. 
2017).  Furthermore it is through context-specific experiences such as bodily sensations 
of pain and joy that people make sense of religious identities and affects. Embodiment is 
an important site in which transcendent meanings and religious authenticity are 
negotiated in modern, secular societies, enabling multiple, fluid experiences of religiosity 
(Knott 2010; Holloway 2013; Olson et al., 2013). Yet, Gao et al. (2019) have recently 
argued against a misguided over-emphasis on “alternative” or individualised spiritualities 
and an epistemology that intentionally looks beyond institutions, beliefs and religious 
elites in the geography of postsecualrity. Instead, they highlight how lived religious 
practices per se collapse spatial categories and create inter-institutional spaces. As they 
argue, “the story of lived religion is not only about how everyday life allows affordances 
or niche spaces for lived religiosity or moral orders but also about how everyday life is 
adopted into institutional religion and brings about transformations” (Gao et al. 2019). 
Therefore, while dismantling the boundary of orthodox/lived religiosity, Holloway (2013) 
advocates a relational approach to embodied religiosity, arguing that the religious or 
spiritual subject is generated through what he calls the patterning of space-times through 
which religious meanings are affectively felt.  
 
Overall, the discussion of postsecuarlity in human geography moves away from adopting 
“the postsecular” as a simplistic categorization towards understanding how postsecular 
possibilities emerge in the construction of religious meanings and processes. The focus 
of this shift is evidenced in the increasing interest among geographers of religion in the 
religious subject, and in particular how theologies and ethics constitute religious 
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subjectivity (Holloway 2013; Sutherland 2017). Sutherland’s (2017) conceptualisation of 
theography argues that, although religious subjects can be constituted through either 
institutional theologies or the affective and embodied presence of transcendence, it is 
through theology-as-praxis that religious actors can reflexively “engage in recursive 
theorizing of transcendence, negotiating between discursive and affective registers in 
order to make choices about and changes to practice” (326). Sutherland (2017) therefore 
highlights not only the contextual and ongoing formation of the theologically informed 
subject but the subject’s reframing of theology in the process of faith-by-praxis. In light 
of this, Cloke et al. (2019) therefore intend to examine “actually existing” postsecularity 
in terms of the production of new subjectivities, a person’s feelings, consciousness, 
desires, and hopes. Therefore, they take postsecularity to be “a third space where the 
blurred boundaries between religious and secular belief, practice, and identity can 
undergo reflexive engagement and produce new ethical and political subjectivities” 
(Cloke et al. 2019).  
 
In this thesis, I therefore build on and advance Cloke et al’s (2019) inquiry of postsecular 
subjectivities. Firstly, following Taylor (2007), I argue that the postsecular turn in human 
geography needs to consider the conditions of belief with which postsecular subjectivities 
and practice are compatible. Therefore, this thesis emphasises how postsecular 
subjectivities articulate, and co-evolve with, secular conditions of being in the world and 
in particular the neoliberal lived order (see the section on “Neoliberalism” below). 
Secondly, I argue that postsecular subjectivities are multi-layered and contested rather 
than singular religious/spiritual experiences, which therefore need to be examined in the 
intersectional matrix in which religion is mutually constituted along with gender, 
migration, class and a particular life course.  
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2.3.2 Neoliberalism: secular conditions for postsecular subjectivities4  
Given that religious subjectivity is crucial in grounding how postsecularity works out in 
practice, greater effort therefore should be dedicated to explicating the social conditions 
in which postsecular subjectivities are enabled, constituted, and embedded. Articulating 
Cloke et al.’s (2019) argument with Taylor’s (2007) account of conditions of belief, the 
central problematic of postsecular subjectivities is not only the emergence of new ethics, 
consciousness, and religiosity, but also the conditions within which postsecular 
subjectivities and practices are compatible. For example, as Tse (2014) argues, the 
presence of lived religiosity is only an indicator of Taylor’s (2007) ‘nova effect’—the 
individuated quests for spiritual fulfilment and the proliferating and fragmented religious 
subjectivities that exist in a differentiated society. Following the spirit of Taylor (2007) 
and Tse (2104), a geography of postsecularity should attend closely to the “ongoing 
reorganization of the nature and forms of religion into configurations which are 
compatible with modern living” (Davie 2013: 61).  
 
This thesis therefore engages with the context of neoliberalism as a secular “ontological 
condition-of-being” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000) and new social order in which not 
only do ordinary people constitute their everyday subjectivities but religious institutions 
also operate (Cloke et al. 2019; Williams 2015). Neoliberalism was originally referred to 
as a set of economic policies characterised by the deregulation of the economy and 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (Steger & Roy 2010). However, the social and 
political implication of neoliberalism has been reformulated both as an ideology that 
prioritises market exchange as a normative reference for human conduct, and as a mode 
 
4 Some material in this section has been published in Social & Cultural Geography. 
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of governance that embraces the logics of a regulating free-market (Ganti 2014). 
Neoliberalism therefore describes a wide array of socioeconomic phenomena across the 
world, including the shrinkage of the welfare state and social services in the West and 
market-oriented structural adjustment in the Global South and postsocialist societies 
(Ganti 2014).  Although neoliberalism is not a singular and homogeneous process, it has 
become “hegemonic as a mode of discourse” that influences how we make sense of our 
society: “[neoliberalism] has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it 
has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and 
understand the world” (Harvey 2005: 3). In general, the scholarship of neoliberalism can 
be classified into three broad themes.  
 
Firstly, neoliberalism functions as structural force that has material effects on the local 
life-worlds of individuals. Many scholars, and especially Leftists, believe that neoliberal 
globalisation has exacerbated global and social inequalities (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2000; Harvey 2005) as public resources and social welfare have been reduced or 
privatised, cities are increasingly commodified and gentrified, and vast reservoirs of 
populations are marginalised and dispossessed. As Harvey (2005) argues, neoliberalism 
is largely a class-based project that restores the power of elite classes. In Chapter 5, I 
elucidate how neoliberalism function through, and is materialised in, the migrant labour 
regime.   
 
Secondly, neoliberalism is an ideological project that moulds the subjectivities and 
affective lives of individuals (Ong 2006; Muehlebach 2011; Anderson 2016). On the one 
hand, neoliberalism shapes particular “subjective forms” in congruence with the capitalist 
logic of accumulation and competitiveness through ideologies of the desired modes of 
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conduct, attitudes, and lifestyle.  This manifests in Foucault’s idea of “homo economicus”; 
that is, the way in which human beings make themselves as economic subjects as the 
basis for politics (Read 2009). Individuals are therefore involved int specific projects of 
subject formation that valorise the “myths” of competition, entrepreneurialism and 
individual autonomy. This influence is particularly apparent in the neoliberalisation of 
work, which demands the refashioning of particular affective bodies automated by 
technologies of self-regulation and targets and is characterised by “a normalised gig 
economy in which ‘get the job done’ mentalities have come to legitimate sequential 
servitude to the ‘next task’ and downgrading of working conditions” (Cloke 2019: 57).  
 
On the other hand, the operation and reproduction of neoliberalism rely on human bodies, 
the affective life and, in particular, “the structures of feeling” that condition how 
neoliberal subjects are actualised as part of everyday life (Anderson 2016). For Anderson 
(2016: 745), the concept of the “structure of feeling” is particularly useful in analysing 
the effects of signifying-subjectifying processes, in which neoliberal subjectivities are 
translated, embodied, and affectively felt in the domain of everyday life. Described by 
Williams (1963: 63) as the “felt sense of the quality of life” in a particular period, a 
“structure of feeling” exerts pressure and sets effective limits on experience and on action 
(Anderson, 2016: 45). This is supported by Ho’s (2009) studies of emotional citizenship, 
which reveal that Singaporeans living overseas are conditioned by a regime of emotion 
produced by Singapore state apparatuses that informs Singaporean migrants about 
appropriate emotional expressions of citizenship and social behaviour. Therefore, as Ho 
(2009: 789) points out, the intersubjectivity of emotions and feelings “structures social 
relations and underpins the social structure, operationalizing social life”. However, the 
emphasis on the “structure of feeling” in a living religion is not to argue for a point of 
 49  
connection between structure and subject, in which powers and already-constituted 
institutions determine what is felt (Anderson 2016). In this sense, human subjectivities 
and affects constitute the conditions of a “structure of feeling” and mediate the way in 
which neoliberalism circulates and operates (Anderson 2016). 
  
Thirdly, an emerging line of scholarship focuses on the agents and institutions through 
which neoliberalism is articulated, operationalised and negotiated (Ganti 2014; Williams 
2015; Cloke et al. 2019). It is concerned with how neoliberalism comes into dialogue 
with social agents, such as NGOs. In particular, religion and faith-based organisations 
(FBOs) are considered to be an alternative force that reformulates “actually existing” 
neoliberalism.  The neoliberal order impinges on both the lived enactment of religious 
faiths and the way religious institutions operate. The everyday culture of neoliberalism is 
increasingly characterised not only by austerity and notions of a precarious life but also 
by the escalation of depression and hopelessness, resulting in “the psycho-spiritual crisis”, 
in which individuals feel disoriented and cannot identify meaning, purpose and sources 
of need fulfilment (Cloke et al., 2019). Instead, religion, and, in particular, faith-based 
organisations (FBOs), are argued to open up ethical and political spaces that deviate from 
and subvert neoliberal subjectivity by offering care, social support, and an alternative 
regime of desire and hope for the victims of neoliberalism (Cloke et al. 2019). 
Furthermore, the religious institution itself adopts modalities of operation informed by 
secular logics of market and economics and therefore adjusts religious doctrines to 
accommodate everyday subjectivities and spiritualities (Hackworth, 2010; Qian and 
Kong 2018). This situation is particularly exemplified by megachurches that utilise 
modernised and growth-oriented strategies and move their theologies towards personal 
experience and spirituality so as to increase their competitiveness in the religious market 
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(Chong 2015; Goh 2008). Neoliberalism therefore exists as a background condition for 
the enactment of religious discourses and practices in everyday life and public 
engagement, enabling the reconfiguration of institutional religion from faith-by-dogma 
to faith-by-praxis (Cloke and Beaumont 2012; Williams 2015). In particular, as Cloke et 
al. (2019: 53) argue, “subjectivities of postsecularity can be considered a by-product of, 
and response to, [the] political-economic and existential set of conditions in late 
capitalism”.  
 
Yet, rather than simply viewing postsecularity as a co-optation into the project of 
neoliberal governance, Williams (2012) and Cloke et al. (2019) argue that the political-
economic and affective context of neoliberalism indeed enables and shapes the 
emergence of postsecular subjectivities. Cloke et al. (2019) therefore crystallise four 
forms of possibilities of postsecularity engendered by neoliberalism. Firstly, neoliberal 
austerity has created spaces of praxis for cultivating ethical capacities, theologies, and 
“common goods” that cut across religious and secular sensibilities. Secondly, 
postsecularity may serve as active resistance to neoliberal rationality, enabling the 
transformation of ethical relations from self-to-self to self-to-others. Thirdly, postsecular 
subjectivities may be manifest in an effective politics of hope that creates possibilities, 
inspiration and goods beyond the neoliberal regime of desire. Fourthly, subjectivities of 
postsecularity may challenge the unreflective assumption of disenchantment, leading to 
a new public consciousness concerning religious sensibilities.  
 
However, some critical commentators note that research on FBOs must include an 
analysis of how a religious regime of feelings can be appropriated or tied to very different 
political and economic projects (Lancione, 2014; Williams, 2015). For example, 
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Lancione’s (2014) research suggests that the affective atmospheres created by practices 
of care in FBOs may conceal the precarious experiences of homeless people. Likewise, 
utilising the concept of “spiritual economies, Rudnyckyj (2009) analyses the articulation 
of religious practice with neoliberalism by transforming workers into both pious religious 
and more productive working subjects. He suggests that Islamic spirituality is imagined 
as a moral duty that justifies the divinity of work. Thus, Islamic values of individual 
accountability, together with the neoliberal ideas of self-regulation, work hand-in-hand 
“to create a new ethical orientation toward oneself, one’s work, and one’s collectivity” 
(Rudnyckyj 2009: 106).  It is therefore important to provide a more careful and critical 
assessment of religious practice per se. In this thesis, I offer such an attempt by 
investigating how religious institutions are implicated in the neoliberal labour regime and 
autocratic state power, where religious institutions and ethics sometimes reinforce the 
production of docile and productive bodies of migrants. Yet, I do not simply consider this 
as a co-option of religion into state-led governmentality, and critical research into religion 
needs to move beyond a focus on social dynamics and delve into individuals’ 
subjectivities and agency that cannot be simply captured by secularist “social 
interpretation”.   
 
In this sense, investigations of the relationship between postsecular subjectivities and 
neoliberalism may face theoretical difficulties in reconciling critical theories and nuanced 
analysis and, in particular, what counts as “critical”. Cloke et al. (2019) argues against 
the secularised epistemology of social science that is often unwilling to recognise religion 
as a force for good and simply reduces it to a part of social dynamics:  
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If a hegemonic pedagogic interpretation of religion only allows us to interpret faith-
based activities as self-serving acts of charity, that at best provided an outlet for liberal 
guilt and morality, and at worst provides cover for proselytising and entrapment of 
vulnerable citizens, then it follows automatically that no good can come of such 
activities, and any scholarship that suggests otherwise is simply uncritical (Cloke et al 
2019: 6).   
 
Cloke et al. (2019) admit that religion has a “dark side” in opposition to human rights, in 
which religion may reinforce the neoliberal politics of subject-formation. Their solution 
is to limit postsecularity as a progressive possibility or a “good side” of religion. Yet, the 
clarification of good/dark side of religion cannot be said to sufficiently theorise the 
progressive politics of religion and postsecularity, as religious agency does not solely rely 
on a normative liberal understanding of human beings (Mahmood 2005) and is not 
necessarily associated with any anti-neoliberal impetus. In the following pages (section 
2.3), I introduce an analytical frame of intersectionality to overcome these theoretical and 
methodological difficulties and to capture the complex nature of religion.  In particular, I 
propose a new approach to examine how the intersectionality of migration can contribute 
to new understandings of postsecular subjectivities and agency under secular and 
neoliberal conditions of being.  
 
2.4 Religion and intersectionality among migrants  
2.4.1 Changing landscape of religion: investigating migrants’ religiosity  
Kong (2010) evaluates that the increasing mobility of migrants has been one of the global 
shifts that deserves the attention of geographers of religion. There has been a significant 
amount of geographical research demonstrating the significant impact of religion on 
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migrants. The classical and early model of the role of religion in the lives of migrants 
formulated by Handlin (2002) emphasises the psychological benefits of religious faith in 
addressing the cultural discontinuity inflicted by the trauma of migration, but this ignored 
the social and cultural construction of religions and the formation of ethnic communities 
(Hirschman 2004). Existing human geographical and sociological research has examined 
the centrality of religion in migrants’ lives. These researchers have mainly focused on 
(but are not confined to): migrants’ religious places of congregation and the formation of 
faith-based communities (Yang & Ebaugh 2001; Ley, 2008; Tse, 2011); how religion 
contributes to identity construction for migrants, with particular attention to ethnic and 
gender identities (Dwyer 1999, 2000; Kurien 2001; Hopkins 2006); religion and civic and 
political participation among migrants (Chafetz and Ebaugh 2000); and the religious 
beliefs, practices, and organisations of second-generation migrants  (Fleischmann et al. 
2012). Recently some scholars have deployed a lived religion approach to migrant studies, 
which emphasises emotion and embodied practice and the narratives through which 
people make sense of their religious activity (Jeldtoft 2011; Edgell 2012). Studies of lived 
religion examine a wide range of the religious expression of migrants, focusing on not 
merely religious centres but also various contested spaces of secularization. However, 
Kong (2010) recently put forward a set of research agendas that current geographical 
scholarship on religion needs to address; for example, how labour migrants differ from  
families of migrants and refugees in negotiating their religious identity, the experience of 
subgroups within larger migrant categories, and the religiosity of second generation 
migrants. Ley (2011: xiii) suggested that: “Immigration from the developing world has 
been one of the forces bringing significant challenges to secularization theory in the old 
world”. It cannot be ignored that migrants have been an important force in revitalising 
and renewing religions in modern society. In other words, future research requires 
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attention not only to the subjectivities of religious migrant groups, but also to the role of 
migration in enabling religion to persist in, or accommodate to, modern society. 
Economic and political reform since the late 1970s has enabled millions of migrant 
workers from rural areas to become key actors in China’s integration into the global 
economy, thereby making China a “world factory” (Chan and Pun 2009). It is commonly 
recognized that migrant workers have been one of the most marginalized groups in China 
who are experiencing the “double exploitation” of the state’s regulatory power and the 
global regime of capitalism. In contemporary China, the hukou system (household 
registration policy) is still one of the most prominent mechanisms determining the 
distribution of social resources, and more broadly access to full urban citizenship, 
providing the basis for the most prominent form of institutional exclusion practised 
against rural migrants in urban space (Chan and Buckingham 2009). The hukou system, 
which stemmed from urban and industry-based policy in the early 1950s, was originally 
designed to regulate China’s population mobility, and was adapted to manufacture a 
socio-spatial division that determines the allocation of state-subsidised welfare between 
urban and rural areas in the reform era (Chan & Zhang 1999). Under yhe hukou system, 
rural residents and migrants are treated as inferior citizens deprived of rights to settle in 
cities as permanent residents and to most state-sponsored benefits and welfare enjoyed 
by urban residents, ranging from medical services to children’s education (Chan and 
Buckingham 2009).  It should be noted that the hukou system not only denies the 
fulfilment of migrant workers’ basic needs and access to social service, but also provides 
a legitimate basis for the social construction of differentiated social categories: it will be 
taken for granted that anyone labelled a migrant worker is considered as cheap labour and 
“low quality” (Angonast 2004). Thus, the system excludes peasants from many urban 
jobs, except for those regarded as “dirty”, unskilled and low-paying. In essence, the 
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urban-rural divide of the population is the state’s regulatory strategy adopted not only to 
maintain the cheap labour needed to feed into China’s modernization project but to 
minimize migrant workers’ consumption of limited public resources (Wu 2010; Qian and 
He 2012). This is particularly true with respect to housing. How to house the urban poor 
and the huge wave of rural to urban migration has been a great challenge for the Chinese 
government, since the state is neither able nor willing to provide temporary migrants with 
housing welfare that is prioritised for urban residents (Wang 2007). Despite this, Wang 
(2007) argues that Chinese cities do not appear to have the large-scale slum settlements 
found in other developing countries, which is mainly due to the Chinese state’s strict 
control of the population of migrant workers and its alliance with global capitalism (Pun 
2005). For instance, the intensive expansion of factory dormitories initiated by global 
capitalism in many Chinese cities was allowed by the government as an alternative means 
of accommodating large numbers of temporary migrants (Pun and Smith 2007). Wong, 
Li & Song (2007) conducted a social survey to identify to what extent migrant workers 
are living marginalised lives, classifying the most five vulnerable spheres for migrant 
workers including employment and working conditions, social security and medical 
benefits, the education of migrant children, housing, and discrimination by urban 
residents. They further argued that the hukou household registration system, the process 
of decentralisation and the obscure role of trade unions have contributed to the experience 
of marginalisation among migrant workers. Lu’s (2006) research reveals that migrant 
workers also experience wage discrimination in comparison to urban residents and non-
migrant workers, and the hukou system in particular is a significant determinant of the 
wage gap. To conclude, the state attempts to make a large supply of rural labour available 
to advance its modernization strategy at low cost, and simultaneously ensures that most 
peasant migrants will eventually return to the countryside without burdening the state. On 
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December 12th, 2015, China announced reforms to the hukou system that attempted to 
allow more rural migrants to attain urban hukou status, which it was hoped could help 
alleviate some of the tension between urban and rural residents. However, as Chan and 
Buckingham (2008) reiterated, we should not over-interpret China’s recent hukou system 
reform, instead it needs to be clarified that “the cumulative effect of these reforms is not 
abolition of the hukou, but devolution of responsibility for hukou policies to local 
government, which in many cases actually makes the permanent migration of peasants to 
cities harder than before”, and therefore as a cornerstone of China’s rural-urban 
“apartheid” the hukou system remains intact and potent. Even if the hukou system is 
completely abolished, the longstanding social exclusion imposed on migrant workers 
cannot easily be eliminated in the short term (Cao 2010).    
On the other hand, the lived experience of migrant workers cannot be separated from the 
overwhelming global capitalism in which they are subjected to a flexible regime of labour 
and are susceptible to exploitation (Pun 2005; Pun & Smith 2007; Chan and Zhu 2010). 
These rural migrants are attractive to global investors because of their institutional and 
social inferiority, as well as the severe labour surplus in the countryside. Fan (2007) 
argues that the migrant labour regime is a safe haven for urban and industrial employers 
that thrive on cost-minimisation and exploitation. In many global factories, management 
practices have become heavily reliant on the use of institutionalised coercive discipline 
and the manipulation of workers’ bodies, thus fostering and squeezing the highest 
possible production from workers. One of the most noticeable contributions in this field 
is Pun Ngai’s (2005) book Made in China: Women Factory Workers in the Global 
Workplace, offering an ethnographic account of Chinese women workers and the 
interactive operation of global capitalism, the socialist state, and the patriarchal family, 
all of which constitute the complex system in which the migrant workers are situated. 
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Pun’s lively description of women workers’ lives was based on eight-month participant 
observation in an electronics factory in Shenzhen, China’s first Special Economic Zone, 
and accounts of Pun’s experiences working and living alongside the women factory 
workers. Drawing on Marx’s theory of class struggle, Pun (2005: 24) argues that “a new 
Chinese working class [is] struggling to be born at the very moment that the language of 
class is sentenced to death”. Pun provided vivid descriptions of the workers’ positioning 
on assembly line, the factory’s social and spatial disciplinary regulation, and workers’ 
daily resistance and formation of social identity. She anticipated in her concluding chapter 
that “a silent ‘social revolution’ from below” (19) was occurring amidst China’s 
repositioning as “the workshop of the world”. By that she means that a new working class 
of migrant workers has been formed. Pun’s (2009; 2010) recent research regarding the 
dormitory labour regime reveals that its use for accommodating millions of migrant 
workers has become a necessity for the daily reproduction of labour power suitable for 
the production needs of the global market. Within the dormitory regime, a set of 
disciplinary techniques is utilized to control the working and non-working day of workers, 
and the living space of workers is merely an extension of the workplace, resulting in a 
sense of hardship and incarceration among workers. The marginalisation of migrant 
workers in the political and economic domains, to varying degrees, has further excluded 
them from mainstream social norms in a cultural sense (Qian and He 2012). For example, 
migrant workers were often stigmatised as a population of incivility and criminality 
(mang liu) who were supposed to deserve harassment by the state’s policing and control 
apparatus. Marginalisation in the cultural sphere may further deepen the vulnerability and 
subordination of this already marginalised group in the face of dramatic societal transition 
and the capitalist model of social relations (Young 1990).  
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Nevertheless, the extant mainstream discourse of scholarship on Chinese migrant workers 
as stated above places much emphasis on the existential condition of the uprootedness of 
migrant workers in the face of the state’s regulatory powers and the regime of global 
capitalism, but relatively less attention has been paid to migrant workers’ agency in re-
solidifying and reconstructing their subjectivity. E.P. Thompson suggested (1963:9) that 
the formation of the working class was not determined by social and economic structures 
alone amidst historical change, but instead was ‘an active process, which owes as much 
to agency as to conditioning’. Migrant workers are not entirely passive recipients of the 
state’s arrangements and capitalist disciplines, butare  capable of manoeuvring various 
kinds of resources to negotiate with existing inequality. For example, Yu and Pun’s (2008) 
research into “dagongmei” (girl workers) revealed that though the identity of these 
workers was constructed by the collusion of state, capital and society as an inferior subject, 
instead, they could recover more freedom, equality, and value through self-transformation 
in practices of consumption. This thesis therefore responds to the lack of research into 
how religion can enable an alternative mode of life for Chinese migrant workers.  
 
In past decades, groups of Christian migrant workers have emerged in China’s megacities 
(Huang 2014; Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018), given that millions of rural Christians have 
migrated to the city and increasing numbers of migrant workers have converted to 
Christianity. However, the existing scholarship concerning Chinese migrant workers has 
neglected their religious beliefs and practices. In particular, how religion may be 
implicated in the migrant worker’s agency has been largely ignored. Defined as “a system 
of symbols” by Geertz (1973: 90), religion provides individuals with perceptions of a 
general order of existence and shapes their attitude towards life, which makes its 
hardships and difficulties more acceptable. This is particularly true in E.P. Thompson’s 
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description of why Methodism was so widespread among the English working class from 
1780 to 1832, because it offered workers a form of interpretation in the face of 
exploitation and displacement:  
 
For migrant workers, it [Methodist church membership] could be the ticket of entry 
into a new community when moving from town to town. Within this religious 
community, there was (as we have seen) its own drama, its own degree of status and 
importance, its own gossip, and a good deal of mutual aid. […] Men and women felt 
themselves to have some place in an otherwise hostile world when within the church. 
(Thompson 1963: 379)     
 
In addition, Thompson argued that the Methodist form of religiosity which emphasized 
the values of discipline and compliance served as a “moral machine” that led the workers 
to willingly sell their labour to the master-manufacturers. Therefore, “many working 
people turned to religion as a ‘consolation’, even though the dreams inspired by Methodist 
doctrine were scarcely happy” (Thompson 1963: 380). This interpretation of working 
class religiosity pointed out the conflict between the morals of religion and the ethics of 
the capitalist model of production, but its Marxist reduction of religion to “the opium of 
the masses” might be considered problematic. Nevertheless, religion not merely provides 
a form of interpretation for workers to negotiate the conditions of exploitation and 
alienation, but also opens up possibilities for a way of life beyond the secular order. 
Above all, the state’s regulatory power, the emerging global capitalism, and the the 
subjectivity of working class are crucial to understanding the religiosity of migrant 
workers and the possibility of postsecularity in contemporary China.  
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2.4.2 Intersectionality: an analytical tool 
According to McCall (2005: 1771), intersectionality is perhaps the most important 
concept or analytical frame to date that can apprehend multiple identities and categories 
and the complex ways in which different forms of inequality and oppression are 
enmeshed. In this thesis, I advance the discussion of secularity, neoliberalism and 
postsecularity by deploying an intersectional analytical framework that captures the ways 
in which gender, class, life course, and religion mutually form and shape one another. 
Firstly I argue that the ways individuals inhabit secularity and postsecularity are shaped 
by multi-layered identities and experiences. As I discuss in this thesis, Christian migrant 
workers are not solely dominated by their religious experience but also are situated in 
particular gender relations, a class-based hierarchy and specific life courses. Different 
forms of lived experiences affect and are affected by each other, which influences how 
migrant workers make sense of religion and transcendence.  Secondly, as I suggest above, 
critical research into religion needs to delve into the complexities of social relations and 
individuals’ subjectivities rather than simply differentiate the good/bad aspects of religion 
or reduce religion to social dynamics alone; in this sense, the intersectional approach 
provides a specific social context to examine which postsecular subjectivities are enabled 
in relation to gender, class and migration, for example. In other words, this thesis uses an 
intersectional approach to ground the discussion of secularity and postsecularity, 
exploring how the social, cultural and political processes of secularity and postsecularity 
are embodied, felt and inhabited in migrant workers’ everyday lives and multiple 
experiences. In what follows, I elaborate on the analytical value of intersectionality and 
how it can advance the scholarship of secularity and postsecularity.  
 
Intersectionality as an epistemology 
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Intersectionality is not only a distinctive epistemology but a burgeoning field of study 
that examines the interlocking of different categories of experience and political 
intervention in countering social inequality (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013). Instead 
of focusing on single axes of difference, the intersectional approach emphasises the 
mutually constitutive forms of social categories and oppression. Despite the varied 
meanings and scope of intersectionality, Collins and Bilge (2016: 2) provide a generally 
accepted description of this concept:  
 
Intersectionality is a way of understanding and analysing the complexity in the world, 
in people, and in human experiences. The events and conditions of social and political 
life and the self can seldom be understood as shaped by one factor. They are generally 
shaped by many factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways. When it comes to 
social inequality, people’s lives and the organization of power in a given society are 
better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social division, be it race or 
gender or class, but by many axes that work together and influence each other. 
Intersectionality as an analytical tool gives people better access to the complexity of 
the world and of themselves.  
 
The concept of intersectionality is primarily based on the feminist critique of identity 
categories. As McCall (2005) notes, the current mode of research on intersectionality is 
the result of the convergence of the development of different sets of feminist thought. The 
early feminist critique in women’s studies urged the need to incorporate women’s 
distinctive experiences into research agendas. Yet, the simple addition of women into 
research accounts did not challenge the pervasiveness of male bias and privileges, which 
subsequently led to the introduction of gender as an analytical category utilised to reveal 
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the social institution of male domination (Scott 2007). The feminist critique went much 
deeper during the 1980s and 1990s as it interacted with postmodern and poststructural 
philosophies that sought to deconstruct the very categories and differences themselves.  
This gave rise to two influential feminist critiques: first, poststructural feminism 
questioned the biological base of gender and emphasised the processes of practices, 
cultural norms and performance through which gender was constituted; and second, 
feminists of colour criticised the assumption of women and gender as “unitary and 
homogeneous categories reflecting the common essence of all women” (McCall 2005: 
1776). It is the combination of these two ideas that led to the intersectional critique.  
 
The term “intersectionality” is generally agreed to have been developed first by Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1989; 1991), although thoughts on intersectionality or what Hancock (2016) 
calls “intersectionality-like thought” can be observed in early Black feminism’s 
intellectual and political tradition.  Crenshaw (1991) puts forward the need to rethink the 
experiences of Black women whose lives cannot be captured by looking at the dimensions 
of race and gender separately. The idea of intersectionality was therefore used to elucidate 
how different oppressions could not be analysed independently: “[The] problems of 
exclusion cannot be solved simply by including Black women within an already 
established analytical structure. Because the intersectional experience is greater than the 
sum of racism and sexism” (Crenshaw 1989: 140). In other words, different systems of 
oppression do not operate separately from each other but are subject to a more general 
system of oppression, the “matrix of domination” (Collins 1990). This resonates with 
Pun’s (2005) argument outlined above that Chinese women rural migrant workers are 
subject to “triple oppressions of global capitalism, state socialism, and familial patriarchy 
that work hand in hand to produce particular labour exploitation”. In particular, to address 
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different ways in which Black women are marginalised, Crenshaw (1991) distinguished 
between structural, political and representational intersectionality. Structural 
intersectionality refers to multi-layered forms of domination, while political 
intersectionality is about the ways in which black women simultaneously struggle with 
different political agendas such as racial and gendered politics. Representational 
intersectionality focuses on how black women are discursively marginalised.  
 
However, the metaphor of intersection may not necessarily address the complex 
interaction and interrelation of different categories. Therefore, early approaches to 
intersectionality have been criticised for the danger of treating social categories as 
mutually ontologically fixed and separate features, which are then combined with others 
(Brown 2011; Jorba and Rodó-Zárate 2019). These accumulative approaches to 
intersectionality therefore result in what Brown (2011:543) calls “an unhelpful additive 
notion of oppression”, with the risk of reducing intersectionality to the additive nature of 
different categories.  Collins and Bilge (2016) have recently identified six core ideas of 
intersectionality that help researchers to critically engage in “how the events and 
conditions of social and political life at play” mutually shape one another, including social 
inequality, power relations, relationality, social context, complexity and social justice. In 
other words, intersectionality is not only about multiple identities but is also about a 
dynamic process in which different structures of power position themselves in particular 
social locations (Hopkins 2017). In concsidering social inequality and social justice, 
Collins and Bilge (2016) encourage scholars to move beyond class- and race-based social 
inequalities and to consider more complex politics to foster justice. By power, they 
emphasise “different dimensions of the organisation of power relations”. On the one hand, 
power needs to be understood as a mutual and intersectional construction. On the other 
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hand, they focus on how the domains of power operate via intersectionality. The idea of 
power, as I argue in what follows, is the most important dimension of intersectionality. 
The idea of relationality encourages relational thinking about intersectionality that rejects 
either/or binaries and instead embraces a both/and frame. Collins and Blige (2016) use 
the concept of relationality to address a Foucauldian account of power, arguing that it is 
not a thing operating in a zero-sum game but rather becomes visible through relationships. 
Finally, by emphasising social context and complexity, Collins and Blige (2016) highlight 
the importance of different historical, political and intellectual contexts that shape 
intersecting power relations and the complexities of social practices through which 
intersectional identities are enabled.  
 
Nevertheless, as Hopkins (2017) suggests, intersectionality is not characterised by an 
additive approach but by its focus on the ways specific forms of inequality are mutually 
constitutive; yet sometimes the deployments of the concept in empirical research 
unwittingly result in an additive approach being used. This is because, as McCall (2005: 
1771) points out, “there has been little discussion of how to study intersectionality, that 
is, of its methodology”. In this respect, McCall (2005) offers one of the most valuable 
contributions in crafting an intersectional methodology. McCall (2005) describes three 
approaches to intersectional methodology used in the existing literature, namely, 
anticategorical complexity, intracategorical complexity, and intercategorical complexity.  
 
The first approach, anticategorical complexity, is based on the poststructural critique that 
deconstructs analytical categories. This approach is responsive to the increasing 
scepticism about using “master” categories in analysing anything in more than a 
simplistic way. Therefore, the project of deconstructing of normative categories is the 
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deconstruction of social inequality per se, since “symbolic violence and material 
inequalities are rooted in relationships that are defined by race, class, sexuality, and 
gender” (McCall 2005: 1777). That is, scholars in this line of tradition advocate a focus 
on social processes of categorization and revealing the hierarchy in and social production 
of boundaries that stabilise social inequality. It emphasises dynamic forces rather than 
categories, gender performance rather than genders, lived religious practices more than 
religious principles, and economic exploitation rather than class (Christensen and Jensen 
2014). The second approach of intracategorical complexity interrogates the “boundary-
making and boundary-defining process itself” in order to “reveal the complexity of lived 
experience” underlying the categories used (McCall 2005: 1773).  In other words, this 
approach is cautious about the normative assumptions involved in categorisation yet does 
not reject the importance – both material and discursive – of categories. It is therefore 
more appropriate to be “critical of broad and sweeping acts of categorization rather than 
[…] of categorization per se” (McCall 2005: 1779).  The third approach, termed 
intercategorical complexity, encourages scholars to “provisionally adopt existing 
analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and 
changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions” 
(McCall 2005: 1773). In comparison to anticategorical and intracategorical forms, the 
intercategorical approach focuses on the complexity of relations among multiple social 
groups rather than the complexity of a single group or category, therefore using categories 
strategically to display the linkages between inequality and categorisation.  
 
Jorba and Rodó-Zárate (2019: 179) observe that the “mutual constitution” model is 
dominant in existing studies of intersectionality. Therefore, intersectional thinking always 
recognises that different categories “are changed by the interaction and […] can even fuse 
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one with another”. Yet, thinking on this mutual constitution is vague in terms of whether 
different existential categories are affected by each other or the process of mutual 
constitution creates new categories or involves proliferation. This therefore results in 
specific theoretical difficulties in simultaneously acknowledging the complex interaction 
among categories and the ontological specificity of each category. To resolve this tension, 
Jorba and Rodó-Zárate (2019) propose to understand gender and race as the properties of 
categories rather than as categories (things) per se. They argue that gender and race as 
properties have effects on individuals’ experiences. In this sense, the mutual constitution 
of categories could be understood as “the relation between the properties and the whole 
experience as a relation of emergence” (190).  
 
In summary, the intersectional approach can shed light in this thesis on three theoretical 
registers. First, Christian migrant workers in this study do not share homogeneous and 
coherent lived experiences, which vary according to different social categories and 
differences within this group. Second, Christian migrant workers may be subject to 
different systems of oppressions and social inequality, and research needs to examine 
how religion interacts with the categorisation of gender, class, and life courses in such a 
way that justifies these social inequalities and power relations. Third, I consider religion, 
gender, class and life course as distinctive lived experiences rather than categories 
themselves. Therefore, I focus on how different forms of lived experiences affect and are 
affected by each other in a way that may enable the formation of new subjectivities that 
cannot be simply captured using singular categories or binaries such as religious/secular.   
 
Intersectional power and agency   
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One of the most important contributions of intersectionality is to provide an analytical 
tool to investigate how powers are organised and operate and the ways in which macro-
scale social and cultural processes are embodied and felt in the everyday experiences of 
religion, gender, class and specific life courses. Yet, as I have discussed above, the 
mutually constitution of different forms of lived experience and categorizations always 
imply not only multi-layered oppression and social inequality but the formation of new 
subjectivity, ethics and agency. In this section, I propose three aspects of intersectionality 
that help ground the understanding of secularity, neoliberalism and postsecularity:  
 
The intersectional nature of power. Intersectional subjects have increasingly become 
the “object-target” through which either disciplinary or neoliberal forms of power 
circulate and operate. Understanding power as intersectionally constituted means neither 
to reduce it to a thing nor to stabilise it as a categorical entity. As Foucault (1988) argues, 
power is not based on a zero-sum game or absolute domination but forms in relations. In 
this sense, intersectionality can shed light on how social-structural arrangements of power 
are exercised through the relationality of social differences. In late-capitalist society, 
power increasingly relies on multiple forms of the categorisation of human bodies. 
Eisenstein (2014) notes that:  
 
Capital is intersectional. It always intersects with the bodies that produce the labour. 
Therefore, the accumulation of wealth is embedded in the racialized and engendered 
structures that enhance it … Labor – the other side of capital – comes in colors and 
sexes and genders and is formulated through new expressions of power. Racialized, 
sexualized and gendered labor contributes to capital accumulation and structures the 
inequality that emanates from it (Eisenstein 2014). 
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Eisentein’s analysis resonates with Ben Anderson’s (2012, 2016, 2017) recent 
discussions of neoliberalism, affect and biopower, although he does not explicitly talk 
about intersectionality. Anderson (2012, 2016) shows how affective capacity and 
relations can be interpreted as object-targets for discipline and biopower, in conformity 
with neoliberal governance and in particular the expansion of new productive forces in 
late capitalism. In the light of Anderson’s arguments, research into intersectionality needs 
to consider how life is normalised through intersectional power, because life in modern 
society is increasingly made productive and governable through techniques of 
intervention (Foucault, Davidson & Burchell 2008; Anderson 2012). That is, the 
intersectional nature of life is used as the “object-target” for the production of normalised 
and governable subjects (Anderson 2016). These techniques of intervention are 
manifestly evident in the gendered, racialized, and classed-based regime of citizenship 
and migrants that justifies the global division of labour and locally-based neoliberal 
development (Zhang 2014).  
 
In this thesis, I respond to and advance these arguments by showing the ways in which 
secular neoliberalism works through the normalisation and categorization of gendered, 
class-based, and aged subjects. In the empirical chapters, I show that secular 
neoliberalism functions through the intersectional biopolitics of gender, class and urban 
citizenship that maximises the productivity of migrant workers yet simultaneously 
minimises their labour costs and consumption of urban welfare. For example, qualified 
workers under the neoliberal labour regime are subject to a particular feminine quality of 
being submissive (see chapter 7) and hegemonic masculinity that justifies hierarchical 
and military management (see chapter 6). Overall, I argue that the political-ideological 
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project of secularity and secularism is always materialised in intersectional subjects. 
Secular and neoliberal powers rely on what Collins (2000) calls a “matrix of domination” 
that grounds the basis for differentiating, engineering and stratifying human beings, 
which itself constitutes an overarching structure of inequalities and power that cannot be 
challenged by singular anti-oppression force.  
 
Intersectional lived experiences. Intersectionality also helps us to capture the 
complexity of mediated lived experiences through which “a range of contemporary geo-
historical processes and transformation are lived and felt” (Anderson 2019: 3). This 
approach emphasises that individuals’ subjectivities are composed through and 
negotiated by intersectional practices and lived experiences. Intersectional lived 
experiences are therefore about a series of experiences, including sensation, embodiment, 
emotion and affect.  
 
As secularism and neoliberalism operate as a macro-social force and imagery, they are 
pervasively felt and performed through intersectional experiences at the level of the local 
and the everyday. In this sense, lived, embodied, and affective experiences are part and 
parcel of political-economic processes, which constitute the “structure of feelings” that 
condition how particular forms of power are actualised (Anderson 2016). It can be argued 
that intersectionality interacts with what Anderson (2017: 504) calls “the intensities of 
power” – that is, the quality that “power operate[s] by becoming part of an organizing 
experience”. This is illustrated by recent studies of precarisation in cultural geography, 
paying attention to “the bodily intensities of precarity with a concern for how a sense of 
precarity surfaces in and is dispersed through multiple everyday scenes” (Anderson 2017: 
504). Overall, I argue in this thesis that intersectionality can help us understand the 
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structure of lived experiences that conditions how social powers are actualsed and are 
organised. The argument is illustrated in the empirical chapters that the intersectional 
experiences of migrant workers in turn reframe the ways secular and neoliberal power 
operate.  
 
Intersectional subjectivity and agency. In Collins’s (2019) book Intersectionality as 
Critical Social Theory, she proposes three major areas of inquiry into the  intersectional 
structure of power, lived experiences of intersectionality, and new ways of living and 
agency that may emerge within this structure:   
 
The idea of intersectionality works in multiple registers of recognizing the significance 
of social structural arrangements of power, how individual and group experiences 
reflect those structural intersections, and how political marginality might engender 
new subjectivities and agency (Collins 2019: 26).   
 
In contrast to her previous discussion that is primarily based on a critique of power and 
oppression and therefore sees intersectional agency as anti-oppression, Collins (2019) has 
recently started to pay attention to the ethical-political formation of the intersectional 
subject. By scrutinizing philosophers Simone de Beauvoir and Pauli Murray’s analysis of 
existential freedom, Collins (2019) distinguishes between intersectionality as a process 
of becoming that might open up spaces of possibility, ethical aspiration and existential 
freedom, and as the reality of oppression. This shift in the ethical-political formation of 
intersectionality may be inspired by the literature on religious women’s agency and in 
particular the postsecular turn in feminist theory (Singh 2015), which challenges the 
resisting, secular-humanist, and emancipatory assumption of women’s subjectivity. In 
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this sense, intersectionality simultaneously offers a situated lens to examine what ethical 
subjectivities and agency emerge.  
 
As discussed above in section 2.1.2, the possibility of postsecular subjectivity cannot be 
simply subject to the criterion of good/bad religion, but must rather be analysed in the 
specific contexts in which religious agency emerges.  The liberal and humanist approach 
primarily or solely links agency to the autonomous, free-willed, and choosing agent, with 
the capacity to act independently within or against structural constraints (Davies 2000). 
This sense of agency is in conformity to emancipatory politics, justifying the feminist, 
anti-racist and anti-colonialist movements. A radical form of the liberal account of agency 
seems mostly to portray religious values as false consciousness and counterproductive of 
agency, to proselytise to people to submit to religious authority. This is exemplified by 
some feminist studies of the veil of Muslim women, which equates the veil with women’s 
oppression by Islamic patriarchy and fundamentalism (Bilge 2010). However, instead of 
presupposing a universal trait of an autonomous and pre-social agent, the poststructural 
critique posits that agency and subjectivities are discursively constituted. For example, 
Judith Butler (1993) argues that subject-formation does not necessarily reside in a 
conscious intent or action but is often achieved through the unconsciously repeated 
performance of social norms. In this sense, the realisation of human agency is opposite to 
processes of subjectivation. Notwithstanding the fact that “poststructuralist critiques have 
been key in decentering liberal notions of autonomy, voluntarism, and the transcendental 
subject, the normative subject of poststructuralist feminist theory remains a liberatory one, 
her agency largely conceptualized in terms of resistance to social norms” (Mahmood 2001: 
208). However, feminist anthropologist Saba Mahmood (2001, 2005) and Rosi Braidotti 
(2009) argue that both liberal and poststructural accounts are deficient in capturing the 
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nuances of religious agency. Recent theoretical advances in feminist theory have 
therefore substantially expanded the scope of agency to encompass multiple and 
previously unrecognised forms. This line of inquiry particularly focuses on the extent to 
which religion can address human agency. For example, Burke (2012) summarises four 
forms of religious agency in existing scholarship, including: (1) resistance agency, the 
capacity to challenge, resist, and modify religious meanings and tradition; (2) 
empowerment agency, the psychological and emotional empowerment provided by 
religious practices and ethics; (3) instrumental agency, to accrue material and non-
religious resources from religious practices; and (4) compliant agency, a way to inhabit 
religious norms or religious ways of lives for reasons internal to the religious meanings 
themselves. It seems that the latter concept of religious agency has not been fully 
recognised, as the former three are consistent with secular-humanist social science.  
 
Yet, it is perhaps Mahmood’s (2001; 2005) research into Islamic piety and virtue that 
most successfully articulate ethical forms of life in theories of agency. For Mahmood 
(2005: 15), “agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist norms but also 
in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms”. By drawing on Foucault’s (1997) 
concept of technologies of the self, Mahmood (2001: 210, emphasis in original) argues 
that:  
 
Importantly, to understand agency […] is neither to invoke a self-constituting 
autonomous subject nor subjectivity as a private space of cultivation. Rather, it draws 
our attention to the specific ways in which one performs a certain number of operations 
on one’s thoughts, body, conduct, and ways of being, in order to “attain a certain kind 
of state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immorality” (Foucault 1997: 24).  
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Mahmood (2005) claims that women in the Egyptian piety movement achieve agency to 
the extent that they can inhabit the norms and submit to religious authority by a degree to 
the point where piety becomes instinctive. Therefore, by disputing the universal 
assumption that agency primarily or solely arises from resistance or confrontational 
practices, Mahmood (2005: 23) calls for the study of how religion constitutes coherent 
projects of ethical self-formation; that is, “the variety of ways in which norms are lived 
and inhabited, aspired to, reached for, and consummated”. In this sense, postsecular 
subjectivities may arise from the ways in which individuals inhabit religious meanings, 
which possibly opens up new forms of agency and ethical self-formation under the 
constraints of secularity and neoliberalism.  
 
However, engaging in ethical agency cannot be said to sufficiently address the formation 
of postsecular subjectivities, as Laidlaw (2013: 142, emphasis in original) argues: “The 
overall effect of Mahmood’s discussion, then, is an equivocation between saying that 
women in the piety movement attain a distinctive, non-liberal kind of freedom, and saying 
that they attain quite other values than freedom”. In other words, religious agency cannot 
be simply defined or captured in a singular way; instead, it is more likely to be a relation 
of emergence, where religious agency emerges from the interaction among different 
forms of lived experience in a specific geo-historical context. As Bilge (2010: 23) points 
out, “[I]ntersectionality, as a meta-theorisation of power and domination, proves 
invaluable to anchor the formation of subjectivities and agency within a nexus of social 
relations and structures (of race, class, gender) that work together to (re)produce power 
and privilege”. Therefore, the subject-formation of postsecularity can thereby be situated 
into the relational concerns with interlocking power structures and lived experiences.  
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I therefore argue that it is through an intersectional lens that postsecular subjectivities and 
agency can be embodied and materialised. This thesis presents such an effort. By 
analysing the intersectionality among migrant workers, I carefully clarify the situated and 
historical structures and power relations as well as multiple lived experiences from which 
different forms of postsecular subjectivity and agency arise. In general, I highlight that 
postsecular subjectivities and agency are multi-layered, hybrid and contested, and need 
to be understood in terms of geo-historical context (chapter 4), the ways religious 
institutions translate theo-ethics through faith-by-praxis (chapter 5), and the ways migrant 
workers constitute their embodied, masculine, feminine and youth subjectivities in 
response to secular and neoliberal conditions of being (chapter 6-9).     
 
2.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have systematically reviewed the literature on secularity and 
postsecularity in human geography and beyond. The classic thesis of secularisation is 
increasingly problematic, particularly due to the challenge from the emerging scholarship 
of postsecularity that revitalises and rethinks the role of religion in modern society. 
Therefore I argue that, instead of focusing on debates about whether societies are more 
or less religious, a geography of religion should seriously re-consider what secularity and 
secularisation mean in modern society. As Kong (2010: 765) suggests, “keeping the gaze 
on ‘postsecularization’ as a global shift may thus be misleading; it is not a discourse that 
can be universally and evenly applied unproblematically without more careful 
consideration of what secularization means and how rigorously evidence for such has 
been collected”. In essence, secularity remains a real, tangible condition under which not 
only religions evolve and thrive but individuals form everyday subjectivities in modernity. 
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By building on and developing Taylor’s (2007; 2011), Asad’s (2003; 2010) and 
Casanova’s (2006; 2009; 2013) accounts of secularity,  I suggest that there are three lines 
of inquiry that a geography of religion can advance: (1) to examine the political-
ideological project of secularity and its normalisation of unreflective knowledge and how 
these secularities are re-configured in different geo-historical contexts; (2) to explore the 
ways individuals inhabit secularity and the immanent frame in the everyday practices of 
place-making and the cross-pressure they face in the modern secular age; and (3) to study 
the embodiment and materialisation of secularity in the intersectional subjectivities of 
religion, class, gender and age. This thesis therefore addresses these theoretical concerns 
in the empirical chapters.  
 
It is through a rethinking of the meaning of secularity that a more nuanced scholarship of 
postsecularity can arise. In this sense, the concept of the “postsecular turn” is theoretically 
rewarding in the sense that it emphasises that secularist ideologies and epistemologies 
need to be thoroughly revisited to account for new religious realities rather than 
presupposing a re-entry into a religious society. In particular, the scholarship of 
postsecularity acknowledges the alternative subjectivities and agency existing beyond the 
secular and normative liberal ethics. This thesis therefore contributes to this debate in 
examining how postsecular possibilities and agency emerge in the construction of 
religious meanings and processes in specific contexts. In general, instead of treating 
secularity and postsecularity as mutually exclusive domains, I argue that that geographers 
of religion need to consider how postsecular ethics and subjectivities articulate, and co-
evolve with, secular conditions of being in the world.  
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In this sense, this thesis provides two approaches to the grounding of geographies of 
secularity and postsecularity. First, I highlight neoliberalism as a condition of being and 
a regime of unreflective knowledge in which the political-economic project of secularity 
operates and individuals constitute their everyday subjectivities. Second, I use an 
intersectional approach to examine how religion, gender, class and age mutually shape 
one another in such a way that gives rise to new subjectivities and agency. I argue that 
the intersectional approach not only helps us to understand the ways “actually existing” 
secular and neoliberal power are actualised, but also provides a specific context in which 
to examine the specific postsecular subjectivities and agency that are enabled.  
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Chapter 3 Religion in China: variegated secularity, variegated 
postsecularity  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following Casanova’s (2009; 2013) insights, I argue that research on secularity and 
postsecularity should adopt a global comparative perspective that recognises them to be 
context-contingent. A comparative geo-historical analysis can move beyond the dominant 
stereotypes about the trajectories of modernisation in the United States and Europe, 
opening up a space for further geographical inquiry into multiple patterns and 
reconfigurations of secularity and postsecularity across different cultures and political 
regimes. Yet, according to Van der Veer (2011), the project of European modernity is 
better interpreted as part of what he calls “interactional history”.  In other words, modern 
ideas such as nation, secularity, citizenship, and right, came into interaction with Asian 
and African societies within the orbit of imperial expansion. Therefore, Van der Veer 
(2011) advocates an analysis of how the universalism of thoughts emerges from a history 
of interactions.  
 
One of the most salient characteristics of China’s modernisation is that China appears to 
be caught in a contradictory dual process involving the entrenchment of secular values 
and state-sanctioned capitalist ideologies and simultaneously the notable revival of all 
forms of religiosity and faith (Gao and Qian 2019). One the one hand, China has been 
viewed as an avowedly atheist state and, in Casanova’s (2013) words, as “one of the most 
secular societies on earth”.  The assumptions that religion is not important to the life of 
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the Chinese and that the Chinese have always been secular, programmatic and rational as 
modernisation advances are generally accepted and prevalent among not only 
intellectuals but ordinary people. Yet, on the other hand, there is a widespread interest in 
religious practices in response to the publicly accepted discourse of “moral and spiritual 
crisis” in the post-reform area. In this chapter, I elucidate the evolution and configuration 
of secularity and secularism  as well as the possibilities of postsecularity in China in order 
to provide contextual knowledge for the analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 
3.2 Secularity and secularism in China 
There are at least four genealogies that can be traced for secularity and secularism in the 
history of China (Yang 2008; Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Palmer and Winiger 2019): (1) 
the structure of religio-political authority in imperial China; (2) China’s encounter with 
Western colonialism and its entry into modernity; (3) the repression of religion in the era 
of communist revolution; and (4) the neoliberal transformations in the post-reform era.  
 
The extent to which ancient China was religious is controversial. Some Western Scholars 
have questioned whether China had a past “Age of Faith” (Davis 2001), since 
Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism are more likely to be conceived as “teachings” (教) 
rather than institutional religions. Conversely, another line of scholarship brings back the 
role of religion into China’s history, which was formerly presumed to be largely secular, 
and now questions whether there ever was an “Age of Faithless”, since imperial China 
(259 BC – 1911AD) was a highly enchanted society (Yang 1965; Szonyi 2009; Goossaert 
and Palmer 2011):  
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Communication with deities, demons, spirits and invisible forces was pervasive at all 
levels of society, from the cult of the kitchen god by all families to the Imperial cult 
conducted by […] the emperor himself, and from use of divination practices in relation 
to all aspects and decisions in life, to the practice of fengshui in the siting of dwellings 
of the living and of the dead in relation to chthonic forces (Palmer and Winiger 2019: 
87). 
 
According to C.K. Yang’s (1965) classic study of Chinese religion, “diffused” religion 
constitutes the main form of traditional Chinese religion. These “diffused” religions do 
not refer to specific kinds of religion but are woven into the fabric of secular institutions 
and family life with rituals positing the presence of ancestral spirits as well as of a wide 
array of gods and ghosts that exist, protest and threaten people in their earthly lives. In 
this sense, the traditional Chinese religions are themselves profanely constituted.  This 
insight is crucial to an understanding Chinese religiosity and the social function of 
religion in contemporary China.  
 
Many historians of Chinese religion therefore argue that Chinese society from the Song 
dynasty (960-1279 AD) onwards can be interpreted as a market where people make 
options from a variety of ritual practices, teachings and divine symbols (Davis 2001; 
Ownby 2003; Szonyi 2009). Yet the imperial regime was built using Confucian religious 
and moral-political discourses, which created high levels of the sacralisation of the 
emperor through an elaborate system of state sacrificial rituals (Yang 2008). Anthony Yu 
(2005) suggests that de-institutionalising Buddhism, Daoism, and sectarian and popular 
religions was a crucial technique to maintain the sovereign power of the Confucian 
imperial state, and therefore these religions could not establish the authority and 
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autonomy comparable to those of the church in Europe. This form of secularism may help 
explain why “the flexible polytheistic system of dispersed and differentiated local and 
regional ritual territorialities” (Yang 2008: 7) during the imperial age of the Ming and 
Qing dynasties (1368-1912 AD) was rapidly swallowed up into a totalising, centralised 
and modern monolithic state in the subsequent republic, communist and post-communist 
eras.    
 
However, secularism as a hegemonic ideology substantially emerged in late imperial 
China (1842-1912 AD), when China’s Confucian state encountered Western modernity 
and colonialism. Although China was never fully colonised by the West, the humiliation 
by and threat from foreign imperialists, including Western, Japanese and Russian powers, 
not only evoked a Chinese desire for state-strengthening and modernisation but brought 
about the totalising processes of secularisation and de-traditionalising. During this period, 
Chinese secularism primarily developed as a form of scientism and rationalism. Many 
political reformers and state elites saw the enchanted elements of communication with 
the cosmos, popular religions and traditional teachings as superstitious, unscientific and 
backward, impeding state-strengthening and civilisation (Goossaert 2006). This 
hegemonic secularism was particularly manifest in the “smash temples, build schools” 
(毁庙办学) campaign against temple cults and specialists in the late Ching reform and 
later adopted by the communist movement after 1949, during which half a million temples 
were destroyed or “secularized” (Van der Veer 2011). These movements were deeply 
influenced by Western, enlightenment ideas, in which civilisation, progress and scientific 
rationality were considered as a basis of national identity. The formation of the republic 
state required a new type of subject that emphasised liberation from the constraints of 
superstition, feudalism, and Confucian authority towards the atomised and secular self 
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(Duara 1996). In this process, intellectuals played a crucial role in reinforcing the 
secularist project of nation-building.  Intellectuals and elites spearheading modernisation 
in both the republican and communist regimes shared similar anti-religious mindsets, and 
enforced the stated-endorsed secularisation of everyday life.  As Yang argues,  
 
What made Chinese secularization different from the Western experience was the fact 
that it was a top-down process engineered by the educated elites and the modern state, 
and that it was part of a nationalist and centralizing process whereby local communities 
and their deity cults were shorn of their identities and autonomy. (Yang 2009: 7) 
 
It would therefore be better to see Chinese secularisation more as a state-led strategy and 
ideology than as a latent function and by-product of modernisation as in a liberal 
understanding of religion. However, Szonyi (2009: 317) argues that the self-conscious 
category of “religion” was the result of state-led secularisation and differentiation in the 
early 20th century in China: “secularization in China was a dual movement of distinction 
and intervention, to distinguish religion from superstition and to reshape those aspects of 
religious life that did not meet the new criteria to make them better serve state agendas”. 
It is against this backdrop that the Western missionary of Christianity took roots in the 
late-Ching and Republic eras, as Christianity was conceived as a moral religion versus 
magic/superstition, in association with Western modernity.  
    
During Mao’s time, political leaders saw religion as an “opiate of the mass”, and the 
Cultural Revolution almost witnessed the complete disappearance of religion from the 
public sphere under militant atheism. The enchanted cosmos and the spiritual life of the 
people were replaced by the sacralisation of communist utopia and particularly by the 
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Mao-cult. The communist movement required people’s self-transformation into 
revolutionary subjects. The sacralisation of the party and Mao operated through a regime 
of truth that demanded that individuals should examine their inner world, emotions and 
attitudes through self-reflection or public confession, such that they could defeat any trace 
of feudal or bourgeois thoughts hidden within the inner self or unconsciousness (Duara 
1996; Goossaert and Palmer 2011).   
 
However, this anti-religious ideology has evolved into a less coercive, but no less 
hegemonic, secularism amidst China’s pursuit of economic modernisation since 1979 
(Potter 2003; Leung 2005). Based on an analysis of Chinese Communist Party policy, 
Potter (2003) argues that the state adopted a more tolerant perspective on religion in post-
Mao China as a new approach to the building of regime legitimacy, accepting a trade-off 
of social and economy autonomy in exchange for individuals’ political loyalty. In the area 
of religious affairs, the state has made a transition from coercive oppression to active 
governance, relocating religions to a sequestrated sphere and continuously enforcing 
atheist propaganda through public education, mass media and grassroots party or social 
organs (Cao 2010; Yang 2010). The regulatory strategies in this period include the 
categorisation of religions, restricting places of worship to officially registered sites 
subject to annual inspection, and the enactment of laws that iterate the distinction between 
religious belief within the boundary of state protection and “illegal and criminal activities 
being carried out under the banner of religion” (Potter 2003: 324). The Chinese regulatory 
framework also pays particular attention to Christianity because the communist regime 
fears ideological subversion via religion from the West, given that Christian missionary 
work has historically been linked to imperialism (Potter 2003).  
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In the post-Mao era, the maintenance of church-state relations is less reliant on 
domination and coercion, but instead increasingly achieves it through ideological power. 
It is generally accepted that the Chinese party-state’s religious policies derive from a 
Marxist interpretation of the socialist theory of religion which states that, with the 
realisation of a communist society, religion will eventually fade out due to individuals’ 
increasing scientific consciousness and material satisfaction (Xing 2003). When the 
leaders of the party-state realised and gradually accepted the impracticality of its target 
to eliminate religion, the state’s perception of religion also changed from conceiving of 
it as “the opiate of the people” to “encouraging religion to adapt to socialism”. This is 
primarily because of the state’s desire to unite people with different religions and to 
maintain social stability and develop production (Xing 2003). For example, the former 
head of the State Administration of Religious Affairs, Ye Xiaowen (2008), describes this 
shift in one report:  
 
A clear path of change lies before us: from viewing religion in a chiefly negative light, 
to objectively viewing religion as having both positive and negative capabilities, and 
finally to looking at religion from a positive angle and emphasizing its positive 
functions. (cited in Szonyi 2009: 314 ) 
 
The co-option of religion is congruent with the state’s encouragement of modern 
sensibilities concerning reason and progress, while market-based economic liberalisation, 
industrialisation and urbanisation have firmly taken root.  
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3.3 Post-Mao religious revival: the possibilities of postsecualrity?5  
Nearly five decades ago, the American scholar Donald MacInnis (1973) visited China, 
reporting on a totally atheist country with empty churches and temples:  
 
During the Cultural Revolution, under the slogans of “class struggles are the guiding 
principle” and “completely break with conventional ideas,” religion was listed as part 
of the “four olds” [old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits] and of “feudalism, 
capitalism and revisionism” that should be eradicated. Religious beliefs of the great 
masses were said to be reflections of class struggles in the sphere of ideology and signs 
of political backwardness and reaction; religious believers were cracked down on as 
“ox-monsters and snake-demons,” resulting in many framings and fabricated cases. 
Religion was a realm of heavy catastrophes. The Religious Affairs Administration was 
dissolved; religious affairs cadres were censured for their crime of following “the 
wrong political line.”  All religious venues were closed. Many religious artifacts were 
destroyed. Religious research completely halted. The “criticism of theism” quickly 
became in practice the theoretical declaration for struggling to eliminate religion in 
society. (Yang 2004: 104).  
 
However, this situation has dramatically changed: China may now have become one of 
the countries where religion is flourishing most, where all kinds of religions, old or new, 
institutional or folk, are being revived and are thriving  (Cao 2010; Overmyer 2003; Yang 
2010) despite the continuing strict regulation imposed on religion. An astounding 
religious revival has taken place over the last three decades including, in particular, the 
unlikely “Christianity fever” in China. A 2012 survey conducted by the China Family 
 
5 Some of the material in this section has been published in The China Quarterly. 
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Panel Studies programme suggested that the number of Chinese Protestants was 
approximately 26 million, making up 1.9 per cent of the total population. According to 
another report entitled “Global Christianity” released by the Pew Research Centre, there 
were at least 58 million Protestants in China in 2010, having increased almost tenfold 
over a period of 30 years.  A substantive body of research has documented the remarkable 
religious revival in China. Scholars have taken various approaches to explain this change, 
including citing moral and spiritual crises caused by drastic social change (Hunter and 
Chan 2007; Yang 2005; Bay 2003), the renewal of traditional practices (Chao 1999; Jing 
1996), changes in state–society relations (Feuchtwang 2000; Yang 2008), and the 
religious market (Yang 2011).  
 
However, to what extent can we understand China’s religious revival as a form of 
postsecularity? Some scholars consider China’s religious revival as a sign of the return 
of tradition or as “invested tradition”.  In this line of scholarship, the rebuilding of rituals 
and practices, especially of folk religions, has sometimes been interpreted as an “invented 
tradition” that repackages the lived spiritual order of the pre-Mao past by drawing from 
communal memories (Siu 1990; Chao 1999; Jing 1996). However, an all-encompassing 
folk belief system was irrevocably diluted due to political movements. Therefore, revivals 
of religions are not continuations of past traditions, but cultural innovations drawn from 
cultural fragments in the post-Mao era (Siu 1990). This thread of research indicates that 
religion has somewhat returned into public life in the post-reform era.  
 
However, this perspective is problematic due to its assumption that coherent and authentic 
“traditions” existed before Mao’s era (Chau 2006). Moreover, this approach implies an 
understanding of China’s transformation to capitalist modernity as what Kipnis criticizes 
 86  
as “historical rupture,” which poses “tradition” as the antithesis of the “modern” (Kipnis 
2016). Communal memories, in fact, are neither about mechanically collecting pieces of 
traditional practices nor freely re-inventing spiritual and ritual experiences in response to 
a changing social and political environment. Instead, it should be better conceived of as 
what Kipnis calls a “recombinant transformation,” an ongoing recombination of pre-
existing elements into a new pattern or mixture (Kipnis 2016). In the light of Kipnis’s 
(2016) views, the return of religion in China is itself changing and historically constituted, 
and should be reduced to neither preconceived categories nor a de-historicized, free-
floating representation of the present. Nevertheless, this research suggests that China’s 
political and economic reform in the past four decades has opened up new social spaces 
for religion and there are more hybrid and mutually constituted relationships between the 
religious and secular. In what follows, I discuss the possibilities for postsecular 
subjectivities to emerge from the political economy in post-reform China. Following 
Cloke et al.’s (2019) ideas, I consider postsecularity as an ethical and self-reflective 
project involving hybrid subjectivities in response to the conditions of being in 
contemporary China.  
 
Firstly, religion, and particularly Christianity, serve as a crucial moral and spiritual 
impetus contributing to “moral reconstruction” in the post-Mao era and to the 
“harmonious society” encouraged by the state. One of the prevailing explanations of the 
religious revival is that people in the post-Mao era are experiencing a spiritual vacuum 
that is enlivening aspirations for various religiosities and traditional ethics. This thesis 
takes the view that changes in lived experiences have been affected by drastic social 
changes such as the collapse of Maoist ideology (Lee 2007), the dismantling of traditional 
social, moral and cosmic orders (Yang 2008), and the intensifying sense of uncertainty 
 87  
among individuals in the face of overwhelming market forces. A spiritual anchor, 
therefore, is desirable. Yang Fenggang argues that the “emerging market is exciting and 
perilous, accompanied by widespread moral corruption, which prompts many individuals 
to seek a theodicy, or a religious worldview, to put the seemingly chaotic universe into 
order” (Yang 2005: 325). For example, a recent special issue of The Asia Pacific Journal 
of Anthropology examined the moral dimension of religious revival in rural China and 
challenged “the current tendency to reduce religion into a politics or economy of human 
need” (Liang 2014: 394). Religion offers “a moral life devoid of state presence” for 
underprivileged villagers in rural communities who appropriate Christian ethics to re-
imagine ill bodies under limited public healthcare or construct a local cosmological 
system as an alternative moral order to instrumental rationality and the market (Liang 
2014; Qi, Liang and Li 2014; Tapp 2014).  
 
As the state’s religious policy has eased, Christianity has had an increasingly significant 
impact on the spiritual cultivation and moral reconstruction of the Chinese (Zhuo 2006; 
Wielander 2009). Xinping Zhuo, Director of the Institute of World Religions at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science, argues that the Christian notions of original sin and 
transcendence have opened up a new sense of the self and of transcendence beyond the 
Confucian and Taoist traditions, since Christian transcendence emphasises the ultimate 
transformation of oneself outside the bounds of this-worldly concerns, and therefore it 
serves as an important moral resource for the pursuit of goodness by the Chinese (Zhuo 
2006). Moreover, Zhuo (2006) also points out that the Christian concept of agape based 
on Jesus Christ’s self-sacrifice emphasises the unconditional nature of love, which is 
different from the Confucian understanding of love based on human relationships. 
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Therefore, the Christian agape has a great ethical capacity to promote the exercise of 
social responsibility among Chinese Christians.  
 
Secondly, faith-based organisations (FBOs) and in particular Christian institutions have 
increasingly filled the gap in social services and care left by the state experiencing 
neoliberal reform. China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy is 
accompanied by the collapse of danwei (work unity) and its associated welfare system, a 
vast reservoir of laid-off workers in state-owned sectors, the ever-widening rich-poor gap, 
and the exploitative and precarious labour regime for rural-to-urban migrants. For 
example, China’s Gini Coefficient has grown rapidly from 0.32 in 1990 to 0.467 in 20186. 
According to a 2012 reported released by Peking University, the poorest 25% of Chinese 
citizens own an estimated 1% of the overall wealth of China, while 30% of the country’s 
wealth is concentrated among 1% of the richest. This situation has impelled the state to 
reconsider state-society relations, allowing more space for NGOs and FBOs to participate 
in social delivery (McCarthy 2013). In turn, in serving marginal and vulnerable people, 
FBOs help relieve the pressure for public goods provision, cultivate new ethics of 
sacrifice and love, and contribute to the state-propagated “harmonious society”. 
Nevertheless, the praxis of these emerging faith-based organisations and the possibility 
of the formation of new civil and ethical subjectivities have not been examined in 
sufficient detail. In chapter 5, I respond to this point by examining the role of theo-ethics 
and faith-based practices in addressing neoliberal precarities.  
 
Thirdly, China’s religious revival always-already implies the malleable and hybrid 
religiosity co-produced by the religious and the secular. Van der Veer (2011) raises the 
 
6 https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/resident-income-distribution/gini-coefficient 
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question “how do we explain the failure of a century of systematic destruction of Chinese 
religious life?” One of the answers is that Chinese religious life contains the heritage of 
Maoist subjects that absorbed quite a lot of its impetus from religious movements (Van 
der Veer 2011). Both Maoism and religion provide inspirations for alternative 
imaginations or transcendence beyond reality. Likewise, as Palmer and Winiger (2019) 
suggest, Maoist subjectivities that emphasise technologies of spiritual discipline and self-
reflection are somewhat congruent with Christian technologies of self-transformation. 
Therefore, some critical commentators note that Christianity cannot be simply interpreted 
as an antithesis to the state’s secular project of modernisation and governance. For 
example, instead of assuming that Christian values and ethics enable a space in which 
Chinese people negotiate and reclaim their autonomy from an authoritarian state, 
Wielander (2013) critically argues that Christian values actually overlap with the party-
state’s project of maintaining power and moral legitimacy. Christian values, and 
particularly the concept of love, are compatible with the state’s efforts to construct a 
“harmonious society” by propagating state-endorsed moral standards and filling gaps in 
social welfare and services. Additionally, the Christian theologies of original sin and 
agape work in tandem with the state’s discourse of civility that seeks to construct a 
“harmonious” public sphere composed of cultured, self-disciplined, law-abiding and 
productive citizens (Wielander 2013: 2009). This is consonant with Cao’s (2010: 66) 
argument that “Christianity certainly has gained recognition from the state as a useful 
source in local governance.”  For Cao, Christian belief not only serves as a moral asset 
for governance but also facilitates the state’s developmentalism and labour regime by 
disciplining and motivating the workforce. In his research into Wenzhou Christianity, 
many Christian entrepreneurs apply theologically mediated moral vocabularies, for 
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example, “transforming faith to productivity” and “using Christians to govern the factory,” 
to reinforce capitalist production and enterprise management (Cao 2010: 66).  
 
However, I do not argue for the co-option of Christianity into the state’s governmentality, 
but suggest that these hybrid religiosities can be captured by neither state-resistance mnor 
co-option models. The possible of postsecularity in China’s religious revival should move 
beyond the criteria related to whether religion offers the capacity to resist, or is simply 
co-opted into, state-led neoliberal governance. Instead, in this thesis, I associate the 
possibilities of postsecularity with the ways individuals constitute hybrid religiosities and 
multiple agency in response to the secular conditions of being.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the geo-historical context of secularity and postsecularity 
in China. In general, secularity and secularism have emerged due to China’s encounters 
with Western imperialism. Secularism became a hegemonic ideology that the state in both 
the Republic and communist China used to break away with “backward” traditions. In 
this sense, secularity and secularism do not simply represent a latent function and by-
product of the inevitable project of modernisation, but more likely a state-led strategy and 
ideology in the history of state-building and social governance. In the post-Mao era, the 
political project of secularity is less reliant on domination and coercion, but is instead 
increasingly achieved through ideological power and economic rationality. In this thesis, 
I further explore how China’s secularity is embodied in neoliberal governance, state 
developmentalism, and local autocratic rule that shape the secular consciousness of docile 
and governable individuals. On the other hand, interestingly, China’s political-ideological 
project of secularity appears to arouse rather than stifle people’s desire for religiosity, 
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which is evident in the nationwide religious revival. Therefore, I argue that the agenda of 
secularity in China always-ready implies the formation of new religious subjectivities and 
agency that cannot simply be dismissed by ideological power. Overall, unlike the liberal 
and civic spheres in the West in which different values contest democratically,  the geo-
historical context of China offers a unique testing ground for an exploration of how 
religion is mutually constituted with secularist and autocratic power.   
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             Chapter 4 Research Context and Methodology 
 
 
 
4.1 Contextualising Christianity and migrant workers in Shenzhen7  
Shenzhen is the fourth largest metropolitan city in Mainland China after Shanghai, 
Beijing and Guangzhou, as well as the first Special Economic Zone in China. Most 
recently, Shenzhen has overtaken Guangzhou to become the third most important 
economic power as measured in terms of GDP.  Shenzhen is located on the Pearl River 
delta – one of China’s (and the world’s) most influential manufacturing and industrial 
centres and economic engines. According to the 2017 national census, Shenzhen houses 
a population of more than 15 million, approximately 70% of whom are migrants who do 
not hold local hukou status. Shenzhen has been considered as the epitome of China’s 
crusade of Reform and Opening and the neoliberal transition since 1978.  Taking 
advantage of policy privileges and its proximity to Hong Kong both geographically and 
culturally, Shenzhen soon began to experience an unprecedented economic boom, 
developing from a fishing village to the “workshop of the world” over the past 30 years.  
 
My rationale for choosing Shenzhen as the geographical focus of this study is threefold. 
Firstly, Shenzhen has been a pioneering city in experiencing the country’s neoliberal 
reform (Pun 2005), and is characterised by its upholding of secular values of economic 
rationality, pragmatism, progress, efficiency and development (Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018). 
This is particularly manifest in the famous saying “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black 
 
7 Some material in this section has been published in The China Quarterly and Cultural Geographies. 
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or white, as long as it catches mice”, put forward by Deng Xiaoping, the second-
generation leader of China as well as the designer of China’s opening-up and reform 
policy. Put differently, as long as the economy works efficiently, it is a good economy 
regardless of socialism or capitalism. Thus, Shenzhen was the first city in China which 
opened to global capitalism. Secondly, Shenzhen is characterised by a vast reservoir of 
rural-to-urban migrants. Most of these migrants are employed in manufacturing 
enterprises, such as Foxconn. Yet although these migrant workers are key actors in 
China’s integration into global economy, they are simultaneously the most economically 
and socially marginalised group in Shenzhen.  Over the past four decades, drastic 
industrialisation and urbanisation in Shenzhen have precipitated class inequality, 
precarious and disciplined labour regimes, and vulnerability to exploitation for the large 
numbers of rural migrant workers.  
 
Thirdly, and the most importantly, Shenzhen has experienced both the entrenchment of 
secular modernity and, simultaneously, a notable flourishing of religion. For instance, 
Fan and James (2003) have documented an intriguing re-emergence of popular religions, 
traditional rituals and Confucianism values among both Shenzhen’s residents and 
immigrants, for whom traditional religious values appear to help them to rebuild the 
mutual trust that was devastated in the Cultural Revolution and to establish a moral 
economy vis-à-vis capitalist forms of social life. In the case of Protestant Christianity 
alone, 27 TSPM (Three-Self Patriotic Movement) Churches has been re-opened or built 
in the past two decades, most of which have full attendance at Sunday worshipping 
sessions. There are also immense numbers of house churches or underground churches 
operating beyond the state’s surveillance.  
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Christian missionaries in Shenzhen date back to the nineteenth century. Shenzhen was 
one of the earliest areas in the Pearl River delta to be targeted by Western missionaries, 
when China was forced to open up to foreign trade and missionary activity after its defeat 
in the First Opium War in 1842. In 1848, Christianity was first introduced in Shenzhen, 
and particularly among the Hakka people, a migrant group from Northern China who 
were subordinated by indigenous inhabitants. Yet, it was not until the early twentieth 
century that Christianity was substantially accepted by the Hakka people, due to 
evangelisation from the German missionary society the Basel Mission (Gao, Qian & 
Yuan 2018).  The churches provided privileged access for Hakka people to missionary 
hospitals and schools, which mitigated the hardship of their life (see Figure 4-1).  After 
the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, all churches were taken over by the local 
Communist government and soon began to experience devastating state disruption 
throughout the turbulent period between 1954 and 1978 under socialist extremism. 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), all churches in Shenzhen were completely 
shut down. Devout believers turned to the “black market” (Yang 2006) in religion, and 
conducted worship in places away from the state’s surveillance. Since the economic 
reforms after 1979, the policies of the Chinese state concerning religion have slackened 
and the right to religious belief was reinstated in 1984. In the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution, many people in China turned away from the discredited morality of Maoism, 
and resumed, or were converted to, religious belief as a way of filling the vacuum of faith. 
After 1984, underground worshippers started to reopen and re-establish Christian 
churches with the state’s permission, while others refused to be involved into state 
regulation and continued to operate underground. One of the huge TSPM churches that 
was established in this period is the Meilin Church, which can accommodate more than 
3000 people.  
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                   Figure 4-1. Missionary school established by Basel Mission 
                   Source: exhibit in Cunzhen museum, photographed by the author.  
 
This research is based on fieldwork that I conducted during two phases (between March 
and June 2015 and September 2017 to March 2018). It involved nine Protestant churches 
in Shenzhen, including five Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) churches and four 
house churches (see Figure 4-2 and Table 4-1). While the churches did not claim to belong 
to a specific denomination, the pastors preferred to identify themselves as evangelical. 
Seven of the 9 churches are located in the guanwai 关外area8 of Shenzhen (outside the 
Special Economic Zone), where factories and migrant workers are particularly 
concentrated. In Shenzhen, Christian migrant workers, be they rural Christians or new 
converts, constitute a significant proportion of the churchgoers. As shown in Table 4-1, 
migrant workers constituted more than 80 per cent of attendance in these churches. 
 
8 Until 2011, a vague borderline was used by the state to separate Shenzhen’s less-developed areas 
(guanwai) from the urban core (guannei). The term guanwai here refers to the current Baoan, Longgang 
and Nanshan districts of Shenzhen. 
 96  
 
Figure 4-2 Research locations.  
Sources: redrawn by the author, based on Chen et al. (2018)  
 
Table 4-1 Proportion of migrant Christians among total churchgoers 
 
Church name  Location Percentage of 
migrant Christians 
Shanzhuli (TSPM) Shiyan 石岩 90% 
Langkou (TSPM) Longhua 龙华 80% 
Guanlang (TSPM)  Guanlan 观澜 80% 
Meilin (TSPM) Futian 福田 N/A 
Bantian (TSPM) Bantian 坂田 N/A 
Foxconn House Church A Longhua 龙华 85% 
Foxconn House Church B Guanlan 观澜 80% 
House Church C Guanlan 观澜 90% 
House Church D Futian 福田 N/A 
Sources: Data for Shanzhuli Church, Foxconn House Churches A and B and House Church C were 
calculated based on lists of registered church members. The figures for Langkou Church and Guanlang 
Church were estimated by pastors at our request. 
 
There are many factors contributing to the predominant role of migrant workers in church 
attendance. Firstly, rural-to-urban migration plays a crucial role in both the translocal 
mobility of religiosity and in situ religious conversion. This is particularly the case in 
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Shenzhen’s two “gospel villages,” 9  Sanzhuli and Langkou. In these two rapidly 
urbanizing villages, Christian beliefs inherited from the Basel Mission in the late 19th 
and early 20th century gradually lost their hold in the local communities due to disinterest 
among villagers in spiritual pursuits. However, the inflows of rural migrant workers have 
substantially re-invigorated the local churches and migrant workers now constitute 
approximately 90 per cent and 80 per cent of registered churchgoers in Sanzhuli Church 
and Langkou Church respectively. Secondly, the relatively relaxed religious policies in 
Shenzhen provide room for evangelising among migrant workers. Church leaders and 
local officials often negotiate with each other pragmatically and, hence, implement the 
state’s religious policies in a practical way in terms of, for instance, tolerance towards 
evangelical activities in public spaces and house churches. As one TSPM church preacher 
remarked, they sometimes invited foreign clergymen to preach without prior application 
to the local authority. The local government also exhibits a somewhat tolerant stance 
towards house churches, which are technically illegal and unapproved by the state. 
Foxconn House Church A, for instance, suggested that they had long enjoyed the 
government’s acquiescence. The government has neither responded to their application 
for registration nor taken coercive action to shut down the church. 
 
Thirdly, both TSPM and house churches tend to target migrant workers for evangelisation, 
and the competitive relationship between TSPM and house churches has further 
reinforced evangelical activity aimed at migrant workers. Foxconn House Church A, 
established by Taiwanese senior managers in 2011, largely targets Foxconn workers in 
response to the 2010 Foxconn tragedy. According to their records, 55.4 per cent (72 out 
 
9 Here, “gospel village” refers to villages in Shenzhen that have widely accepted Christian beliefs 
due to the work of Western missionaries, with more than fifty per cent of the population being 
Christians (see Gao and Qian 2018). 
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of 130) of their churchgoers are Foxconn workers. If migrant workers from outside 
Foxconn are added, then approximately 80 per cent of the congregation are migrant 
workers. The saliency of migrants also applies to Guanlan Church, a TSPM church which 
is largely sponsored by a “boss Christian” who owns a plastics factory located next door. 
The “boss Christian” donated 3 million yuan to re-establish the church in 1999. Thus, a 
significant proportion of its churchgoers are workers from his factory. Likewise, House 
Church C was organised in a factory by a “boss Christian” who introduced Christian 
activities as a form of communal life and leisure. Foxconn House Church B was originally 
a small congregation spontaneously organised by Foxconn workers, but it has developed 
into a church with more than 100 members, most of whom are migrant workers.  
Overall, the migrant-worker-driven Christian revival in Shenzhen provides a social niche 
in which the co-production of secular neoliberalism and religion can be examined and the 
possibility of postsecularity explored.    
 
4.2 Conducting a reflexive ethnography of religion in China: 
positionality and situated knowledge   
4.2.1 Ethnography: advantages and limitations 
The primary method used in this research is ethnography, which is a method that mainly 
rests on participant observation and interviews during through the seven months which I 
spent observing and interacting with migrant workers and church members. The origins 
of ethnography lie in nineteenth-century anthropology, when some researchers, and 
particularly Franz Boas, conducted descriptive accounts of indigenous communities with 
non-western cultures (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). That is, the ethnographer was 
usually required to reside over a relatively long-term period with local people and to 
participate in everyday activities in order to document and interpret their distinctive way 
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of life as well as the values and beliefs underlying it. Bronislav Malinwoski (1922) 
substantially developed ethnography in his two years of fieldwork accounting on native 
enterprise of the Trobriand people who lived on the island of New Guinea. Where 
anthropologists had previously mainly focused on “ethnology”, which relies on historical 
documents or materials produced by travellers or missionaries, Malinwoski’s method was 
characterised by direct observation and participation in the life of local groups. Over time, 
ethnography came “to refer to an integration of both first-hand empirical investigation 
and the theoretical and comparative interpretation of social organization and culture” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:1).  
 
By adopting an ethnographic approach (Wolcott 1999; Atkinson 2001; Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007), the data collection and analysis in this research are characterised by three 
distinctive features. The research places the emphasis on the “natural” and everyday 
context rather than controlled conditions created by researcher, and thereby it csn be 
distinguished from techniques using questionnaires and highly structured interviews. 
Although I was inescapably involved in the process of knowledge production in this study, 
I made an effort to minimise my influence on the ways in which Christian migrant 
workers and religious institutions constituted meaning. For example, a significant 
proportion of the data are drawn from fellowship conversations at the churches, which 
provides a crucial supplement to the interviews. Also, the research was conducted 
primarily with a single group (Christian migrant workers) in order to facilitate an in-depth 
investigation, although the study of church elites was also necessary so as to gain an 
understanding of the structure in which ordinary migrant workers practised their religion. 
The analysis of data then consisted of making interpretations concerning the motivations, 
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meanings, consequences and functions of the human actions or institutional practices 
involved, and mechanisms of their implication in the local or wider social context.  
 
As a qualitative method, the methodology of ethnography has developed as a competing 
or “conflicting” philosophical position with respect to quantitative approaches. It is 
generally accepted that early ethnography built philosophically on “naturalism”, while 
quantitative methods rest on “positivism”. These two philosophical approaches give 
divergent accounts with regard to the best way to approach the real world.  Positivism 
provides a methodological model for social research which privileges the logic of 
experimentation and statistical laws to provide scientific rigour (Ayer 1966; Caldwell 
2010). Therefore, positivists seek to explore the “overarching laws” of society or nature 
by identifying relationships between variables. In this sense, they are encouraged to place 
a greater emphasis on sampling procedures and statistics in order to increase the 
generalisability of their findings. For positivists, the world is out there for exploration and 
knowledge of the real world can be tested or at least confirmed with certainty. Therefore, 
scientific knowledge is capable of justifiably replacing myths of common sense and 
traditional views. Ethnography, however, along with many other kinds of qualitative 
approach, does not match up to these positivist imperatives. As a result, in the 1950s, 
ethnography came under criticism for lacking scientific rigour and the data ethnographers 
produce were accused of being subjective, or representing idiosyncratic explorations of 
one to two cases that were not representative. In response, ethnographers, and especially 
Lofland (1967) and Blumer (1969), and later Schatzman and Strauss (1973), developed 
alternative insights into the nature of social research, which are often described in terms 
of “naturalism”. Naturalism argues that society and culture should be explored in their 
“natural” state, uninfluenced by the researcher. Therefore, “natural” rather than controlled 
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and “artificial” settings is considered to be more awarding for data collection. For Matza 
(1969: 5), naturalism is mainly “the philosophical view that remains true to the nature of 
the phenomenon under study”. In other words, knowledge inherently exists in the real 
world and not lies in the methods deployed to study the world. Equally importantly, 
naturalism proposes that, since the behaviour of individuals is not structured in a 
mechanical way, but instead continually varies according to people’s interpretations of 
the circumstance in which they are situated, social research which aims to understand 
people’s behaviour should be concerned with the meanings that guide that behaviour 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). Hence, in ethnography, the researcher as a social actor 
participates in the specific situations that people live in, can give such capacity and access 
to learn the culture of people. In the face of the criticism from quantitative researchers, 
the development of naturalism undoubtedly legitimates ethnography. Against this 
background, it could be understandable that early ethnographic research preferred that no 
interpretation should be involved in a study, nor formal interviews, and getting off the 
veranda.    
  
However, the methodology used in this research moves beyond both positivist and 
naturalist approaches and instead follows the post-structural and social constructionist 
approaches that emphasise the subjectivity of the researcher in producing knowledge.  In 
essence, both naturalism and positivism share similar grounds that seek to comprehend 
social phenomena as pre-existed objects independent of the subjectivity of a researcher, 
although they are interpreted in divergent ways. They therefore both claim that preserving 
objectivity in social research is a priority in producing valid knowledge of the social world. 
This gives rise to an important issue regarding the subjectivity and reflectivity of the 
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researcher in ethnography. In this chapter, I provide some reflections on the issue of the 
researcher’s reflectivity  
  
Following a constructionist point of view in ethnography, I am self-conscious of my 
positionality and worldview in the interpretation of text and the perception of the world I 
am involved in, and therefore the ethnographical text produced is regarded in terms of 
constructions. That is, my subjectivity is an indispensable component of ethnography, 
since an ethnographical account is inevitably a reflection of social and historical 
positioning and a specific background in which the researcher is situated. In this sense, I 
need to critically reflect upon my ways of thinking and the social and cultural 
environment in which I am situated (as elaborated upon below). This is particularly 
important in a country whose citizens are dominated by atheist education.  Put differently, 
in social research, not only is the researcher’s subject important but also the context where 
this is arranged (Holstein and Gubrium, 2008).  
 
I also engage with the ideas of poststructuralism, especially its claims of the unstable 
nature of meanings and truth. Therefore, I emphasise the role of discourse and power in 
producing ethnographic knowledge. Hence, the validity and truth-claims associated with 
ethnographic knowledge need to be considered in terms of how this knowledge is 
produced and what power relationships are embedded in it (Crang and Cook 2007). This 
thesis therefore suggests that it is the subjectivity and position of the researcher that 
facilitate the reliability of the ethnographic method.  Hebert (2000) argues that there are 
two factors that shape ethnography as a distinctive understanding of the nature of the 
social world. Firstly, ethnography offers the scope to examine the ways in which macro-
level social structures explicitly function and are reproduced through the processes of 
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everyday life. Ethnography can arguably elaborate on the relationships between the 
macro- and micro-logics of social life. Hebert (2000) takes “the state” as an example,  
arguing that the state is often conceived of in terms of structural scope and power, whose 
coercion can determine the distribution of social resources. But the exercise of state power 
is inevitably implicated in everyday life; and an in-depth exploration of everyday 
processes can reveal the “contingent nature of state power, and the various tensions, 
fractures” (Hebert 2000:555) which characterise state institutions. In this sense, 
ethnography offers a method for the examination of secularity and postsecularity as 
concrete social processes rather than simply conceptual knowledge or the social 
imaginary. Secondly, it seeks to reveal the sets of meanings that guide the actions of 
individuals and which code the everyday processes in which they are situated. 
Ethnographers argue that social life is meaningful and its meaning systems are created 
through the inter-subjectivity or ongoing interactions between social agents. However, 
ethnographers move from outside to inside; for example, only through long-term 
participant observation and communication with local people can they understand how 
these meaning systems orientate people and their social world from the points of view of 
insiders, which the use of questionnaires and statistical analysis cannot fully achieve.  
 
Two methodological insights can be drawn from Hebert’s discussion. Firstly, I did not 
take the classic approach of congregation studies of Christianity; instead, my research 
largely relies on information about individual Christian life histories, narratives, and 
emotions in order to reveal the processes of everyday life and its underlying meanings as 
produced by individuals. I followed the everyday routines of Christian migrant workers 
and their practices in churches, factories and living spaces, and participated in sermon 
sessions, fellowships and other religious activities in and outside the churches. Secondly, 
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I was cautious of the ways in which institutional and lived knowledge are produced and 
constantly questioned how knowledge was produced and how it can best be presented so 
as to avoid misrepresentation.  
 
Although ethnography is theoretically and practically valid, there are still many potential 
critiques concerning the limitations of ethnography in this research. Most commonly, 
ethnography is criticised for lacking scientific rigour because it “involves a small sample 
size, is difficult to replicate, and contains a great deal of subjectivity and interpretation 
on the part of the researcher” (Rengert 1997: 469). However, following Hebert (2000), I 
would argue that it is exactly the features of small samples and the involvement of the 
researcher that make ethnography reliable.  I consider the research process to involve 
reflexive and self-conscious acts, where even “objectivity” is itself a product of social 
construction. On the other hand, my Chinese identity enables me to act as an insider in 
understanding social phenomena in my own culture. Therefore, ethnographers are 
engaged in conversation with one another.  Another critique might arise from concerns 
regarding ethnography’s capacity to allow generalisation and representativeness. In 
response to this, I would argue that it may depend on the specific research questions and 
concerns involved, because some ethnographers do not appear to regard generalisation as 
being necessary since they only offer interpretations concerning one particular group or 
phenomenon.  But for ethnographic research that seesk a micro-interpretation of the larger 
scale of social life, there are some ways to improve the ability to generalise, including 
comparative analysis which can explore similarities and divergences between groups, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, and the examination of existing 
theories through fieldwork (Heber 2000; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). As an 
example of small-scale ethnography, this research does not aim to provide general and 
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representative knowledge of scenarios of secularity, neoliberalism and Christianity in 
China; instead, it attempts to capture the complexity of the Christian revival among 
working-class communities in Shenzhen and the ways in which broad social and cultural 
processes are inhabited by ordinary people.   
 
4.2.2 Positionalities and the political context in this research: insider/outsider, 
methodological agnosticism and reflexivity  
The study of religious and spiritual belief as an aspect of cultural life raises complex 
epistemological and methodological questions for social scientists (Stewart 2001). When 
a researcher conducts research into his/her own or different ethnic/religious groups, issues 
of positionality and in particular the negotiation of the researcher as insider/outsider 
abound. The existing literature highlights the advantages of being an insider in 
undertaking research, providing greater ease in establishing rapport with participants and 
hence more reliability in the interpretation of data on account of a shared cultural outlook 
and knowledge (O’ Connor 2004). For me, being an insider as a Chinese and a Cantonese 
person in particular may enable me to enter into the experiences and meanings of these 
working-class communities more easily and thereby bridge the gap between subject and 
object. However, the very familiarity may also limit my interpretative ability, and 
increase the risk of making presumptions with regard to what is being perceived as an 
outsider would. As a result, an outsider position may be more reliable in this sense. Yet 
the insider and outsider positions, in many circumstances, can simultaneously co-exist or 
alternate during the research process (Rubin 2012). This is particularly the case for me, a 
researcher who has been trained in a Western university and returned to my home country 
to conduct fieldwork. For example, I can regard myself as an outsider when interviewing 
Christian migrant workers in regard to their experience of Christianity due to my non-
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Christian status, and simultaneously an insider given a similar cultural background. 
Therefore, I am constantly aware of my fluid insider/outsider status and have become 
reflexive about their positionality.  
 
On the one hand, I should take advantages of my position as an insider by utilising my 
social network during the fieldwork. Hence, I gained access to field sites with the help of 
a few acquaintances who were young Christian workers serving the Churches. My 
research started with interviews with these acquaintances, who tended to be more open 
because of high levels of familiarity and trust. For example, I interviewed several church 
volunteers who are my friends. To enter into the experiences and meanings of other 
Christian workers as an insider, I participated in volunteering work at one church with 
the help of the gatekeeper (a Church sexton) who had already granted my request, so that 
I could establish mutual trust with other migrant workers and be more likely to access the 
private moments of their lived experience. In sum, my insider position helped me to gain 
access to information that other researchers might not have obtained.  
 
Yet, many scholars have pointed out that the boundaries of insider/outsider should not be 
considered fixed, but are rather open to revision in accordance with specific social 
contexts (e.g. Sherif 2012; Kusek and Smiley 2014). For instance, Zhao’s (2017) study 
of street vendors in Dali suggests that the insider position is sometimes counterproductive 
in establishing mutual trust with strangers. When he talked with street vendors in the local 
dialect, he was eyed with scepticism because they tended to conceive of him as a local 
official investigating them or a competitor intending to learn trading and avoidance skills 
from them. On the other hand, when Zhao spoke in standard Mandarin, the street vendors 
tended to perceive him as a journalist or writer and became more open to conversation. 
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Therefore, the researcher ought to limit his/her projection of ‘insiderness’ in some 
circumstances. The fluid boundaries of insider/outsider were particularly crucial when I 
was conducting ethnographic study in house churches or underground churches where 
church members were especially vigilant about outsiders. In the early stages of my 
research, I tried to gain access to one migrant worker’s house church via an introduction 
from a Christian friend. In order to participate in this church as an “insider”, I decided to 
identify myself as a “Christian seeker” (慕道) and only at a later stage openly identified 
myself as a PhD researcher after I had established mutual trust with other church members. 
However, the insider position did not sufficiently help me to establish mutual trust with 
the church leader and other Christian fellows, because some of the church members were 
suspicious about my identification and were therefore unable to be open with me. It was 
most challenging to pretend to be an “insider”, because I found it hard to alter my 
disposition, emotions, manners, and behaviour in conformity with the “affective 
atmosphere” (Anderson 2016) of this church. For example, I was unable to conduct 
passionate prayer, as most Christian migrant workers did. In subsequent stages of the 
study, I made explicit my purposes and identification. As a result, they were very willing 
to accept my presence and thought that my research was very meaningful, which might 
have encouraged them to share testimony and stories with non-Christians. In such a 
context, being an outsider in this sense has two advantages. Firstly, to be sincere in the 
first place was crucial in conducting the investigation and establishing mutual trust in the 
churches, as many Christians would not be open-minded about dishonest people. 
Secondly, my identification as a PhD researcher from a British university and particularly 
my research area concerning geographies of religion often attracted attention in the 
churches, as many Christian migrant workers were interested in my research and 
voluntarily shared their stories with me.   
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However, in order to occupy a mediating position that reconciles insider/outsider status, 
I engaged in the possibility of attaining a more nuanced methodological agnosticism. 
Methodological agnosticism is an approach developed by Ninian Smart (1972) which 
describes a neutral, value-free position that scholars should adopt in the scientific study 
of religion. Since the 1960s, and in particular the publication of Peter Berger’s The Sacred 
Canopy (1967), social scientists have endeavoured to safeguard the study of religion from 
theology by treating religion as a unique cultural phenomenon. In adopting this definition 
of religion, the researcher should, often for methodological purposes, suspend their 
personal judgements and make no comment about the truth and value of religion whilst 
engaged in research (Cox 2003). This standpoint for the study of religion was initially 
termed “methodological atheism” by Berger. However, Smart preferred the phrase 
“methodological agnosticism”, given that it is not necessary to assert that religious faith 
is not truth as “methodological atheism” may imply. Therefore, “methodological 
agnosticism” can be summarised as follows: while acknowledging religion as “human 
interaction with a culturally postulated nonfalsifiable reality” from a scientific 
perspective (Van Beek and Blakely 1994: 2), the researcher of religion should not take a 
position in response to questions of the validity of religion but try to understand and 
interpret human religious behaviour. However, although “methodological agnosticism” 
was widely embraced for the scientific approach to religious study, it has received 
increasing criticism since the late-1990s, particularly from scholars employing post-
structural and post-colonial approaches (Cox 2003). Post-structuralist scholars deny that 
it is possible to attain “objective” and reified knowledge of religion, and thus scholars 
must be inescapably situated in a specific space and time that ideologically shape their 
position (see Hufford 1999).  
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When employing methodological agnosticism in interviews, I avoided asking questions 
involving truth concerning participants’ perspectives. For example, supernatural 
phenomena and in particular the Christian miracles play a crucial role in Chinese 
Christians’ perceptions of the world. Many Church members consider China to be a 
“chosen” nation where miracles are not only possible, but also are increasingly common. 
Many Christians also believe in faith healing. Stories of conversion described in previous 
research (Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018) often begin with a non-believer suffering from a 
serious illness, then a Christian “lays hands” on the person and prays to cast out the 
physical ailment or demon. A significant proportion of Christian workers claimed that 
they had witnessed such miracles. In this sense, to be agnostic meant that I should place 
myself in the position of not having sufficient information with which to make a decision 
on the truth of their claims of miracles.  
 
Although studying private religious experiences seems to validate the claim of insider 
status, some other researchers assert that the insider position needs to be abandoned when 
developing explanatory theories. Knott (2005) suggests that the scientific approach in the 
study of religion often privileges the outsider stance for the sake of attaining an objective 
interpretation. The social nature of religion is emphasised, in acknowledging that religion 
can be studied like other institutions and ideologies. Therefore, the aim of the scholar of 
religion should be to use the stance of methodological agnosticism to explain religious 
phenomena at a critical distance rather than by trying to ‘get inside’ the experience of 
religion. Notwithstanding the argument that scholars should observe religious phenomena 
at a critical distance, I do not reduce the stance of methodological agnosticism as a 
secular-naturalist-scientific epistemology which I intended to avoid.  Methodological 
agnosticism does not mean seeing religion as an object and social phenomena to be 
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studied and interpreted by reducing theology to purely social dynamics and migrant 
workers’ mechanical response to the social-economic environments they inhabited. In 
this sense, I also put significant effort into learning about Christian theologies and 
philosophies and participated in some Bible studies classes in the churches so as to 
understand the ways migrant workers made sense of the world.  
 
Apart from these three positions of insider, outsider, and agnostic, I also emphasise the 
problem of the researcher’s positionality, so as to incorporate reflexivity into the study of 
religion. This emphasis on reflexivity is largely dependent on developments in 
poststructuralism. For poststructuralists, meaning is not something possessed by specific 
objects or actions, but rather is the product of a series of relations which comprise the 
object or practice. In this approach, an allegedly objective stance can be criticised for its 
insufficient consideration of the effect of the researcher’s position, as the label “objective” 
itself is associated with a power relationship that attempts to create artificial detachment 
in order to construct an illusory objectivity and in turn to generate authority (Ferder 2006). 
Instead, reflexivity underscores important factors such as identity, status and power 
relationships which scholars may be (unwittingly) involved in during the research process 
(Shaw 1995; Donaldson and Pui-Lan 2002). As Rose (1997: 308) argues, reflexivity 
critically denies the universal employment of a neutral position in addressing situating 
knowledge: 
 
Reflexivity in general is being advocated by these writers as a strategy for situating 
knowledge: that is, as a means of avoiding the false neutrality and universality of so 
much academic knowledge. […] It is crucial to consider the role of the (multiple) 
“self”, showing how a researcher’s positionality (in terms of race, nationality, age, 
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gender, social and economic status, sexuality) may influence the “data” collected and 
thus the information that becomes coded as “knowledge”.  
  
In sum, the reflexive stance is a position which addresses the way in which all 
observations are inextricably interwoven with the self-referential statements of the 
researcher. Put simply, as Pillow (2003) suggests, to be reflexive is to be involved in an 
ongoing process of self-awareness that reflects upon how knowledge is produced.  One 
of the most noticeable trends in the use of reflexivity is to increase the attention paid to 
the researcher’s subjectivity in the research process, such as in a focus on how who I am 
and who I have been affect data collection and analysis. Davies (2008:12) argues that 
reflexivity also addresses how to consider the dual nature of social research, in “that it 
depends both on some connection with that being researched and on some degree of 
separation from it”.  Here, I realised that my identity, experiences, emotions and political 
and ideological stances may shape the ideas which I had when I went into the field and 
interacted with informants.  
 
During the process of research, I developed close relationships with many Christian 
migrant workers and church leaders. For example, in the first month of the fieldwork, I 
regularly participated in volunteering work and daily affairs in Foxconn House church A, 
including cooking, church maintenance, preparing Sunday worship, and visiting Christian 
workers who were ill. Therefore, I gradually became one of the members of this religious 
community, and many church members regarded me not merely as a researcher but also 
called me “brother Gao”. However, this also posed ethical challenges, because when 
friendships are established between the researcher and the researched, then there is the 
potential to exploit the latter in order to collect data. To minimise this effect, I made 
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efforts to avoid “faking friendship” with informants and maintained friendly interaction 
with informants I had interviewed until I left the field.  Gradually, I found myself being 
able to meet some of the pursuits and interests of my Christian respondents, such as 
helping them to hunt for jobs online. In general, establishing “guanxi” (interpersonal 
relations) was crucial in doing research in the Chinese context (see Chapter 9 for more 
discussion of guanxi). That is, doing research was also a process of co-producing an 
interpersonal network and reciprocal relationships. The church leaders and other 
Christian respondents actually welcomed me in working with them to promote the values 
of Christianity and therefore offered me much freedom to conduct tape-recorded 
interviews and observation. Yet, as we interacted more deeply with one another, some 
Christian respondents would from time to time invite me to be baptised. On such 
occasions, I normally explained to them that my research required a certain degree of 
neutrality and that I would consider the possibility of baptism in the future.   
 
It is noteworthy that political context is one of the most important structural forces that 
may influence the positionalities of both the researcher and the researched. As Thøgersen 
and Heimer (2006:1) note, “doing fieldwork inside the People’s Republic of China is an 
eye-opening but sometimes also deeply frustrating experience”. Given its authoritarian 
regime, China would appear to present various restrictions on researchers who are intent 
on eliciting genuine views and experiences of local people. During the Mao era (1949-
1977), the social sciences such as sociology, psychology, anthropology and  human 
geography were viewed by the party-state as “capitalist academics” and “fake academics” 
that justify the hegemony of Western imperialism, and were removed from mainstream 
research. As field-based research was strictly controlled during this period, researchers 
and policymakers found it difficult to achieve an accurate picture of what was really going 
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on in the country (such as the disastrous outcomes of the ‘Great Forward Movement’). 
Since the reform and opening-up policy from the early 1980s, along with Deng 
Xiaoping’s advocacy of the restoration of the social sciences, the Chinese state has 
allowed more freedom for researchers. In the post-reform era, the state’s policy on 
religion has also been transformed from suppression to active governance (Yang 2005). 
In 1981, the Central Committee of the CCP released ‘Document 19’, containing basic 
policy on religious affairs in post-reform China, which emphasises that “respect for and 
the protection of religious freedom is the Party’s basic policy on religious issues” (Guo 
& Zhang 2015: 2187). Notwithstanding the more open atmosphere, some topics such as 
ethnicity and religion are still too politically sensitive for research in China to be possible 
(Thøgersen and Heimer 2006). In particular, in the eyes of the CCP, Christianity is often 
associated with “religious infiltration”, which refers to any activity or propaganda that 
may be used to “overthrow the regime and socialist system, undermine unification of the 
nation, control religious organizations and religious affairs, as well as illegally establish 
and develop religious organizations and strongholds of activity” (Guo & Zhang 2015: 
2188).  According to Yang (2006), Christianity can be divided into three “markets” in 
accordance with the degree of legitimacy afforded by state regulations: the white market, 
primarily the TSPM churches that legally operate but under state surveillance; the grey 
market consisting of some house churches that are legally ambiguous but subject to 
flexible governance by the local state; and the black market constituted by illegal 
underground churches. The present research covers these three kinds of churches.  
 
In this sense, I had during my research to carefully negotiate the presence of state power 
so that both I and the participants needed to deal with the party-state’s discourses that 
define which topics can and cannot be talked about in order to ensure that the research 
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would not elicit unwanted political risk. Political factors sometimes imposed constraints 
on my access to certain fields. Carrying out research in the officially permitted churches 
normally required an introductory letter from the Chinese government or public 
institutions such as universities which a PhD student from a UK university cannot obtain. 
Thus, some church leaders, and in particular those of TSPM churches, were reluctant to 
participate in my research, although they were interested in its topic. Yet, despite 
government supervision, TSPM churches still have a large degree of autonomy in dealing 
with church affairs. Therefore, many TSPM church leaders who refused to personally 
participate in my research still allowed me to freely conduct interviews within their 
churches, as long as I did not break the law or spread anti-government propaganda. In 
some circumstances, I would conduct covert research as a normal visitor if interviews 
with church leaders were not necessary (and the ethics of covert research are discussed 
later). In underground churches, I risked suspicion of being a government agent, but this 
could be eliminated by establishing mutual trust and guanxi, as discussed above.  
 
The political context can also produce an “atmosphere of self-censorship” in which both 
interviewer and interviewees need to be aware of which topics are “unspeakable”. Apart 
from political factors, Chinese culture is also characterised by power distance; that is, 
individuals often have high acceptability or unequal power distribution (Hofstede and 
Hofstede 2005). This is reflected in hierarchical management structures and very 
powerful managers. Therefore, interviewees often tended to avoid offering negative 
comments, fearing that their involvement may become detrimental to themselves 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). To mitigate this effect, I carefully designed interview 
questions with different degrees of political sensitivity and observed interviewees’ 
responses to these questions. Through repeated experimentation, I found that most 
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interviewees could somehow be critical of the reality that they inhabited. They were 
reticent in commenting on the state’s religious policy and the legitimacy of the CCP, but 
many were critical of specific social issues that were less politically sensitive; for example, 
those relating to social injustice and class exploitation. In particular, most migrant worker 
interviewees freely criticised the factory regime, and the injustices of the labour market 
and hukou system that devalued them, although they rarely associated these problems 
with the party-state. However, it is noteworthy that reticence concerning politically 
sensitive topics is not simply due to fear, but also a collectivist culture in which 
individuals do not want to undermine the image of the collectivity (Zhou and Nunes 2013). 
Overall, given that my research primarily focuses on the lived experiences of migrant 
workers rather than political issues, participants felt able to articulate their true thoughts 
and feelings. Moreover, I used various strategies to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the research, including being open and honest with participants, collecting as much data 
as possible and cross-verifying it, and integrating the analysis with the existing literature.  
 
In order to be as reflexive as possible, my positioning as “agnostic” in both religious and 
political senses was particularly helpful in this study. Having studied at Newcastle 
University and completed extensive research on geographies of religion as well as often 
participating in Christian fellowship in the UK, I identified myself as a “cultural 
Christian”, a term utilised by Cao (2010: 18) to describe his positionality whilst 
conducting an ethnography of Christianity in Wenzhou, China, as “someone who 
appreciates the doctrine and the faith but has no personal commitment to the church”. As 
a “cultural Christian”, I participated a variety of church services and fellowships, listening 
to sermons, sharing everyday experiences with Christian fellows, studying the Bible, 
saying prayers, and even becoming one of the performers in a Christmas gala, like an 
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ordinary Christian practitioner would. However, I avoided participating in Holy 
Communion, which only baptised Christians are qualified to receive. 
 
Moreover, being “agnostic” in this study could also minimise any political and 
ideological bias. Carrying out research into religion in China is unavoidably a politically 
charged process and requires reflexivity and self-consciousness on the part of the 
researcher. This in turn affects the politics inherent in religious scholarship and the 
stances which scholars take in interpreting religious activities. However, existing research 
into religion in China is dominated by two competing political stances: one which accepts 
an atheist ideology and serves as part of state propaganda (Yang, 2004), and another 
(which is considered to be mainstream) which privileges a politicised perspective in 
interpreting China’s religion. The former tends to legitimate the state’s religious 
regulations and secularization campaign, whilst the latter aims to criticise the Chinese 
state’s policy on religion and thus challenges the repressive situation where religion is 
concerned.  
 
Yang (2004) suggests that research into religion in Communist China was first 
established in the service of atheist propaganda and religious control. This branch of 
scholarship, although accepting the ideological doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), includes two major forms of atheism: scientific and militant atheism.  Scientific 
atheism was inherent ikn China’s 1919 Five-Four Movement, which embraced the 
European Enlightenment and sees religion as illusion or the false consciousness of the 
people that will wither away as society progresses. On the other hand, militant atheism 
regards religion as the ‘opium of the masses’, and by extension as a false political 
ideology that serves anti-revolutionary forces; thus, control over religion is necessary to 
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eliminate religion. Nevertheless, scholars of religion in China who believe in atheism 
primarily adopt scientific atheism, which offers a theoretical basis for the limited 
tolerance of religion rather than antireligious measures (Yang 2004; 2010).    
  
In contrast, another branch of scholarship, particularly among those who publish in the 
English literature, often politicise issues of religion in China. As Cao (2010: 7) suggests, 
many researchers are more concerned with “moral clarity and an old political logic rather 
than the views of local believers”. These scholars often follow Marxist-inspired critical 
approaches which emphasise the political commitment of research. Such politicised 
stances nonetheless risk the reduction of religion in China to a binary construct of state 
domination and concessions to or the resistance of religious subjects.  
  
In this sense, being “agnostic” means that I should move beyond these two political and 
ideological stances and let the data “speak for themselves”.  In my view, there is no 
privileged explanation, and no political position and basis on which to prioritize one view 
as more correct; instead, all perspectives are discursively constituted, hence I emphasise 
the socially situated nature of knowledge. In light of this viewpoint, I do not presuppose 
that state power and neoliberalism are inherently hegemonic and thereby inimical to 
religion. In this sense, instead of asking migrant workers and church leaders about how 
they made sense of the political-ideological project imposed on Christianity, my 
ethnography put more emphasis on how they produced, consumed and interpreted 
Christian values and symbols. For example, in the interviews with church leaders, I would 
ask them how they operated in the church rather than how they responded to state 
regulation. In most circumstances, I viewed state power and the political-economic 
project of neoliberalism as a condition of being which migrant workers inhabit rather than 
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an all-compassing power structure to be resisted. In religious terms, to be agnostic does 
not mean reducing theological knowledge and migrant workers’ religious experiences to 
simply “social phenomena” devoid of transcendence. I therefore reconcile the positioning 
of agnosticism with a postsecular critique in the interpretation of research data; while 
acknowledging the importance of theological knowledge, I treat transcendent experience 
(such as of the holy spirit, healing and miracles in this study) as unknowable and do not 
claim to possess any privileged approach to their explanation.  
4.2.4 Practical issues of ethnography  
Access  
Gaining access so as to be able to collect data plays a crucial role in ethnography. It not 
only concerns the way researcher enters a place but also involves access to the social 
relations that take place there. In my research, I needed to gain access to Protestant 
churches in Shenzhen. In China, the Protestant church is not simply a public domain open 
to every individual, but is associated with the state’s regulation of religion. Two types of 
Protestant church in China can be identified according to whether or not they are state-
sanctioned: the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) Churches subject to state 
registration, and house churches or underground churches that operate outside of state 
surveillance. The house churches are often perceived as legally ambiguous or illegal 
according to state policy, thereby they often operate underground and are only open to 
one’s acquaintances or those deemed trustworthy. 
 
The first factor I needed to consider is gatekeepers, who control entry or police the 
boundaries of churches and their internal affairs. Before entry, I must know who has the 
power to make decisions on access, or who regards themselves as having the authority to 
secure or refuse access. My ethnography started in Sanzhuli Church, a TSPM church in 
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a “gospel village” which Hakka people had lived in for 800 hundred years. Despite the 
fact that most churchgoers were migrant workers, the church leaders (pastor and preacher) 
were aboriginal Hakka people. As a descendant of Hakka people10, I quickly attained the 
church leaders’ trust. I made my identity and research purposes clear to the gatekeepers 
and they were very willing to support my research. Meanwhile the most challenging part 
of the ethnography was finding and entering house churches, given their closed nature 
and distrust of non-Christian outsiders. It is noteworthy that the boundaries between 
TSPM churches and house churches are not necessarily impermeable, as some Christian 
respondents at Sanzhuli Church claimed that they often attended both TSPM and house 
churches. In this situation, the “snowball” sampling technique was useful. One Christian 
respondent introduced me to House Church A, an underground church located next to the 
Foxconn prermises. House Church A was operated by two Taiwanese senior managers at 
Foxconn who were also interested in my research project, as we had common concerns 
in wishing to understand the Christian lives of migrant factory workers. Having got the 
gatekeepers’ permission, the relationship established with those people also influence the 
progress and subsequent course of the research, and thereby how to facilitate the 
relationships with the relevant people looms large in the process of ethnography. Having 
stayed at Foxconn House Church A for one week up to the point that we had established 
basic mutual trust, I started to conducted interviews with Foxconn workers assisted by 
the church leaders. However, I also kept in mind that the gatekeepers or sponsors could 
shape the conduct and development of the research, as the researcher may tend to be 
channelled in particular directions in line with their networks of friendship and territory. 
In this situation, I sometimes found it difficult to achieve independence from the 
 
10 The name Hakka literally refers to “guest people”; they are a clan who migrated from the 
North to the South of China in ancient times.  
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gatekeepers who arranged respondents for me to interview. Therefore, I had to be 
constantly aware of whether or not I was limited by the horizons provided by a gatekeeper. 
Moreover, a researcher is often expected to be an “expert” who should be extremely well- 
informed with regard to the problems which arise and relevant solutions. In these 
circumstances, I tended to re-clarify the research purposes as well as the issue regarding 
whether my research can contribute to sort out the problems of organization or 
community to both gatekeepers and participants.  
 
Sampling  
I used an intersectional analytical frame to examine migrant workers’ religion, gender, 
age and class subjectivities. This project was conducted with 52 Christian migrant 
workers (32 males and 20 females) and 8 leaders, pastors and preachers in Shenzhen’s 9 
Protestant churches (including house churches and officially recognised churches) from 
September 2017 to March 2018. The migrant worker informants ranged in age from 17 
to 60 years, of whom 17 aged between 20-29 could be classified as young migrant 
workers.  As a small-scale study, this sample could not represent the diversity of rural 
migrant workers, but efforts were made to include different age groups, genders, places 
of origin, and religious denominations of informants. A majority of Protestant migrants 
were not explicitly conscious of their denomination, except for a few who identified 
themselves as Pentecostal. The official churches typically identified themselves with 
urban evangelism, while the rural migrant house churches often bore the legacy of a 
Pentecostal-style charismatic Protestantism due to their rural origins (see Kao 2009). The 
sampling was roughly in accordance with the demographic profile, where men constitute 
65.1% of Chinese rural migrant workers. This study primarily focuses on migrant factory 
workers, who are normally defined as part of the working class in China. Approximately 
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two-thirds of the informants were working or had worked at Foxconn, while the 
remaining informants were workers at other factories or held other occupations, such as 
construction workers and security guards. 
 
Table 4-2. Demographic information of respondents  
 
 
Interviews 
The in-depth qualitative interview is the primary research method which I employed to 
collect first-hand qualitative data. The interview method, as Valentine (2005) comments, 
is generally believed to be sensitive to rich social realities. It is employed to understand 
a research subject’s deep experiences and feelings, and to make sense of their own ideas 
and perspectives. The interview questions were primarily geared towards examining the 
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ways in which migrant workers experienced and interpreted religious beliefs in an 
everyday context.  
 
Following Byrne (2004), I regard the interview in terms of a “discursive repertoire”; that 
is, the researcher and the researched develop a collaborative relationship and make sense 
of discursive meanings in a mutually interactive way (McDowell 1992). In this sense, 
certain kinds of mutual disclosure and the sharing of meanings are necessary in interviews. 
To this end, the interviews were semi-structured, in which researcher can set parameters 
to open discussion, or relatively unstructured akin to open conversations within or beyond 
the research topic. This means that in my interview schedule I only listed some broad 
research concerns and questions, as well as the questions asked to collect background 
information about the research setting,. As the interviews proceeded, I normally started 
from a few broad and general questions regarding their how they converted to Christianity. 
Then I tried to elicit more detailed descriptions from the interviewees about the situations 
I wanted to examine and asked them to express their own ideas, viewpoints and 
judgements. A mutual and conversational partnership in the interview was paramount for 
me, since I am a well-educated and culturally “mainstream” postgraduate student and I 
could not guarantee that my understanding of the interview data would accurately reflect 
the broad social, cultural and political time-spaces which condition migrant workers’ 
perspectives and experiences. So, it was necessary to allow ample room for interviewees 
to give statements and counterstatements in the joint construction of knowledge and 
viewpoints. To reduce my bias in interpretation, I shared my views, understandings and 
tentative conclusions with the interviewees. This rendered possible more in-depth 
exchanges of ideas. In sum, the interviews I conducted tended to involve an active process 
of mutual discussion and dialogue, rather than a passive Q & A session. 
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I also drew on the method of the narrative biographical interview which prevails in studies 
of migrants (Rosenthal 1993). That is, I conducted open interviews but guided 
participants to represent their life stories. Yet the results depended upon the participants’ 
willingness to narrate what happened and which parts of the story were more meaningful 
than others.  This method was employed to not only reveal what people have been through, 
but also how they narrate and interpret their own lived experience through the telling of 
stories about their lives. Although the interviews were unstructured, I outlined some open-
ended questions about their migration history, conversion history, working life and living 
strategies in the cities. I paid particular attention to the life stage at which they converted 
to Christianity and participated in urban churches, and how Christianity impacted upon 
their experiences as migrants.   
 
Ethical considerations in ethnography  
Although the goal of ethnographic research is to produce knowledge this does not mean 
that this goal should be achieved at all costs, and therefore the ethical issues surrounding 
social research must be attended to. It is generally recognized that there are five main 
aspects of ethical issues that need to be considered: informed consent, privacy, direct and 
potential harm, and consequences for future research.  
 
(1) Informed consent and the ethics of covert research  
It is generally argued that the people being researched must consent to be interviewed, 
where they make decisions based on the relevant accurate and comprehensive information 
related to the process. This means that participants should have right to withdraw from 
participation at any time. Informed consent was addressed carefully with participants and 
the nature of their involvement in the study was explained as well as the aims and 
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objectives of the research, using appropriate expressions that migrant workers could 
comprehend. If necessary, I would give an information leaflet to participants with various 
questions made clear.  I confirmed that informed consent was sought from participants in 
terms of explaining to them the nature and purpose of the research and their right to refuse 
to participate in it and to withdraw at any time. This was presented at the beginning of 
the interview and all participants were requested to sign a consent form or to confirm  
consent orally to indicate their willingness to participate in the research. Moreover, all 
participants were reminded that they could withdraw from the research at any time 
without having to give a reason.  
 
However, the paper-based consent form will not be very often used in a serious manner. 
In many circumstances, formally styled, paper-based consent forms may be associated 
with official state bureaucracy and considered to be “too formal”. Thus, the form can 
evoke unnecessary and unwelcome feelings of caution and nervousness. Also, most 
interviewees in China tended to keep their true names secret and thus were reluctant to 
give a formal signature on the forms. Hence in many cases I had to avoid using the formal 
paper document in order to maintain a comfortable atmosphere during the conversations. 
Nonetheless, I did ask for the interviewees’ oral consent for the interviews to be 
conducted and for me to use the data they contained. If they were also willing to sign the 
consent forms, participants would not be obliged to use their real names and may sign 
using a pseudonym or symbol.  On the occasions in which I did use a formal consent form, 
the document concerned can be found in Appendix I.  
 
However, in some circumstances I did conduct covert observation without referring to 
the principle of informed consent, in order to avoid the presence of the researcher 
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affecting the authenticity of the environment being studied and to cross-verify data in 
different research conditions (Calvey 2008). However, a variety of strategies were 
deployed to minimise potential negative outcomes of covert research activity, such as  
betraying trust and bringing harm to people and organisations involved in the research. 
In some house or underground churches, covert observation was conducted only in the 
phase of my entry into the situation – and once the church leader refused my research 
intent, I would terminate my research activities and abandon the material collected there. 
In one TSPM mega-church, I conducted semi-covert research; that is, I received the 
informed consent of every single interviewee individually but did not inform the church 
leaders of my research intentions. In this situation, I would limit my research to 
conducting interviews only. Moreover, to minimise any potential harm to interviewees, 
the interviews were conducted outside of this church and all information was kept 
confidential.   
 
(2) Confidentiality and anonymity 
The information collected from participants can be classified as public information and 
that was secret or confidential, and hence a very important concern in ethnographic 
research is to define what is private or public. In my research context, I treated the 
participants as a meaningful research sample rather than as specific persons to be 
identified. Moreover, the researcher also needs to consider the public and private spaces 
in which interviews may be conducted. Both the process of the interview and the 
information from it should not be leaked by third-party or person.  
  
The interviews took place in private spaces where the conversations would not be 
overheard, such as in the tea houses of churches. Audio-recordings, transcripts and field 
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notes were digitalised at the earliest possible opportunity and hard copies and original 
audio-recordings were destroyed immediately after they had been digitalised and stored 
in password-protected spaces. All information has been anonymised through the use of 
codes and/or pseudonyms and the removal of specific information that may render 
participants or others identifiable. Completed consent forms were stored in a safe place 
(a locked filing cabinet in my private accommodation). 
 
(3) Direct and potential harm: 
Given that I investigated how Christians workers made sense of their situation of 
exploitation in the factory, I needed to clearly consider if my questions would create stress 
or provoke anxiety, especially when I was evaluating the workers’ lives. In some 
circumstances, being subject to research can create or worsen the anxiety of people who 
are already in stressful situations, and therefore research may be regarded as unethical in 
this sense. To overcome this ethical challenge, I remained alert throughout the interviews 
to any signs of discomfort, such as shown in facial expressions and body language, and 
changed the direction of discussion or chose to terminate the interview if it appeared that 
participants were experiencing discomfort. Another potential area of harm could be the 
consequences of the publication of ethnographic accounts, which may open the 
participants’ behaviour to public scrutiny. Exposing them to publicity can impact on the 
reputations of individuals, organisations, and locations, as well as hurting the feelings of 
those involved. The solution employed in this thesis was to treat the individuals and 
institutions  studied as abstract objects to minimise the directional effect from my study. 
In the ethnographic writing, I therefore always use pseudonyms.  
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Chapter 5 
Reconstituting the neoliberal subjectivity of migrants: 
Christian theo-ethics and the migrant labour regime 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the connections between the secularist-neoliberal governance 
of migrants and Christian theo-ethics. Regulating migrant labourers has been one of the 
primary mechanisms of the state’s secular and neoliberal governance. This chapter 
therefore focuses on the “actually existing” workings of this neoliberal migrant regime 
and in particular its everyday encounters with locally based ethical agents. Explorations 
of “actually existing” and “variegated” neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Ong 
2007) have increasingly focused on how neoliberal governance and subjectivities are 
assembled and negotiated through grounded political-economic realities and locally 
based social agents. In particular, migrant labourers have been viewed as the “object-
targets” through which neoliberal subjectivities and ethics are materialised, maintained, 
and reproduced (Pun & Lu 2010; De Neve 2012; Buckley 2013). Therefore, how to 
manage the bodies of migrant labourers – to optimise their economic utility while 
diminishing their labour costs – has been a crucial task for the neoliberal agenda (Ong 
2007; Buckley 2013). 
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However, recent studies of the geographies of religion have emphasised the role of faith-
based activities and religious values that can open up new sets of logics and processes 
that defy the dominant subjectivities normalised by neoliberal ethics (Cloke and 
Beaumont 2013; Williams 2015; Cloke, May and Johnsen 2011; Cloke et al. 2019). In 
particular, as Cloke et al. argue (2019), theo-ethics (e.g., the Christian values of agape 
and caritas) and their translation in faith-based praxis not only actively resist neoliberal 
subjectification that ignores care for others but also create possibilities of hopeful re-
enchantment in an age of neoliberal uncertainty. In this sense, religious ethics and values 
are crucial in understanding the operation of neoliberalism in quotidian encounters with 
ethnically flavoured agents. This chapter therefore contributes to this discussion by 
exploring the connections between the neoliberal governance of migrants and Christian 
theo-ethics. First, I examine how neoliberal governance and subjectivities are 
materialised through the locally based disciplinary labour regime in Shenzhen, China. 
Second, I investigate the lived enactment of theo-ethics in the everyday praxis of care and 
justice for marginalised migrant workers and how theo-ethics can rework neoliberal 
subjectivities. 
 
Nonetheless, both neoliberalism and theo-ethics are highly culturally variable and need 
to be contextualised within specific political, economic and social entanglements. In this 
chapter, I will situate the analysis of neoliberalism and theo-ethics within China’s place-
particular autocratic and authoritarian governance and its moral ground on state-enforced 
secularism. Unlike in liberal and pluralist societies, neoliberalist ideologies are often 
incorporated into China’s state developmentalism and the autocratic rule that produces 
docile and governable subjects (Qian and Florence, 2020; Qian and Guo 2018; Gao, Qian 
and Yuan 2018). Therefore, neoliberalism is complicit in China’s secular ideologies, in 
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which hegemonic discourses of reason, efficiency and progress can override religious and 
humanist ethics . The collaboration of the authoritarian state and neoliberalism is 
particularly evident in Shenzhen, a paradigmatic Chinese city epitomising the country’s 
neoliberal reform (Pun and Lu 2010). According to the records, approximately 70% of 
the city’s total population are migrants, classified as non-residents and lacking the urban 
citizenship necessary to receive welfare and public services under the Chinese hukou 
system. This apartheid-like hukou system, together with the disciplinary factory system, 
has created a highly exploitative migrant labour regime that aims to produce durable, 
governable and self-reliant migrant bodies and minimise their labour costs and 
consumption of welfare. However, I also suggest that this neoliberal migrant labour 
regime is constantly changing in line with the negotiation between autocratic power and 
neoliberal logic. After the 2010 Foxconn suicide event in which 18 young migrant 
workers attempted suicide because of alienation and spiritual emptiness, the neoliberal 
migrant labor regime has switched from coercive discipline to active governance that 
regulates migrants’ psychological subjectivity. 
 
It is against this background that this chapter discusses how Christian theo-ethics can 
open alternative ethical spaces beyond the subjectivity endorsed by the secular state and 
neoliberalism. In response to the Foxconn suicide event, many faith-based organisations 
(FBOs) have emerged, in line with the nationwide “Christian fever”, to provide care and 
spiritual support for vulnerable migrant workers. The simultaneous flourishing of 
Christianity and neoliberalism in Shenzhen has created a social niche for faith-based 
praxis and the quotidian performance of theo-ethics. The Christian theo-ethics of love, 
care, and equality based on brotherhood/sisterhood not only create an ethical space that 
enables migrant workers to navigate their sense of alienation and depression but also offer 
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a means for reconciling religious and humanist ethics to enable collaborative work with 
factory workers. In particular, Christian theo-ethics of transformation and Christian 
entrepreneurship have been translated into a new faith-based praxis that goes against the 
militarised factory regime. I argue that, although theo-ethics oftentimes co-produces 
neoliberal governance by either ameliorating neoliberal subjectivity or drawing on 
neoliberal logics per se, it nevertheless creates possibilities of more hopeful spaces and 
hybrid subjectivities beyond secularism. 
 
5.2 Neoliberal subjectivity, migration and theo-ethics in China 
Instead of viewing neoliberalism as a fixed set of economic reforms that produces 
homogenising political results and social transformation, considerable efforts have been 
made to explore the hybrid and variegated character of the “actually existing” processes 
of neoliberalisation (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Ong 2007). In this formulation, 
neoliberalism has been described as an economic hegemony suturing a top-down market-
oriented restructuring with the activities of everyday life (Barnett 2005) or as a logic of 
governing citing market utility to justify socioeconomic regulation and the curtailment of 
social welfare (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Neoliberal governance therefore creates new 
“ontological conditions-of-being” (Jean and Comaroff 2000: 239) for subject formation, 
under which individuals are encouraged to see themselves as self-managing, autonomous, 
and entrepreneurial subjects in accordance with the requirement for “governable but 
alienated” subjects in neoliberal orders (Kipnis 2007: 385; Ong 2007). This particularly 
manifests in the workfare regime, in which the state is actively involved in the promotion 
of competitive, flexible and precarious labour regimes tailored to the footloose nature of 
global capitalism (Peck & Theodore 2001). 
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In conjunction with this, a growing body of research has focused on migrant labourers as 
“object targets” for neoliberal governance that facilitate and justify the global division of 
labour and transnational movement of capital (Pun & Lu 2010; Ong 2010; De Neve 2012; 
Buckley 2013). This line of research indicates that regulating the bodies of migrant 
labourers is viewed as one of the primary mechanisms of neoliberal governance, as 
neoliberalism heavily depends on the calculation of both the utility and bodily needs of 
human beings and the process of subjectivisation through which neoliberal ideologies are 
articulated. 
 
First, the neoliberal governance of migrants often operates through a scalar and 
differentiated politics that reconciles the structural power of a deregulated market with a 
locally situated mechanism of discipline (Ong 2010; Gill 1995). It decontextualises the 
labouring population as placeless free subjects at a global scale but simultaneously 
delineates a new social hierarchy that differentiates segments of the population based on 
economic utility in the name of “market civilisation” (Hardt and Negri 2000; Gill 1995). 
In the situated assemblage, neoliberalism is not a standardised apparatus but sometimes 
works in tandem with autocratic agendas in the pursuit of rational optimising. In India 
and Malaysia, for instance, “neoliberal thinking is directed toward the promotion of 
educated and self-managing citizens who can compete in global knowledge markets”, 
while cheap labourers are excluded from the neoliberal ethics of self-authorisation (Ong 
2007: 6). Instead, those who are viewed as less neoliberal subjects (e.g., low-skilled 
workers) are often the victims of more coercive regulation and discipline utilised to shape 
their neoliberal adaptability. This is also illustrated by labour camps (Buckley 2013) and 
factory dormitories (Pun 2010), which are deployed by some autocratic regimes as 
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neoliberal spatial politics to accommodate and govern migrant workers’ everyday lives 
and hence diminish their labour cost. 
 
Second, the hegemony of neoliberalism is not simply maintained through a common 
economic logic but circulated and reproduced through the moulding of particular 
subjective forms and the manipulation of belief, desire, and affect (Cloke et al. 2019; 
Anderson 2016; Qian and Guo 2018). This is particularly manifested in the neoliberal 
state’s discourses of desirable labouring subjects as the basis of citizenship and social 
inclusion, carefully marking the undesirable “others” who are denied protection 
(Varsanyi, 2008). In this cultural–ideological superstructure, migrants’ value, worthiness 
and eligibility for welfare are defined primarily in terms of their productive bodies and 
their industriousness and economic potential rather than their political participation 
(McDowell, 2004). On the other hand, Anderson (2012) argues that neoliberalism relies 
on a manipulation of collective feelings that shapes individuals’ conception of hope and 
their desired future. This affective politics often entails self-destruction and immaterial 
labour exploitation, which is “increasingly automated by technologies of self-regulation, 
targets, and a normalised gig economy in which ‘get the job done’ mentalities have come 
to legitimatise sequential servitude to the ‘next task’ and downgrading of working 
conditions” (Cloke 2019: 57).    
 
Many scholars have argued that the political-economic transformation in post-reform 
China is a contingent integration of neoliberal logics and techniques into its authoritarian 
governance, despite the discrepancies between China’s reform and ideal neoliberal 
restructuring (Zhou et al. 2019; Wu 2010; Zhang, 2012; Ong, 2007; Pun & Lu, 2010; 
Kipnis, 2007; Qian, 2018). This is supported by the following evidence: the market as a 
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dominant mechanism in the optimisation of capital accumulation; the state’s creation and 
promotion of a flexible labour regime; the production of spatial class differentiation; and 
the state-propagated norms of self-improvement, individual responsibilities, competition, 
and work ethic. Harvey (2005) emphasises that the ultimate goal of neoliberalism is not 
the market-oriented reconfiguration but rather the restoration of elite forms of class power. 
This argument resonates with Ong’s (2007: 6) observation that the neoliberal regime in 
China privileges some self-enterprising groups while marginalising others; in this regime, 
“the vast majority of Chinese people outside [the loop of the neoliberal ethos] are not 
groomed for this kind of self-authorisation, but serve as a vast reservoir of cheap labour 
power frequently abused by self-enterprising elites”. In particular, Kipnis (2007) argues 
that the state-propagated discourse of suzhi (quality) embodies this neoliberal logic of 
class differentiation. In most circumstances, suzhi equates with one’s economic utility 
defined by market value and human capital. The suzhi discourse is therefore understood 
as a “blame the victim” governing technique, e.g., labelling rural migrants as having low 
suzhi ascribes their marginality to individual quality while obfuscating the fact that the 
state/capitalist alliance is the very source of institutional marginality (Anagnost, 2004; 
Jacka, 2009; Qian and Guo 2018). In this sense, suzhi discourse actually de-politicises 
class and other hierarchical differences that legitimate structural inequality through 
neoliberal ideologies. Overall, instead of arguing about the extent to which China is 
neoliberal, it is more productive to view neoliberalism as “a set of malleable technologies 
and practices” being reconfigured in a local socio-economic environment (Zhang 2012). 
 
Some scholars have noted that neoliberalism is not a dominant force that has a direct 
effect on shaping the conduct of individuals but rather is reproduced and negotiated 
through an actually existing assemblage of techniques and ethics (Williams 2015; Cloke 
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et.al 2013). This line of research highlights the role of social agency in the reproduction 
of neoliberal ideologies and ethics. In this way, religion (including religious values, actors 
and organisations) has been viewed as an alternative force that can subvert, resist and 
rework the subjectivities and ethics normalised by neoliberal dominance (Williams, 2015). 
Religion is becoming increasingly prominent in the public sphere, as the vacuum created 
by the neoliberal state with respect to welfare and social services is being filled by FBOs 
(Williams, 2015). Some commentators interpret these faith-based activities as self-
serving acts of charity that provide an outlet for liberal guilt and morality or as the 
incorporation of religion into the political ethos of state-led governmentality. Therefore, 
the public engagement of religion has been interpreted as a by-product of neoliberalism 
serving the state’s goals of retaining faith-based civil forces to delegate the risk of welfare 
provision (Buckingham 2009; Hackworth 2012). However, the perspective of co-option 
might obscure the imperatives of ethical values and registers in subject formation and the 
ethically attuned politics that animates more hopeful imaginations, subjectivities, and 
praxes as alternatives to neoliberal norms (Cloke et al. 2019). Therefore, in the 
burgeoning geographies of postsecularity, religion has been re-theorised as an ethical and 
self-reflective project that co-constitutes the values and ideologies of secular and 
neoliberal modernity (Cloke et al. 2019; Gao, Qian and Yuan 2018; Williams 2015). 
 
Here, Cloke’s (2010) notion of theo-ethics is helpful for emphasising the formation of 
ethical subjectivity beyond secularism and neoliberal metrics and the role that theological 
notions play in shaping the behaviour of faith-motivated actors (Williams 2015). Theo-
ethics is not equivalent to conventional theologies or religious values; rather, “it follows 
an emerging post-phenomenological approach to religion which focuses on 
conceptualising the lived embodiment of religion” and highlights the way lived religiosity 
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or spirituality is experienced and performed through faith-motivated praxis (Williams 
2015: 195). 
 
Building on arguments made by Cloke (2010; Cloke et al. 2019; Cloke and Beaumont 
2013) and Williams (2015), theo-ethics provides at least three ethical and political 
possibilities, especially in the releasing of new ethical energies that reconcile religious 
and secular subjectivities. First, theo-ethics creates opportunities for the assimilation and 
mutually reflexive transformation of religious and secular values. Theo-ethics emphasises 
the change from orthodox faith and ecclesial practice to the performative and embodied 
interpretation of theologies to reconcile the ethics of transcendence with this-worldly care 
and public engagement (Cloke and Beaumont 2013; Williams 2015). Moreover, theo-
ethics moves beyond both religious and secular fundamentalism towards the more hybrid 
formation of faith-related identity and practice based on the pursuit of common good (e.g., 
the Christian value of agape). For example, theo-ethics serves as a postsecular 
rapprochement in which religious and non-religious actors come together to provide care 
for excluded and marginalised people (Cloke and Beaumont 2012). Second, theo-ethics 
may serve as active resistance to neoliberal subjectification, which relies on self-to-self 
ethical relations and is therefore indifferent to the “other”. Theo-ethics is premised on the 
critiques that neoliberal secularism implies an indifference to care for others and a broad 
disavowal of any possibility and hope beyond the market-state’s reach (Blond 1998; 
Cloke 2010). The neoliberal form of concern for otherness is constrained by a material 
logic and rationale and therefore fails to include the exotic other – “others are typically 
kept at a geographical and representational distance, press-ganged into the role of 
perpetual victims to be observed through societal lens of moral detachment and ethical 
indifference” (Cloke 2010: 229). Instead, theo-ethics involves a call to love others, devoid 
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of rational calculation and social expectations that impose conditions on the recipients. 
Third, theo-ethics may create an alternative affective politics of hope that cuts through 
the precarious and cruel optimism of neoliberalism. It provides new imaginations and 
hope in life contained in the name of God but not confined to that name (Cloke et al. 
2019). Theo-ethics places a greater emphasis on religious or spiritual states, such as love 
and suffering, than on the truth and story of God. However, there are few studies 
examining how this affective capacity for hope, desire, justice, and equality are brought 
into being in faith-based praxis. Nevertheless, a more critical account of theo-ethics is 
needed to focus on the discursive formation of theo-ethics within specific contexts 
(Williams 2015). In light of the above, this chapter reflects on the specific economic and 
political conditions in which theo-ethics can convey ethical agency and produce more 
hopeful and progressive spaces. 
 
5.3 Migrant workers’ subjectivities under neoliberal governance 
5.3.1 Exploitative labour regime 
In this section, I will specify how neoliberal logic and subjectivities are materialised 
through the locally based disciplinary labour regime in Shenzhen. In Shenzhen, a high-
pressure production regime and exploitative labour relations are deployed to govern 
migrants’ bodies so that labour costs and labour protections can be substantially reduced. 
Under the suzhi discourse, rural migrants are often regarded as subjects with low market 
value and competitiveness, which therefore legitimates the coercive discipline imposed 
on them to reinforce their adaptation to a neoliberal order. This is particularly the case in 
Shenzhen’s manufacturing factories, including Foxconn’s factories, where disciplinary 
techniques such as partnerships with vocational schools, intensive pre-work training, 
compulsory overtime, strict surveillance with monetary penalties and collective 
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dormitories work jointly to produce docile migrant labourers. For instance, to meet the 
need for young and productive labourers, many factories engage in business partnerships 
with vocational schools that “dispatch” students to work as trainees in the factories or 
directly recommend graduates for formal jobs. As one migrant worker named Hui 
remarked, the vocational school guaranteed him a job as a technician at Foxconn after 
graduation, yet the job he received did not meet his expectations because Foxconn 
allowed limited opportunity for him to practise the technical skills he learned, and he 
simply repeated the same operation to test the mobile phone models. Other assembly line 
workers were subject to more coercive discipline standards. As one Foxconn worker 
stated, a slogan reading “Outside the laboratory, there is no high-tech but only executive 
discipline” was posted on the wall of his shop floor, which vividly expressed the 
management philosophy at Foxconn. On Foxconn’s assembly lines, workers have to 
finish every action in seconds, and the time is carefully calculated; if they fail to meet this 
standard, the workers are condemned for dragging down the productivity of the assembly 
line. Moreover, to keep the assembly line working uninterruptedly, the workers are not 
allowed to go to the toilet until the line leader temporally takes over the position. 
 
However, it is not the regulatory discipline but rather the refashioning of migrant workers’ 
subjectivity that most efficiently maximises productivity. For example, Foxconn adopted 
an ideological campaign to shape migrant workers into autonomous and self-responsible 
subjects, aiming to turn a worker “into his own slave driver” (Thompson, 1963: 356). The 
founder of Foxconn, Terry Gou, continually propagated the teachings among staff and 
workers that “A harsh environment is a good thing” and “Suffering is the identical twin 
of growth”. The master production schedule at Foxconn has as its basic unit the assembly 
line, and each unit and worker is required to be self-responsible for the quality and 
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productivity within a specific work procedure. At the beginning and the end of the work 
day, the line supervisors often give lectures to production workers emphasising the 
production targets and the importance of a professional attitude. Workers are repeatedly 
reminded that they are responsible for every expensive electronic product and piece, and 
any mistake will cause unexpected damage. Thus, it is ideologically justified to punish 
the workers with monetary penalties if they fail to act in an autonomous and self-
disciplined manner. 
 
It is therefore common for migrant workers to feel incarcerated and alienated within this 
hyper-exploitative labour regime. Jincheng, a 37-year-old assembly line worker, noted 
that in contrast to the exploitative and difficult conditions at other small manufacturing 
factories in Shenzhen, the experience of working at Foxconn was more programmatic and 
repressive: 
 
I couldn’t adapt to Foxconn’s management culture, the militarised management. I had 
worked at some small factories with worse working conditions than Foxconn’s, but I 
didn’t have such depressed feelings. They emphasise that every worker on the 
production line is not allowed to have any personality. You don’t need to be concerned 
with the most appropriate operations that you often need to think about at the small 
factories. In Foxconn, the only thing you need to do is to strictly follow the SOP 
(standard operating procedure) they designated and repeat the actions… Sometimes 
you cannot catch up with the speed of the work because of tiredness on the night shift, 
so the products will pile up and the line head often comes to screw you. Working at 
Foxconn often makes you feel that you have no dignity, and your willpower will be 
gradually worn away. 
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Indeed, the long-term depression wrought by the alienation and exploitation experienced 
by migrant workers ultimately exploded, as in 2010, when 18 young workers attempted 
suicide by jumping from the production facilities at Foxconn; 14 died. Therefore, 
although neoliberal labour regime heavily depends on the bodies of migrant labourers as 
a site for capital accumulation (Buckley 2013; Kipnis 2007), the corporeal and affective 
life of migrant workers also in turn limit the capacity of the reproductivity of this labour 
regime (Pun & Lu 2010; Anderson 2016). It is in this sense that the neoliberal labour 
regime evolves from the disciplinary power to less coercive biopolitics that fosters 
particular durable labouring subjects.   
 
5.3.2 Post-tragedy era: from discipline to neoliberal governance 
The Foxconn tragedy drew media attention nationwide and abroad to the working 
conditions and welfare of China’s migrant workers. Not only the Chinese central 
government but also several Foxconn customers, including Apple and Hewlett-Packard, 
participated in the investigation independently. The overwhelming denouncement 
impelled both the state and manufacturing factories to collaboratively re-adjust the 
governance regime of migrant workers. In the post-tragedy era, the labour regime has 
therefore evolved from disciplinary regulation to a less coercive, but no less hegemonic, 
neoliberal governance, which aims to cultivate both durable and governable labouring 
subjects. 
 
As I discussed above, one distinction of China’s neoliberalism is its integration into the 
authoritarian regime. This is particularly the case in the state’s crisis management of the 
Foxconn suicide event. One of the state’s first responses to the crisis was to reclaim its 
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autocratic power over the labour regime from the realm of the free market. This resulted 
in a power configuration resembling a coalition between the state and capitalists. For 
instance, a former Taiwanese senior manager at Foxconn, Evan, a Christian himself, 
remarked: 
 
The State Council sent officers from Beijing to Foxconn to manage the crisis. They 
said, first, the successive suicides must be stopped; otherwise, they would stop the 
production of Foxconn. 
 
To mitigate the labour conflicts, the state started to re-emphasise the enforcement of 
labour laws protecting migrant workers’ rights but continued to exhibit a certain level of 
tolerance of the violation of labour rights in exchange for capital accumulation. For 
example, since 2010, Shenzhen has witnessed more effective enforcement of labour laws 
and labour contracts, especially in terms of increasing workers’ wages, limiting their 
workload and improving their working conditions. However, notwithstanding the labour 
costs being borne by the manufacturing sectors, the denial of migrant workers’ access to 
the urban welfare system remained unchallenged. Moreover, the state also made efforts 
to reduce the enormous size of the migrant worker population that Foxconn 
accommodates to a level within reach of the state’s effective regulation. Former Foxconn 
senior manager Evan explained: 
 
The state council said, they didn’t want Foxconn to be so huge. Currently, Foxconn 
has more than one million staff and production workers [in mainland China]. First, it 
will be difficult to manage such a huge network of migrant workers, especially if they 
are mobilised [to protest or resist the state]. Second, there is a significant proportion 
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of Chinese people with unhealthy mental states. [If too many people concentrate on 
Foxconn], suicide will create a kind of atmosphere that provokes more successors. 
 
In this sense, the neoliberal agenda in China is not to create a deregulated sphere of free-
market but rather “a set of malleable technologies” (Zhang 2012) that the state can 
constantly reconcile autocratic power and logics of deregulation in the service of the state 
developmentalism (Ong 2010). On the other hand, Foxconn also deployed a series of 
coping measures to prevent suicide, including installing suicide-prevention netting and 
asking employees to sign legally binding no-suicide pledges with government 
acquiescence. However, the most substantial change took place in Foxconn’s 
management model. In tandem with the state’s emphasis on migrant workers’ mental 
health, Foxconn deployed a new form of biopolitics to differentiate and cultivate desirable 
workers. In the post-tragedy era, the discourse of xinli suzhi (psychological quality) has 
been created as a new hegemonic criterion that defines a worker’s value in terms of not 
only productive bodies but also their psychological endurance of exploitation. This 
criterion indeed functioned as a new model of inclusion/exclusion in the labour market.  
In response to the suicide crisis, a set of regulatory techniques, such as strict surveillance 
of workers’ emotional state, psychotherapy consultation, and pre-work psychological 
evaluation, have been introduced to precisely distinguish the “dangerous” workers from 
the normal. A retired senior manager at Foxconn, Chan, who previously served as a 
director of one factory, explained: 
 
Quan: What new measures have been adopted in response to the suicide event since 
2010? I heard that Foxconn launched a psychological campaign, is it true? 
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Chan: Yes, too many. First, every production unit was required to identify those who 
had psychological problems. So, the front-line managers must pay attention to their 
workers’ emotions and behaviour.  
Quan: How did Foxconn treat them if they were identified as unusual?  
Chan: The front-line managers were required to keep close contact with them. For 
example, if I am a group head who manages 20 people, I should pay special attention 
to those workers with eccentric personalities. If a worker isn’t on duty abnormally, 
you should immediately contact him and ask him about his circumstances… For those 
who had serious psychological problems, to the extent that they cannot regularly work, 
we would persuade them to leave the job.  
  
In this context, suzhi discourse is in essence a “blame the victim” neoliberal technique 
(Kipnis 2007) that ascribes suicides to workers’ own psychological quality and durability 
to exploitation. In addition to strict surveillance of workers, Foxconn also made efforts to 
scientifically profile and improve workers’ psychological quality. Shortly after the 
suicide event, Foxconn launched a large-sample psychological investigation and 
psychotherapy programme in cooperation with Shenzhen’s two hospitals and the 
Shenzhen Health and Family Planning Commission. The investigation indicated that 
approximately 8% of Foxconn’s workers had a psychological disorder (primarily 
depression) or post-traumatic stress disorder precipitated by the suicide event (Fang et.al. 
2012). During this campaign, 629 workers at the Foxconn Longhua campus received 
psychotherapy or psychological counselling, among which 181 were classified as high-
risk workers who had made suicide attempts (Fang et al. 2012). However, this 
psychological campaign can be interpreted more as a crisis management and governance 
technique premised on the logic of rational optimising than as a long-term project aiming 
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to substantially improve workers’ psychological wellbeing. For example, 1000 
production workers and staff who were identified as having good psychological quality 
were trained as “psychological assistants” to provide counselling and care to other  
 
             Figure 5-1. Mental nets installed in the Foxconn dormitories to prevent suicide  
              Source: pictured by the author 
 
workers. In this sense, workers were encouraged to be autonomous and self-responsible 
subjects so that the labour costs of improving workers’ psychological quality could be 
successfully channelled to the workers themselves. Foxconn subsequently set up a “care 
hotline”, namely, 78585, which is phonetically similar to “please help me, help me” in 
Mandarin, to provide counselling services or help to workers. However, the extent to 
which this hotline can help workers solve problems is doubtful, as the hotline 
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receptionists can do nothing to address or coordinate the structural conflicts that many 
workers often complain of, such as excessive overtime and conflicts with their line leaders. 
Instead, the 78585 hotline has become an outlet for releasing the feelings of repression 
and dissatisfaction that workers encountered in the workplace. As former senior manager 
Evan commented: 
 
Foxconn claimed that every worker was welcome to call 78585, regardless of what 
problems they have. Some workers called 78585 when they were unhappy, but 
basically the reasons they called were strange, for example, “I don’t want to have a 
night shift”, “I asked for a leave, but the workshop director didn’t approve”… But 
workers indeed need a channel to express their dissatisfaction despite the unreasonable 
requests. 
 
It is noteworthy that the psychotherapeutic practices Foxconn adopted did not aim to 
improve workers’ wellbeing and welfare per se but rather served as a technology of 
subjectivity to manage workers’ bodies and emotions and thus cultivate ideal labouring 
subjects more durable under exploitation. This is consistent with Rose’s (1990: 257) 
argument that “[psychotherapeutic] technologies for the government of the soul operate 
not through crushing subjectivity in the interests of control and profit, but by seeking to 
align political, social and institutional goals with individual pleasures and desires”. 
Although Foxconn’s governing regime has switched from coercive discipline to more 
flexible neoliberal governance, the ultimate aim of fostering both governable and self-
governing labouring subjects on the basis of the logic of optimisation has remained 
unchanged. The neoliberal labour regime has increasingly reproduced through the 
 145  
manipulation of desires and affects of migrant workers, which leads them to a more 
durable self-exploitation (Anderson 2016).   
 
In sum, I suggest that neoliberal governance was reproduced and materialised in the 
locally based labour relations in Shenzhen. In particular, the regulation of migrants’ 
bodies epitomises the neoliberal logics of rational optimising, which demands the 
refashioning of migrant workers’ subjectivity to feed into capital accumulation while 
simultaneously diminishing labour costs and workers’ consumption of welfare. This 
resonates with recent studies of neoliberalism and migration (Buckley 2013; Qian and 
Guo 2018), which reported that migrants’ bodies offer an important site for the 
reproduction of neoliberal subjectivities. However, it is noteworthy that the agenda of 
neoliberalism is complicit with China’s secular ideologies and autocratic power in aiming 
to produce docile and governable subjects even at a cruel human cost. 
 
5.4. Negotiating neoliberal domination through Christian theo-ethics 
The alliance of the autocratic state and neoliberalism has worked to create spaces of 
neoliberal domination, which left not only noticeable gaps in welfare and social support 
for migrant workers but also led to a spiritual void and psychological vulnerability. In 
this section, I will elaborate on the way that Christian theo-ethics opens up space for 
migrant workers to negotiate with neoliberal domination. 
 
5.4.1 Filling the gap: theo-ethics and social and spiritual support 
In Shenzhen, faith-based communities, such as Protestant churches or other religious 
organisations, have become increasingly involved in providing both spiritual care and 
social support for migrant workers. This has particularly been the case since the Foxconn 
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suicide tragedy, after which many Protestant house churches started to target migrant 
workers for both evangelisation and spiritual care, among which Foxconn House Church 
A and B are two typical faith-based communities predominantly constituted by migrant 
workers. Although the Chinese state often exerts strict control over both religious 
activities and NGOs, these FBOs nevertheless enjoyed a more relaxed policy, as the FBO 
interventions at Foxconn filled a gap in social support and welfare left by both the state 
and Foxconn. Foxconn House Church A, for instance, suggested that it had long enjoyed 
the government’s acceptance. The government has neither responded to their application 
for registration nor taken coercive actions to shut down the church. Interestingly, some 
FBOs or churches were established and organised by Foxconn senior managers 
themselves, who were able to negotiate with local officials to implement the state’s 
religious policies in a practical way. For example, Foxconn House Church A was 
established in 2011 by Foxconn’s Taiwanese senior managers, Chan and Evan 
(mentioned above), in response to the 2010 suicide tragedy. According to the church’s 
records, Foxconn workers constitute 55.4% (72 of 130) of the churchgoers. When migrant 
workers outside of Foxconn are considered, this figure reaches approximately 80%. 
Foxconn House Church B was spontaneously organised by Foxconn workers, and it has 
developed from a small congregation into a church with more than 100 members, most 
of whom are migrant workers. 
 
These churches offer migrant workers social and spiritual support in various ways. First, 
they provide migrant workers with an emotional space built on the Christian theo-ethics 
of love, brotherhood/sisterhood, and equality, which contrast the excessive workloads 
and coercive and hierarchical management at the factories. For example, the church leader 
of Foxconn House Church A, Chan, claimed that the church intended to create an 
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atmosphere of love and equality in which migrant workers could regain respect and the 
sense of home they were deprived of in the workplace. Zhiqiang, a 35-year-old migrant 
worker who had worked at a small factory in Shenzhen, recalled his experience of being 
humiliated by his boss and how the church offered him emotional comfort: 
 
There was one time I was extremely angry because my boss deliberately withheld 
some of my wages when I quit the job. I really wanted to give him a slap at that time… 
Brother Chan invited me to his home. When the door open, brother Chan and his wife 
welcomed me with smiling faces, and all [fury] disappeared. They sincerely said, they 
would help me find a new job and offered a space for storing my baggage until I settled 
down at a new place.  
 
 In Foxconn House Church A, it is also common to see Foxconn staff members, 
production workers, line leaders and senior managers chat harmoniously with one another 
during the fellowship, which rarely happens at Foxconn. For many migrant workers, the 
church is conceived of as a comfort zone in which they can unleash their feelings and 
confide their distress and the private emotions that they do not share elsewhere. Through 
church involvement and services, migrant workers gain recognition and comfort from 
faith-based communities. 
 
Second, the Christian theo-ethics of brotherhood/sisterhood also serve as a spiritual bond 
that integrates and unites the social relations of Christian migrant workers. This is 
particularly exemplified by Foxconn House Church B, which was established by migrant 
workers themselves. In 2011, a small group of Christian Foxconn workers came together 
to form a fellowship driven by their common aim of transforming Foxconn through, as 
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they claimed, “Jesus’s love”. As one of the current church leaders, Hui, said, they aimed 
to unite every single “lamb of God”—Christian migrant workers who came from different 
origins and made a livelihood at Foxconn and nearby factories. Hui noted that it was 
difficult for rural migrants to survive in an unfamiliar place; therefore, Christians should 
come together to help one another first and then they could make a difference by 
spreading their love to other non-Christian workers. In 2014, they established their house 
church in a rented apartment financially maintained by more than 100 Christian workers. 
This house church is affectionately celebrated as the “workers’ home” and provides social 
support for migrant workers from a variety of social backgrounds, Christian or otherwise. 
It provides free accommodations for job-seeking workers, facilitates the sharing of 
information about jobs and housing, and donates money to workers with serious illnesses. 
In this sense, Christian theo-ethics facilitates a form of mutual help and, by extension, 
self-empowerment within this marginalised group whose members are deprived of urban 
citizenship. 
 
Third, Christian theo-ethics offers a means for reconciling religious and humanist ethics 
to work collaboratively with workers who suffer from depression and other psychological 
or emotional problems. Because Foxconn’s psychotherapeutic practices primarily 
focused upon reinforcing workers’ psychological capacity for exploitation, they did not 
significantly improve the workers’ mental wellbeing. In this circumstance, Foxconn’s 
“Care Centre” and 78585 hotline formed a partnership with Foxconn House A to help the 
psychologically vulnerable workers. The church leader Chan explains how they work 
collaboratively with Foxconn: 
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They know our existence, and we indeed have a close relationship with them. Although 
they aren’t Christian, they understand and accept the core values of Christianity. When 
they [psychotherapists] found a worker who attempted suicide, they would talk to him 
first. If it doesn’t work, they would ask the worker if he is willing to go to the church. 
Many of our Church members were recommended from the 78585 hotline and the 
“Care Centre”. Those who intended to commit suicide complained to us: “I want to 
live on, but I don’t find any significance that inspires me live on”.  
 
The workers’ complaints in this quotation indicate that although Foxconn’s 
psychotherapy may prevent workers from committing suicide, it fails to address migrant 
workers’ quest for hope and meaning in life and thus cannot give them spiritual fulfilment 
in the face of their programmatic and alienating factory life. Instead, Christianity provides 
migrant workers with not only a religious worldview and cosmology but also a form of 
communal life, opening new possibilities for them to put the chaotic universe into order. 
The 25-year-old worker Xu was referred to the church by the Foxconn “Care Centre” in 
2013. He told us that he had overcome the shadow of depression and felt more tashi 
[mentally secure] now because God was with him. He emphasised that the Bible verse 
“we love because He first loved us” touched him particularly and helped him get through 
his difficulties. Christianity therefore serves as a form of “spiritual healing” that offers an 
alternative to neoliberal psychotherapeutic technologies. In this sense, a theo-ethics of 
common good (e.g., love and care for others) can cultivate a more hybrid cultural identity 
and faith-based praxis by recombining both a religious and secular ethics of care and 
thereby create an affective capacity for hope in migrant workers (Cloke et al. 2019). 
 
5.4.2 Redeeming the factory through the theo-ethics of transformation 
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At Foxconn, the militarised and bureaucratic management has given rise to an aggressive 
culture based on “the law of jungle” that defines relations between rank-and-file managers 
and production workers and even among production workers themselves. When rank-
and-file managers are pressured regarding assignments and orders from above, they often 
channel this pressure and negative emotions to assembly line workers at the expense of 
workers’ dignity. In particular, diaoren (屌人), a form of verbal violence involving 
blaming and sneering at others with dirty words, is prevalent in the workshop. Fear of 
being blamed and punished has produced mutual distrust among production workers—
some workers pass the buck to each other when they make mistakes. Ironically, personal 
abuse is even celebrated as a valuable personality trait signalling one’s capacity for 
disciplining recalcitrant workers, contributing to a better chance of promotion. Former 
Foxconn senior manager Evan reflected on Foxconn’s management culture and explained 
how personal abuse was justified as reasonable: 
 
[Terry Guo] is an authoritarian CEO; he completely dominates the company. He 
requires his subordinates to execute his orders without any questions. I think this kind 
of management is quite problematic. For example, when problems occur, managers 
tend to abuse their subordinates. This atmosphere came from Terry Guo himself. It has 
become a kind of culture that people treat each other with derogatory language and 
even some very embarrassing dirty words, for example, “Why can’t you do this? Are 
you waiting to die?”  This is considered reasonable because everyone did so and they 
even thought that the more aggressive the language, the better. So, they unwittingly 
lost their ability to respect others.  
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However, for the leaders of Foxconn House Church A, Chan and Evan, Christianity can 
revitalise the humanist ethics suppressed by Foxconn’s abusive management culture. 
Therefore, one of the core aims of the church is to transform the “atmosphere” at Foxconn 
through love and to bring the gospel to workers and staff. In one sermon, church leader 
Chan reiterated the four important principles that the church members working at 
Foxconn were encouraged to follow and practise: (1) standing up and lighting the factory; 
(2) being an influence; (3) becoming fishers of men (Matthew 4: 19); and (4) transforming 
the atmosphere. 
 
The first principle means that Christian Foxconn workers and staff should neither conceal 
their Christian identity nor isolate themselves from non-Christian workers and staff; 
instead, they should avow their Christian identification and thus enlighten others by 
performing a Christian’s responsibility. Chan explained that many Foxconn managers 
were Christian, but they were reluctant to acknowledge themselves as such because they 
feared not only political reprisal but also that they would fail to represent what a Christian 
should look like at Foxconn. However, for Chan, it is time to arouse all Christians to stand 
up and take their responsibility of redeeming the factory through “love”.   
 
The second principle refers to the fact that a Christian worker should influence non-
Christian workers through their faith-based practices. For Chan, a Christian worker 
should exhibit leadership in the workplace regardless of his/her position. As a devout 
Christian worker, Chan thought that a Christian worker should exhibit the virtues of a 
Christian worker, such as being hardworking, helpful and trustworthy, so that non-
Christian workers could feel the positive influence of Christianity. It is therefore common 
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for many Christian Foxconn workers to cover other workers’ shifts or willingly undertake 
a greater amount of work to reduce colleagues’ workloads.  
 
The third principle comes from the Bible and suggests that Christian workers should bring 
the gospel to other workers so that non-Christians can be brought to God’s refuge. Many 
Christian workers think of evangelisation as not only their inherent commitment as a 
Christian but also a way to bring peace to non-Christian workers. After the Foxconn 
suicide event, Christian migrant workers were encouraged to wear faith-based T-shirts 
with slogans that conveyed ethics of love and care, such as “love never ends” and “love 
is about trust”. These slogans did not aim to propagate the Christian faith explicitly but 
rather to increase the visibility of the Christian ethics of love in a more acceptable way. 
For Chan, wearing a Christian T-shirt was a way not only to bodily practice his faith but 
also to produce “positive energies” (zhengnengliang, 正能量) for non-Christian workers. 
Zhicheng, a 34-year-old Foxconn worker, told us how he was affected by the Christian 
evangelisation and subsequently converted to Christianity:  
  
It was one day in 2011, I was hanging out at the factory. I suddenly saw two workers 
wearing the same T-shirt with a verse, namely, “love never ends”, written on it. It 
struck me, I had never seen such a verse at Foxconn before. It made me think about 
whose love never ends. I guessed it’s something about Jesus because I heard it from 
Hongkong broadcasting before… They finally led me to this Church.  
 
According to the records, approximately 300 workers have been baptised at Foxconn 
House Church A since 2010, though only 72 of them remain due to high job mobility. 
However, for Chan, many workers at least found a spiritual retreat when they were 
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working at Foxconn. The overall aim of the former three principles is ultimately to 
transform the atmosphere of Foxconn. This aim can be interpreted based on Chan’s words: 
“There is no abuse, blame and depression anymore and workers don’t need to fear”. 
 
Overall, the theo-ethics of transformation and its faith-based praxis have created an 
ethical space that undercuts the aggressive and abusive “culture” at Foxconn. However, 
somewhat different from Cloke et al.’s (2019) and Williams’s (2015) argument that theo-
ethics can create the possibility of active resistance to neoliberalism, the theo-ethics of 
transformation in this study is better understood as an ethics of remedy that ameliorates 
rather than fundamentally challenges neoliberal subjectivity. Following Cloke et al 
(2019), I argue that the faith-based practices in essence implicate into the economic and 
political conditions in which particular theological discourses and ethics are interpreted 
and translated.  
 
5.4.3 Translation of theo-ethics into Christian entrepreneurship 
Christian theo-ethics does not merely contribute to reworking the disciplinary factory 
regime but is also salient in reshaping labour relations at the factories owned by Christian 
entrepreneurs, who apply Christian ethical vocabularies in enterprise management and 
production. For example, Hong Kong Christian entrepreneur Brother Li runs a food 
factory with approximately 250 workers, approximately 20 of whom are Christians. Li is 
enthusiastic about integrating Christian ethics into his business principles and 
management philosophy, which aim to improve working conditions and workers’ 
spiritual wellbeing on the one hand and to cultivate manageable and loyal workers on the 
other. Li described how he translated the Christian values of love and care into the 
management of his factory: 
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Quan: How does Christianity influence your management of the factory? 
Li: I tried to evangelise my workers, but I thought that it shouldn’t be achieved by a 
hard sell. I just sow the spirit of Christianity among them; when to harvest is not 
dependent on me but on Jesus…They knew their boss is Christian and I wanted to let 
them realise that they weren’t being exploited… Our management is more humanistic 
than many other factories. First, the culture of our company is to respect others. Every 
staff member should be respected by virtue of his responsibility to the company rather 
than his rank, whether a cleaner or a cook. Second, we are not allowed to abuse others. 
Our staff basically don’t speak dirty words. When someone makes mistake, our 
managers look at the mistake itself, but not the person. Third, because I have a family, 
I also need to consider the families of the workers. So, the husbands and wives were 
supplied with special dormitories. [At Foxconn’s dormitory, male and female workers 
are strictly divided.] I found many workers had to get up early to send their children 
to Guanlan town for school, so I arranged a special car for them and they didn’t need 
to wait for the bus and slept one hour longer… They are all the Christian values—care 
and love for the disadvantaged group.  
 
Li’s management ethics also manifests in his strategy of introducing Christianity as a 
form of leisure to fulfil workers’ quest for a communal life. To some extent, the Foxconn 
suicide tragedy could be ascribed to migrant workers’ lack of access to leisure and their 
sense of incarceration within the factory regime. Therefore, Li places heavy emphasis on 
the role of leisure in improving workers’ wellbeing. To support this, Li transformed the 
factory canteen into a house church that accommodates various communal leisure 
activities. However, Li’s factory house church is not an institutional one characterised by 
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collective rituals and preaching but an “unofficially sacred space” (Kong, 2001) for 
communal activities such as musical performances, dancing, singing and fellowship. 
Every Monday evening, approximately 40-50 workers, Christians and non-Christian, 
voluntarily participate in the fellowship, singing hymns and other popular gospel songs. 
Moreover, Li also introduced public square dancing (Guangchang Wu 广场舞) to the 
church as a form of exercise and entertainment. Li recruited a professional dancer to 
modify the square dance and gave it a Christian spin, calling it “gospel dance”. One 
worker frankly told us that he did not believe in Christianity, but he enjoyed participating 
in the Christian fellowship because he always felt joyful and relaxed while listening to 
the hymns. Likewise, many other workers recounted that one of their first and most 
beautiful impressions of factory fellowship was the singing. 
 
The translation of Christian theo-ethics in everyday management has in turn fostered an 
affective politics of hope and belonging (Cloke et al. 2019) among workers and staff, 
who exhibit a high degree of loyalty to the factory. As Li claims, his company has 
maintained a very low rate of turnover, as many workers have stayed at the factory for 
many years because of their optimism about the future of the factory, even though the 
wages had always been substantially lower than Foxconn’s. A 34-year-old female worker 
named Lifang and her husband have worked at Li’s factory for 6 years. She positively 
commented on the factory as follows: 
 
Although I don’t know much about Christianity, I can feel that it has great influence 
on the atmosphere of our factory. We won’t intrigue against each other because our 
boss has set a good model for us. What we think about is how to collectively get the 
work well done. I like this atmosphere where we feel happy and relaxed. 
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Li’s Christian entrepreneurship appears to contrast with the highly exploitative labour 
regime. Indeed, Li was enthusiastic about investing in workers to improve their skills and 
quality: 
 
I particularly emphasise providing job training for workers. I would finance them to 
attend technical training courses such as chemical examination, quality control, and 
machinery maintenance. They [the courses] are all useful for their job and career. I 
paid all the tuition fees… I would consider their future: if they are eager for self-
improvement, I will invest in them. 
 
However, it is noteworthy that it is the loyalty of staff and workers that prevents this 
investment from being risky, as investing in workers’ quality can be stably materialised 
in productivity. Although Foxconn also offers job training, it is only limited to quick pre-
work training, as the company cannot guarantee the return on investment due to high job 
mobility. In this sense, Li’s Christian entrepreneurship follows a new logic of rational 
optimising. I therefore suggest that Christian theo-ethics cannot be simply understood as 
the antithesis of neoliberal logics (Williams 2005); instead, it also draws on neoliberal 
logics to persist and flourish. This is not to argue that religion is co-opted into neoliberal 
logics of production and management but that theo-ethics of Christian entrepreneurship 
contributes to a more humanist, hopeful and hybrid mode of neoliberalism.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
Theoretical work on neoliberal governance and subjectivities has often outpaced the 
empirical examination of the situated workings of neoliberalism and its encounters with 
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ethical agents. This research has shown the ways in which neoliberal governance and 
subjectivities are performed and materialised in locally based labour relations and 
simultaneously how neoliberal domination is negotiated and contested by faith-based 
praxis and theo-ethics. The flourishing of neoliberalism in China is not a singular process 
that produces standardised subjectivity; rather, it is implicated in the authoritarian regime, 
creating a new condition of being for hybrid and contested subject formation. It is in the 
context of this transformation that FBOs and theo-ethics have emerged as ethical and 
reflexive projects of neoliberalism. This resonates with Ong’s (2006: 4) view that 
neoliberalism is not a “dominant structural condition that projects totalising social change” 
but rather is played out through a carefully situated assemblage of motion and 
contingency, governing technologies and ethics. 
 
In sum, this chapter makes two contributions to the geographies of neoliberalism, 
migration and religion. First, this chapter provides new understanding of how neoliberal 
governance are circulated and reproduced through migrants’ bodies and subjectivities. I 
argue that the neoliberal logics of rational optimising demands not only the coding and 
differentiation of migrants’ bodies but also the refashioning of migrant workers’ 
subjectivity so they become governable and durable labouring subjects. In particular, I 
bring the research of migrant labourers into dialogues with recent discussion on the 
affective politics of neoliberalism (Anderson 2016; Cloke et al. 2019). In this study, 
psychological and psychotherapeutic technologies were utilised to enhance migrants’ 
affective capacity for exploitation. Moreover, under the neoliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics, migrants’ affective life becomes “object-target” for the state’s efforts to 
reconcile its neoliberal and autocratic agendas. Thus, future research needs to be attentive 
to migrants’ affective life through which various forms of power operate and contest.  
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Second, this chapter has grounded and advanced the discussion of theo-ethics and 
neoliberalism (Cloke 2010; Cloke et al. 2019; Williams 2015). Christian theo-ethics in 
this study opens spaces of agency for mobilising social services, reconciling religious and 
humanistic ethics, transforming the work space, and providing a new management 
philosophy representing an alternative to neoliberal logics. This research suggests that 
Christian theo-ethics not only negotiates the neoliberal economy and governance but also 
co-constitutes the latter. Theo-ethics cannot be separated from the neoliberal condition of 
being through which hybrid expressions of faith-through-praxis are made possible. 
However, different from Cloke et al. (2019) and Williams (2015) who view theo-ethics 
as an active resistance to neoliberal governance, I argue that theo-ethics also contributes 
to a more humanist and hopeful neoliberal order. Therefore, future research needs to 
move from the co-option/resistance model to specific contexts in which new religious 
subjectivities are engendered.   
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Chapter 6    
Becoming Christian workers: embodied theologies, faithful 
subjectivities, and technologies of the self 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I have discussed how religious institutions and the theo-ethics they enact 
can open up spaces of hope, care and love for migrant workers and reconstitute neoliberal 
subjectivities. In this chapter, I further examine how Christian migrant workers constitute 
their religious subjectivities and religious bodies through theologies-by-praxis. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the postsecular critique argues that religion should not be reduced 
to social dynamics falling outside the domains of self-interpretation and theological 
knowledge (Holloway 2013). Although geographies of religion have moved the focus 
from simplistic categorisations of religion to religious subjects and meanings (Knott 2005; 
Gökarıksel and Secor 2009; Finlayson 2012; Olson et al. 2013), this subject-focused 
research intensively engages with how subjects and religious identity interact with 
various power relations, within which “deficient understandings of theology have 
undermined attempts to generate nuanced knowledges regarding religious subjects” 
(Sutherland 2016: 322). This chapter therefore contributes to this line of inquiry by 
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examining how the knowledge of faithful subjectivity can be informed by more 
sophisticated understanding of theologies and postsecular ethics (Holloway 2013; 
Sutherland 2016). First, I emphasise the importance of the embodied knowledge of 
theologies and the affective presence of transcendence in the formation of faithful 
subjectivity. As Holloway (2013) points out, it is through bodies and affective techniques 
that faithful sensibilities and the sacred can be corporeally felt. However, theology 
involves not simply discursive and embodied knowledge but also about subjects who 
contextualise it (Dittmer 2007). In this sense, theologies need to be understood through 
praxis, and reflexive practice in particular social-spatial contexts (Sutherland 2016).  
Second, therefore, I highlight the day-to-day reflexive practices of migrant workers and 
particularly their ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault 1988) in response to a neoliberal 
labour regime, through which embodied theologies are translated and negotiated and the 
faithful subjectivities are constituted.  
 
On the one hand, by analysing the preaching, sermons, and rituals of both house churches 
and TSPM churches, I suggest that religious institutions offer migrant workers a regime 
of embodied knowledge that directs them in how to feel and make sense of their religious 
bodies and transcendence. The institutional knowledge of Christian bodies is 
contextualised and brought into migrant-worker communities, emphasising the theology 
of valuable and self-mastering Christian bodies, a “new self”, and the mediumship of the 
Holy Spirit. It is through this embodied knowledge and sensation that transcendent and 
faithful sensibilities are corporeally felt. On the other hand, these embodied theologies 
have been reflexively adopted by migrant workers as “technologies of the self” to 
constitute desired ways of being in everyday practices of work, healing and health, and 
self-interpretation. These technologies of the self can be understood as involving the 
 161  
migrant workers’ project of self-transformation into faithful, virtuous and superior 
subjects in face of an exploitative neoliberal labour regime endorsed by the secularist 
state and capitalism (as discussed in chapter 5). Although migrant workers’ self-
transformation through embodied theological discourse often overlaps with the 
state/capitalist agenda to produce the docile, productive bodies of migrant workers, this 
embodied theology nevertheless enables a more hopeful, self-valued and morally superior 
subject that conditions and reframes the inferior subjectivity inflicted by neoliberalism.  
 
6.2 Embodiment and the formation of religious subjectivities  
The importance of the body and embodiment as a site for examining the formation of 
human subjectivities and the negotiation of power and social relations has been 
commonplace in the fields of social science and the humanities (Connell 2005; Turner 
2007). As Bartkowski (2005) observes, existing scholarship on religious bodies and 
subjectivities has primarily focused on two lines of inquiry: (1) symbolic representations 
of the religious body, or how religious teachings and ethics discursively shape particular 
forms of desired bodies; and (2) the way lived, embodied, and performative practices 
produce religious subjectivity and modes of selfhood. The symbolic depiction of the body 
serves as what Charles Taylor (1988) calls moral frameworks, which specify the 
normative conditions for appropriate bodily practices. Yet bodies can function as both 
object-targets of and agents for religious meanings, since bodily practices may subvert 
and recreate power structures (Bartkowski 2005). In this chapter, I address both the 
semiotics of the Christian body through which contextualised theologies are felt and made 
sense of, and the lived and embodied praxis through which faithful sensibilities are 
reflexively constituted.  
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Existing research on religious bodies and subjectivities is dominated by social 
constructionism, which argues that our bodies are embedded in sociocultural matrices 
that offer us the categories and knowledge with which our subjectivities are shaped 
(Turner 2007). Both Marxism and poststructuralism views human bodies as social 
artifacts shaped by political, cultural and economic processes (Vásquez 2011). For Marx, 
bodies become objectified in material activities (particularly in the capitalist model of 
production) and historical conditions such that human beings can make sense of 
themselves and attain certain kinds of consciousness. Bodies are not only lived in material 
relations but also shaped by the ideologies that mould particular forms of bodies in 
congruence with capitalist production and accumulation. In the light of this, the Christian 
asceticism that sees bodily practices of hard work, self-discipline, and the control of 
desires as a sign of glory and salvation (Weber 1920) is much more a historically and 
socially constructed ideology, which entrenches and sanctifies capitalist social relations. 
This line of thinking was exemplified and reformulated by E.P. Thompson (1963: 355-
356) in his cultural-materialist account of religion and working-class in 19th century 
England. Thompson argues that Methodism, with “its elevation of the values of discipline 
and of order as well as its moral opacity”, served as an ideological self-justification for 
the capitalist mode of production, which requires the enforcing of the productivity of 
human labour by regulating the docile bodies of workers. Thompson describes 
Methodism as a “moral machinery” that could turn a worker “into his own slave driver” 
through an imposed “inner compulsion”.  Post-structuralism is more concerned with how 
bodies constitute particular forms of subjectivities. While admitting that bodies are 
object-targets for power and domination, Foucault (1978) suggests that bodies also 
constitute the social field in which governance and the micro-physics of power operate. 
For Foucault, power is not localised in and exercised by particular subjects but rather 
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forms and operates in the chains and relations of bodies. Bodies are therefore crucial sites 
for what Foucault theorises as the logic of governmentality, in which power often operates 
through the creation of subjectivities or certain desired bodies. He points out that “it is 
already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain 
discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault 
1980: 98). The Marxist and Foucauldian accounts of bodies and subjectivities have been 
echoed in Chapter 5 regarding how neoliberalism produces normative subjectivities and 
body forms. However, migrant workers’ religious subjectivities cannot be simply 
understood as social artifacts of neoliberal economics, governance and power relations. 
Based on the postsecular critique, fuller knowledge of religious bodies and subjectivities 
requires an analysis of not only power relations but also “subjective interactions with 
theology, and how this process engenders difference and change, creating hybrid religious 
subjectivities” (Sunderland 2016: 322).  
 
Recent research in the geographies of religion suggests that theology and religiosity are 
not doctrinal knowledge transmitted by institutions but involve the affective capacity to 
sense the transcendent in the body (Holloway 2013; Olson et al. 2013; Sunderland 2016). 
In Olson et al.’s (2013: 1423) study of the religious subjectivities of Christian-affiliated 
young people, they contend that young people’s perception of “authentic” Christianity 
and transcendence is valorised through religious embodiment; that is, “constructing the 
body as the space in which faith might smoothly extend beyond traditional religious 
spaces”. Holloway’s (2013) discussion of affective techniques of religion and the 
cultivation of faithful dispositions provides powerful insights into the embodied nature 
of theology and religious subjectivities. For Holloway, theology does not consist of the 
credal and doctrinal elements of belief that directly shape particular religious subjects, 
 164  
but instead “being religious, spiritual or faithful is enacted through many different 
registers of emotion and affect” that emerge in the performance of religious practices 
(2013: 205).  He therefore emphasises the assemblage, a relational space that creates 
affective atmospheres of the sacred. The religious or spiritual subject is generated through 
what he calls “the patterning of ritual space-times”, “the outcome of an assemblage of 
heterogeneous materialities and immaterialities: text, talk, bodies, objects, architectures, 
atmospheres of mood, smell, touch and sound, rhythms and emotion combine and interact 
to realise the ritual space-time”. These patterns of ritual space-times therefore impinge on 
which affective registers and religious dispositions are presented, encouraged and 
reconfirmed. In particular, Holloway emphasises the Christian disposition of hope as an 
affective technique and an “ethos of engagement with the world” (Anderson 2006: 692) 
as part of the production of faithful and pious subjectivities. Drawing on philosopher John 
Caputo, Holloway suggests that Christian subjectivity is made hopeful through the defeat 
and self-transformation of bodies such that they can relate to the body of Christ, the site 
of hope which provides “the setting for the events that will transform the flesh of those 
laid low by suffering” (Caputo 2007: 75). 
 
Notwithstanding both theological knowledge and embodiment as important sources of 
religious subjectivities, the subject may redefine and reframe the theology and its spatial 
imaginations through praxis (Sutherland 2016):  
 
[I]t is through the subjective agency of religious people that theology is reproduced in 
increasingly hybrid forms. Theology is not solely a top-down matter, but something 
that the subject can interact with in the day-to-day in order to make sense of and 
 165  
formulate a response to their circumstance, interacting with both the affective and the 
discursive resources of religion (Sutherland 2016: 325). 
 
Sutherland’s framing of theology as praxis underscores how the affective and discursive 
nature of theology is negotiated and reworked through reflexive practice.  In particular, 
both Holloway (2013) and Sutherland (2016) highlight what Foucault (1988) calls 
“technologies of the self” as an important form of reflexive practice that brings theology 
into ways of being and engenders more hybrid subjectivities and agency. Foucault’s 
(1988) latter works about technologies of the self in essence deal more directly with how 
new subjectivities can be attained through practices that redefine relations to oneself. 
According to Foucault (1988:18), “technologies of the self” arose within the ethics of 
Judeo-Christian tradition regarding “how one should live”, referring to what “permit[s] 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality.” For example, through bodily practices such as penance and 
confession, Christians can confirm the truth about themselves, which therefore constitutes 
themselves as faithful and virtuous subjects. Foucault’s insights are substantially adopted 
by anthropologist Talal Asad (1993) in his book Genealogies of Religion, which examines 
the relationship between disciplinary practices and virtuous Christianity in medieval 
monasticism. Asad (1993) argues that obedience and self-denial cannot be simply 
understood as suppressive practices imposed by religious discourse; instead, the monastic 
technologies of the self create self-applied strategies to “construct and reorganise 
distinctive emotions — desire, humility, remorse”, such that Christians can re-order their 
souls and sharpen their emotional capacity to attain sacredness and religious virtues.  
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6.3 Embodied theology and the production of faithful-hopeful 
subjectivities  
In Chapter 5, I have shown that the neoliberal labour regime has devalued migrant 
workers as docile and governable labouring bodies. Since the Foxconn suicide event in 
2010, the families of the dead have each received approximately 250,000 RMB in 
compensation; therefore, the “affective atmospheres” of despair and in particular the 
discourse that “workers’ lives are only as valuable as 250,000 RMB” has been widely 
spread among migrant workers. Apart from translating the theo-ethics of love and care 
into faith-based praxis, as I will show in this chapter, the institutions of Christianity also 
reframe their theologies regarding bodies in response to the neoliberal regime that 
devalues migrant workers. I suggest that the religious institutions produced a regime of 
embodied theology that directs migrant workers how to feel and make sense of their 
bodies and subjectivities. Following Foucault (1988) and Holloway (2013), I suggest that 
the institutional enactment of faithful subjectivities is subject to both the discursive 
production of bodies (knowledge) and the relational patterning of affective bodies (space). 
It is through both embodied knowledge and the affective space that faithful-hopeful 
subjectivities can be felt and embodied.  
 
6.3.1 Valuable bodies  
The theology of valuable Christian bodies can be understood as a form of discourse that 
may reframe migrant workers’ inferior subjectivities. In both the Pentecostal house 
churches and TSPM churches I investigated, the discourses of “old bodies” and “new 
bodies” are dominant in the preaching and fellowships. As Holloway (2013:209) suggests, 
the faithful Christian body is achieved through “another body – the ‘Good News’ of the 
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body of Christ, its crucifixion and its resurrection”. In this study, the body of Christ not 
only constitutes one of the most important epistemologies of the religious teachings but 
is also utilised as an appealing concept to empower migrant workers. In the teachings of 
these churches, Christian bodies are viewed as the property of God, which means that 
their bodies are born from but also belong to God. This teaching essentially opens up a 
new horizon for migrant workers to re-interpret their bodies. Via the connection to God’s 
body, their bodies become valued and meaningful. For example, in one sermon of the 
Foxconn House Church A (Pentecostal), the pastor emphasised that:  
 
How precious we are! Our bodies belong to God. We are God’s property. “I belong to 
my beloved, and his desire is for me”. There are two most important things in our life: 
God values us, and we follow God… When we submitted ourselves to God, we will 
enter a new phase. “Dark am I, yet lovely [in the eye of God]”. When I first believed 
in God, I had a bad past, a very negative self, and did many things that God didn’t 
encourage. So, we will perhaps immerse in self-denial. That’s true, dark am I, but I am 
lovely in God’s eye. This is a very beautiful announcement. “I am a rose of Sharon, a 
lily of the valleys”. On the barren land, we are the most lovely, precious followers in 
God’s eye. When we immerse in the love of God, we will look on ourselves very 
differently. If you are still entangled by an unbearable past and a negative self, I tell 
you: make an announcement in front of God. We should look forward. Every day is 
different, with God’s new grace.   
 
Moreover, the churches often teach their adherents that Christian bodies are holy because 
God made them, and everything God makes has a purpose. The discourses of the valued 
and holy body are apparently appealing for the migrant workers whose bodies are 
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devalued as machine-like labourers under the factory regime. In other words, migrant 
workers can attain sense of recognition in the eye of God.  
 
However, it is through Christ’s body – the incarnate and personalised image of God – that 
the discourses of the valuable body can be corporeally felt by many migrant workers. The 
churches repeatedly emphasise that Jesus would always bear the sufferings for them, 
because Jesus died for them on the cross. Therefore, according to the churches’ teachings, 
migrant workers’ bodies are valuable in the sense that they are worth Jesus dying for. 
During one sermon at Guanlan church, the pastor contended that Jesus not only loves and 
invests in Christian fellows but also expects them to take care of Jesus’s investment:  
 
Look at the cross, you will know how valuable your life is to Jesus. We often neglect 
the fact that Jesus always values us, loves us. Don’t think about how much we can gain 
from Jesus but think about how to be the property that Jesus likes. “I am my beloved’s 
and my beloved is mine”. We are loved by Christ.  
 
In this sense, the discourses of the valuable body are made sense of through the 
connection to Christ’s body. The truth of the Christian body cannot be separated from 
rituals such that it can be emotionally felt. As Holloway (2013: 209) notes: “the event of 
the crucified and resurrected body therefore is told (in sermons, in texts, in hymns, in 
prayers, and so on), performed (in communion, in baptisms, and so on) and present again 
and again (in the continual performative casting of these techniques) in the Christian faith 
such that the event of this body is impressed and expressed in the hopeful disposition of 
faithful bodies”. In Foxconn house Church A, the end of the sermon was often 
accompanied by a collective prayer, which required the participants to repeat and speak 
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out the “truth” through saying their prayers one after another. For example, a woman 
worker, Lijuan, made an announcement during the collective praying:  
 
God, we thank you, because I’m your property. Thank you for seeing us as treasure. 
God, I’m willing to be the property that you are pleased with. There are so many cages 
that constrain us during our life, God, we count on you to renew us …  
 
6.3.2 New self  
Although the Christian faithful subjectivities rely on the truth of the Christian body (the 
truth regarding the body’s belonging to and connection with Jesus), the formation of the 
desired Christian body is nevertheless played out through particular embodied practices 
and techniques, especially through a defeated and transformed body. The theology of a 
“new self” (新我) among the migrant workers’ churches addresses this idea.  In my study, 
both house churches and TSPM churches emphasised the discourse of the transformed 
body, advocating that pious Christian subjects are characterised by a “new self” who has 
defeated the constraints of flesh and desires.  
 
However, instead of negating bodies as obsessed with desires and sex and therefore 
viewing them as a spiritually unimportant obstacle to spiritual purity as in the monastic 
principles of early Christianity (Foucault 1988), the theologies of these churches contend 
that the body matters because it is not only the palace where God’s spirit resides but is 
also a battlefield between the flesh and holy spirit. Although TSPM churches and some 
Pentecostal house churches hold different epistemologies concerning what the holy spirit 
is and how it operates (to be elaborated on later), they both recognise the dualism between 
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flesh and holy spirit and that only through the transformation to a “new self” or “new 
body” can a new form of virtue and freedom be attained.  
 
These embodied theologies are particularly manifest in two themed sermons, namely 
“Holy Spirit and Flesh” at Foxconn House church A and “Freedom and Commandment” 
at Sanzhuli church. For example, in the sermon “Holy Spirit and Flesh”, the church leader 
distinguished two forms of bodies: the body of salvation and the body of victory. The 
former is related to the redemption of a sinner’s body because of Christian faith, while 
the latter  is associated with the battle between the holy spirit and flesh. The church leader 
Chen explained in the preaching:  
 
We need the “Good News” of Christ because of the sins in our bodies. We need 
redemption. That’s the reason Jesus came to the world.  He undertakes all sins for us. 
What’s the method of salvation? We can be justified by faith. We’re saved not because 
of our wisdom, the kind things we did, but because of the faith… We’re saved [because 
of faith], but we also need to have a victorious body (得胜). What’s the victorious body? 
If we have faith, we still have bad manners and often gamble. That isn’t victorious but 
rather being defeated by the flesh. We should defeat sins, devil, flesh, and desires. 
What’s the approach to victory? We shall count on the law of the holy spirit.  Therefore, 
there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus, because through Christ 
Jesus the law of Spirit who gives life has set you free from the law of sin and death 
(Romans 8: 1-2). Therefore, this is the battle between flesh and Spirit … Our bodies 
are often occupied by two voices. For example, when we get off work, one voice 
persuades you to go out to look for fun while the other persuades you to go to the 
church, the home of God. What should we choose?  We do not live according to the 
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flesh but according to the Spirit. Those who live according to the flesh have their minds 
set on what the flesh desires, but those who live in accordance with the Spirit have 
their minds set on what the Spirit desires. The mind governed by the flesh is death, but 
the mind governed by the Spirit is life and peace (Romans 8: 4-6) …We shall sentence 
our flesh to death so that we can be victorious.   
 
The church leader further elaborated that the Christian body consists of the flesh and the 
holy spirit, and only through sentencing the old self to death can one be transformed into 
a victorious body and attain life and peace (see Figure 6-1). In this sermon, the church 
leader outlined particular forms of flesh that Christians need to defeat, including:  
 
Sexual immorality: loyalty to marriage and family. 
Impurity and debauchery: misbehaviour, improper language and manners; indulging 
oneself and disregarding the other’s eyes.  
Idolatry: worshipping any image that men make for themselves. “Idolatry also refers to 
what occupies your minds, such as film stars, soap operas, and smartphone”.  
Hatred and discord: quarrelling with or offending others, and particularly the conflicts 
between workers and supervisors in the factory: “when conflict occurs, control your 
mouth and stop quarrelling, even though you have a grievance. If you won the quarrel, be 
cautious because you might be occupied by the flesh. God will redress an injustice for 
us.” 
Fits of rage: cannot control one’s temper. 
Jealousy: feeling unhappy when someone is better and luckier than you.  
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                                       Figure 6-1. The Christian body as a battlefield 
                        Source: Remade from PowerPoint presentation of the Sermon of Foxconn     
                                                       House church A 
 
The church leader concluded that only through breaking out the cage of these forms of 
flesh can they attain a victorious self and a real kind of freedom. This embodied theology 
is echoed in Caputo’s (2007) notion of the risen body in Christianity that allows a new 
kind of agency to freedom:  
 
The risen body is freedom from this body of flesh and death … It is a body whose 
powers of agency have been extended or allowed to run to completion beyond all the 
limitations imposed by flesh. It instantiates the event of agency, the agency of the event, 
without restriction, in a body of pure action, vision, light, intelligence, and power, in 
which these qualities, the qualities of these events, are released or put on display, 
allowed free play in exemplary fashion (2007: 81-82). 
 
The teaching of freedom is one of the central topics in the theologies of both TSPM-
Evangelical and House-Pentecostal churches. In another sermon at Sanzhuli church, 
namely “Freedom and Commandment”, the pastor provided a more detailed explanation 
 173  
of the understanding of freedom. In the preaching and fellowship in the Sanzhuli church, 
migrant workers are encouraged to be aware of the distinction between “spiritual freedom” 
and “bodily freedom”: the former is applauded as ethical and good, in contrast to the latter. 
The pastor Li believes that doing whatever you want could not be counted as real freedom 
because your options are controlled by your desires. Instead, he argues that “freedom is 
that you are not dominated by bodily desires and that you have options not to do what is 
not good”. Li’s notion of bodily freedom can be understood as a kind of negative freedom, 
which refers to the absence of external obstacles to desire-oriented choice and action. 
Instead, the pursuit of “spiritual freedom” is in line with the spirit of positive freedom, 
which Manhood (2001: 207) understands as “the capacity to realise an autonomous will, 
one generally fashioned in accord with the dictates of ‘universal reason’ or ‘self-interest’, 
and hence unencumbered by the weight of custom, transcendental will, and tradition”. In 
this sense, the theology of the ‘new self’ provides encouragement that it is by overcoming 
the constraints of the flesh that Christians can attain true freedom.  
                
6.3.3 Embodying the Holy Spirit   
Although the embodied theology provides migrant workers withg a regime of knowledge 
regarding their bodies, it is through the mediumship of the Holy Spirit that this knowledge 
can be sensed and validated. Despite acknowledging the Holy Spirit as a medium of faith, 
both the TSPM churches and some Pentecostal house churches have different 
epistemologies concerning the way the Holy Spirit relates to and operates on bodies. The 
TSPM churches typically identified themselves with urban evangelism, which is 
intellectual and text-centred, while the rural migrant house churches often bore the 
legacies of a Pentecostal-style charismatic Protestantism due to their rural origins (see 
Kao 2009).  
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Some Pentecostal house churches such Foxconn House churches A and B particularly 
emphasise the Holy Spirit as the mediumship of being a faithful Christian as well as  
experiences and feelings as central to the faith. These churches highlight the “work of 
Holy Spirit” (圣灵的作工) on the body such as speaking in tongues, healing, miracles, the 
sign of God, and the joy that arises from the possession of Holy Spirit. This is exemplified 
by practices such as sharing experiences of the miraculous healing of their bodies and the 
Holy Spirit guiding and empowering them to get through life’s difficulties. The concept 
of Holy Spirit is appealing for migrant workers who prefer to make sense of God through 
embodied practices and emotional narratives. Some migrant workers even see the Holy 
Spirit as the validation of their faith in God. For example, the worker Zhengcheng 
remarked that: 
 
They [the church] told me every human being has spirit, I testified to this by my own 
experiences. Many people may know the existence of God, but they don’t believe. I 
didn’t believe either until one time the Holy Spirit possessed my body. Once there was 
a time I mysteriously felt very touched. It’s amazing. I felt I was possessed by the Holy 
Spirit. I always felt very touched suddenly when I was walking. I would be seized with 
a sudden impulse, very joyful, and couldn’t help laughing or being touched to cry. I 
felt I was so intimate with the Lord.   
 
However, the TSPM churches may hold a milder and more conservative theology of Holy 
Spirit in congruence with the state’s discouragment of religious fundamentalism that may 
threaten social stability. Despite acknowledging the force of the Holy Spirit, the TSPM 
churches normally contend that it is unpredictable and not subject to any ritual and 
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practice. In 2010, the theological journal Tianfeng operated by the TSPM Association 
published an article entitled “The reflection on charismatic movement”, which could be 
viewed as representative of the stance of official churches. The author, Wang (2010), also 
a pastor, argues that: (1) The embodiment of Holy Spirit is not equated with and restricted 
to the supernatural phenomena such as speaking in tongues and miracles but resides in 
everyday life; (2) Holy Spirit cannot be produced, manipulated and directed by a Christian; 
(3) Miracles are not necessarily the work of Holy Spirit but are sometimes enchanted by 
devils; (4) Experiences of being possessed by Holy Spirit, if they occur, do not equate 
with a sign of spiritual development; (5) The teachings of God are more important than 
passion on Holy Spirit.    
 
One way in which geographers of religion can interpret the Holy Spirit is to locate the 
cause of these bodily sensations instead of reducing it to a question of whether 
supernatural phenomena are neither something nor nothing (Holloway 2006). The Holy 
Spirit may “not exist as a real material thing, but at the same time”, it “possessed and 
haunted them [the adherents], and thus is in certain senses real” (Holloway 2006: 185). 
In one prayer meeting at Foxconn House Church B, the 31-year-old worker brother Gao 
claimed that he once received the grace of the Holy Spirit. The prayer meeting is the most 
affectively loaded congregation conducted in an enclosed room at Foxconn House church 
B every Wednesday evening. In one prayer meeting that I participated in, all those present 
were required to kneel in a circle to say the prayers in loud voices. The church organisers 
directed and formalised the conduct and procedures of the ritual, encouraging participants 
in linking hands and hugging from time to time. Apart from praying, the participants were 
also guided to sing collectively, accompanied by certain rhythmic comportment. Joy 
arising from this occasion is usually expressed by passionate prayers with shouting and 
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even crying, which was affectively felt by some participants as the possession of the Holy 
Spirit. Brother Gao told me how he connected to the Holy Spirit in this meeting:  
 
The director asked us to open our mouths, to speak in tongues … Guided by the 
director, one brother was hugging me. He was praying for me with crying. I didn’t feel 
any embarrassment but felt that we all returned to a state of purity and love. At that 
moment, I was recalling my past – why I followed God. I didn’t believe in God before 
and relied on my own to try to acquire recognition, but I failed. I’d done a lot of jobs, 
internet bar receptionist, street vendor… but they all failed. When I first started my 
career, I found that society had no love, was full of darkness. It’s God who gave me 
the confidence to continue … So, I opened my mouth to follow the singing, a very 
touching song. Then, I felt something like electricity coming down my body. My body 
started to be slightly paralysed, like being shocked by electricity. When I continued 
following the rhythm of the song, I found that my mouth was moving automatically, 
uttering a sound like “lala, lala, lala” … My tongue was moving so quickly, 
automatically. 
 
Brother Gao believed that the sound of “lala, lala, lala” he experienced was a sign of 
speaking in tongues and the grace of the Holy Spirit. As Holloway (2013) argues, the 
presence of transcendence and the formation of faithful subjects are affective responses 
in particular patternings of ritual space-time: disciplinary guidance, an enclosed room, 
atmospheres of mood, touch, and sound, and memories are assembled such that the 
intensive feeling of the sacred is corporeally sensed. In this sense, I agree with Holloway 
(2013) that the theology of valued bodies, the new self and the Holy Spirit in this study 
is an embodied process through which doctrinal knowledge of the self can be represented 
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and legitimated. Yet, theology is not simply about how doctrinal knowledge is affectively 
felt but also about how it is ‘lived’ in praxis in order to constitute a desired way of being 
(Olson et al. 2013; Sunderland 2016). Therefore, in what follows I focus on how theology 
is reframed in praxis through “technologies of the self”.     
 
6.4 Technologies of the self and the transformation to faithful-virtuous 
subjects  
In this section, following Foucault (1988), I further elaborate on how Christian migrant 
workers constitute themselves in an active fashion, through “the technologies of the self”. 
Embodied knowledge of Christianity in essence not only directly shapes the particular 
normative bodily images of migrant workers, but also provide a mode or a form of relation 
to the self that enables them to refashion themselves into the desired subject. However, 
as Foucault (2007: 291) argues, technologies of the self are “not something invented by 
the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and proposed, 
suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group”. In this 
sense, the religious subject interacts with the way individuals reflexively formulate a 
response to their lived circumstance. In what follows, I illustrate how this embodied 
theology is incorporated into the migrant workers’ project of self-transformation into 
faithful-hopeful subjects in response to neoliberal subjectivity.  
 
6.4.1 Christian ethics of work and self-mastery  
For Foucault (2007), ethics involves not simply codes of principles or rules regarding 
“right” or “good” for action but are a matter of self-relation. Although ethical self-
constitution is conditioned by moral codes, Foucault (2007: 263) understands “ethics” as 
“the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself”, and “how the individual is 
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supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions”. As I have discussed 
above, the Christian institutions’ propaganda of “victorious bodies” provides a set of 
moral codes regarding self-control over the flesh. For Christian migrant workers, these 
theological and ethical teachings do not simply concern how they restrain themselves; 
instead, the everyday practices of Christian ethics provide an approach to attain self-
mastery, a status that is necessary in establishing a personalised and intimate relationship 
with God.  
 
In Chapter 5, I have described the high-pressure production regime and exploitative 
labour relations in Shenzhen, and particularly in the factory of Foxconn.  For many 
Christian migrant workers, the exploitative labour regime and regulatory discipline in the 
factory are not a matter of class domination but rather about how they master and position 
themselves in relation to God. When I asked what he thought of Foxconn’s regulatory 
rules, the 38-year-old worker Liu told me that he never bothered about the rules and 
regulations in the factory, as the “world” was dominated by foreigners (waibangren 
外邦人) but ultimately it was under God’s control. Therefore, Liu said, the matter was 
ultimately about how you saw yourself in the face of the regulatory rules in the factory. 
For Liu, a kind of humiliation is even acceptable: “The purpose of work is to glorify the 
Lord. If you have this attitude, you can remain peaceful no matter how they treat you.”  
The teaching that the purpose of work is to glorify God is widely accepted by migrant 
workers who regard themselves as “God’s workers,” meaning that they are working for 
God, not for capital. It is because of this kind of relation that, for many migrant workers, 
the domain of work is not so much a material power structure but rather a question of 
how they act upon themselves (such as having the proper attitude toward work in line 
with Christian ethics and theology).  
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It is against this backdrop that a contextualised theology and ethics of “benfen” (本分) 
emerged among migrant workers.  In line with how Christian workers see themselves in 
relation to work, the word “benfen” (本分) frequently appeared in the interviews. Benfen 
literally refers to a duty or obligation that god arranges or a normative set of decent 
behaviour required in one’s position.  Christian workers believe that it is their benfen to 
work heartfully, since they are working for God and all will ultimately appear before the 
judgement of Christ. Wang, who had worked in Shenzhen’s factories for 15 years, was 
viewed as a devout and senior Christian in the church. He explained how a Christian 
worker performs his/her benfen: whether your wage was calculated by the hours of work 
or the number of products, and whether or not the managers engaged in surveillance, 
Christian workers ought to work with full spirit because “you need to make a confession 
before God one day”.  Wang has often taught young migrant workers that they should 
exhibit the virtues of a Christian worker, such as being hardworking, trustworthy and 
helpful, and that Christians should embrace peace and tolerance rather than rage and 
complaint. For example, another young female worker, Liu, argued that Christians should 
have a different way of seeing themselves so that they could attain peace and tolerance at 
work. She understood benfen as the position that God arranges:  
 
People should focus on themselves. If the world doesn’t have a division of labour, how 
can we survive? So, people doing their own work is benfen. God created us and gave 
us a different position and wealth in accordance with your ability. I also want to be a 
manager, but in fact I don’t have the ability for that position. So, just do the work well 
in your own position. 
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In this sense, the Christian work ethic that manifests in the discourse of glorified work 
and benfen in this study is integrated into migrant workers’ project of self-mastery, a 
project regarding how to act upon and see themselves in godly desired ways.  
 
In I have discussed above , the embodied theology of the churches encourages migrant 
workers to take control of the flesh and particularly emotional impulses such as those 
related to discord and fits of rage.  These Christian doctrines and teachings are 
appropriated in the context of work and everyday life, and migrant workers believe that 
it is the self-discipline of bodies that contributes to the formation of the new self. 
Therefore, despite the aggressive culture prevailing among the working-class at Foxconn, 
Christian migrant workers rarely resist their managers through confrontational practices 
and aggressive language. For many Christian workers, quarrelling with or offending line 
managers and other workers are viewed as signs of losing control over one’s flesh, which 
God would be displeased with. For example, the 27-year-old worker Tiansheng 
considered the disciplinary regulation in the factories as God’s training. It is through the 
proper management of emotional impulses that he can establish a personal relationship 
with Christ:  
 
The person who belongs to the flesh cannot hear the voice of living God. If you can’t 
control your emotional impulses, you won’t be able to feel the spirit of God and the 
joy and peace either … So, a true Christian shouldn’t complain and his [or her] life 
should be always positive. You need to understand God’s work and why he did this 
for you. Everything has a reason, so I could get benefits from the difficulties and bad 
circumstances I encountered. For example, the line-leaders always attack you [with 
verbal violence], they can help you shape your personality. I used to have a very bad 
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temper, but now I have become very gentle. That’s because I defeated the environment 
around me and defeated the flesh that took over me. It’s ultimately the relationship 
with Christ but rather the relationship with the world.  
 
In such circumstances, although the Christian ethics that emphasise benfen, self-mastery 
and self-control of the flesh are partially integrated into the state and capitalist project of 
the production of docile and productive bodies, I do not consider this contextualised 
theology as simply a co-option into neoliberal governance. Instead, it is through 
submission and docility that Christian migrant workers transform themselves into faithful 
subjects who may reframe their exploitative experiences. Moreover, as I discuss in what 
follows, this embodied theology also enables a more hopeful and morally superior subject 
in response to neoliberal vulnerability.   
 
6.4.2 Faith healing, Holy Spirit and grace 
Apart from self-mastery, healing is another technology of the self that Christian migrant 
workers utilise to reconfirm their faith, enhance their ability to cope with suffering and 
establish a personal relationship with Christ. Because of the Chinese hukou household 
registration system, rural migrant workers are deprived of their citizenship and welfare 
rights in the city. In Shenzhen, rural migrant workers have limited access to the resources 
of public health care and medical services that only urban citizens are eligible to enjoy. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that some Christian migrant workers turn to faith healing to 
cure themselves when they fall ill. 
 
In many circumstances, both TSPM churches and house churches recognise the validity 
of faith healing in coping with disease. What these churches call “faith healing” often 
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refers to cures accomplished in the name of the Holy Spirit and Christ. As a commonly 
recognised religious practice, faith healings are often conducted individually or 
collectively, involving a set of actions including prayer, penance, and participating in 
sacraments. However, most Christian migrant workers do not deny the utility of scientific 
methods such as medical treatment in addressing illness or disease, but simultaneously 
believe that only through faith and God’s cure can medical treatments take effect. For 
example, when I asked one migrant worker what he thought of faith healing, he answered: 
“I think it’s wrong to think that Christians do not need to take medicines. As medicines  
exist, they must be God’s invention. So, God often cures you through the assistance of 
medicines.”  
 
In the book Healing in the History of Christianity, Porterfield (2005: 9) suggests that “the 
basic dynamic [of healing] that begins to explain how Christianity has actually worked to 
make people feel stronger and find relief and comfort is the personal relationship that 
believers experience with Christ”. This is also illustrated in my study, where some sick 
migrant workers view faith healing as the relief of suffering and a sense of hope that 
enhances their ability to cope with diseases, although they also aspire to the grace of God 
who performs miraculous cures for them. Yang is a 37-year-old Foxconn worker who 
was diagnosed with uremia in 2011 and needed to receive dialysis treatment in hospital 
to clean the blood once a month. However, Yang had to work continuously at Foxconn 
to pay the significant medical expenses. Yang frankly admitted that he had converted to 
Christianity a few years ago to search for healing from God. Although his symptom had 
been continually worsening, as he said, his faith had not been diluted. Instead, he 
suggested that God enabled him to be fearless in the face of the disease: 
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When I laid down on the sickbed, I didn’t have fear any more because of God. I have 
nothing to rely on now [except God]. Relatives are afraid you will borrow money from 
them. The parents are afraid you cannot be cured. The spouse is afraid you involve her 
in trouble. The supervisors are afraid you cannot work. The doctors are afraid you 
cannot pay the medical fees on time. 
 
However, much more commonly, faith healings are experienced and testified by Christian 
migrant workers in their coping with ailments such as colds and fever. Many migrant 
workers believe that they can get cured through faith healing and therefore do not need 
to visit a doctor if they have ailments. They have often pointed to the curing of ailments 
as evidence of the power of Christian faith and the gift of the Holy Spirit. For example, 
the 32-year-old worker Zhenjie told us of his experience of faith healing:  
 
Zhenjie: Since I graduated from occupational school, I haven’t paid a penny to doctors. 
I haven’t visited a doctor all these years, although I have also had some ailments from 
time to time. But I don’t encourage other Christians to do so, because not every 
Christian can receive this kind of grace from God … There was a time I had a fever 
but I didn’t visit a doctor. The fever lasted for one week and my roommates 
encouraged me to visit a doctor. I thought I have a strong faith in God, he would cure 
me, I didn’t need to seek help from a doctor.  
 
Quan: So, you thought visiting a doctor would weaken your faith? 
 
Zhenjie: No, they are not incompatible. I just believed that I didn’t need a doctor. I had 
a strong faith that God would definitely cure me. I had such confidence. So, I prayed 
 184  
and hoped God could listen to my prayer … God eventually cured me. Not everyone 
has such grace from God. I think I have such ability, the ability to experience the work 
of the Holy Spirit. Because when the Holy Spirit comes to live in our bodies, we shall 
be cured. [Zhenjie opens the Bible] Jesus said: “Because you have so little faith. Truly 
I tell you, if you have faith as small as a mustard seed, you can say to this mountain, 
‘Move from here to there’, and it will move. Nothing will be impossible for you.” So, 
thanks to God, it's the faith that cured me.  
 
In this quotation, Zhenjie believed that he was cured because of his strong faith and the 
work of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, he considered this as the distinctive grace of God. 
This is consistent with Porterfield’s (2005: 4) argument that Christian healings “represent 
only a fraction of what Christians have experienced and meant by healing”.  This is also 
illustrated by another Christian worker, Li, who celebrated the curing of an ailment 
through healing as a sign of power in God’s arrangements, and therefore accepted it as 
part of religious life. Li told me how he successfully quit smoking through faith healing 
and God’s special gift. Like Zhenjie, Li did not seek any medical assistance but rather 
relied on faith healing when he once got severe flu:  
 
When I recovered from the flu, I just realised God not only cured me but helped me 
quit tobacco. After I recovered, I continued smoking but surprisingly I couldn’t feel 
the flavour of tobacco anymore. It’s tasteless. So, I haven't smoked since then … I had  
prayed before God and hoped he would help me quit smoking. It is out of expectation 
that God helped me overcome smoking through the flu. 
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6.4.3 Superior and valued subjects 
In this chapter, I have shown how the religious institutions create a regime of embodied 
knowledge that tells migrant workers how and what Christian bodies are valued. In this 
section, I further suggest that this embodied knowledge and truth are mobilised by 
migrant workers to constitute a superior and valued self in their everyday praxis, which 
contrasts with the state-propagated discourses of cheap labour and the low suzhi (quality) 
of rural migrants.  
 
Firstly, migrant workers utilise Christian ethics and discourses to re-imagine themselves 
in relation to “others” and therefore to establish social-religious distinctions. Migrant 
workers normally accept the churches’ teaching that a Christian is valuable, and therefore 
assume a moral and spiritual high ground compared to non-Christians who they label as 
“foreigners” (外邦人). This is manifestly evident in Christian worker’s assumptions of 
superior subjectivities over people who engage in Buddhism, Taoism and popular 
religions (such as ancestor worship). Many Christian migrant workers believe that they 
are “chosen” and “blessed” by God and only Christians inclusively enjoy access to 
ultimate truth and salvation. This distinctive and superior Christian subjectivity can be 
illustrated by Liang’s understanding of what it is to be “chosen”:   
 
Lord said: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, I will have chosen whom I 
will have chosen”11. It’s God who determines whom will be chosen. So, people will 
never know whether he/she will be chosen [to be a Christian], it’s not dependent on us 
rather than on God. It’s not people who find God. In our society, many people are 
 
11 The original phase in Bible should be: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, I will have 
compassion on whom I will have compassion” (Exodus 33:19). 
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finding “gods”, but in Christianity God will find us. This is the difference: in other 
religions, people attempt to find their gods through, for example, their own practices 
or doing good. But only we Christian are found by God.  
 
Apart from being “chosen”, many Christian workers also emphasise the distinctiveness 
of the Christian rhetoric of morality, and in particular confession and repentance in merit-
making and the cultivation of the ultimate, transcendent good. For many Christian 
workers, being Christian means being morally superior and good. For example, as the 24-
year-old woman worker Xueyi said, unlike other religions, especially Chinese popular 
religions that people turn to for utilitarian reasons, Christians emphasise repentance and 
the inner reflection of sins:  
 
To be honest, Christianity is the best religion in the world. If you committed sins, you 
can seek relief by going to Buddhist temples. Whatever sins they committed, they felt 
more relieved by asking Guanyin (a Buddhist god) for protection … So, Buddhist, 
Taoism, worshipping guanyin, they all told you which gods could help you. But for 
Christians, if you commit sins, you will feel guilty. If you don’t repent and renew 
yourself, how dare you go to the church?  
 
As Richard Madsen (2007) argues, “in contrast to Christian philosophy that absolutises 
the notion of goodness (as a quality identified with God), there is no clear distinction 
between good and evil in either the Confucian tradition or the Daoist classics” (Cao 2009: 
56). This forceful Christian moral rhetoric, as Cao (2009:56) points out, “lends 
tremendous power to the self-justification of Christian identity”. As Yang (2005) suggests, 
in sharp contrast to popular religion that has been stigmatised as feudal superstition and 
 187  
a synonym for backwardness by the state, Christianity is associated with developed West 
and cosmopolitan modernity. In this sense, Christian workers’ imagination of themselves 
as superior religious subjects is partly justified by the state’s devaluation of popular 
religion as feudal superstition.   
 
Moreover, for some migrant workers, the superiority of Christian subjectivity is not only 
understood in an ethical sense but is also corporeally sensed as spiritual power. The 42-
year-old rural migrant worker Jun told me that he was excluded by some of the villagers 
who practiced popular religions in his village because he thought that God was the 
mightiest entity. Therefore, Jun suspected that some of the villagers might be afraid of 
his God who overshadowed the images or idols they worshipped:  
 
In my village, some of my friends haven’t got along with me any more after I believed 
in Jesus. They rarely invite me to their homes because, if I enter their house, their idols 
don’t dare to appear. I have the Holy Spirit in my body, which is more powerful than 
their idols. So, they might be afraid of me, exclude me. You know, our God is the only 
true God, and their idols are devils. Devils cannot defeat righteousness. People are the 
same, they are dominated by devils so they exclude me. 
 
Secondly, this re-imagination of the superior Christian subject is utilised to negotiate with 
state-propagated discourses of suzhi (quality), which stigmatise rural migrants as uncivil 
and low-quality subjects. In this sense, Christian migrant workers seek to construct 
themselves as distinctive subjects within the larger group of migrant workers. As Cao 
(2009: 56) points out, “Protestant belief played an important and visible part in the 
making of Chinese citizenship and the reform of immoral social practices such as 
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gambling, opium, smoking, concubinage, child-brides, and prostitution in the early 
Republican period.” Nowadays, for many migrant workers, Christian faith enables them 
to keep the label of “low suzhi” at a safe distance through self-transformation into morally 
superior and valuable subjects. Many Christian workers repeatedly emphasise that they 
are different from non-Christian workers due to their obedience to Christian ethical 
principles and their pursuit of transcendent ends that transform them into civil subjects. 
In migrant workers’ interpretation, suzhi is associated with a set of technologies of the 
self, including good manners, politeness, dedication to work, and mastery of desires, 
which distinguish them from non-Christian workers:  
 
[Wang:] For non-Christian workers, because they don’t believe in Jesus, they are more 
calculated. For example, if the workshop supervisors don’t oversee them, they will just 
lie there [on the working platform] and work slowly. But we Christians are different, 
we just work silently, no matter if supervisors are overseeing or not. They often loaf 
on the job: going to the toilet frequently, going out to smoke and drink tea. So, we are 
very different from wangbangren (foreigners or non-Christians), although I don’t deny 
that some of them are also very dedicated.  
 
[Zhibo:] I want to let them [other workers] know I am Christian, I am different. For 
example, I never talk dirty. You know, they often talk dirty and this became a matter 
of common practice in the workshop. Some of the colleagues thought I am different.   
 
[Tianci:] First, to be people with self-cultivation, you need to treat others kindly. 
Because God is kind, you need to live out the image and personality of God. Second, 
you need to manage yourself, many Christians rarely smoke, drink and never gamble. 
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Every time my colleagues or supervisors invite me to KTV [karaoke] or drink, I refuse. 
But I will explain to them, I am a Christian. 
 
In this sense, Christian migrant workers adhere to an different interpretation of suzhi 
(quality) from that in the state’s discourse, emphasising self-disciplined bodies in tandem 
with their reading of Christian ethics and doctrines.  Although migrant workers’ project 
of self-transformation does not challenge the hegemonic state and public discourse, it 
nevertheless sets conditions for the processes of neoliberal subjectivation (Mahmood 
2005) by reconstituting the devalued and inferior labouring subjects into morally superior 
and faithful-virtuous subjects. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
In response to the postsecular critique that religious subjects cannot be reduced to simply 
the outcome of power relations (Holloway 2013; Tse 2014; Sunderland 2016), the aim of 
this chapter has been to investigate how religious subjectivities and religious bodies 
interact with theologies-by-praxis, and how this process engenders more hybrid 
subjectivities. By reconciling the Foucauldian approach that emphasises the discursive 
formation of the body and Holloway’s (2013) affective presence of transcendence, this 
chapter therefore highlights not only the embodied knowledge of theology but also how 
it is translated into the praxis of migrant workers. In response to the argument that the 
body is the primary site through which faithful disposition, piety, and transcendence can 
be achieved (Holloway 2006; Olson et al. 2013), I suggest that migrant workers’ project 
of self-transformation through the discourse of benfen, valued and superior Christian 
subjects, and the theologically-mediated interpretation of the self is corporeally felt and 
negotiated in their lived experiences under the neoliberal labour regime.  
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In this study, the migrant worker’s bodily interpretation of piety, faithfulness and virtue 
cannot be separated from the “regime of embodied theology” through which religious 
institutions tell them how to corporeally feel and understand what is a valued and desired 
Christian body.  However, following Sunderland (2016), I do not understand religious 
subjects as simply determined by this affective and discursive knowledge that shapes 
particular forms of religious personhood. Instead, this embodied theology is often 
negotiated and reframed by subjects’ responses to their circumstance in praxis. For 
example, embodied theology is contextually interpreted in migrant workers’ everyday 
life, deployed as the “technologies of the self” to reconstitute the inferior subjectivity 
devalued by neoliberal labour regime. In this sense, I further highlight the co-production 
of religion and neoliberalism (Williams 2015), since neoliberalism offers a space of 
praxis through which not only are theo-ethics translated but also migrant workers 
reflexively consume these religious meanings. Overall, the embodied theology and 
migrant workers’ “technologies of the self” need to be further examined in relation to 
their intersectional subjectivities, in particular their negotiation of masculinity, female 
agency, and adulthood. I discuss these issues in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 7 
The aspiration for moral manhood: Christianity, class and 
migrant workers’ negotiation of masculinities  
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the formation of Christian and moral masculinity by focusing 
on the intersection of religion, class and gender among rural migrant workers in Shenzhen. 
By bring postsecularity into dialogue with the critical geographies of masculinity, this 
chapter aims to answer how postsecular subjectivity may emerge through the 
intersectional constitution of religion, class and masculinity. In the past two decades, 
Connell’s (1995) original concept of hegemonic masculinity has been addressed by 
geographers as an analytical frame to explore the plurality of masculinities and the power 
relations in which masculine subjects are enacted and lived (Hopkins and Noble 2009). 
Geographies of masculinities have focused on not only the representations of 
masculinities but also how masculinities are utilised as a strategy to claim power and 
respectful subjectivity in particular contexts (MacDonald 2003; Nayak 2006; Hopkins 
2006; Gorman-Murray and Hopkins 2016). This line of inquiry has offered two important 
insights. First, previous research has shown the complex relations of different 
masculinities and therefore recognised the agency of subordinated and marginalised 
groups who lack economic resources and institutional authority but draw on regional or 
cultural resources to claim power (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). This is particularly 
manifested in studies of “protest masculinity” constructed by resisting or deviant 
practices among local working-class or ethnically marginalised men (MacDonald 2003; 
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Walker 2006; Nayak 2006). This pattern of masculinity is often a response to deep 
feelings of powerlessness and insecurity (Walker 2006), which Connell (1995: 111) 
likens to a “tense, freaky façade, making a claim to power where there are no real 
resources for power”. In this sense, masculinities may become a space of agency to 
reclaim a “respectable” and culturally superior subjectivity and, simultaneously, a site 
where marginalisation takes place (MacDonald 2003; Nayak 2006). Second, the 
geographical study of masculinities highlights the relational and intersectional nature of 
masculinities (Berg and Longhurst 2003; Hopkins and Noble 2009; Hopkins 2018; 
Messerschmidt and Messner 2018). This approach is not simply about how masculinities 
interact with other social categories (i.e., class, ethnicity, and religion) but is also about 
“capturing the messiness of layered subjectivities and multi-dimensional relations in 
particular localities” (Hopkins and Noble 2009: 815) that jointly constitute the 
institutionalisation of gender relations. However, although the plural, relational, 
intersectional approach to masculinity has been considered in the geographical agenda, 
less attention has been paid to how religion and morality shape the formation of masculine 
subjectivity (Gökarıksel and Secor 2017). In particular, the issue of how religion and 
morality can create an alternative pathway for masculinity formation and thereby open 
dialogical spaces for transforming, reworking and even subverting normative 
subjectivities and homogenising forms of masculinity has been substantially 
underexplored. 
 
To address this gap, this chapter draws attention to the intersection of gender, religion, 
and class among male Christian rural migrant workers in Shenzhen and the formation of 
what I call “moral manhood”. It specifically focuses on how Christian workers 
strategically deploy existing religious and moral discourses to construct their masculine 
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subjectivity and thus question and come to terms with—and sometimes reinforce—the 
dominant and hegemonic masculinities. In the countryside, rural Christian men’s 
masculinity, which has relied on their commitment to and headship of local rural churches, 
has been increasingly marginalised and unattainable in the context of China’s economic 
reform, in which “capable” and productive masculinities have become dominant. 
However, as these individuals became migrant workers in urban workplaces and 
particularly in Shenzhen’s global factories, such as Foxconn, they have been subject to a 
militarised and hierarchical management regime of labour. The factory floor is therefore 
dominated by two conflictual sets of masculinities: the hegemonic and hierarchical 
masculinity characterised by coercive management and verbal violence among rank-and-
file managers and the “protest masculinity” among production workers who utilised 
rebellious and aggressive practices to defend their deprived masculinity. For Christian 
workers, Christian ethics and discourses enable them to construct a morally superior 
manhood to negotiate with the dominant masculine power and an alternative space 
beyond the dichotomy of dominance and resistance. This chapter looks beyond the 
working sphere to examine how Christian morality influences migrant worker men’s 
familial and gender relations. In this regard, Christian migrant workers seek to construct 
a distinctive “godly manhood” and soft patriarchy that emphasise divine marriage and 
men’s headship as an alternative to the hegemonic and patriarchal masculinity defined by 
Chinese familial values and secular ideologies. I suggest that migrant workers’ 
performance of moral manhood is itself hegemonic as it is conditioned by a set of 
normative religious moralities and conducts; nevertheless, it serves as a tactical 
alternative for migrant workers to reframe their marginal experiences and claim a 
meaningful way of being a man that may psychologically empower them. In this sense, 
Christian migrant workers’ masculinity formation can be understood as a process of 
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autopoiesis or self-cultivation into pious subject beyond the secular-humanist account of 
autonomous and emancipatory personhood (Mahmood 2005). In this chapter, I also 
underscore the intersectional and relational formation of Christian migrant workers’ 
moral masculinity, which is assembled through a subaltern subjectivity aspiring to 
meaningful manhood, self-reflection on class positionality, and theological interpretation 
of gender relations. This chapter is an effort to bring the critical geographies of 
masculinity (Peter and Noble 2009) into dialogue with the literature on geographies of 
Christianity by highlighting the religious and moral reflexivity of masculine subjects. 
 
7.2 Masculinities, class, and religion: towards an intersectional 
approach 
Connell’s (1995) concept of hegemonic masculinity is perhaps the most influential 
contribution to studies of men and masculinities and provides a useful theoretical 
framework for analysing patriarchy and gendered hierarchies, class and labour politics, 
and racial and ethnic differences. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 832) formulated 
hegemonic masculinity as the normative pattern of practices of being a man, which 
“required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically 
legitimated the global subordination of women to men”. They further argued that 
masculinities are not fixed personality traits inherent in the body but rather configurations 
of practices subject to social action and specific social settings. 
 
Nevertheless, the concept of hegemonic masculinity is subject to criticism. Early 
criticisms focused on the ambiguity of the concept, especially with regard to what and 
who actually produces, represents and enacts masculinities (Wetherell and Edley 1999; 
Whitehead 2002). Another strand of critique argues that Connell’s conceptualisation 
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implies the logics of political determinism, under which masculinity has become a 
normative, taken-for-granted patriarchal practice, while making the actual practices, self-
representation and embodiment of men themselves invisible (Beasley 2008; Christensen 
and Jensen 2014). In response to these criticisms, Connell and Messerschmidt have 
acknowledged the need for geographical and scalar analysis to combine the societal 
process of representation and men’s everyday performance (Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005; Messerschmidt 2012; Messerschmidt 2015). They argue that admired masculine 
conduct may be exalted by institutions at the society level (e.g., church, social media, and 
state) and embedded in specific social environments at the local level, such as school and 
the workplace. Masculinities can be purely discursive constructs that do not necessarily 
coincide with the lives of any actual men but nevertheless shape how men position 
themselves in the locally specific construction of hegemonic masculinity. Moreover, 
instead of viewing masculinities as structured by one set of ruling ideas and thus exercised 
only through patriarchal relations, recent studies on masculinities have identified 
structures of relations in which different masculinities (such as subordinate, complicit and 
marginal masculinities) interact and compete (Hopkins and Noble 2009). 
 
Geographers’ contributions to this field lie in the spatial dimensions of masculinity and 
“explore not simply how masculinities are played out in different spaces, but how those 
spaces shape the very nature of the experience of masculinity, and how it articulates with 
other key dimensions of social relations” (Hopkins and Noble 2009: 814). These 
contributions are particularly apparent in research on the cultural representation of 
masculinities (Jackson 1994), male identity and embodied practices (Longhurst 2000; 
Berg and Longhurst 2003; Barber 2016), youthful Muslim masculinities (Hopkins 2006), 
and non-normative and queer masculinities (Gorman-Murray 2013). This line of research 
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has focused on the relations among space, subjectivity, and relationality, moving towards 
a situated, relational, and intersectional formulation of masculinities (Hopkins and Noble 
2009; Van Hoven and Hörschelmann 2005). In this geographical research, masculinities 
are conceptualised as strategic, where men perform and position themselves in particular 
contexts by drawing on discursive resources (Hopkins and Noble 2009; Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005; McDowell 2003). 
 
Masculinities are not simply about the multiple representations of men but are also 
implicated in material relations and hierarchies. Therefore, attention has also been paid 
to how masculinities interact with economic transformation and class subjectivities, 
especially for men in precarious and marginal positions (McDowell 2003; McDowell, 
Rootham and Hardgrove 2014; Nayak 2006; Lin 2013). The increasingly dominant role 
of service economies in the employment market has produced a hierarchy of eligibility 
based on idealised serving bodies, disadvantaging working-class masculinities (Haywood 
& Johansson 2017; McDowell, Rootham and Hardgrove 2014). The masculinities of 
disadvantaged working-class men are often constructed in opposition to the hegemonic 
definition of masculinity that equates manhood with being materially successful and 
capable (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). This is exemplified by “protest masculinities” 
or “marginal masculinities”, which marginalised men utilise to open a dialogical space 
with mainstream society and state power through deviant behaviours such as being tough, 
rebellious and violent, thereby restoring their lack of power or maintaining their cultural, 
regional or ethnic privilege (Cheng 1999). Similarly, Nayak’s (2006) research on 
working-class young men in post-industrial Northeast England elaborates how 
“spectacular masculinities” of white male excess enable young men to accrue a form of 
body capital that reinforces the boundaries of working-class culture and subjectivities. 
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Further research should explore how masculinities become not simply a form of 
domination but also the arena in which marginalisation takes place. 
 
However, despite the acknowledgement of a variety of social categories and relations 
(such as class, ethnicity, and sexuality) that interact with masculinity formation, religion 
and morality have been underexplored within this literature, with the exception of a few 
important studies on Muslim masculinities (see Gökarıksel and Secor 2017; Hopkins 
2006, 2008). Hopkins’s (2006) early work demonstrates that youthful Muslim 
masculinities are influenced by a contradictory narrative of gender relations that 
challenges the stereotypical representation of Muslim men as patriarchal by highlighting 
the Islamic principles of gender equality and simultaneously relies on gendered 
expectations of women as the guardians of religious authenticity or appropriateness. 
Gökarıksel and Secor’s (2017) recent research on Muslim men’s embodied practices and, 
in particular, their looking-desiring nexus suggests that Islamic masculinities are never 
pre-programmed by universal Islamic knowledge and practices but are instead contingent 
and multiple, strategically navigating the regulation of acceptable manhood and sexual 
desires to publicly perform Islamic piety in different moral spatialities. However, 
compared with Muslim masculinities, Christian men’s masculinities and their relation to 
religious ethics and morality have received scant attention. Some theological and biblical 
studies have noted that the emphasis on virtue and the ability to control one’s passions 
and desires marks manhood in Christianity (Stewart 2016; Krondorfer 2009). In terms of 
gender roles and rations, it is also controversial whether Christian doctrines and ethics 
(i.e., the theological discourse of men’s headship) maintain a symbolic patriarchy. For 
example, Brusco’s (1995) research on the evangelical movement in Latin America 
suggests that the morality of asceticism blocks men’s consumption and the behaviours 
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that mark masculinity in Colombia, such as drinking, smoking, and gambling, essentially 
domesticating men and enhancing female status. In particular, the Christian ideal of men’s 
headship is not simply a mystification of male domination; it potentially strengthens 
men’s material and emotional ties to their wives (Gallagher and Smith 1999). Christian 
discourses of gender may create a “soft patriarchy” that maintains men’s privilege but 
simultaneously highlights their responsibility and love towards their wives (Heath 2003; 
Gallagher and Smith 1999). Nevertheless, the theological discourses and moralities of 
being a man are interpreted through the performative practices of “place-making, the 
negotiation of social identities, and the formation of political boundaries, including in 
geographies where theological analyses do not seem relevant” (Tse 2014: 202). In other 
words, religion research should move beyond institutional beliefs and teachings per se to 
the ways religiosity and ethics are “lived” and practised in the realms of everyday life and 
embodied experience (Tse 2014). This chapter therefore examines how lived and 
embodied experiences of religion influence religious men’s everyday performance of 
masculinities and focuses on how religious masculinities come to terms with uneven and 
hierarchical power relations. 
 
To achieve these goals, instead of focusing on single axes of difference, an intersectional 
analytical framework is deployed to capture how masculinity, class, and religion mutually 
form and shape one another. As Hopkins (2017:1) recently argued, “Intersectionality is 
not only about multiple identities but is about relationality, social context, power relations, 
complexity, social justice, and inequality”. In other words, the concept of intersectionality 
should be used ethically and politically and should be viewed as a dynamic process in 
which different structures of power position themselves. It emphasises dynamic forces 
rather than categories, gender performance rather than genders, lived religious practices 
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more than religious principles, and economic exploitation rather than class (Christensen 
and Jensen 2014). Thus, the power relations of masculinity may vary for different 
identities, such as class, religious, and ethnic identifies, as well as within men. Some 
scholars argue that masculinity is itself intersectional and relational, emphasising the need 
to differentiate external masculinities (patriarchal power relations) and internal 
masculinities (power relations between masculinities), which allows a multifaceted and 
complex analysis of power (Christensen and Jensen 2014; Messerchmidt 2012). Despite 
men maintaining patriarchal power, other social categories may either reinforce or 
subvert male privilege. In this sense, the intersectional approach is sensitive to the 
complex processes by which some masculinities become hegemonic and others are 
relegated to the margin. 
 
7.3 Contextualising working-class masculinities in China 
Although masculinities are relational and anti-essentialist, it is necessary to outline the 
representation of men and, in particular, working-class masculinities in China to situate 
the research in a specific discourse/power relation. In Chinese cultural tradition, wen 
(literary) and wu (martial) are often viewed as historically hegemonic models of Chinese 
masculinity (Louie 2002). Confucius and Guan Yu were icons of wen and wu, 
respectively, for most of the history of imperial China (Louie 2002). The former is 
associated with intellectual power under imperial China’s civil official system, while the 
latter represents physical power and the virtues of loyalty (zhong) and righteousness (yi). 
In the Maoist period, “class struggle” required socialist workers to be masculine; they 
were characterised by a revolutionary impulse and political pureness, and women were 
even pressured to dress and act like men (Brownell and Wassertrom 2002; Lin 2013). 
During this period, the political representations of Chinese masculinity were dominated 
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by masculine socialist workers, who were depicted as masters of the country (Lin 2013, 
2017). Working-class people enjoyed not only high social status and class superiority but 
also social security and welfare provided by the state. However, the hegemony of 
working-class masculinity has declined with the post-Mao modernisation following the 
launch of the “reform and opening-up” policy in 1978. As Song and Hird (2013: 12) 
suggest, “with the redistribution of wealth and power and the emergence of the nouveau 
riche in postsocialist society, masculinity [in China] is increasingly being defined in terms 
of money, bearing remarkable similarities with the discourse of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ 
in the West”. The hegemonic masculinity that focuses on career, competition, and 
material acquisition is in congruence with the Chinese state’s project of 
developmentalism and secularism that uphold reason, efficiency, progress, and the pursuit 
of material prosperity as the overriding ideologies of society (Van der Veer 2012). In 
other words, being a modern, civilised, and productive subject has become a normative 
personhood that is required by China’s unfinished project of modernisation. 
 
In the post-reform era, tens of millions of rural-to-urban migrant workers (or peasant 
workers, nongming gong) have become China’s new working class. They constitute the 
major labour forces in manufacturing, construction and mining and are considered the 
most marginalised groups in state and media discourses. In state propaganda, the idealised 
manhood of migrant workers is defined in terms of productive, willing, hard-working, 
self-reliant bodies contributing to urban development (Qian and Guo 2018). Depicting 
migrant workers as a marginal but self-reliant group politically contrasts the state’s 
“generosity” in its limited welfare provision for migrant workers while obfuscating the 
fact that the state is itself the producer of institutional marginality. These presentations of 
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(male) migrant workers legitimate the highly exploitative “migrant labour regime” in 
China, which maximises their labour utility (Qian and Guo 2018). 
 
7.4 Performing moral manhood: the negotiation of religiosity and 
marginality 
7.4.1 Leaving the villages in search of masculinity 
In approximately the past three decades, China has witnessed a noticeable revival of all 
forms of religion and has especially witnessed “Christianity fever”. According to the 
Global Christianity report released by the Pew Research Center, there were at least 58 
million Protestants in China in 2010, representing an almost tenfold increase over a period 
of 30 years. Unlike early Christianity, which was mainly an urban evangelising movement 
in the West, China’s Christian revival fundamentally took root in rural areas. According 
to the officially recognised data, most Christians are concentrated in rural areas (Huang 
2014). However, this scenario has begun to change as tens of millions of rural Christians 
have thronged into cities in search of better incomes and livelihoods. I suggest that this 
broad social change has had strong impacts on the masculinity and subjectivity formation 
of rural Christian men. 
 
Accordingly, rural churches have undergone a drastic loss of young members because the 
majority of rural “surplus labourers” have become seasoned rural-urban migrants, leaving 
only the children and the elderly (particularly elderly women) in the churches. However, 
some devout rural Christian men have faced a dilemma regarding whether they should 
stay in the village and continue serving their church or go to the city like most of their 
peers. Jinjie, a 35-year-old Christian man from rural Jiangxi Province, was one of the 
church leaders in his village. He explained the difficult situation he had faced: 
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Christianity was quite flourishing before, particularly in the late 1990s. There were 
dozens of churches around at the peak, but now only several are left. Now all the young 
people have gone out to dagong (doing employed jobs), especially for labour-
exporting provinces like ours, so the church became very salient… Apart from 
preaching to the old people, I was also responsible for the preaching work in several 
other churches nearby. There must be some men looking after the church and 
especially the old people so that God will bless us. 
 
Jinjie’s narrative implies that the role of Christian men in local churches is indispensable, 
especially in the face of the decline of rural Christianity, which meant that fundamentally, 
only women and the elderly remained in the churches. In these circumstances, Jinjie 
believed that Christian men should take the primary responsibility (i.e., in terms of 
leading the churches and looking after the old), which conforms to the principle of men 
holding the headship of the churches in Christian teachings. Additionally, for Jinjie, 
Christian men’s active performance of their headship of the church is crucial to attain 
God’s blessing. It is not surprising that the church leadership in China, whether in a house 
church or an officially recognised church, is homogenously composed of men even 
though women constitute the majority of Christian adherents. Despite men’s divine role 
as the heads of the church, according to Jinjie, only a few Christian men were willing to 
stay and lead the rural churches. 
 
Nevertheless, being a Christian man is still a marginalised identity as Christians are 
essentially a minority whose values are sometimes incompatible with the popular 
religions, such as ancestral worship, that prevail as the mainstream in rural society. In 
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particular, the Christian kind of manhood that privileges religious devoutness is not 
understood by most non-Christian villagers, who define men’s value primarily by their 
labouring capacity. This was particularly the case in the reform and opening-up period, 
in which leaving the villages to dapin (fight for one’s own career) became the marker of 
“capable” masculinities. Jinjie told me how this hegemonic discourse labelled him as less 
masculine or even “abnormal” in the village and therefore pushed him to join the group 
of rural migrant workers: 
 
If you always stayed in the village, waibang ren (foreigners, referring to non-
Christians) would humiliate you and say, “These Christians, they can live without 
labouring”. In their stereotypes, only old women or the most disadvantaged people 
would believe in God. They always looked at you with this judgement. Other villagers 
said, “You are young. Why do you always go to church?”… So I had to go out to 
dagong; I also need to feed my family. 
 
Like Jinjie, many other Christian migrant workers that I interviewed described the 
always-irreconcilable tension between becoming a devout Christian man and, in the this-
worldly sense, a “capable” man. In many circumstances, being Christian men in rural 
society was often at odds with the secular and hegemonic definition of “capable” men. 
As they said, rural Christian men were often conceived of as “honest men without 
capability” (laoshi mei benshi, 老实没本事). As Van der Veer (2012) argues, the anti-
religious ideologies in China are part and parcel of the state’s secularist project to produce 
a modern, national identity of Chinese people. Therefore, rural Christian men’s 
masculinity, which relied on their commitment to and headship of local churches, has 
become increasingly unattainable under the hegemonic masculinity of “capable” men as 
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secular values such as material acquisition and successfulness have become an overriding 
consensus among rural men in the post-reform era. 
 
7.4.2 Negotiating hegemonic masculinity in the urban workplace 
When Christian men go to the cities like other rural migrant workers, they join one of the 
most marginalised social groups in contemporary China and experience the “double 
exploitation” of state regulatory power and highly unjust labour relations (Pun 2005). 
First, under China’s apartheid-like hukou system (household registration system), rural 
migrant workers are treated as inferior citizens and are deprived of the right to permanent 
settlement in the cities and access to most of the public welfare enjoyed by urban residents. 
Second, they are subject to exploitative and precarious labour regimes that maximise their 
productivity and simultaneously minimise labour costs and their consumption of welfare 
(Pun 2005). 
 
This is particularly the case for migrant workers working in Shenzhen’s manufacturing 
sector for companies such as Foxconn, the world’s largest contract electronics 
manufacturer. Foxconn deploys a set of regulatory techniques, such as collective 
dormitories, compulsory overtime and strict surveillance, to produce productive, docile 
workers. As Foucault (1988: 18-19) argued, the technique of production relies on not only 
“the modification of individual conduct” but also “the technologies of the self” that shape 
“how an individual acts upon himself”. This is manifestly evident in Foxconn’s regulatory 
techniques, which are notoriously characterised by militarised and masculine 
management. 
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On the one hand, the hierarchical management and coercive control of workers at 
Foxconn have produced a hegemonic and militarised “culture” that legitimates 
unquestioning acceptance of the hierarchical power relations and simultaneously 
degrades the dignity of the lower working-class men. Foxconn’s grassroots management 
system is divided into different assembly lines supervised by 2 or 3 group leaders and 
deputy group leaders who are responsible for production assignments, and each assembly 
line is divided into 3 to 4 sub-lines with 20 or 30 workers and 3 sub-line leaders (who are 
responsible for surveillance and quality control) per sub-line. Under this hierarchical 
order, migrant workers’ practices are subject to strict discipline. For example, they need 
to obtain a supervisor’s permission to go to the toilet and constantly experience 
supervisors’ verbal abuse and even punishment if they violate the rules or make mistakes. 
This situation has given rise to an abusive and aggressive culture characterising the 
relations between rank-and-file managers and production workers. When rank-and-file 
managers feel pressure (e.g., because of an intensive production assignment) from above, 
they often channel this pressure and their negative emotions to assembly line workers at 
the expense of the workers’ dignity. This is reflected in the culture of diaoren (屌人), a 
form of verbal violence involving blaming and sneering at others using dirty language. 
The 27-year-old male worker Jincheng complained to me: 
 
Sometimes when you are sleepy, especially on night shift, you would slow down a 
little bit. So, the products would heap up in front of you. The line leaders would 
immediately come to scold you for dragging down the speed… Before the beginning 
of the work every morning, the line leaders would give lectures to us about the 
production assignment and the rules. Basically, he was scolding us during this time… 
I felt I had no dignity. 
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However, this masculine and hierarchical management is often challenged by working-
class men, who attempt to resist this hierarchical power relation by performing aggressive 
and rebellious masculinities. Many male workers use verbal violence to speak out against 
the abuse from the supervisors and therefore to defend their masculinity. However, the 
culture of diaoren prevails even among workers themselves. This is because the fear of 
being abused and punished has created mutual distrust among production workers; some 
workers pass the buck to others when they made mistakes. It is common for workers to 
quarrel with one another over who made the mistake and who should take responsibility. 
In Foxconn, there are two dominant forms of conflictual masculinities: the hierarchical 
and hegemonic masculinity among rank-and-file managers who use verbal violence and 
punishment to discipline workers and the protest masculinity (Connell 1995) among 
production workers who utilise rebellious and aggressive practices to defend their dignity 
and interests. 
 
However, Christian male workers struggle not only with the marginalised and deprived 
masculinities inflicted by the exploitative labour regime but also with how to act in 
accordance with Christian moralities in the face of the culture of diaoren. Zhicheng is a 
32-year-old Christian man who had worked at Foxconn for 7 years. He was promoted 
from an assembly line worker to a sub-line leader in 2017 because of his experiences and 
diligence. However, he resigned the position of sub-line leader shortly after his promotion 
because, as he claimed, he had to constantly struggle between God’s laws and the laws 
of Foxconn. Despite his intention to keep the aggressive and abusive culture at a safe 
distance, he could not escape the discourses of normalised masculinity that defined how 
a male leader should act. In a Christian fellowship among Foxconn workers in one 
 207  
Pentecostal church, Zhicheng shared with other Christian workers the difficulties he 
encountered shortly after his promotion: 
 
Zhicheng: A girl (worker) said to me that she wanted to go to the toilet. We normally 
had a ten-minute break at 3 pm and now it was 2:45. So I politely responded, “It’s 
nearly 3 o’clock, you can take a break 15 minutes later”. The girl suddenly became 
extremely angry. It scared me, out of my expectation. I froze there, not knowing what 
I should say. Our line leader witnessed this scene. 
 
Li (Christian male worker): The line leader scolded you? 
 
Zhicheng: Yes, he said, “You shouldn’t let your workers deter you, you shouldn’t let 
her go to the toilet, it’s just 15 minutes”. I thought a while, said, “She is a girl, perhaps 
she was on her period and felt mood swings”. The line leader replied, “You shouldn’t 
act like that—consider the workers’ feelings. If you continue acting like this, being a 
laohaoren (one who tries to never offend anybody), you aren’t able to manage the 
workers”. I was thinking, if I acted coercively, it went against Bible’s teachings. The 
Bible teaches us to be benevolent and considerate of others. So, sometimes I had no 
ideas. 
 
Long (Christian male worker): The Bible teaches us that God is not only merciful but 
also righteous. So, you should obey the rules first. But you can talk to her after work. 
 
Zhicheng: I did. I tried to explain to her, but she gave me a very unpleasant face and 
said, “Stop! Don’t talk!” She disliked all managers. 
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Long (Christian male worker): In my opinion, you should stick to the principles, but 
you should try to let them know you are different. You can follow the principle in the 
workplace and simultaneously be a kind Christian in everyday life. Try to care for 
them with love, to understand them. 
 
Ironically, for low-status managers, being aggressive and coercive was even viewed as a 
valuable asset that signalled the male supervisors’ capacity to discipline recalcitrant and 
rebellious workers and contributed to a better chance of being promoted. The response of 
Zhicheng’s line leader implies that the hierarchical masculinity was largely hegemonic as 
aggression and coercion were part of the normative personhood required by Foxconn’s 
militarised management. In contrast, both Zhicheng and Long agreed that a Christian man 
should be considerate and caring of other workers’ feelings and, in particular, those of 
the women workers. However, they also admitted that this sometimes conflicted with the 
principles of justice (that factory rules apply to each worker equally), though Long 
thought this conflict was not irreconcilable. Nevertheless, they both pursued an idealised 
Christian manhood characterised by moral righteousness that involved how they treated 
other people and spoke respectfully of supervisors and workmates in accordance with 
God’s principles. The Christian workers’ interpretation of manhood echoes what 
Mcsheffrey (1998) calls the “respectable masculinity” held by some low-status Christian 
men in British public service who sought to control their misbehaviour and to avoid 
offences to others in their exercise of power to maintain “godly conduct”. However, what 
is defined as “morally right” in Christian language is not fixed but is individually 
interpreted by Christian men in particular contexts. Therefore, it is better understood as a 
 209  
grounded strategy that Christian workers utilise to establish a form of respectable and 
civilised masculinity (Hopkins and Noble 2009). 
 
Another Foxconn worker, Zhang, explained to me why working-class individuals tended 
to fight against each other and why obedience to Christian moral principles was important 
for a Christian man: 
 
Zhang: There are many people at the bottom of our society. You must fight and 
compete for the limited resources. But it’s more competitive among our underclass. 
 
Quan: Why do you think so? 
 
Zhang: How many people can enter the ruling class? Most of the people from the 
countryside are struggling at the bottom. Do you know that the bottom of society is a 
mire? 
 
    Quan: Yeah, I agree. 
 
Zhang: You need to struggle, powerlessly. So there are two kinds of people at the 
bottom of society. First, some people who undergo cruel exploitation became crueller 
in response. If others bullied them, attacked them, they would accumulate the hate and 
impose it on those who are weaker than them. But for the second kind of people, if 
others bullied them, they could sympathise with those who had been bullied. They 
aren’t willing to bully those who are weaker. They won’t impose their pain on others. 
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Interviewer: So, you think you should be the second kind? 
 
Zhang, Yes, but society also has this kind of people. 
 
In this quotation, Zhang described himself as part of the underclass like other rural 
migrant workers at Foxconn and therefore showed great sympathy for those workers who 
were struggling to escape the “mire”. Despite this, he refused to follow the “jungle law” 
at Foxconn in which the weak served as prey for the strong because a Christian man 
should at least sympathise with others’ pain. Thus, male Christian workers sought to map 
out a distinguishing manhood in accordance with what is moral and immoral and 
therefore to discursively construct a socio-religious distinction within male workers 
themselves. Male Christian workers normally classified their non-Christian workmates 
as waibangren (foreigners) who were assumed to be less engaged with moral principles. 
Compared to non-Christian workers or supervisors, they often assumed a moral and 
spiritual high ground because of their obedience to Christian moral principles. 
 
First, unlike some non-Christian workers who sought to defend their deprived masculinity 
through rebellious practices, male Christian workers instead placed considerable 
emphasis on tolerance and self-disciplined bodies in tandem with their reading of 
Christian ethics and doctrines. In particular, controlling emotional impulses is of great 
importance for Christian men. Compared to their non-Christian workmates, male 
Christian workers rarely quarrelled with their supervisors or workmates. The 39-year-old 
male worker Dong considered good manners to be a marker of a mature male Christian. 
As a retired soldier, he previously often quarrelled with others because he could not 
tolerate anything he thought was unjust. However, after he converted to Christianity, as 
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he remarked, his bad manners were much more controlled, and he rarely quarrelled with 
others. While talking about the prevalence of verbal violence at Foxconn, the young 
worker Liqiang commented, “We are different from other non-Christian workers. We 
Christians shouldn’t talk dirty; we need to guard our mouth and tongue”. In this sense, 
Christian men’s exertion of self-control, tolerance and proper manners is consistent with 
both wu masculinity, which requires self-discipline and self-control within a set of codes 
to achieve self-transformation, and wen masculinity, which emphasises proper manners 
in the pursuit of being civilised and respectful subjects. 
 
In addition to their emphasis on self-control, male Christian workers actively construct 
their distinctive Christian manhood by performing a hardworking, helpful, and reliable 
image. For many male Christian workers, the factory life offers an opportunity to practise 
their commitment to God. In particular, the Christian teaching of “living like Christ” 
frequently came up in the interviews. Male Christian workers simply applied this teaching 
to their everyday lives and work and believed that being hardworking and helpful was 
consistent with a good Christian image. It was this distinctive way of living that 
distinguished them from non-Christian workers and enabled them to attain a meaningful 
and morally superior manhood: 
 
Dong: I often tidied the dormitory for the rest of my (male) roommates. We Christians 
should have proper habits. It is also my responsibility to let waibangren see the image 
of Jesus Christ, to influence others, to let them know having Christian faith is a good 
thing. At least we could let them realise that Christians have a clear understanding of 
what is proper. 
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Fuqiang: If you don’t believe in God, you only look at your current circumstances. For 
example, if your supervisor or boss isn’t on surveillance, you will be less dedicated to 
your work. But we Christians always work silently and wholeheartedly regardless of 
whether supervisors are on surveillance. We won’t loaf on the job like other workers 
often do when supervisors are away. 
 
In this sense, Christian workers sought to create an elevated subject position by 
constructing a morally superior and distinctive manhood to fend off and negotiate with 
the aggressive masculinity among both rank-and-file managers and production workers. 
Nevertheless, they rarely challenged the suppressive labour regime. Moreover, Christian 
workers’ emphasis on tolerant, civilised and self-disciplined male bodies even legitimated 
the hierarchical power relations in the factory setting as it reinforced the discourses of 
productive, docile and non-rebellious bodies. It is noteworthy that the workers also 
exhibited a clear consciousness of their class position. For example, many workers 
referred to themselves as the underclass. However, this form of class subjectivity appears 
to be concerned only with their moral relationship with other non-Christian working class 
people and is therefore non-radical and uncritical of the broader material inequalities they 
experience. 
 
7.5 Christian morality and gender/familial relationships 
While moving away from the working spheres that define masculinity through 
hierarchical power relations, gender/familial relationships are also crucial in 
understanding the formation of Christian migrant workers’ masculinity. Christian migrant 
worker men can be divided into two groups according to whether they are single or have 
a lover/spouse. The former struggled to reconcile Chinese traditional values (e.g., filial 
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piety) and familial obligations with Christian moral subjectivity in their negotiation of 
singleness, while the latter sought to construct an alternative patriarchal (or soft 
patriarchal) masculinity based on male headship in relation to women. 
 
7.5.1 Religiosity, singleness and the imagination of godly marriage 
In the Chinese context, being single carries largely negative connotations as getting 
married at a “suitable” age is viewed as a hegemonic cultural norm in Chinese society 
(Lin 2017; Kong 2010). Single men experience “double marginalisation” inflicted by 
both heteronormative social stigma and traditional familial values in Chinese society 
(Kong 2010). This is particularly the case in rural society, where lineage and familial 
ethics are deeply rooted. In traditional Chinese cultural values, men’s masculinities are 
highly associated with their capacity to fulfil familial values and obligations. “Capable” 
masculinities are manifested in not only men’s role as the “breadwinner” but also their 
performance of passing the family name to the next generation (Lin 2013). Single men 
are therefore often stigmatised as less “capable” for failing to perform their expected 
gender role. 
 
However, the Christian way of being single and the Christian interpretation of marriage 
are often at odds with Chinese traditional familial values and obligations that necessitate 
marriage as a compulsory part of filial piety and family-based masculinity. Instead, many 
Christian single men emphasise that marriage is holy, a gift from God, and central to the 
community of faith and that it cannot be reduced to the utility of continuing the family 
line (传宗接代). Male Christian migrant workers are often more cautious than non-
Christians in seeking a potential spouse as a set of Christian values shapes their image of 
a “suitable” lover/spouse. Christian men therefore have, as our interviewees claimed, 
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different definitions of and higher requirements for “suitable” lovers/spouses than 
waibangren (non-Christians). I suggest that migrant workers’ divine imagination of 
marriage somehow justifies their status of being single and creates a discursive power to 
purse self-directed choices of “godly partners” unhindered by traditional Chinese familial 
norms and secular values.  
 
Lidong is a 32-year-old single man from rural Henan Province who had worked at 
Foxconn for 8 years. He noted that most of the young men his age in his village were 
married, and his parents often pushed him to find a spouse. It is unsurprising that his 
parents pressured him as men in their 30s are often seen as disadvantaged under the 
heteronormative cultural norms in China (Lin 2017). In 2015, his parents arranged a 
xiangqin (blind date) for him and asked him to return to the village to meet the woman 
they had chosen. However, Lidong was reluctant to attend the xiangqin because, as he 
claimed, he did not want to find a waibangren as his partner. He ultimately did not attend 
the xiangqin his parents arranged, making an excuse that his mobile phone was out of 
order. Lidong’s resistance was considered highly offensive to his parents because he 
failed to exhibit filial piety towards his parents: “My father hated me because of this. He 
said I didn’t listen to him and made him really lose face. My father said the villagers 
would gossip about us and considered us to be arrogant people”. 
 
Like Lidong, many other Christian men insisted that they could not accept a waibangren 
as a wife. This was not simply because of the requirements of biblical doctrines but also 
because they saw waibangren as less self-constrained and less reliable than Christians. 
For example, the 27-year-old worker Ma, a member of one Pentecostal house church, 
believed that non-Christian women often viewed men superficially, defining the quality 
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of a man through his material success more than his inner self-cultivation. Before 
converting to Christianity, he had pursued a non-Christian woman. However, the woman 
ultimately did not accept him because, as he believed, the woman was not satisfied with 
his economic circumstances. Moreover, the emphasis on sexual purity in Christian 
morality shapes Christian men’s image of a “proper” woman. Many Christian men 
believe that Christian women are more loyal in marriage than non-Christian women 
because of their adherence to premarital chastity and their common Christian faith. 
According to my ethnographic work, some Pentecostal house churches in which rural 
migrants were concentrated put more emphasis on the imaginary boundary between 
Christians and waibangren in comparison to the officially admitted churches because 
their legally ambiguous or illegal status required them to be more self-enclosed and 
vigilant in terms of the entry of non-Christian members, who were believed to be less 
trustworthy. In contrast, official churches were more open to non-Christian members 
because of their legal status. This difference may potentially influence Christian men’s 
imagination of and interaction with non-Christian women. 
 
Many Christian men thought that the ideal lover/spouse must be God’s arrangement and 
gift and that only a “blessed” relationship could be a perfect match. However, the Bible 
does not specifically address what constitutes the right spouse. In one male fellowship of 
Foxconn workers, they discussed how they would know when they had found the right 
spouse. Several single Christian men suggested that they were often careful or hesitant to 
enter an intimate relationship because they could not confirm whether she was part of 
God’s arrangement. For example, Yu was a 35-year-old male Christian worker who had 
remained single, although he had dated several potential lovers. Yu emphasised that 
 216  
finding a suitable spouse was not dependent on individual desire but rather on both 
yuanfen (destiny) and God’s will: 
 
You need to look at yuanfen. You can’t know when God will arrange a partner for you, 
so what you need to do is to seek God’s will carefully, pray more, and make your 
spiritual life more mature. When yuanfen comes, you will eventually meet the right 
lover. 
 
What Yu refers to as “yuanfen” was originally a Buddhist word referring to the destiny 
or fate that brings people together, but it has become a popular word to describe the 
supernatural forces determining gender relationships. When used in the Christian sense, 
“yuanfen” implies that a marriage is predetermined by God and that individual agency is 
less relevant. For Yu, being single was even considered a test of his faith by God. The 
process of waiting not only was a motive to undergo purification but also helped him 
develop maturity. This is reminiscent of Mahmood’s (2001) study of single Islamic 
women who utilise the discourse of “blessed marriage” to justify their self-directed 
autonomously chosen goals. For single Christian men in this study, Christian moralities 
appear to offer them an autonomy beyond the family-based masculinity defined by the 
Chinese traditional cultural norms of familial obligation and filial piety, but also enhance 
their capacity to endure and persist in the face of marginal singleness.  
 
7.5.2 Male headship and gender relationships 
It is common for young male Christian workers to find a spouse/girlfriend at church. 
Many churches that migrant workers attend not only encourage marriage between 
believers but also serve as “marriage agents” for young Christian workers. For example, 
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in one house church next to Foxconn, the church leaders organised a series of single 
fellowships or outdoor activities to help young Christian workers meet each other. Some 
Pentecostal house churches emphasise the sharing of testimonies and emotional 
experiences of Christian couples, while some officially recognised churches tend to 
organise sermons or fellowships to teach Christian couples to build a strong marriage in 
line with their common faith and biblical values. Zhiqi, a 35-year-old worker and father 
of a 5-year-old child, met his wife at one fellowship. As Zhiqi recalls, though he first 
indicated interest in his future wife, other church members helped him to elicit a response. 
Once relationships are made public, the churches arrange a fellowship on love/marriage, 
which offers guidance on marriage and family relationships. 
 
For many male workers, Christian values therefore play a crucial role in shaping their 
understanding of ideal manhood or the role of husbands in relation to their wives. Of 
particular importance is migrant workers’ interpretation of the view of “men as the head” 
in Christian doctrines. In my interviews, some Bible verses were frequently quoted and 
interpreted by Christian male workers to describe men’s headship, such as “Wives, submit 
to your husbands as to the Lord” and “For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is 
the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior” (Ephesians 5:22-23). Some 
feminist scholars interpret the notion of male headship as a form of patriarchy that 
maintains a symbolic structure of male dominance and justifies female subordination as 
the “order of creation” mandated by God (Ruether 2001). However, in this case, male 
migrant workers’ understandings of male headship are not simply an affirmation of 
traditional views within the patriarchal discourse of Christianity. I suggest that Christian 
migrant men’s efforts to maintain and balance the husband’s symbolic headship with 
pragmatic egalitarianism in everyday life imply a transformation from a secular 
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patriarchal masculinity to a morally legitimated “Godly manhood”. The Christian men 
workers consciously distinguish themselves from secular masculinity and men’s 
domination through a soft patriarchy that emphasises responsibility, self-reflection, 
mutual submission, love and emotional intimacy with their wives. These ideas of men’s 
headship challenge as well as justify and reinforce a hegemonic and patriarchal 
masculinity. 
 
The view of male headship is particularly appealing to migrant workers seeking to 
construct a strong moral and spiritual manhood. The male Christian workers commonly 
expressed the belief that men had been given a divine role and received higher power than 
women. However, they did not simply equate men’s higher power with men’s dominance. 
An example of this can be found in Zhiquan’s ethical-theological account of the 
relationship between male headship and gender equality: 
 
Zhiquan: In a worldly sense, men and women’s status in the family is often dependent 
on their capability, particularly how much money they can win. But it’s different for 
Christian couples. Because we have a common faith, we are equal regardless of how 
much money each one earns… However, the man is the headship of the family. Men 
have been given the role as the head by God. 
 
Quan: How do you think of the relationship between gender equality and men’s role 
as the head? 
 
Zhiquan: I think they are consistent. They are established on a common faith, so the 
ultimate goals of the husband and wife are consistent. Men’s headship emphasises that 
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men should take more responsibilities than women. If you look at Genesis in the Bible, 
God asked Adam to take a lot of responsibilities. For example, God asked Adam to 
name all the animals and manage the Garden of Eden. Given that Adam couldn’t 
manage these affairs alone, God took one of Adam’s rib to create Eve to assist him. 
God arranged Eve to assist Adam in performing his divine role. So, the wife should 
assist her husband and help him better perform his role. 
 
Zhiquan’s statement suggested that God designed men differently from women because 
Adam was created first and God then created Eve to assist him. He considered this order 
of creation an indication and symbol of men’s headship. For Zhiquan, it was a divine 
arrangement that women must assist men and bolster men’s masculinity for the better 
performance of men’s headship and responsibility. Zhiquan’s narrative resonates with 
Heath’s (2003:436) argument that by justifying wives’ role in helping “men to be men”, 
Christian understandings of gender “promote a hegemonic masculinity that allows men 
to be involved husbands and fathers while maintaining their privilege as men”. However, 
Zhiquan did not simply equate this symbolic headship with men’s domination. In 
Gallagher and Smith’s (1999) study of the evangelical ideas of men’s headship, Christian 
men constantly balanced and negotiated between symbolic male headship and pragmatic 
egalitarianism to maintain a Godly distinctive masculinity. Likewise, Zhiquan 
underscored that male headship and gender equality are consistent in Christian teachings. 
First, he emphasised that gender equality is inherent to the spouses’ common faith in God. 
Moreover, for Zhiquan, the Christian gender relationship seemed morally superior to 
secular definitions because of the irrelevance of a couple’s capability or economic status. 
Second, Zhiquan did not question the view of male headship but related it to the moral 
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requirement to take more responsibility than women. In other words, taking the primary 
responsibility is related to the divine role of men’s headship. 
 
Although some migrant workers did not deny the “actually existing” inequality in their 
gender relations, they insisted that Christian morality enabled them to be more self-
reflective on their misbehaviours. For example, the 40-year-old Christian worker Fuqiang 
frankly admitted that he sometimes behaved dictatorially to his wife, particularly in 
relation to the issue of decision-making in marriage. However, he was self-conscious of 
this and had made efforts to correct his behaviours in line with Christian teachings: 
 
Sometimes I have masculinist (da nanzi zhuyi) behaviours at home. If my wife 
wouldn’t listen to me, I would get angry sometimes. But I knew it was a bad habit and 
needed to be changed. It’s perhaps influenced by my father. My father is typically a 
masculinist, and I would inevitably follow his qualities a little bit. After I converted to 
Christianity, I knew that the wife shouldn’t be subordinated to the husband. You need 
to love your wife. 
 
This quotation demonstrates that Christian discourses enable migrant workers to shift 
from hegemonic patriarchy to self-reflective, soft patriarchy. However, this form of soft 
patriarchy is not necessarily less hegemonic as it justifies the wife’s submission to the 
husband through religious ideologies. For example, the worker Lidong insisted that male 
headship and, in particular, the wife’s submission to the husband is practically justified 
in building a harmonious marriage: 
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The Bible says submitting is blessed. My experiences tell me that it’s reasonable. 
When I’m wrong and my wife still submits to me, I will know that my wife has 
sacrificed for me. So I will reflect upon myself and realise why I’m wrong. Instead, if 
my wife is against me overtly, it will make the situation worse and bring conflicts. 
 
Somewhat different from Fuqiang and Lidong’s interpretations of men’s headship as self-
reflection, a few Christian workers, particularly the Pentecostal men who prioritised the 
“holy spirit” as a source of authority, emphasised “mutual submission” as a reconciliation 
of men’s headship and equal partnership in Christian teachings. For example, the 41-year-
old male worker Liu believed that husbands and wives are united into one flesh and 
thereby should submit to one another under the guidance of the “holy spirit”: “Husbands 
should love their wives as their own bodies because they are one flesh… If any conflicts 
occur, no matter who compromises first, the holy spirit will remind you of this [one 
flesh]”. 
 
Most informants agreed that loving their wives was an important manifestation of men’s 
headship. They appeared to embrace the stereotype that men were commonly less able 
than women to discuss emotions, but Christian wisdom could enable them to be 
emotionally sensitive and enhance their intimacy to wives, which distinguished them 
from “worldly” men. One of the Bible verses they frequently mentioned was “Do not let 
any unwholesome talk come out of your mouths, but only what is helpful for building 
others up according to their needs, that it may benefit those who listen” (Ephesians 4: 29). 
Thus, many male workers viewed speaking with good words as a pearl of Christian 
wisdom and an indication of expressive masculinity that enabled them to be more 
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sensitive to women’s subjectivity. For example, one married worker suggested the 
following: 
 
Men and women are different. This is God’s law… So, [Christian] men should 
consider women’s feelings. The Bible teaches us to communicate with love. Women 
usually love hearing a nice word. If you praise her every day, how pretty her dress is, 
she’ll be happy. A man can judge how much his wife loves him (without hearing nice 
words), but a woman can’t. Women need to feel through what you have said. 
 
Above all, Christian migrant worker men sought to construct a morally distinctive and 
soft patriarchal masculinity that was different from the patriarchy and male domination 
in the secular sense. However, this type of soft patriarchy maintains its hegemony as 
superior to secular patriarchal masculinity because its emphases on responsibility, self-
reflection, love and expressiveness do not challenge the dichotomous understanding of 
the gender order and difference that maintain men’s privilege. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented Christian migrant workers’ narratives and performance 
of masculinities in Shenzhen in the context of neoliberal economic transformation. This 
chapter fills an important gap in existing geographical scholarship regarding how 
Christian masculinities are lived and performed in everyday life by working-class 
individuals. I have examined how migrant worker men employ Christian discourse and 
ethics to construct and perform morally meaningful manhood in their negotiation of social 
change, exploitative labour regimes, and gender/familial relationships. Being a Christian 
migrant worker is not only about living a moral and godly life but also about how 
 223  
Christian men reposition themselves in relation to class and hierarchical power structures 
as well as gender relations. By deploying an intersectional, relational, and situated 
approach to masculinity, this study makes two contributions to the geographies of 
masculinity and religion. 
 
First, this chapter brings the geographies of Christianity literature into dialogue with the 
study of masculinities. On the one hand, Christianity provides migrant workers with 
ethical impulses and theological discourses to negotiate the hegemonic masculine subject 
institutionalised by the suppressive and hierarchical factory labour regime. Intuitively, 
migrant workers’ emphasis on moral manhood appears to reinforce the 
state’s/capitalism’s discourse on hard work and compliance with rules as virtues and 
manifestations of valued and encouraged qualities. Christian morality also enables 
migrant worker men to construct a godly manhood in gender/familial relationships, but 
this godly manhood is itself hegemonic. This research also highlights that migrant 
workers’ constitution of moral manhood cannot be separated from the hierarchical power 
relations and particularly the politics of migrant labour under the capitalist restructuring 
of the Chinese economy. To further the argument that masculinity is also a site where 
marginalisation takes place (McDowell 2003; Nayak 2006), I suggest that it is the 
structural and intersectional power relations rather than religious morality itself that lead 
to the marginalisation of Christian working-class men. 
 
This chapter therefore raises concerns about how moral masculinity can open up the 
possibility of empowerment and agency for marginalised men beyond the resistance 
practices claimed by “protest masculinity”. Unlike non-Christian workers, who construct 
their “protest masculinity” through rebellious practices, Christian migrant workers’ 
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performance of moral manhood is apparently non-confrontational. As Mahmood’s (2005) 
ethical reflection on Muslim piety suggests, agency and empowerment may not rely 
solely on the production of counter-subjectivity; subject formation is a process of 
autopoiesis or self-styling, involving multiple negotiations with dominant values or 
norms. In this sense, moral masculinity in this study cannot be understood simply as hand-
in-glove with the politics of subject formation of the state/capitalist project; it also opens 
a possible space for agency in which migrant workers can claim a meaningful way of 
being a man and thus psychologically empower themselves (Cloke et al. 2019; Gao, Qian 
and Yuan 2018; Gao and Qian 2019). Echoing Hopkins’ (2006) study of Muslim youth 
masculinity, I suggest that religion and morality create a relational space in which men 
reposition their marginal experiences and reimagine the ways they are seen by others. In 
this sense, moral masculinities are better understood as a technique of self-refashioning 
into morally distinctive subjects in “doing” gender. 
 
Second, this research responds to recent calls for a global comparative study of 
masculinities. In particular, this study responds to Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) 
emphasis on the relationship between globalisation and masculinity and especially how 
multiple patterns of masculinities are performed and configured in locally situated 
contexts. In this research, Christian masculinity, Chinese masculinity, and working-class 
masculinity are never globally homogenous, nor do they mechanically combine to form 
a new masculine subject. In this sense, migrant workers’ moral manhood is better 
conceived of as an embodied strategy and a way of being in response to the dominant 
social, cultural and political imaginaries in China, understood through discursive 
practices and individuals’ quests for ethical and meaningful subjectivity. 
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Chapter 8 
Rethinking postsecular feminism: intersectionality and the 
religious agency of women migrant workers  
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the constitution of women Christian migrant workers’ religious 
subjectivity and agency.  In particular, I draw on recent debates about post-secular 
feminism regarding to the extent to which women’s subjectivity and agency can be 
conveyed through and supported by religious ethics and piety and how women’s agency 
can be rethought beyond the limitations of Eurocentric and secular humanist theorising 
(Mahmood 2005; Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016; Cloke et al. 2019). As I have proposed 
in chapter 2, an intersectional approach may open up new orientations to the 
comprehension and grounding of both multiple power relations and postsecular 
subjectivity and agency. In this chapter, therefore, I examine this inquiry empirically by 
looking at women migrant workers’ intersectional experiences of religion, gender, 
migration, and familial relations.    
 
Since the reform-and-opening-up policy was introduced in 1978, Chinese rural migrant 
women have been placed at the forefront of the encounter with global capitalism and the 
international division of labour (Pun 2005). This transformation has not only produced a 
more flexible and intensive sexual and class exploitation of migrant women but also 
opened up the possibility for the formation of new forms of female subjectivity (Zhang 
2014). Existing discourses in scholarship tend to link Chinese rural migrant women’s 
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subjectivity to the power of state-socialism, global capitalism and familial patriarchy, 
which collectively produce institutionalised domination over rural women migrants (Pun 
2005; Ong 2007; Gaetano 2008; Jacka 2013). This line of thought normally situates 
migrant women’s subjectivity in a domination-resistance dichotomy, implying that 
women’s agency solely or primarily relies on oppositional practices and the production 
of counter-subjectivities.  For example, Pun (2005) describes rural migrant women “as a 
specifically Chinese subaltern, [which] embodies the dual process of domination and 
resistance and is marked by various forms of collaboration, transgression, and defiance 
that together come to make up its complex, dissident, and heterogeneous subjects”. On 
the one hand, following the ideas of postsecular feminism, I therefore reflect upon this 
normative-secularist understanding of women’s subjectivity that situates women’s 
agency within the domination-resistance dichotomy. On the other hand, however, rather 
than mapping out new forms of religious agency, I argue that postsecular feminist critique 
needs to carefully consider the pattern of intersectionality in which both the “matrix of 
domination” (Collins 2000) and postsecular subjectivity and agency are engendered and 
interweave.  
 
In the empirical sections, I propose to understand Christian migrant women’s subjectivity 
within the intersectional “matrix of domination” woven by the state’s hegemonic 
discourses and ideologies, urban-rural dualism, the legacies of traditional familial and 
patriarchal culture, the gendered disciplinary labour regime, and the patriarchal institution 
of Christianity, which work hand-in-hand to produce the subaltern femininity of migrant 
women. I suggest that Christian migrant women indeed experience multiple 
marginalisation in rural society under the overwhelming patriarchal lineage of culture and 
within the patriarchal Christian institution per se. In the urban workplace, as I have 
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discussed in Chapter 7, the hierarchical management and coercive control of migrant 
workers operates through a hegemonic “culture” of masculinity that encourages 
aggressive practices and verbal abuse. Here, I further analyse how this disciplining of 
workers’ subjectivity is linked to the production of sexed bodies and feminine identity. 
In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 2, intersectionality therefore serves as the “object-
targets” for social power and constitutes a “matrix of domination” that cannot be 
challenged by simply subverting a singular oppression force.  On the other hand, this 
chapter also focuses on the extent to which new religious subjectivity and agency are 
made possible within this intersectional power structure. I therefore examine the 
intersection of gender and familial experiences in which Christian piety might open up 
the possibility for reworking the way the power of denomination operates.  I observe that 
the women migrants’ emphasis on the authority of feeling, emotion, and experience in 
some Pentecostal-style churches not only offers them a “comfort zone” to negotiate with 
labour alienation but also redefines the institutional religious spheres where men have 
traditionally been dominant. Women migrants’ agency is also manifest in their efforts to 
Christianise family relations through marriage and evangelisation so as to redefine the 
power dynamics within the family. However, these kinds of agency are not achieved 
through confrontational practices but rather through performing docile, hardworking, 
tolerant Christian femininities, and particularly pious ways of life. Overall, while 
acknowledging the postsecular feminist account of religious agency that emphasises the 
embodiment of ethical norms and self-realisation beyond counter-subjectivities 
(Mahmood 2005; Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016), I argue that postsecular feminism needs 
to be attentive to the intersectional power in which new religious agency and 
subjectivities are enabled or thwarted.  In this sense, the critical theory of postsecular 
feminism should pay heed to the intersectional power and multiple social inequalities that 
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condition whether or not and the extent to which new religious subjectivities can have 
counter-hegemonic effects.  
 
8.2 Women migrant subjectivities and post-secular feminism  
The last two decades have witnessed the burgeoning of feminist studies of migration, with 
focuses on not only women’s specific migration pattern, experiences, and subjectivities 
but also how gender interacts with the wider spatial politics of difference, mobility and 
labour in an era of globalisation (Dwyer 2000; Willis and Yeoh 2002; Silvey 2004; 
Gaetano and Yeoh 2010; Silvey 2013). This line of scholarship has shifted from studying 
women migrants as a distinct research category to studying the gendered being of 
migration, and in particular how gender as a system of practices or ideology permeates 
every aspect of the migration experiences and power relations. Instead of viewing gender 
and gender relations as a dichotomous variable that shapes the mobility and pattern of 
migration, critical feminist migration researchers argue that gender is better understood 
as a constitutive element of migration, given that “the structures that precipitate migration 
flows and shape the economic experiences of all migrants are [themselves] gendered” 
(Nawyn 2010: 142).   
 
Central to feminist migration studies is inquiry into women migrants’ subjectivity and 
identity politics. Migration involves the displacement and mobility of subjects through 
space and place, which requires feminist scholars to attend to the tensions around identity, 
belonging and grounded embodied practices. Gender identities and subjectivities are 
crucial to an understanding the social networks of migrants’ lives, the emotional 
boundaries of the migrant community, and issues of exploitation and inequality under the 
global labour regime (Silvey 2004). However, as Silvey (2004) suggests, feminist 
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concerns with migrants’ subjectivities is distinct from the approach to identity that 
emphasises the political implications of cultural differences. Attention to subjectivity is 
more sensitive to migrants’ views of who they are, delving into how the performative 
production of gender is implicated in larger social institutions and structures (Silvey 2004: 
9).  
 
Drawing upon Connell’s (1987, 2007) gender relations theory, one strand of research has 
highlighted the way migration can maintain, challenge, or reconstitute the fixed basis of 
gender power relations, and in particular patriarchy. Early research engaged in a critique 
of patriarchy, seen as a sociocultural structure that privileges the masculine over the 
feminine (Halfacree 1995). Gender inequality is evidenced in the new international 
division of labour that shapes gendered patterns of migration. For example, the growing 
“third world” rural-to-urban migration was prompted by increases in light manufacturing 
activity driven by foreign direct investment. Some studies have explored whether or not 
migration can reconstruct women’s subjectivity and therefore alter patriarchy, as women 
migrants might gain empowerment and agency through participation in the labour force 
in host places (Boyd and Grieco 2003). For example, Lee (1998) studied the Chinese 
“dagongmei” (young female rural migrant workers) and demonstrated that migration 
experiences such as working on a production line reconstituted their sense of self and 
provided them with a relatively independent, romantic lifestyle and adulthood in contrast 
to the dominant familial patriarchy of Chinese rural society, despite their bodies being 
highly disciplined and inscribed within the factory labour regime. Similarly, Pun (2005: 
56) argues that Chinese female migrant workers were not passive objects of the 
patriarchal family, as they were “either kept detached or had attempted to subvert the 
familial grip of power”. Nevertheless, there are more complicated relationships of 
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dominance and subversion which require feminist scholars to focus on cultural 
conditioning and the possibilities that enable women migrants to negotiate with 
patriarchal power structures.  
 
In this sense, the regulatory power of the state and global capitalism is better understood 
to operate in tandem with the patriarchal culture of labour, which together discipline and 
produce the offshoring and feminisation of labouring subjects (Silvey 2013). It is 
generally acknowledged that femininity is articulated, imagined, and engineered in the 
disciplinary practices of the global migrant labour regime, since it is always linked to the 
making of good workers characterised by docile, tolerant, and hardworking bodies (Pun 
2005; Ong 2010). For example, given its interest in reinforcing the export of labour, the 
Philipino state depicted and hailed domestic maid workers as “new national heroes”, 
contributing to the discourse of the ideal worker as self-sacrificial, individualised, and 
hard-working (Rodrigues 2002; Pratt 2012). In particular, the ideology of motherhood 
that encourages women migrant workers to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their 
children and nation was manipulated so as to refashion women migrants’ subjectivities in 
congruence with the state/capitalist project. Similarly, Pun (1999; 2005) provides an 
intriguing narrative of how the gendered quality of being submissive was linked to the 
making of qualified migrant workers, where being obedient, industrious, and tender is 
internalised as an indication of modern and civilised women workers as well as the 
constitution of new selves, in contrast to rural and “backward” femininities. Therefore, 
this process of self-subjectivisation actually legitimates and extends new forms of 
domination and patriarchal hierarchy. Overall, women migrants’ subjectivities are 
increasingly circulated in gendered forms of governmentality and biopolitics (Silvey 
2004).  
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Yet, despite the acknowledgement of gender subjectivities in the literature described 
above, and as I have suggested in chapter 2, women migrant workers may not share 
common and coherent gendered experiences, and are subject to different systems of 
oppression and inequality that cannot be simply captured in terms of singular hierarchal 
power. Therefore, in this chapter I focus on how intersectional lived experiences and 
multiple power relations among women migrant workers affect and are affected by each 
other. Although intersectional approaches have been introduced in migration studies 
(Anthias 2012; Sinatti 2012) , relatively little research has focused on the way religion 
and religious ethics are intertwined with migrants’ performative practices of femininity. 
Migrants’ religious lives not only allow them to imagine alternative subjectivities beyond 
those normalised by material and discursive power relations, but also provide support and 
a sense of community that enables them to materially and emotionally settle in new 
socioeconomic environments (Silvey 2013; Gao et. al 2018). Therefore, attention to 
religious practices can enable a more nuanced understanding of women migrants’ gender 
subjectivities as malleable, becoming, and culturally conditioned. So, on the one hand, 
religion might possibly open up new spaces for the restoration of spiritual and religious 
sources of agency for women migrants, and thus reconstruct their subaltern subjectivities.  
 
In particular, the emerging scholarship of postsecular feminism has prioritised religious 
ethics as an important impetus that brings forth an alternative notion of the feminine self 
and feminist consciousness beyond the femininity defined by the ethos of secularism 
(Mahmood 2005; Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016). Nilsson and Tesfahuney (2019: 2) note 
that religion has not been seriously taken into account in the analysis of women’s 
subjectivities and agency, since “the traditional and the religious have been equated with 
female oppression, patriarchy and hierarchy”. Therefore, the postsecular turn in feminism 
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calls for a critical rethinking of religion, gender and the secular, beyond secularist 
accounts of religion as a space that thwarts women’s agency, as well as the assumption 
of women’s agency in terms of emancipatory and resisting subjects (Mahmood 2005; 
Braidotti 2008; Vasilaki 2016). In this regard, the feminist scholar Rosi Braidotti (2016) 
proposes a ‘non-oppositional’ understanding of woman’s agency which contests the 
normative liberal-feminist assumption that agency primarily manifests in practices of 
resisting or subverting social norms. In other words, women’s agency can also be 
achieved through strategically reconstituting their subjectivities by drawing on existing 
cultural resources rather than socially, ethically, or political opposing hegemonic norms. 
Nevertheless, research on gender and religion should abandon a zero-sum stance with a 
simple dichotomy between domination and resistance which omits the complex and 
ambiguous relationship between gender and religion.  
 
However, the ‘postsecular turn’ that moves towards an affective and ethical engagement 
with religion might also risk adopting an apolitical account of religion per se, overlooking 
religion as ideologies that sustain women’s natural status (Vasilaki 2015). For instance, 
in Ammerman’s (1987: 146) study of a North American conservative Christian 
community, “most women learn to influence family decision making while still deferring 
to their husbands’ authority, and that both they and their husbands find ways to live with 
the tension between Fundamentalist norms for family structure and modern norms of 
individuality and equality”. Yet, as I argue in chapter 2, instead of discerning the 
‘progressive’ and ‘dark’ sides of religion, women’s religious subjectivity and agency 
need to be examined in relation to their intersectional experiences.  This chapter therefore 
presents such an attempt by examining how lived and intersectional experiences  
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influence woman migrants’ construction of gender subjectivity and what forms of 
religious agency are engendered in this process.  
 
8.3 From peasant women to migrant workers: Christian femininity in 
the intersectional “matrix of domination” 
 
8.3.1 The multiple marginalisation of Christian women in rural society  
I this section, I argue that Chinese rural women’s subjectivities cannot be separated from 
the intersectional “matrix of domination”, including the state’s hegemonic discourses, the 
legacies of both traditional familial and patriarchal culture and Mao’s ideologies, and the 
emerging mechanisms of market forces in the post-Mao era. In imperial Chinese society, 
the cultural legitimacy of the state and the political system were based on ideal 
Confucianism moral codes that emphasised the proper order and hierarchy of the family 
and “the moral training of obedient, filial subjects” (Johnson 2009: 2). Women’s 
submission to men was normalised as one of the “three cardinal guides” (sangang, 三纲) 
including “ruler guides subject”, “father guides son”, and “husband guides wife”. This 
moral order was further entrenched in the ideal production model characterised as “men 
tilling the land while women weave at home” (nangeng nvzhi, 男耕女织) in Chinese rural 
society. During the Republican period in China (1912-1949 on the Mainland) and in 
particular the Chinese Enlightenment Movement from 1919 onwards, the imperatives of 
altering and even subverting the traditional family system to transform China into a 
modern nation-state had become a cconsensual aim among both liberal democrats and 
communist reformers. When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, they 
claimed that the socialist revolution had released rural women from ‘feudal’ oppression 
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within both the Confucian familial hierarchy and society as a whole. During the 
communist era from the 1950s to 1970s, peasant women were actually endowed with a 
relatively high social status in the ideologies of the party-state, as peasants were viewed 
to stand in alignment with the urban working class at the vanguard of the socialist 
revolution. In particular, peasant women were even hailed as “holding up half the sky”, 
which epitomised a Marxist representation of feminism and the efforts to mobilise women 
into socialist construction (Fan 2003; Jacka 2013). Yet, the Maoist state scarcely 
challenged patriarchy because, as Honing (2000) notes, Maoist gender ideologies focused 
on the sameness between men and women rather than women’s social expectations and 
circumstances per se.  
 
Since the launch of reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, China’s rural areas have 
undergone drastic social and economic changes as the state adopted a set of pragmatic 
policies such as marketisation and decollectivisation to release individuals’ productive 
agency. Chief among these policies that profoundly impacted on rural societies was in 
the introduction of the household responsibility system (HRS), which indicated the 
collapse of communal production. However, despite the fact that the post-Mao reform 
policies substantially improved agricultural productivity and peasants’ quality of life, 
they have indeed reinforced rather than diminished patriarchy and gender inequality (Xu 
2000; Fan 2003). Firstly, gender ideology in the post-Mao state appeared to retreat from 
a symbolic gender-equality agenda to instead focus on economic growth. Now, peasants, 
and particularly peasant women, were depicted as “backward” and low suzhi (quality), 
and were viewed as a barrier to China’s project of modernisation (Jacka 2013). Secondly, 
the release of households from communes facilitated by the HRS also signified the 
restoration of deep-rooted patriarchal power dynamics in the peasant household. As Fan 
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(2003: 289) suggests, “rather than being part of a commune, the wife is now likely to be 
subordinate to the husband as he takes on the role of the household head when negotiating 
with village authorities”. Overall, the post-Mao reform did not undermine any of the 
forms of domination of women in history, but rather reformulated them in a new mixture.  
 
Fang, for example, was a 34-year-old Christian rural migrant woman whom I met at a 
house church in Shenzhen. Fang told me the story of her lived experiences and family in 
the countryside. She grew up in a village in one of the provinces in North China where, 
as she complained, the value of “privileging men over women” (zhongnan qingnv, 
重男轻女) was prevalent. As she recalled, her family had not allowed her to go to primary 
school until she was 9 years old, because she had to take care of her younger brothers 
until they were able to walk. In spite of her good academic performance at school, Fang 
was forced to drop out of education at the age of 13 because her family had to find money 
for the education of her two younger brothers:  
 
My father said: “You have two younger brothers who need to attend school. Just come 
back, it is useless for a girl to have too much education”. But I really want to go to 
school. After I came back home, I worked hard at farm work. I worked hard to cut the 
wheat in order to please my father, make him change his mind.   
 
This phenomenon is common among the woman migrant workers I interviewed, who 
stopped pursuing an education during the ages from 13 to 18. Regardless of whether they 
willingly quit school or were forced to by their family, this responded to the traditional 
patriarchal ideology that discourages investment in girls and thwarts women’s 
achievement of personal goals. Like many other young women who became “surplus 
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labour” in the countryside, Fang left the village to pursue work as a migrant at the age of 
16. Although Fang became a worker in the city, she dutifully sent her earnings to her rural 
family until she married, in order to support her two younger brothers’ education.  Fang 
was apparently subject to a gendered expectation of being a “filial daughter” who is more 
tolerant and thus should make sacrifices for the family (Bauer, Wang, Riley and Zhao 
1992). In the patrilineal marriage tradition, daughters are expected to eventually become 
the daughter-in-law of another family. Thus, it is normally a filial duty for young migrant 
women to offer financial support to their family to repay their parents’ expenses in raising 
them. Aged 23, Fang married a man in her town who was introduced to her by her parents 
(to an extent, in an arranged marriage). Fang told me: “Usually, I have to listen to my 
parents, including the arrangement of marriage. I was young at that time. I’d considered 
resisting but they wouldn’t allow it, I guessed.” Most of our married participants had 
returned to their villages for marriage or married other rural migrants, while only a few 
(2 out of 20) had married urban residents. Nevertheless, marriage only legitimates the 
transfer of a rural woman’s labour to her husband’s household.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, social and economic reform has been accompanied by the 
nationwide religious revival, and particularly the “Christian fever” in rural society. One 
noticeable aspect of the rural Christian revival is the fact that the majority of rural 
Christians are women (Fiedler, 2010). Women’s conversion to Christianity can largely 
be attributed to the insecurities and hardships of rural life and especially women’s 
subordinate status, which compel them to seek refuge in God (Fiedler 2010). The 
prevalence and active role of women in rural Christian congregations are particularly 
manifest in the notion of “sisterhood” prevailing in many rural churches, which helps 
women maintain social networks. Some scholars therefore view the embrace of 
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Christianity as an emancipatory force that empowers rural women believers (Li et al. 
2004; Hunter and Chan 2007).  
 
Yet, notwithstanding that Christian communities in the countryside might somewhat 
empower women Christians, I suggest that rural Christian women’s religious experiences 
often interact with and are mutually constituted by other forms of oppression in rural 
society, which combine to subordinate Christian women as inferior subjects.  On the one 
hand, rural Christian women struggled to be “filial daughters” or “good wives” under the 
expectations of traditional patriarchal culture and to be devout Christian women 
following god’s will. Despite the noticeable revival of Christianity, Christians still 
constitute less than 8% of the overall rural population. In other words, Christian believers 
are still a religious minority group in the face of an overwhelming patriarchal lineage and 
culture and Confucianism-based ancestor worship in rural society. The Christian faith is 
always incompatible with and unaccepted by ancestor worship or other folk religions in 
terms of religious doctrines and rituals. For example, many devout Christian women 
might refuse to offer sacrifices and burn incense for the ancestors of a family or lineage 
community, as they think of this kind of “idolatry” as going against Christian doctrine. In 
turn, many non-Christian villagers view Christian rituals as representing a great offence 
to their lineage culture. Moreover, Church activities and particularly Sunday worship 
distract women’s focus from the household and agricultural work, which other non-
Christian family members would often be unhappy about.  
 
For example, Xiaoli, a 25-year-old woman migrant worker, told me how the Christian 
faith was suppressed by the patriarchs in her family. In Xiaoli’s family, her mother and 
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grandmother were both devout Christians, but her grandfather strongly objected to their 
Christian faith. As she recalled:  
 
Xueyi: My grandfather didn’t believe in Christianity. He really disliked Christians. At 
that time, he even burned my grandmothers’ Bibles, quite a few. He had strong lineage 
values. Every time he found my grandmothers went to congregations, he would get 
angry and scold my grandmother.  
 
Quan: Why was he angry?  
 
Xueyi: Because there were men and women in the church. He thought this was quite 
improper. He couldn’t understand why they sing and pray, why the men and women 
sit together. Many people of older generations despised this.   
 
Likewise, another young migrant worker, Liting, from the countryside in the Chaoshan 
area of Guangdong province, told me how her Christian faith was treated by her family:  
 
My family worships laoye (various folk beliefs of gods in the Chaoshan area) so they 
disliked my Christian faith. My parents didn’t even want to talk with me. My relatives 
also scolded me, because they thought what I believe was a foreigners’ religion.   
 
On the other hand, the oppression of rural Christian women might sometimes take place 
within Christian institutions themselves. For example, Christian women and especially 
young Christian girls were more likely to be sent by rural churches to the front of the 
“evangelising battle”. Many rural house churches or underground churches were 
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particularly dedicated to sending church members to cities or villages elsewhere for 
evangelical actitivies, some of which even claimed to “occupy the city”, an organisational 
strategy in a manner similar to the spread of early Chinese Communist Party ideas in a 
hostile political environment (Koesel 2013). Four participants in my research mentioned 
their early experiences of evangelisation when they were young.  
 
For example, after Fang (mentioned above) quit school, the local church sponsored her 
to learn theology and Korean in preparation for missionary work that would be 
undertaken in Korean ethnic areas in North-east China. However, undertaking 
evangelisation in a hostile environment in which the state imposes strict controls on 
religion often put them in dangerous and vulnerable situations.  Another Christian migrant 
worker, Lijun, also shared her horrible experiences of evangelisation when she had to 
escape pursuit by the police. As Fang and Lijun recalled:  
 
Fang: The elder (a male church leader) of the church said he wanted me to be devoted 
to god (fengxian chuqu, 奉献出去). So, they raised money for me and sent me to study 
theology. It was tough at that time, you had to go to remote mountains to study [beyond 
the reach of state surveillance] … To evangelise the villagers, we often climbed several 
mountains and slept there overnight.   
 
Lijun: The policy on religion was quite strict at that time. If the police were about to 
catch you [when we were evangelising], we had to escape into the mountains. I 
remember there was one time I escaped into the mountains with another girl: we two 
girls were extremely scared and didn’t dare to leave the mountains until midnight. 
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Fang and Lijun’s accounts reveal that the hierarchal and patriarchal culture in rural 
society indeed influences the way religious institutions operate, expecting women to be 
more tolerant and self-sacrificing. In this sense, religion institutions can both empower 
and repress rural Christian women’s subjectivities.  
 
8.3.2 Christian femininity under the migrant labour regime  
As the existing literature has documented, when Chinese rural women migrants migrate 
to cities in search of “dagong” (employed work, 打工), they may attain a liberating sense 
of autonomy from familial patriarchy and a urban modern identity (Pun 1999; 2005; 
Zhang 2014). However, this does not mean that migration necessarily empowers rural 
migrant women, as they are actually absorbed into a larger “matrix of domination” woven 
by the state and global capitalism.  
 
In chapter 4, I have elaborated on how the neoliberal governance of migrants’ bodies is 
materialised through the factory labour regime in Shenzhen. The state and manufacturing 
factories (particularly the Foxconn company) adopted a set of governing techniques to 
produce both endurable and governable labouring subjects but simultaneously to 
minimise labour and welfare costs. In chapter 7, I have further illustrated that the 
hierarchical management and coercive control of workers relies on a hegemonic “culture” 
of masculinity. This hegemonic masculinity legitimates the unquestioning obedience to 
hierarchical power relations and simultaneously degrades the masculinity and dignity of 
lower working-class men. Against this background, this section further expands on how 
the process of discipline controlling workers in the workplace is linked to the production 
of the sexed body and feminine identity. Simultaneously, I discuss how Christian 
femininity comes to terms with the factory labour regime and patriarchal power relations.  
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Firstly, becoming dagongmei (working sisters) or women workers is a process of self-
subjectivisation in which migrant women refashion themselves as modern, disciplined 
working subjects (Pun 1999; 2005). Chief among this politics of identity is to discard a 
peasant identity and embrace urban modernity, including “proper” behaviour as defined 
by the factory management. This is particularly evident in Foxconn, where they deployed 
a set of disciplinary techniques such as intensive pre-work training, strict surveillance, 
monetary punishment, and the avowed blame on those who make mistakes, so as to 
refashion rural migrant women’s rural lifestyles as “modern” docile labouring subjects. 
In this sense, the factory labour regime actually worked in hand with the state’s 
hegemonic discourses that degrade rural women as “low suzhi” (low quality), backward, 
and uncivilised bodies. For example, as my participants reported, the managers or line 
leaders would often give lectures to them regarding the imperatives to discard “bad habits” 
from the countryside, such as acting casually and lacking discipline, when they were 
newly recruited into Foxconn. When I asked Xueyi, a 32-year-old Christian worker, about 
how she thought of the managers’ lecture, she recognised it as reasonable because she 
thought migrant women should adapt to the city. Xueyi unwittingly accepted the state’s 
representation of rural women as low-quality and backward and that being obedient to 
factory regulations was a necessary adaptive strategy:  
 
It depends on where you are. If you come back to the countryside, you need to adapt 
to the rural lifestyle. If you go to the city, you can’t only take a shower every few days 
like you do in the village. You need to adapt to the lifestyle here, take a shower every 
day, make yourself tidy, queue up in the canteen … You need to be especially cautious, 
behave well, and be professional (jingye, 敬业) in your work.  
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Secondly, under the factory labour regime, and particularly in the collective factory 
dormitory system tightly interwoven with the just-in-time production model, women 
migrant workers were intentionally largely atomised as isolated subjects and were 
deprived of emotional support from family and friends. Many of the participants in this 
study complained that the intensive workloads and work schedules constantly shuffled 
them from day to night shifts, with little daily interaction with friends and workmates 
possible. Even roommates in the same dormitory could hardly ever meet each other if 
they worked different shifts. Married couples were separated in different dormitories 
strictly segregated between men and women. It was not until the suicide events of 2010 
that Foxconn started to allow friends or those in the same working unit to become 
dormitory mates. For example, a 28-year-old Christian woman worker, Lili, described the 
feelings of loneliness and isolation she faced at Foxconn:  
 
There was one time I got cold because of the intensive workload. So, do you know 
what? I just realised that no dorm mates cared about me. There were four people in 
our dormitory. I had moved in two weeks before but nobody really knew me, and 
neither did I know them. Because I worked on day shifts, I only saw them sleeping 
when I came back at night. So, we scarcely had any communication … I have several 
friends, all my colleagues, but we are tied up by the work and seldom meet one another.  
 
According to Lili’s narrative, woman migrant workers’ social ties seem to be cruelly 
severed so that their socialisation activities were minimised. This exploitative logic was 
essentially an effort to structure workers’ lives in the holistic sense of service to the goal 
of profit maximisation.  
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Thirdly, under the hierarchical management at Foxconn, woman migrant workers were 
victims of double repression inflicted by both hierarchical and patriarchal power (see 
figure 1). As I have illustrated in Chapter 4, the biopower of the factory machine 
attempted to increase workers’ capacity to endure exploitation. In essence, this biopower 
was not simply targeted at a general body but also a specifically sexed and feminine body. 
At Foxconn, as my participants mentioned, a popular phrase amongst the workers is that 
“women are treated as men, and men as animals”. Moreover women, and especially rural 
women workers, were imagined to be easier to regulate and control in comparison with 
rebellious and aggressive male workers in Foxconn’s masculine culture.  
 
As a result, while men’s production workers’ masculinities were deprived by the 
organisational hierarchy, they, in turn, constructed their masculinity both through 
confrontational practices against managers and in claiming superiority over woman 
workers. As the participants remarked, it was common for male managers or production 
workers to overtly ‘talk dirty’ and make sexual jokes and flirt with women workers in the 
workshops. In some cases, offensive language turned into sexual harassment, such as 
touching women’s bodies. However, this verbal violence and sexual harassment were 
viewed as natural by men. If the women tried to complain and resist, they would be 
viewed by male workers or managers as “too serious” and as someone who “can’t take a 
joke”.  
 
Moreover, women workers sometimes endured more intensive exploitation than men in 
terms of unjust workloads and assignments, as they were expected to be more obedient, 
tolerant in conforming to the factory machine. This is particularly the case for Christian 
migrant women, whose religious morality and doctrine already taught them to be obedient. 
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Like male Christian workers, who defined their manhood in terms of hard work and self-
control over the body, female Christian workers also actively constructed their Christian 
femininity by performing an image of being kind, hardworking, helpful, and reliable. For 
example, when I asked Yangyi, a 34-year-old Christian worker, regarding what she liked 
or disliked about her non-Christian colleagues at Foxconn, she replied that she could not 
tolerate those who did not take their work seriously:  
I dislike those who don’t take responsibility for their work and disregard the job you 
do. If you ask me to loaf on the job, I can’t, and neither will I do that. You know, what 
we Christians do is for God ultimately. At least, I ensure that my work should be done 
in the right way and weigh the salaries I received.  
For Yangyi, being diligent in her work in tandem with Christian morality appeared to 
offer her moral superiority over non-Christian workers. It is therefore no wonder that 
Christian workers, and especially woman Christian workers, were conceived of as “good 
people” in the eyes of their colleagues. However, this kind of religiosity made Christian 
women workers more susceptible to unjust treatment in the workplace, as they would be 
viewed as more tolerant of exploitation by their managers. This can be illustrated by the 
story of a 23-year-old Christian girl, Xiaoli, who had been assigned by the line head to 
perform the same repetitive operation for two months because no one else was willing or 
able to take on this work: 
 
Right after I was assigned to this assembly line, they asked me to assemble the phone 
screen, by just pressing the flexible printed circuit (FPC) into the phone model. I said: 
“OK, I have no objection”.  But they asked me to do this every day, repeating the same 
action again and again with my two fingers. Other colleagues could switch to other 
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operations but I wasn’t allowed to. So, I had pressed the FPCs for ten hours a day for 
one month and my fingers were injured already. After the first month, I talked to the 
line heads and asked them to let me shift to other positions, but they refused. The line 
head and assistant line head both asked me to continue. They said: “You do a good job 
on this. If I change to another one who is unfamiliar with this, he is more likely to 
destroy the FPCs, so more products will become scrap.” I guess this may be God’s test. 
God must realise I am going to study traditional Chinese medicine, so he trained my 
hands in advance [laughing here].    
  
It is apparent that those who behave obediently were subject to more intensive 
exploitation at Foxconn. Despite being conscious of her unjust treatment, Xueyi 
nevertheless did not question and challenge her supervisors. Instead, for Xiaoli, labour 
discipline is re-interpreted through religious values and discourses, and the problem was 
deflected from labour discipline per se and to God’s arrangements and tests. This is 
further demonstrated by her attitude towards labour protest. When I asked what she 
thought of recent workers’ collective struggle for better welfare and fair treatment, Xiaoli 
responded that she would not participate in it because Christians should accept the sitation 
arranged by god. Xiaoli said a Christian should learn to adapt to rather than overthrow 
the job he was doing.  
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                         Figure 8-1. The hierarchical and patriarchal management at Foxconn 
 
8.4 Women’s religious agency: constructing Christian femininity in 
church and family  
Although Christian woman migrants were highly constrained by the double exploitation 
of patriarchy and labour discipline, they were not entirely negative recipients of the 
dominant arrangements, as they were capable of constituting their Christian femininity 
and ethical selves, and sometimes tactically redefining the existing power structure by 
drawing on Christian discourses and ethics. This is particularly manifest in the churches 
where woman workers constructed a “comfort zone” in response to the subaltern 
subjectivity inflicted by labour discipline, and in the family relations in which they 
negotiated patriarchal dominance through evangelisation. In particular, I elaborate below 
on how religious agency can be conveyed by performing docile, hardworking, tolerant 
Christian femininities, and particularly in pious ways of living.  
 
8.4.1 Church: the making of women’s “comfort zone” 
In Chapter 5, I have elucidated how churches, be they TSPM or house churches, provided 
migrant workers with faith-based communities based on the theo-ethics of love, 
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brotherhood/sisterhood, and equality, in terms of social, emotional, and psychological 
support. In this section, I explore this line of inquiry further by specifically focusing on 
women’s interactions with the churches.  
 
In contrast to oppressive factory life in which women were atomised as isolated subjects 
and were deprived of emotional support, the churches offer a sense of relative freedom. 
Many Christian woman workers conceive of their churches as places in which they can 
unleash their feelings, talk freely to fellow believers and express private emotions that 
they do not share elsewhere. For example, Xiaoyue, a 36-year-old woman at Guanlan 
Church, mentioned the women’s fellowship which offered her a “comfort zone” to 
confide about her distress inflicted by family conflicts and work, while she was ashamed 
to share such feelings elsewhere. However, attending the church could help her 
temporarily fence off the distress and enter a state of being “free” and “belonging to God”:   
 
When stepping into the church, I can put aside all my distress and joyfully participate 
in it. When I was working, I always felt unhappy. I would think I was at such an old 
age already but had achieved nothing. But in the church, I feel quite relaxed. The 
brothers and sisters often encourage me, and I constantly remind myself I'm joyful, 
I'm free, I'm healthy, and I'm belonging to god. 
 
However, women’s perception of churches as a “comfort zone” is often constituted 
through particular religious rituals such as prayer and testimony, which create 
possibilities for the liberation and transformation that many woman workers claim to 
experience. For example, the 27-year-old woman worker Lijuan conceived of prayer as a 
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crucial way to attain inner peace, because through praying she could submit herself to 
God who, as she believed, would bear the distress for her:  
 
There was one time the line head scolded me harshly. I felt really upset. I didn’t even 
want to eat anything, because all I ate was tasteless. But my mind suddenly turned to 
God — I should go to the church and pray before God. Lord, it’s not my fault (the 
mistakes in the work), please testify for me, please bring justice for me. After I prayed 
for a while in the church, I gradually felt peaceful … If I solely rely on myself, it’s 
useless regardless of how great the efforts I’ve made. You can’t solve any problem by 
relying on your own mind.  
 
Moreover, woman migrant workers also actively construct a feminised space 
characterised by embodied practices and emotional narratives through day-to-day 
participation in the churches. This is particularly the case for some house churches I 
investigated which, according to my observations, were more capable of accommodating 
women workers’ requests for lived, affective and embodied religiosity compared with the 
TSPM churches. The latter normally identified themselves as urban evangelists and 
therefore followed a highly institutionalised structure that emphasised religious hierarchy, 
theological knowledge and formal training. The TSPM churches are often based on a 
gender division of religious participation in which males have greater responsibility for 
leading worship and preaching while females tend to undertake more responsibilities for 
evangelisation (Kao 2009). For example, the chief pastors of Shenzhen’s 27 TSPM 
churches were all male, with only a few women entering the core of power in these 
churches. However, the situation is quite different in some house churches, most of which 
bear the legacy of a Pentecostal-style charismatic Protestantism. For example, the 
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Pentecostalism-dominant churches like Foxconn House Churches A and C often prioritise 
feelings and emotional experience, such as healing and the experience of the holy spirit, 
over religious hierarchy and orthodox theological vocabulary. It is noteworthy that 
emotionally laden narratives are dominantly shaped by women and in particular rural 
migrant women. According to my observations at these house churches, rural migrant 
women primarily make sense of their religious activities and commitment to God through 
embodied practices such as sharing experiences of the miraculous healing of their bodies 
or God empowering them to survive life’s difficulties. For example, in the prayer meeting 
of Foxconn House Church A that takes place every Wednesday evening, participants 
would kneel aroundin  a circle to say their prayers, and women are intuitively the leading 
actors in this ritual, who can bring a joyful atmosphere to an emotional climax. The joy 
arising from these occasions is usually expressed via women’s passionate prayers with 
shouting and tears. Liyun was a 36-year-old rural migrant women at Foxconn who was 
overwhelmed by the distress caused by her husband’s addiction to gambling and 
irresponsibility toward his family. However, for Liyun, prayer with tears offered her an 
emotional channel to release her distress:   
 
Liyun: When I first came to Shenzhen, it was a tough time. I felt touched every time I 
went to the congregation. I even cried every time when I prayed with other Christian 
fellows during that time. Especially when I accepted the Holy Communion, I was 
almost crying my eyes out.   
 
Researcher: What made you so touched? 
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Liyun: I was thinking there was nothing in the “world” worth my addiction. Only God 
and Christian fellows were reliable. I said, Lord, I submit anything of myself to you, 
life or death, blessing or curse. I said, even I and my husband will divorce or anything, 
I don’t care anymore.    
 
This is consistent with Woodhead’s (2001:71) observation that the “emphasis on the 
authority of feeling, intuition, and experience in religious matters empowers women to 
attain a spiritual and institutional power denied them elsewhere”.  
 
Another strongly feminine symbolic act was the introduction of the “square dance” 
(Guangchang Wu 广场舞) into Foxconn House Church C for entertainment, particularly 
for women workers. However, in China, Guangchang Wu is often viewed as a grassroots 
form of dancing conducted in a public square, and is popular among middle-aged and 
elderly women. Therefore, the pastor recruited a professional dancer to modify 
Guangchang Wu and attributed it a new meaning; namely, “gospel dance”. At 8 p.m. 
every Saturday evening, approximately 20 women workers (with a few male workers) 
would gather to dance for one hour (see figure 2). In this sense, rural migrant women’s 
quest for a subjectivity of everyday life has somehow reformulated the lived religiosity 
of Foxconn House Church C.   
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                                     Figure 8-2. “Gospel dance” at Foxconn House Church C 
 
In these house churches of the Pentecostal style, women’s religiosity actually reframes 
the institutional spheres where men have traditionally been dominant, therefore creating 
spaces for women workers to reclaim their agency in femininity that is suppressed 
elsewhere.   
 
8.4.2 Family: empowerment and the Christianisation of family relations 
For feminist scholars, the family is not only a structure of inequality in which various 
powers contest but also epitomises the institutionalised ways in which broader ideologies 
and socially constructed meanings are enacted and reproduced (Lloyd et al. 2009).  As I 
have noted, the Christian migrant women were suffering from a double marginalisation 
inflicted by patriarchy and the exclusion from the dominance of familial or lineage culture. 
As a cultural minority group, Christian migrant women need to reconcile the tensions of 
not only gender relations but also cultural conflicts with non-Christian family members. 
However, Christian migrant women are capable of negotiating with this double 
marginalisation by endeavouring to create Christianised family relations and therefore 
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attaining a certain kind of empowerment within the family. Chief among these strategies 
of Christianisation are establishing Christian marriage and evangelising non-Christian 
family members.  
 
Firstly, like male Christian migrants, women migrant workers also pursue a “blessed” 
Christian marriage. In my interviews, no matter whether they were single Christian girls 
(6 of 20), women with Christian husbands or boyfriends (9 of 20), or married women 
with non-Christian husbands (5 of 20), all insisted that an ideal marital relationship was 
based on common Christian faith. When I asked Xiaohong, a 26-year-old woman, about 
what kind of ideal marital relationship she aspired to, she explained with reference to 
Matthew (19: 4-6) in the Bible: 
   
At the beginning, the Creator ‘made them male and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason 
a man will leave his father and mother and be united with his wife, and the two will 
become one flesh’. So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has 
joined together, let no one separate. 
 
Xiaohong emphasised that an ideal marital relationship should be to be “joined together” 
by God so that the couple could achieve “a spirit of unity” (同心合一, tongxin heyi) and 
therefore less likely to separate in comparison with non-Christian couples. However, what 
I want to emphasise here is that Christian women’s imagination of ideal spouses morally 
justified their struggle for autonomy in marriage from their parents. Xiaohong’s parents 
had match-made a potential spouse for her but she refused to return to the village to attend 
the xiangqin (blind date, 相亲). She told me that her parents cared more about how much 
benefit and particularly betrothal gifts (caili, 彩礼) they could get than her own happiness 
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if she married the man they arranged for. Most importantly, as she said, she was not 
willing to find a waibangren (foreigner, referring toa  non-Christian) as his husband in 
spite of her resistance that irritated her parents. Xiaohong eventually found a Christian 
husband whom she knew in the fellowship at Foxconn House Church A. Xiaoli’s story 
was not unique, as finding a spouse at church was quite a common phenomenon according 
to my observations. As I have discussed in chapter 7, these churches not only encourage 
marriage between believers but serve as “marriage agents” for young Christian workers. 
In this sense, by drawing on Christian relationships, the migrant women attained a certain 
sense of agency to establish a type of marriage they aspired to.   
 
Secondly, for Christian migrant women, evangelising among their non-Christian family 
members is another strategy that might improve their status in the family. For Christian 
women, evangelising is not only the duty of a Christian that brings glory to God but also 
a way to make their situation in the family more “habitable” in a practical sense. My 
interviews show that it was usually women who first converted to Christianity before 
converting their husbands and other family members. All 20 women participants in my 
research have experiences of evangelising their family members. Among 9 women with 
Christian husbands or boyfriends, 4 of them had successfully converted their spouses 
while the others were themselves already Christians.  All 5 married women with non-
Christian husbands had been trying to convert their husbands.   
 
The most common trajectory of evangelisation often started from husbands and mothers-
in-law, then targeting other female relatives and then male relatives, although Christian 
women would readjust their strategies in accordance with relatives’ susceptibility to the 
“gospel”. However, evangelisation is also a process accompanied by various cultural 
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conflicts and misunderstandings. For example, the 42-year-old women worker Lijun told 
me that her husband could not understand her Christian faith at the beginning: “When he 
heard me saying prayers, ‘Jesus, you’re the love of my life’, he was jealous of Jesus and 
thought I was crazy”. But Lijun gradually resolved her husband’s misunderstandings and 
eventually converted him by enacting an image of a good Christian wife. As Lijun said, 
her husband felt that she became softer and more passionate and tolerant after converting 
to Christianity and therefore he believed that having Christian faith was a good thing. 
Lijun sincerely admitted that their intimate relations had substantially improved, as she 
explained: “When you submit yourself to God, He will re-lighten your life, let your life 
shine again”.  
 
Apart from the husband, a mother-in-law is an equally important target for evangelisation. 
In Chinese family life, the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law relationship, which 
scholars often depict as inherently conflictual (Stacey 1983; Gallin 1994), is crucial in 
determining the harmony of family life. As Shih and Pyke (2010: 334) argue, the 
contentiousness of this in-law dyad is associated with “Confucian values of filial piety 
and respect and gender hierarchies that obligate the daughter-in-law to serve and defer to 
the mother-in-law and that place both women in a subordinated position, pitting them 
against one another as they vie for more individual power”. Against this backdrop, I 
suggest that evangelisation could enable migrant women to establish a Christian alliance 
of daughter- and mother-in-law that might extend to other women family members, who 
may thus collectively reformulate gendered power relations. This can be illustrated by the 
story of Xiaochen, a 46-year-old rural migrant women who married into an urban family. 
In the first few years of her marriage, she had been harshly treated by her mother-in-law 
because of her identification as both a rural woman and Christian.  However, her status 
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substantially improved after she successfully converted her mother-in-law, husband, and 
sisters-in-law:  
 
I converted to Christianity at 19 and got married at 25. When I first married into my 
husband’s family, my mother-in-law very much disliked my Christian identification 
and discriminated against me because I was a rural women and she thought I was ugly. 
But thanks to God, when they discriminated against me, I didn’t give up. I had always 
prayed and followed God’s will. During the toughest times, my tears wet three pillows 
altogether, but God has always loved me … With God’s blessing, I started a small 
business in 2001. I worked hard and brought a “peasant house”[12] in 2003. God always 
blesses me and He gave me a pretty daughter and a pretty son subsequently. My friends 
all said that both my daughter and son were pretty … Now, I have led my mother-in-
law and husband to the church, bringing them to God. I am delighted I didn’t give up 
before. Now, they all treat me well, like a noblewoman. My mother-in-law even 
cooked for me.  
 
It is noteworthy that evangelisation is never achieved through the “hard sell” of Christian 
theology but rather through migrant women’s performance as docile, tolerant, 
hardworking Christian wives that gradually transforms family members’ understanding 
of Christianity.  
 
Additionally, Christian migrant women also draw on churches and “supernatural forces” 
(such as healing and exorcism) to help them evangelise, especially in cases of disease and 
 
12 A “peasant house” is a kind of state-owned low-rent housing that the Shenzhen government sells to 
rural migrants at a relatively low price.  
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difficulties occurring with their family members. When their relatives became ill, the 
migrant women would usually organise Christian fellows to visit and pray for the patients 
at home or in hospital. One of the most common rituals during these visits was the 
Christian women’s performance of faith healing with patients as a complement to medical 
treatment. Christian women’s relatives were normally willing to accept this healing or 
exorcism, and many Chinese people request divine assistance to resolve dilemmas despite 
not necessarily having any formal religious faith. However, in comparison with 
Buddhism, Taoism and folk religions, in Christian healing there is no need to pay for 
rituals or to donate to temples as is widespread in the increasingly commercialised 
traditional belief systems (Gao and Qian 2018). In some cases, the church fellows would 
make donations for those with serious illnesses. Therefore, Christian women’s 
evangelisation was often conceived of by their ill relatives as not only an expression of 
care and emotional support but also a spiritual act that might possibly cure the disease 
based on confidence in the efficacy of prayer. But the visit did not aim to successfully 
convert ill relatives in a short time but rather, as they claimed, to plant “Christian seeds” 
in the patients’ minds. For example, the 27-year-old Christian migrant woman Liufang 
converted her father-in-law, sister, and sister-in-law by providing regular care, material 
help, and spiritual healing:  
 
My father-in-law converted after his leg injury caused by an accident. Although I 
didn’t have many savings, I paid for my father’s medical expenses. I prayed in front 
of my father. I prayed for 20 days. His surgical operation was very successful. He said 
he didn’t experience any suffering. So, he finally accepted my gospel.  
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Overall, Christian migrant women’s efforts to Christianise the family did not subvert 
patriarchal power and traditional familial values, as their performance as good Christian 
wives and daughters-in-law during evangelisation sometimes overlapped with the ethics 
of filial piety and submission based on the family hierarchy. However, women’s religious 
agency cannot be solely defined in terms of a resisting subjectivity. In this study, 
submission and being docile is not only a process of self-cultivation into a pious way of 
life that may spiritually empower them, but is also an integral part of the tactic that 
redefines familial power and relationships; in this sense, as Christian women’s agency. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
According to Mahmood (2005, p.15): 
 
Agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist norms but also in the 
multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.  
 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the formation of Christian migrant women’s 
religious subjectivity and agency under the intersectional power relations produced by 
the state, global capitalism, patriarchy within the family, the workplace, and religious 
institutions. These intersectional forms of domination have established a structural 
oppression that defines rural migrant women’s subaltern subjectivity. In this sense, this 
chapter echoes Silvey’s (2013) argument that the regulatory power of the state and global 
capitalism work in tandem with patriarchy and the feminisation of labouring subjects. 
Intuitively, religious piety and norms that emphasise docile, tolerant, and self-sacrificial 
femininity legitimate the exploitation inflicted by the state, patriarchy and global 
capitalism. On the other hand, Christian migrant women are also capable of utilising 
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Christian discourses and social capital to construct their religious agency in churches and 
the family and therefore achieve a certain sense of empowerment. Yet, Christian migrant 
women’s religious practices nevertheless do not directly challenge dominant powers. 
Therefore, the most crucial problematic of this chapter concerns how to understand 
migrant women’s religious agency.  
 
This chapter engages in a non-confrontational account of women’s religious agency in 
terms of post-secular feminism, which moves beyond normative and secular definitions 
that reduce agency solely to resisting actions and counter-subjectivity. Christian migrant 
women’s performance of religious piety can be understood as a reconstitution of their 
subaltern femininity that hardly challenges oppressive power at all in many cases. 
However, this does not mean that it cannot have counter-hegemonic effects. I argue that, 
if we differentiate between the ethical meanings of religious practices and their 
consequences, we can achieve a more nuanced understanding of religious agency. On the 
one hand, migrant women’s religious practices somehow emotionally and socially 
empower them, although this empowerment is never achieved through a zero-sum game 
of domination-resistance but rather through compliance and docility. On the other hand, 
women’s religious agency can also be understood “in terms of ethical formation, 
particularly in its Foucauldian formulation” (Mahmood 2005: 32). In this sense, 
Christians’ technologies of self that transform themselves into meaningful ethical 
subjects (as discussed in Chapter 6) actually open up a kind of agency for migrant women. 
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Chapter 9    
Youth transition to work, spiritual capital, and the remaking 
of working-class adulthood 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines young Christian migrant workers’ transition to working-class 
adulthood and the possibility of postsecular subjectivity and agency that emerge within 
this process of transition. By adopting an intersectional approach, I have analysed how 
secularity and postsecularity interact with gender relations in Chapters 7 and 8. In this 
chapter, I further explore how neoliberalism, secularity and postsecularity are inhabited 
within particular life courses in young people’s transition to adulthood. It is noteworthy 
that the 18 Foxconn workers who attempted suicide in 2010 were all rural migrant youths 
aged from 17 to 25, which implies not only that these youths have been one of the most 
marginalised and psychologically vulnerable groups in contemporary China but that 
youth transition is essentially a conflictual and contested process which may be imbued 
with hope, aspiration, and psychological growth as well as despair, struggle, and chaotic 
selves (Bynner 2005). This is particularly the case in the era of reform and opening-up in 
China in which contradictory ideologies and values, including the propagation of 
communism and the entrenchment of neoliberal ideologies of self-responsibility, have 
jointly shaped Chinese youths’ personhood (Liu 2011). Against this background, this 
chapter therefore delves into young migrant worker’s lived experiences of the transition 
from school to labour market and the ways they struggle to navigate their marginalised 
and precarious working-class adulthood. In particular, I focus on how Christianity can be 
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manoeuvred by young migrant workers as a form of resource or capital and a way of 
being, enabling an alternative approach to working-class adulthood beyond the 
personhood normalised by the neoliberal labour regime.  
 
Recent research in geographies of religion and youth has highlighted the fact that religion 
can enable new forms of agency and may represent an alternative pathway to adulthood 
for young people ( King and Roeser 2009; Hopkins et al. 2015; Olson and Reddy 2016). 
Instead of reducing youth agency to practice per se, these studies emphasise the 
importance of social, cultural, and material resources and capital associated with religion 
through which youth agency is made possible. In the light of these arguments, I propose 
that the geography of postsecularity needs to be attentive to how youth agency and 
subjectivity are mediated through, and materialised in, resourcefulness and social/cultural 
capital. This chapter addresses these concerns by re-examining the analytical value of the 
concept of “spiritual capital” (Verter 2003; Guest 2007), in the sense of religion embodied 
as a specific kind of knowledge, ideology, habitus, disposition and interpersonal relations. 
The reason for the use of the concept of spiritual capital rather than religious capital is 
that spiritual capital highlights the religious capital, habitus, disposition and everyday 
practices that diffuse in-and-beyond institutional religious fields. I argue that the concept 
of spiritual capital provides a tool to examine how postsecularity can be understood as a 
particular form of social/cultural capital. I do not reduce postsecularity into moral and 
cultural resources in an instrumental sense, however, but emphasise that postsecular 
subjectivity is contextualised in and mediated by everyday sociability. Moreover, to 
explore the socio-spatially specific (re)production of spiritual capital and how it 
influences the youth transition to adulthood, I situate my study in the sino-knowledge of 
jiazhiguan (value), suzhi (quality) and guanxi (interpersonal relations).  
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In the first empirical section, I explore the structural forces, and in particular the 
neoliberal coalition of vocational education and factory regime, that influence young 
migrant workers’ transition to working-class adulthood. In particular, I show how this 
neoliberal educational-economic regime produces particular forms of precarity, depriving 
young migrant workers of aspiration, hope, and upward mobility.  In the second empirical 
section, I elaborate on how spiritual capital can produce hopeful geographies of adulthood 
for rural migrant youth. Firstly, young migrant workers acquire “spiritual capital” by 
forming religious networks and establishing a system of jiazhiguan (values), which 
enables them to attain a more coherent model of adulthood. Secondly, young migrant 
workers manoeuvre spiritual capital (in the form of what they called “Christian wisdom”) 
to establish guanxi or interpersonal networks of influence beyond the social spaces 
normalised by the neoliberal labour regime.  This chapter aims to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the ways religion and spirituality impact on young people’s transition 
to adulthood by engaging with the concept of spiritual capital. Overall, I suggest that 
geographies of postsecularity require critical reflection on how religious ethics and 
discourses are mediated by and embodied in contextualised everyday sociability.  
 
9.2 Youth transition, spiritual capital, and working-class adulthood  
In late modernity, young people’s transition to adulthood is increasingly regarded to be 
complicated, fractured, unpredictable, self-focused, and a process of ‘becoming’ in which 
young people tactically negotiate their life course and validate their adult identities by 
mobilising cultural resources and social networks (Ansell 2008; Hopkins et al. 2015). 
Youth transition does not simply involve uniform rites of passage (such as leaving home, 
finding a stable job, and forming a new family) from which young people are expected to 
inevitably move into adulthood (Ansell 2008). Instead, young people increasingly 
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abandon these normalised markers of adulthood in favour of self-exploration and multiple, 
reflexive and individualistic identities so as to attain an inwardly directed selfhood (Arnett 
2006; Silva 2012).  
 
Much of the research on youth transition draws on the social imaginary of cultural 
transformation in late-capitalism, as the collapse of external sources of authority (Giddens 
1991) and the ubiquity of risk (Beck 1992) make the external and traditional markers of 
adulthood more uncontrollable and unattainable for young people. However, the 
emphasis on individualistic markers of adulthood is by no means simply a by-product of 
the cultural project of modernity, but also an ideologically charged process engineered by 
neoliberal governmentality. As Jeffrey (2010) notes, the equation of successful adulthood 
with autonomy and independent choice is the outcome of a socio-political project of 
neoliberalism rather than universal social datum. For instance, the “blame the victim” 
type of neoliberal discourse produces a hegemonic moral judgement that ascribes the 
precarious lives of working-class youth and the causes of worklessness to their rebellious 
nature and masculine egos and overall their inability to become ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ 
in line with structural transformations such as the decline of manufacturing and the 
withdrawal of state welfare (Hardgrove, McDowell, and Rootham 2015). This self-blame 
is further internalised into young people’s subjectivities, particularly in the age of the 
“mood economy,” in which young people increasingly redefine happiness and competent 
adulthood in terms of the ability to control their negative thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour on their own (Silva 2012). Overall, the individualistic and therapeutic 
narratives of youth transition, stressing for example self-care, the management of 
emotions, taking responsibility for oneself, and independent decision-making, represent 
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an accessible cultural schema that young people can adopt to attain a sense of control 
over the uncertainty associated with neoliberal conditions of being.  
 
In this line of scholarship, the structural processes and in particular the global neoliberal 
transformations that afflict and marginalise young people’s experiences of growing up 
are particularly emphasised (Jeffrey 2010). As an alternative to transitions models, 
meanwhile, other scholars have highlighted the importance of “vital conjunctures” 
(Johnson-Hanks 2002), meaning a socially structured zone of possibility emerging around 
particular spans of the life course in which new visions of the future and socio-spatial 
marginalisation might occur simultaneously in young people’s negotiation of adulthood 
(Jeffrey 2010). For example, a substantial body of research has examined education and 
employment as two concretely structured elements where “vital conjunctures” take place 
(McDowell 2003; Pimlott-Wilson 2017), including the switch from schooling to the 
marketplace, which endow young people with individual autonomy in constructing their 
independent adulthood while also drawing them more tightly into the prevailing regime 
of governance.  
 
Nevertheless, young people’s adulthood never simply involves the normalised 
subjectivities that institutionalised discourses and associated affective regimes tell them 
to act and feel, they are capable of creating their own cultural models and narratives that 
ascribe meaning and coherence to their transition to adulthood (Holt 2010; Holloway, 
Jeffrey 2012; Holt and Mills 2018). Although religiosity and spirituality have only 
recently been brought into the discussion of youth transition in human geography and 
beyond (Hopkins et al. 2015; King and Roeser 2009), they are argued to provide 
alternative markers of and different paths to adulthood (Bailey, Harvey, and Brace 2007; 
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Hopkins et al. 2015; Olson and Reddy 2016). Religion frequently appears as a coping 
mechanism or a source of resilience that young people use to alleviate stress and 
uncertainty or reposition themselves in relation to parents, peers and other adults ( Pearce, 
Little, and Ferez 2003; Bailey, Harvey, and Brace 2007; Hopkins et al. 2011). It can also 
represent a consciousness, of external authority and/or personal faith, utilised to create 
meanings, self-definitions and self-management (Bailey, Harvey, and Bruce  2007; Olson 
et al. 2016), and an institutional sphere in which youths cultivate social networks and 
civic engagement through faith-based activities (Hopkins 2015; Williams 2015). One of 
the central concerns of this literature is how young people’s agency in their negotiation 
of adulthood can be conveyed through and supported by religion and spirituality. On the 
one hand, religion may serve as institutional accommodation and a moral framework that 
structure or direct youth into what Hopkins (2015) calls “religious adulthood” by offering 
a restricted and institutionalised agency; and particularly the technologies of the youthful 
self in the logic of religious doctrines (Bailey et al. 2007; Olson et al. 2016). On the other 
hand, young people may also question institutional beliefs and construct their own 
narrative of religious adulthood that is neither theologically pure nor orthodox 
transcendence, for example by emphasising embodied practices and lived authenticity 
(Olson et al. 2013) or by drawing on alternative and individualistic spiritualities (Bartolini 
et al. 2017). Although this type of research illustrates that young people can tactically 
deploy religious or spiritual discourses in their transition to adulthood, however, it is still 
unclear to what extent religion can be used to forge a more politically progressive agency 
through which young people actively navigate and redefine the dominant power structure.  
 
Moreover, despite the essential influence of religion on youth transition, there is relatively 
scant geographical research examining how young people’s religious agency is mediated 
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through, and materialised in, resourcefulness and social/cultural capital.  This is perhaps 
because human geographers “have tended to underplay the analytic value of social capital, 
by equating the concept with dominant policy interpretations” (Holt 2008: 227). A re-
emphasis on social/cultural capital is valuable in trying to overcome the theoretical 
difficulties that equate youth agency as practices per se in a reductive sense while 
omitting to analyse the social, cultural and material resources on which it is based. 
Manifested as either embodied habitus and a distinctive way of being (Bourdieu 1984), 
social networks of civic engagement (Putman 2000), or invested resources with expected 
returns (Lin 2001), social/cultural capital does condition the ways in which young people 
navigate their transition to adulthood. This is particularly the case for working-class youth, 
and Silva (2012) suggests that constructing a therapeutic narrative of adulthood may 
“require a particular set of class-based linguistic skills, knowledge, and resources” that 
are more accessible to professional middle-class than to working-class people. Instead, 
working-class youth may forge distinctive forms of youth transition by drawing on their 
class languages; for example, constructing blue-collar adulthood by mobilising the ‘ethos 
of bravery, strength, and distrust of words’ shared among those on the shop floor (Illouz 
2008: 234). Likewise, Nayak’s (2006) ethnography of working-class young men in 
North-east England suggests that the performance of ‘spectacular masculinities’ of while 
male excess cultivates a bodily capital (with particular codes of respect, dress, bodily 
adornment and comportment) that forms “respectable” working-class networks. In this 
sense, close attentiveness to resourcefulness and social capital can provide a more 
nuanced understanding of how working-class youth exercise their agency to create 
alternative adulthood.  
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In this chapter, I therefore examine how religiosity and spirituality can be mobilised as a 
form of resource or capital that enables an alternative model of youth transition. To 
achieve this goal, I incorporate the notion of spiritual capital (Burger and Hefner 2003; 
Verter 2003; Guest 2008) that has rarely been deployed in human geography. Theorising 
religion as a form of social and cultural capital might start from Bourdieu’s (1991) 
conceptualisation of “religious capital” and the “religious field”. Bourdieu (1991) insists 
that religious knowledge, competencies, and dispositions can be defined as a form of 
symbolic capital to be acquired and exchanged within particular fields and utilised to 
maintain and modify one’s social position. Bourdieu (1991a) suggests that religious 
capital manifests in two forms: religious symbolic systems (with ideologies and myths) 
and religious competences (mastery of specific knowledge and associated embodied 
practices) (Verter 2003). For Bourdieu (1991b), religious capital persists, circulates and 
is consumed and recognised within a circumscribed field of religion with its legitimacy 
and species of capital; therefore, the accumulation of religious capital is subject to the 
ideological apparatuses which produce it, within which laypeople can wield but hardly 
redefine religious capital. Yet, Bourdieu may omit the evolving significance of religion 
in late-modernity, as religion is increasingly conceived of as variously an extra-
institutional cultural resource, individualistic spirituality, and ‘highly eclectic personal 
theology,' with emphasis placed on the interior and subjective dimensions of religiosity 
(Beckford 2003; Guest 2008). Therefore, Verter (2003) provides a more subtle account 
of religious capital, which he calls ‘spiritual capital’:  
 
Thus, if religious capital is conceived à la Bourdieu as something that is produced and 
accumulated within a hierocratic institutional framework, spiritual capital may be 
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regarded as a more widely diffused commodity, governed by more complex patterns 
of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption (Verter 2003: 158).  
 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1986) theorisation of capital, Verter classified three forms of 
spiritual capital: an embodied state, an objectified state, and an institutionalised state. The 
embodied state refers to spiritual dispositions (such as knowledge and taste) that 
accumulate in the unconscious processes of socialisation and are embodied in “habitus”, 
“the socially structured mode of apprehending and acting in the world” (Verter 2003: 
159). In the objectified state, spiritual capital is viewed as material and symbolic 
commodities; that is, religious goods to be consumed, including ideologies and 
theological knowledge. As Verter (2003: 159) argues, objectified spiritual capital relies 
on the embodied capital that directs individuals to appropriate and practise these objects 
and texts: “Proper consumption in the religious field implies knowing the operations 
through which sacred objects release their power.” Finally, spiritual capital exists in an 
institutionalised state, as religious institutions exercise their power to legitimate and 
determine the meanings of and access to religious goods.  
 
While admitting that spiritual capital is mostly an institutional product that can diffuse 
and circulate beyond the religious field, Vector (2003) also notes the existence of extra-
institutional forms of spiritual capital, such as in New Age religions, for instance. 
Vector’s theorisation of spiritual capital appears to imply that there is a visible 
demarcation between different spheres/fields and particularly between the religious and 
the profane. Yet, instead of seeing spiritual capital as something solely enacted and 
structured by religious/spiritual spheres which then may “spill over” into the spheres of 
everyday life, I argue that spiritual capital is better understood as a co-production of a 
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more sophisticated interactive network woven by different institutions and the practices 
of everyday life. Put differently, spiritual capital is not simply about how it is acquired 
and exchanged but how it is made possible in the everyday “doing” of religion. 
 
In light of this, a useful way forward would be to explore the socio-spatially specific, 
relational, and performative (re)production of spiritual capital (Massey 2005; Holt 2008). 
Geographers could tease out how spiritual capital can be embodied in forms of 
postsecular agency that “emerge through social practice within time/space-specific 
regimes of power” and at particular ‘moments’ in young people’s lives (Ottosson et al., 
2017; Holloway, Holt and Mills, 2018). Firstly, spiritual capital is often made possible 
through embodied practices, performance, and even a process of subjectivation. Yet, as 
opposed to secular social/cultural capital that might be acquired through manipulable, 
rationalised and staged behaviours, spiritual capital is also performatively constituted, but 
achieved through the unconscious ‘doing’ of religion (Bulter 1993; Nash 2000; Holt 
2008).  Secondly, it is through sociospatial relationalities (such as a contextuality of 
reciprocity and trust) that normative frames of personhood are transmitted through 
conscious/beyond-conscious bodily acts (Holt 2008). Thus, spiritual capital is always 
becoming, and is materialised in the sociospatial context and everyday practices in which 
people render the representational resources in their social networks and relationships. 
The analytical frame of spiritual capital may open up possibilities beyond the dualist idea 
of religious agency where the analyst must choose between comprehending religion as an 
instrumental resource that people use to solve problems or as preconscious morality, 
habits, and dispositions that form a meaningful way of being. 
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9.3 Contextualising youth in China: jiazhiguan, guanxi and suzhi  
Since the economic and political reform in the late 1970s, Chinese youth have been living 
under a series of contradictions, including between the emergence of individualistic 
values and self-reliant neoliberal subjectivities and the state prorogation of collective and 
socialist values (Liu 2011). This is particularly the case since the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989, in that Chinese youth have been involved in a “spiritual or ideological 
crisis” caused by the collapse of both Maoism and traditional values along with a growing 
sense of uncertainty about market-oriented reform. The Chinese state has been 
overwhelmed by anxiety that socialist values have increasingly lost their hold on the 
younger generations in the face of the pluralisation of Chinese society after forty years of 
reform. Therefore, how to reconstruct values (jiazhiguan, 价值观) among young people 
has become one of the crucial ideological agendas of the Chinese state in maintaining its 
legitimacy, thwarting the youth’s revolutionary motivations and preventing peaceful 
evolution from the West. In 2007, the Marxist “three outlooks” (sanguan, 三观 ), 
consisting of a world outlook, an outlook on life and values, were advocated as an 
essential task in China's project of spiritual civilisation. In this sense, the state has made 
efforts to establish normative values for youth, which are defined by a set of criteria such 
as patriotism, loving the Chinese Communist Party, self-sacrifice, collectivism, striving 
and atheism. As Liu (2011) suggests, these values represent a: “call on people to be the 
loyal subjects to the authoritarian Party state, which enjoins the subject to ‘deny’ one’s 
self and embrace communist-collectivist values such as selflessness, collectivism, a hard 
and plain life and devotion to the Party, the people and the motherland”. For many 
Chinese youth, acting in conformity with state-propagated values can be considered as a 
form of social capital that can be embodied in higher assessment at school and better 
chances of promotion in the workplace.  
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However, the state’s guidance for young people subjectivity formation is often 
contradictory, as the state has adopted “a creative blending of neoliberal rationalities and 
revitalized forms of socialist rationalities” (Sigley 2006: 504). On the other hand, young 
people are encouraged to be autonomous, free to choose, self-enterprising, and self-reliant 
in congruence with China’s market-oriented reform and the dismantling of the socialist 
welfare system (Rosen 2009). In this vein, the state-propagated discourse of suzhi (quality) 
addresses the effort to cultivate both productive and governable subjects (Anagnost 2004; 
Kipnis 2006). While deriving from the state’s problematisation of human conduct as 
indicative of the ‘low quality’ of the population, which impedes the project of 
modernisation (Liu 2011), the discourse of suzhi is bound up in every aspect of young 
people’s lives in the form of the ‘one child’ policy, healthcare, education, and the labour 
market. In most circumstances, suzhi equates to one’s economic utility as defined by 
market valuation and human capital (Kipnis 2006; 2007). In essence, the suzhi discourse 
serves in the social engineering of differentiation, fostering the knowledge and skills of a 
specific population necessary for national economic development while devaluing 
another (for example, rural migrant workers) as low-quality cheap labourers needed to 
maintain the relatively competitive labour regime (Kipnis 2007). One of the examples is  
the state’s reform of “suzhi education” which primarily targets urban middle-class 
children in order to improve the competence of the “high-quality” urban population while 
rural children are still subject to the regime of exam-oriented education that disadvantages 
them in access to the labour market. Therefore, suzhi can be understood as a form of 
discursive power that disciplines young people through normative selfhood. 
 
Apart from suzhi, another crucial social knowledge that influences Chinese young 
people’s youth transition might be guanxi (关系), which literally means interpersonal 
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relationships between individuals. Guanxi is better conceived of a sinicised form of social 
capital, which indicates “carefully constructed and maintained relations between persons 
which carry mutual obligations and benefits” in Chinese sociality (Qi 2013: 309). 
Likewise, Bian (2016: 312) defines guanxi as “a dyadic, particular, and sentimental tie 
that has the potential of facilitating favour exchange between the parties connected by the 
tie.” In the traditional social fabric, the capacity to navigate guanxi is the most important 
marker of adulthood, meaning that one’s ability to get access to resources through 
personal relations and informal structures (Yeung and Tung 1996). According to Hwang 
(1987), guanxi can be classified as expressive or instrumental ties, with the former 
characterised by moral obligations and emotional relations that reinforce stable and long-
term mutuality between people within networks, while the latter emphasises a rent-
seeking strategy in forming beneficial relationships. Therefore, guanxi works closely with 
other social norms in China, including renqing (interpersonal behaviour, 人情), mianzi 
(‘face’, 面子), and xinyong (trustworthiness, 信用), which jointly impose constraints by 
exerting social and emotional pressure on individuals (Qi 2013; Bian 2018). If jiazhiguan 
and suzhi entail the state’s effort to shape the desired subjectivity of young people in 
spiritual and embodied terms respectively, guanxi may in turn open up a form of agency 
which individuals utilise to form informal social ties and networks beyond institutional 
spheres. In this literature, guanxi tend to be interpreted in terms of embedded resources 
within specific networks, operating under the relational logic of asymmetrical exchange 
in which both the receiver and granter seek favours or anticipate the future return of 
favours (Lin 2001; Bian 2018).   In sum, jiazhiguan, suzhi, and guanxi offer a specific 
texture of the social fabric to understand youth transition in the context of China’s social 
and economic transformation.  
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9.4 Youth transition under China’s neoliberal transformation: hope and 
despair  
9.4.1 The story of Tian Yu: a young Foxconn suicide survivor  
At 8 a.m., March 17, 2010, overwhelmed by the feeling that she described as 
“helpless and gruelling” at Foxconn, Tian Yu jumped from her fourth-floor dormitory at 
the company’s Longhua plant in Shenzhen. At the age of 17, she was the youngest 
Foxconn worker who attempted suicide, along with the other 17 young Foxconn workers 
aged from 18-25 to have attempted suicide in 2010. Fortunately, Yu eventually survived 
after various operations and three months of treatment, despite being left paralysed from 
the waist down and suffering from psychological damage caused by the suicide attempt13.  
 
Yu was born in February 1993 into a peasant family in a village in Hubei Province. Like 
many adults in her village, Yu’s parents were rural-to-urban migrants who made their 
livelihoods far away from home. Yu was therefore one of the “left-behind children” of 
her generation, who were typically brought up by grandparents, and experienced a lonely 
childhood. However, rural life did not limit her aspirations, as she intended to leave the 
village to pursue a more wealthy and modern urban lifestyle one day. Like many rural 
youths, Yu did not go to high school but instead opted to complete a skills training course 
at a vocational school in order to help her secure a job at the city in the future. In early 
February 2010, Yu decided to leave the village to seek a job in Shenzhen, Guangdong 
Province, one of China’s most economically developed areas which was the first to open 
up to global capitalism. She recalled that:  
 
 
13 South China Morning Post, 15. December 2010. https://www.scmp.com/article/733389/struggle-
foxconn-girl-who-wanted-die 
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My cousin brought me to the long-distance coach station. I was joining many rural 
youths leaving the land to find jobs in the city. It was the first time in my life that I 
was far away from home, my familiar place, food and people … Getting off the coach, 
my first impression of the industrial town was that Shenzhen was nothing like what I 
had seen on TV14. 
 
Yu’s curiosity and enthusiasm quickly disappeared, because the reality of the industrial 
town did not match her imagination of Shenzhen as a modern and lively city. The 
prosperity of Shenzhen had nothing to do with Yu, as she said: “I had never been to 
Shenzhen’s city centre and just stayed inside the plant. Foxconn is a very large factory 
with many people, but people are cold there. Friendly chit-chat is not common.”15  
 
After the pre-work training about the rules and regulations at Foxconn, Yu was formally 
employed as an assembly-line worker with the staff number F9347140.  Yu’s job was far 
from technical, and involved checking computer screens for surface defects. However, 
she had to complete every action in seconds before the next item rushed along the 
production line. For Yu, this monotonous process lasted for 10 hours a day. The switch 
from being a student to an assembly-line worker appeared to happen so dramatically that 
she had no anticipation of the harsh production regime she was going to face. As a 17-
year-old girl, Yu had never experienced severe humiliation before, but this happened 
every day due to Foxconn’s punishment-oriented management. As she recalled,  
 
 
14 This quotation comes from Chan’s (2013) interview with Tian Yu.  
15 South China Morning Post. 15. December 2010. https://www.scmp.com/article/733389/struggle-
foxconn-girl-who-wanted-die; South China Morning Post. 24. April 2013.  
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1222225/foxconn-suicide-survivor-says-no-job-worth-ending-
your-life-over 
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I didn’t make any mistakes on the products, but the line leader blamed me anyway … 
I saw a girl who was forced to stand at attention for hours for supposedly making an 
error. Public humiliations occurred several times during the working month16. 
 
Apart from the militarised management, what troubled Yu most was that she had made 
no friends even after having worked at Foxconn for one month. She was randomly 
assigned to a dormitory with workers who often worked different shifts and it was hard 
to meet one another. For Yu, it was difficult to make friends at Foxconn because the 
round-the-clock, military-style training and discipline broke up socialised space and 
isolated everyone from one another. 
 
 
      Figure 9-1.  The survivor Tian Yu 
 Source: photograph from Chan (2013) 
 
 
16 This quotation comes from Chan’s (2013) interview with Tian Yu. 
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An accumulation of despair eventually reached a physiological limit in the middle of 
March 2010 when Yu encountered frustration in claiming her wages.  Her supervisor told 
her that her personnel file and documents were kept in another Foxconn plant, in the 
Guanlan district, and she needed to go there to receive her pay. With only five yuan left 
in her pocket, Tian took a bus to Guanlan plant, but she could not find any information 
about her wages as the managers and administrators all denied responsibility and told her 
to ask someone else.  After a fruitless day of searching and with no money left, she walked 
for around 10 km back to her dormitory and cried herself to sleep without dinner. Even 
worse, unfortunately, Yuan’s mobile phone was broken at that time, and she could not 
call her parents to ask for help. She was overwhelmed by anger and desperation at that 
time, and her dormitory mates were on night shift so that there was no one she could rely 
on. The next morning, Yu jumped from the dormitory in utter helplessness17. 
 
Yu’s story epitomises the tragedy of the 18 young Foxconn workers who committed 
suicide in 2010. It is possibly not a coincidence that they were all young rural-to-urban 
migrant workers aged from 17-25, as this age group may face the toughest and most 
precarious period in which they are experiencing the transition to adulthood, leaving the 
village for the city, learning to be independent, and struggling through their early careers. 
In this section, I elaborate on how China’s neoliberal transformation has created new 
“vital conjunctures” (Johnson-Hanks 2002) in which young migrant struggle to navigate 
their marginal working-class adulthood.   
 
 
 
17 South China Morning Post. 15. December 2010. https://www.scmp.com/article/733389/ struggle-
foxconn-girl-who-wanted-die 
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9.4.2 Learning to be labour: education, capital and suzhi  
China’s political and economic reform has unleashed millions of rural young people from 
their homeland, enabling them to be free-floating labourers that have facilitated the rise 
of China as “the factory of the world”. This young labour force provide the “demographic 
dividend” that has fuelled China’s rapid economic growth over the past three decades.  
However, improving the quality of these young labourers to meet the urgent demands of 
industrial development has been a crucial task for the party-state governance (Kipnis 
2007). It is against this backdrop that the Chinese state started to re-emphasise the 
imperative of education in the country’s transition to a market economy. This is evident 
in the state-reinforced expansion of vocational education over the past two decades in 
order to increase the quality and labour skills of young people in congruence with China’s 
labour-intensive manufacturing economy (Koo 2015; Pun and Koo 2018). As Koo (2015) 
argues, the Chinese state’s promotion of vocational education is in the service of the 
country’s neoliberal transition, and is therefore subject to a neoliberal ideology of human 
resources which believes that “the economic success of individuals, and also of whole 
economies, depend on how extensively and effectively people invest in themselves” 
(Beck 2002: 3). This ideology is widely accepted among rural youth, who attempt to 
increase their employability and achieve upward mobility by attending vocational schools. 
Until 2012, enrolment in vocational education at high-school level (including at technical 
secondary schools, vocational high schools and skilled workers’ schools) had reached 
21.13 million, with 7.54 million new enrolments in 2012 18 . Given the minimal 
opportunities for rural youth to gain access to higher education, attending vocational 
schools is seen to be the most feasible way for them to accumulate human capital and 
 
18 Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2013. “Education at High School Level.” 
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China Website, October 29. Accessed April 15, 
2019. http://big5.gov.cn/ gate/big5/www.gov.cn/test/2013-10/29/content_2517467.htm 
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increase their competitiveness in the labour market. Among the 20 youth informants in 
this study, 14 had attended vocational schools for varying periods from 6 months to 3 
years, while the others continued at high school or left education entirely19.  
 
In vocational schools, students are generally required to cultivate an active individualised 
strategy that encourages personal responsibility for their employability. For example, the 
young migrant worker Hui told me that, “Be master of your own future” is the famous 
slogan of the vocational school he attended. The school required him to join a one-year 
internship in a manufacturing factory as a compulsory element in attaining a vocational 
degree. On the other hand, to meet the need for young and productive labourers, many 
factories actively engage in business partnerships with vocational schools that “dispatch” 
students to work as trainees in their factories or directly recommend graduates for formal 
jobs. As Hui remarked, the vocational school guaranteed him a job as a technician at 
Foxconn after graduation, yet the job he received did not meet his expectations because 
Foxconn allowed only limited opportunities for him to practise the technical skills he had 
learned and instead he just repeated the same operation to test mobile phone models. Hui, 
therefore, faced emotional stress due to the discrepancy between his dream of searching 
for a technical job and the programmatic factory life. 
 
Likewise, other young migrant workers who attended vocational schools also complained 
that the school trapped them and the knowledge and skills they learned neither matched 
the work they were doing nor increased their competitiveness in labour market. 
 
 
19 According to China’s laws, students are obliged to complete 9 years of compulsory education with the 
government's support of free tuition fees, but students need to pay for textbooks and accommodation. In 
this study, all youth informants had completed middle school education. 
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I learned software development in vocational school. They only taught me very basic 
things, so it is difficult to find a job. But they (employers) usually demanded workers 
highly skilled in computer programming. I was finally recommended to a printing 
company where I was responsible for graphic design. However, I was only accepted 
as a trainee with a very low salary, because they thought I lacked the capacity for 
imagination. I was educated in an examination-oriented system, and no one taught me 
this before. (Xiaolong, male, 25-year-old worker)  
 
Xiaojie appeared to accept the neoliberal ideology of self-responsibility and thereby 
attributed his marginalised situation more to his own capability than to the unjust 
partnership between vocational schools and factories.  In essence, the outcome of the 
investment in human capital is associated with class differences, as “working-class 
families are systematically disadvantaged by the strategic processes of ‘self-investment’ 
in neoliberal times” (Koo 2015: 48). Vocational education is embedded in China’s mixed 
neoliberal values that integrate authoritarian state control and collective morality with the 
mechanisms of the market (Pun and Koo 2018). In particular, the hukou household 
registration system and the discursive power of suzhi have jointly created an institution-
based opportunity structure that manipulates rural migrants into becoming cheap 
labourers to feed China’s industrialisation (Fan 2002; Kipnis 2007).  
 
Xiaojie, a 28-year-old male migrant, shared stories of how the dominant labour regime 
devalues his professional training and blocks his path to upward mobility. 
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I majored in financial management in a vocational school in Huizhou, but no company 
was willing to employ me, because they didn’t trust a rural migrant. They didn’t think 
that I could handle the position. Afterward, I worked in several jobs in different cities.  
 
As Sun (2009: 637) argues, suzhi is inscribed into the geographical imagination of 
individuals, and in particular urban residents, as it “supposedly inheres in the bodies from 
that particular place, which legitimates the definition, branding, and classification of 
people according to their place of origin”.  It is thus no wonder that one’s place of origin 
even overrides professional training in finding a job. 
 
For many rural youths, “investment for a better future” as propagated by state and 
vocational education institutions has been shown to be an illusion after they switched 
from school to the labour market. Their self-investment has not increased their chances 
of upward mobility but only matches both the expansion of vocational education and the 
state’s demands for cheap labourers. In such circumstances, manufacturing factories like 
Foxconn have become the most feasible places accommodating the “urban dreams” of 
millions of rural youths.   
 
9.4.3 Guanxi: surviving the workplace 
For many young rural migrant workers, establishing guanxi or personalised networks of 
influence at the workplace is a most challenging prospect during their early careers. This 
is particularly the case under the militarised management at Foxconn in which workers 
are largely deprived of spontaneous interpersonal relations and turned into hierarchically 
organised and atomised subjects. Young workers usually need to cope with two sets of 
guanxi, including personal relations with supervisors and other assembly line workers. In 
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Chapter 5, I have elaborated on how Foxconn’s militarised management has created 
tension and distrust both between managers and production workers and among workers 
themselves.  However, this is not a uniform scenario, given that workers may cultivate 
their own personalised networks beyond institutionalised and hierarchical relations in 
order to make their working spaces more habitable. For example, establishing guanxi is 
such an effort to create informal spaces that enable some migrant workers to survive the 
workplace yet disadvantage others.  
 
Jiale was a 22-year-old who had worked at Foxconn for two years. When he was 
humiliated by his line leader, Jiale started to realise how guanxi mattered at the workplace 
in terms of chances of promotion, mitigating humiliation and reducing workloads. In the 
third month after he had joined Foxconn, Jiajie made a minor mistake because of the 
mislabelling of one product, but his line leader blamed him at the morning meeting, which 
made him lose face in front of all his colleagues. He believed that the line leader 
overreacted to his mistake because he had not dealt with the guanxi with his line leader 
properly and had argued with him. According to Jiajie’s observation, apart from the 
common methods such as giving gifts and social eating, the most crucial way to establish 
guanxi with supervisors was to being docile and loyal to them. Jiajie told me that a few 
workers who had good guanxi with supervisors were rarely blamed even if they made 
obvious mistakes. Instead, more coercive punishments were more likely to be targeted at 
more rebellious workers. However, establishing personalised relations with supervisors 
is often devalued as liuxu paima (shameless flattering, 溜须拍马) by most production 
workers. Some young workers instead tried to establish guanxi with workmates and 
sought to create small networks among workers to protect themselves. For example, a 
new worker, Lilong, remarked that: 
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The line heads tend to humiliate those new workers, scolding them seriously even 
when they made small mistakes. But it depends on whether or not you have close 
workmates to support you. You know, they always bully the weak and fear the strong. 
Because I have five close friends or fellow-townsmen at the same workshop and we 
support each other, the line leaders don’t dare to bully us deliberately. 
 
However, these interpersonal networks of influence only operate in segmented and 
largely restricted spaces, and Foxconn’s militarised management along with the state’s 
regulation of labour have successfully stifled the possibility of large-scale labour protests.   
 
9.4.4 Master production, upward mobility and hopelessness    
The new generation of rural migrant workers often have higher expectations of life and 
upward mobility than their elders; however, working at manufacturing factories like 
Foxconn does not coincide with their aspirations. Many young workers complained that 
they could not attain any sense of achievement and hope under the standardised 
production and hierarchical management. Foxconn’s master production adopted what 
Kemp (2013) defines as standardisation, a system by which production workers can 
master standardised operational procedures, and use standardised machinery, materials, 
and tools. Additionally, every employee is only responsible for a particular process, or 
even only responsible for a specific action and operations. The young worker Wu entered 
Foxconn in 2015 after he had completed vocational education. However, he quit his job 
one year later because, as he claimed, he could not find any motivation to continue his 
work:   
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I feel I have no future at Foxconn. I learned mechatronics at vocational school, but 
what I am doing has nothing to do with this. Foxconn will gradually wear away your 
willpower and impetus. I think any ambitious young people shouldn’t stay there for 
long … Although I was responsible for repairing machines, unlike what other 
assembly line workers do, it is indeed a quite unskilful job. You only need to repair a 
certain kind of machine so the technologies are very limited. Unlike some small 
factories that require comprehensive technicians, Foxconn only required you to have 
expertise at certain operations. So, I learned nothing at Foxconn. (Wu, male, 22-year-
old) 
 
Apart from the standardised production and sophisticated division of labour, Foxconn’s 
highly hierarchical management allows only limited opportunities for upward mobility 
among young workers. Normally, a young worker is only eligible for promotion to group 
leader (of a subunit of an assembly line) after having worked for 3 years with good 
performance. For example, the 26-year-old worker Liujun explained to me:  
 
Why did I finally quit the job? Because there was nearly no space for promotion. If 
the line leaders didn't leave their positions, the group leaders couldn’t be promoted. I 
was promoted to be a group leader before because our previous group leader was 
promoted to be deputy line leader. If you have worked in Foxconn for several years, 
perhaps you could only become a group leader. So, I think my life shouldn’t be like 
that. (Liujun, male)  
 
The loss of hope was overwhelming among young workers at Foxconn, and this feeling 
was further reinforced after the Foxconn suicide events when the company started to use 
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robots to substantially replace some of the labour force. Since 2015, the Foxconn factory 
has laid off approximately 110,000 production workers thanks to the introduction of 
robots.20 By replacing workers with robots, Foxconn has substantially reduced its labour 
costs and relieved itself of any issues stemming from the exploitation of workers. 
However, in doing so, it has ultimately ended up not only putting hundreds of thousands 
of people and particularly young rural migrants out of work but also reinforced its 
Taylorist mode of production. Zhenjie, a 28-year-old technician who had worked at 
Foxconn for 7 years, told me that the introduction of robots and other autonomous 
technology had deprived him of any sense of achievement, hope and upward mobility 
that he had ever had:  
 
I held a technical position at Foxconn before, but the job became less and less 
challenging as digital control techniques were widely introduced in recent years. What 
you needed to do was a simple operation, and you didn’t need to programme ikt 
because the programming was already done for you. Previously, I needed to 
programme the machine but in recent years I just operated the robots. This is quite 
unskilful. I feel I have no future.  
 
9.5 Spiritual capital and the remaking of working-class adulthood  
As I have shown above, China’s neoliberal transformation has largely structured the 
trajectory of the transition to adulthood of migrant working-class youth. Due to the 
structural inequalities inflicted by the neoliberal regime of education and labour and the 
lack of the social, cultural and human capital that would enable them to achieve upward 
 
20 South China Morning Post, 21 May 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/ 
article/1949918/rise-robots-60000-workers-culled-just-one-factory-chinas 
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mobility, it is challenging for young rural migrant workers to acquire a sense of order and 
self-navigation in their transition to adulthood. This can partially explain why 18 young 
people attempted suicide at Foxconn. In this section, however, I elaborate on how 
Christianity can generate a form of spiritual capital that enables young migrant workers 
to attain an alternative and spiritually coherent model of adulthood.  
 
9.5.1 Cultivating spiritual capital: religious networks and jiazhiguan  
As I have suggested, spiritual capital is produced, accumulated and exchanged in and 
beyond institutional spheres. For many young migrant workers, spiritual capital is 
primarily cultivated in two forms. On the one hand, Christian churches and their 
associated communal life provide interpersonal networks in contrast to the highly 
atomised factory life under neoliberal management. On the other hand, Christian 
knowledge and ethics offer young migrant workers alternative jiazhiguan (values) 
through which they can re-interpret themselves and cultivate certain kinds of spiritual and 
psychological coherence such that they can attain order and self-navigation to mediate 
the chaos, despair, and precariousness that may otherwise be overwhelming.   
 
Firstly, access to local communal participation in churches opens up a social network and 
the possibility of empowerment for young workers. Echoing Cao’s (2010) research on 
migrant workers in Wenzhou’s churches, the migrant workers in this study acquired 
symbolic power through religious participation. In Cao’s (2010) ethnographic work, 
migrant workers obtained a certain level of upward social mobility through interactions 
with boss Christians, but their position was nevertheless conditioned by the local-migrant 
dichotomy, so that migrant workers cannot enter the power core of Wenzhou’s churches. 
In contrast, many churches in Shenzhen are more inclusive in the sense that young 
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migrant workers play a crucial role in church organisation and operations. In the churches 
that I investigated, somewhat differently from Cao’s descriptions, migrant workers had 
largely taken over responsibility for the day-to-day church operations. In Sanzhuli church, 
young migrant workers have been the most active group in church management 
concerning the organisation of religious and evangelical activities. This communal 
participation has also created a network of support for young migrant workers and 
particularly those who are psychologically vulnerable. For example, the 19-year-old 
Christian worker Lihua told me that participating in the youth fellowship in the church 
had made her more mature and outgoing:  
 
I used to feel very inferior and rarely talked with others when I first arrived at Foxconn. 
On the occasions with strangers, I would walk away to the corner and avoid talking 
with them. It was only when I participated in the youth fellowship that I gradually 
learned to communicate with strangers. I felt very comfortable to talk with brothers 
and sisters in the church. It’s a place where I can lay down my guard and relax. So, 
I’ve become more outgoing than before. I gradually came to know that Christian faith 
is not only written in the Bible but you can see it in the Christian fellows around you.  
 
A few young migrant workers even established their own religious networks by 
organising Christian congregations. For example, Hui is one of the leaders of Foxconn 
Church B, which was established by Foxconn workers themselves. Hui suggested that 
taking charge of the operations of a house church not only allowed her to cultivate 
organisational, preaching and musical skills but also offered an outlet for the development 
of spiritual life. In 2016, he quit his job as an assembly worker at Foxconn for a full-time 
commitment to the church; he also noted that co-supervising a church with more than 100 
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adherents propelled him to improve himself in terms of Biblical knowledge and public 
speaking ability.  
 
Secondly, and most importantly, Christian discourses and knowledge have offered young 
migrant workers a form of spiritual capital that reshapes their jiazhiguan (values) and 
enables them to attain a more psychologically coherent adulthood. In this sense, spiritual 
capital was produced through the mastery of specific types of spiritual knowledge such 
as dispositions, conduct, ways of thinking, and the ability to enact religious morality.  
 
Idolatry and Christian freedom. In a youth fellowship at Foxconn House Church A, the 
28-year-old worker Gao shared his experience about how Christian jiazhiguan (values) 
offered him freedom and order, which substantially reformulated his chaotic life after he 
first graduated from vocational school. Despite being a rural migrant, Gao considered 
himself as an ambitious youth who strove to escape from the blue-collar jobs that most 
rural migrants held. After he quit his first job as a factory worker, Gao turned to a 
marketing company and became a salesman. As Gao said, he was addicted to stories about 
the histories of striving by successful men and therefore considered Chairman Mao and 
Jack Ma (Chinese businessman and founder of the Alibaba group) as his idols and life 
directors. In order to achieve his dream of becoming a successful man, Gao attended a 
few training classes that he described as “devil training camps” to increase his selling 
techniques and confidence. However, his new job did not offer him a stable income even 
for daily expenditure because of the limited numbers of products he sold. Gao had 
changed jobs four times in the subsequent 3 years and was overwhelmed by feelings of 
anxiety and depression. He said: “I was crazy and really thirsty to succeed during that 
time”. Afterwards, Gao converted to Christianity in 2015 when he worked at a company 
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operated by a Christian entrepreneur. Gao told me that Christianity has fundamentally 
reshaped his system of jiazhiguan:  
 
We Chinese always like to set up icons for you to follow. For example, when we’re 
children, we’re encouraged to follow Lei Feng[21]. Our education encouraged me to 
learn the spirit of Chairman Mao. I used to admire Chairman Mao very much, but after 
I converted to Christianity I started to realise we shouldn’t idolise any icon. I started 
to think that what Chairman Mao said was not necessarily true … The human is 
powerless. I have realised I should confront my weaknesses rather than conceal them, 
and submit myself to God. What I need are confidence and patience. 
 
When I asked Gao why Christians should not encourage idolatry, he replied that it would 
blind him. He added that the Christian jiazhiguan (values) made him realise that what he 
desperately pursued before was more likely what the idols tell him to pursue, regardless 
of whether or not it is suitable for him. In this sense, I did not consider Gao’s switched 
focus from idols to God as jiazhiguan that transferred his this-worldly pursuit to 
transcendence (for example, the “human is powerless” and “submit yourself to God” in 
the quotation above); instead, I argue that Christian jiazhiguan provided him with a 
certain degree of freedom and autonomy through which he could critically and 
reflectively re-examine secular values and ideologies and therefore re-adjust his 
aspirations and way of life.  
 
 
21 Lei Feng was a soldier and a Communist Party member in China. After his death, he was portrayed as a 
selfless and modest person devoted to the CCP and Mao Zedong under the state’s propaganda campaign. 
Lei’s image as a role model and serviceman has endured for several decades in China.  
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Tolerance, patience and life attitude. For many young rural migrants, the yearning for 
upward mobility made them frequently change jobs to seek better opportunities. 
According to Yang’s (2013) research, approximately 44% of rural migrant workers 
switched jobs within one year while only 26.9% stayed in the same work unit for more 
than 3 years. Some young rural migrants quit their factory jobs because they could not 
tolerate the exploitative and unfree factory life. For example, a distinctive group of semi-
employed migrant youth who were jokingly described in the Chinese media as “Sanhe 
Gods” has emerged around the Sanhe Human Resources Market in Shenzhen. This group 
of young migrants is depicted as pessimistic and week-willed youths who cannot tolerate 
the hardship of factory work and only accept low-wage jobs that merely sufficient to 
sustain their low living costs. Young rural migrant workers are therefore characterised by 
frequent job mobility and precarious lives in China’s neoliberal transition. However, this 
general scene is somehow at odds with the young Christian migrant workers who exhibit 
more patience and tolerance in their jobs. When I asked Yang how Christianity has 
changed the way he looked at the world, he replied:  
 
Before I converted to Christianity, I always looked at things with worldly views and 
tended to go with the flow. If I saw my friend had a job with a higher salary than mine, 
I would be jealous of him and considered changing my job. But I gradually became 
mature and learned to be patient. (Yang, male, 22-year-old) 
 
The teaching to be tolerant and patient is widely celebrated by the churches, especially 
among the pastors and senior Christians. For example, prior to being appointed the sexton 
of Sanzhuli Church, the senior migrant worker Wang worked in Shenzhen’s factories for 
15 years. He has often taught young migrant workers that Christians should love their 
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jobs: whether your wage was calculated by the length of work or the number of products, 
and whether or not the managers engaged in surveillance, Christian workers ought to 
work with a full spirit because “you need to make a confession before God one day”.  
 
In my interviews, the word “tashi” (steadfast) frequently appeared.  For example, the 27-
year-old Foxconn worker Huang told me that being tashi was one of the most valuable 
assets she learned from the senior Christians in the church. She considered being patient 
and tashi as important markers of Christian adulthood:  
 
Brother Chen and sister Liao (the church leaders of Foxconn House Church A) always 
taught me to be tashi: an adult Christian should have a stable personality and avoid 
rashness and impatience.   
 
Huang has continually worked in Foxconn for nearly four years. Echoing the church’s 
teachings, she believed that young Christian workers should have the proper attitude to 
their work:  
 
For an ordinary worker, you should try to do well in what you ought to do. As the 
Bible teaches us: “Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the 
Lord, not for men” (Colossians 3:23). No matter whether managers or workers, they 
are only placed in different positions. They are all the children of God. They are equal. 
So, just do what you ought to do, and in God’s eye, you are glorified.  
 
From this quotation, Christian discourse appears to generate different jiazhiguan (values) 
about labour and work that emphasise devotion to one’s current position. Huang’s 
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interpretation of work seems to be rooted in the Protestant ethic that “it was not what the 
believer did but the commitment with which she or he did it that determined the spiritual 
quality of an action” (Abbey, 2014: 90). By attributing transcendent meaning to work, 
young migrant workers became more tolerated and patient about their work and therefore 
acquired a particular source of spiritual coherence in comparison with the psychologically 
vulnerable youths at Foxconn. In this sense, Christian jiazhiguan actually served as a 
form of spiritual capital or emotional resource that migrant youths utilised to navigate 
their precarious adulthood. This is also illustrated by the narrative of Minggang, a 28-
year-old Foxconn worker who successfully prevented himself from committing suicide 
because of the therapeutic effects of Christianity. When he entered Foxconn initially, he 
was very depressed and always complained about his life: “I often used to blame my 
parents who weren’t able to support me to get a better education, which resulted in my 
bad situation now”. However, fortunately, he said that: 
 
When the suicide event happened in 2010, it didn’t affect me seriously because I  
already believed in Jesus at that time. If not, I guess I would be one of their successors. 
If only they had believed in God! They could know God was always with them.  
 
9.5.2 Performing spiritual capital: guanxi and Christian wisdom 
As I have discussed above, spiritual capital (including that from religious networks and 
Christian jiazhiguan) not only operate within the field of religion but also shape young 
migrants’ working practices and interpretation of adulthood. In this sense, spiritual capital 
can create inter-institutional spaces that cross the boundaries between religion and 
everyday life. In what follows, I further show that spiritual capital is not merely manifest 
in the ways in which religious discourses and knowledge are utilised in everyday life, but 
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rather about how it is ‘done’ and performatively constituted, and implicated in  
contextualised interpersonal relations (as guanxi, in this chapter).    
 
In the context of Chinese culture, to be a Christian cannot be separated from the social 
fabric of guanxi. In the interviews, many young Christian insisted that to be a spiritually 
mature Christian was primarily about “living out the image of God Jesus” (活出耶稣基督
的样子) and the capacity to cope with interpersonal guanxi in accordance with God’s will. 
They frequently reported that Christian knowledge or theology made them wiser in terms 
of navigating interpersonal guanxi.  
 
Xiaolong was a 22-year-old rural migrant who had worked as an assistant chef after 
graduating from vocational school. He told me that Christian knowledge and dispositions 
offered him different sources of wisdom in coping with the guanxi at the workplace:  
 
Quan: You mentioned that Christianity has influenced the way you deal with 
interpersonal guanxi? 
Xiaolong: Yeah. 
Quan: How does this happen?  
Xiaolong: Sometimes I’m like a kid, a naughty kid. It’s as if the holy spirit left my 
body. But if I listen to God’s words, I’ll be very polite to my colleagues. Fellowship, 
praying, and reading the Bible all benefitted me a lot and made me wiser in dealing 
with interpersonal guanxi. The Bible says: be as shrewd as snakes and as soft (温柔) 
as doves22. If you want to run towards your goal, you do not necessarily walk straight 
to it. You can also take a tortuous path to it, as in the movement of snakes.  Although 
 
22. The original verse is “Therefore be as shrewd as snakes and as innocent doves” (Matthew 10:16). 
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it covers a longer distance, you can arrive at the destination as well. In terms of 
speaking, you should be as soft as doves. I used to have a bad temper, but now I 
gradually changed the way I get along with my colleague and boss … So, I get along 
well with my colleagues and boss, quite harmoniously. I have a co-worker one year 
younger than me, and he said the boss thought very highly of me. 
 
In the interviews, holding back the tongue and in particular speaking in a proper manner 
are accepted by many young Christians as a pearl of Christian wisdom to maintain their 
interpersonal relationships. Unlike many rebellious non-Christian workers, young 
Christian workers rarely argue with or offend their supervisors.  
 
Likewise, the 19-year-old worker Duo shared his story about how Christian wisdom 
refined his guanxi at the workplace when he was working at a small factory. Despite being 
one of the youngest workers, Duo was conceived by his co-workers as the most helpful 
and reliable workmate on the factory floor. When some workers worked an extra shift in 
the evening, Duo often came back to the factory and cooked tong shui (糖水) dessert for 
them which, as he said, could slightly relieve the hardship of his workmates. Duo insisted 
that the best way to make his factory life better was just to behave in the way that a 
Christian should, focusing on your own work and treating your workmates and superiors 
kindly. Additionally, Christian wisdom provided him the means to cope with the guanxi 
with his supervisors:  
 
Duo: The profits of the factory were very low. So, I came up with an idea that could 
improve the productivity of the assembly line: we should position the efficient workers 
at the front of the assembly line and the less effective ones at the end. This is human 
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nature; we like to compete and therefore the less efficient workers would try to follow 
the effective ones.    
 
Quan: So, you relayed this idea to your shop manager? 
 
Duo: I let him know about this idea, but I didn’t tell him directly. Because “do not let 
any unwholesome talk come out of your mouths, but only what is helpful for building 
others up according to their needs, that it may benefit those who listen”. I recalled this 
verse of the Bible, so I spoke good words to my supervisor and indirectly addressed 
my idea to him. My supervisor was very willing to follow my idea. As I spiritually 
grew, I realised that managing your tongue was very important for a Christian … The 
idea finally became my supervisor’s because I didn’t give him any suggestions.  
 
Apart from manner and speech, many young Christian workers also considered sacrifice, 
unconditional love and suffering loss as wisdom that might sometime improve their 
situation unexpectedly. For example, the 25-year-old woman worker Xueyi shared with 
me her story about how she got along with classmates at vocational school. Xueyi’s 
performance was among the best in the class when she was studying graphic design at 
vocational school. She always shared learning materials and skills with other students, 
even though other they were unwilling to do so because of the competitiveness. Xueyi 
believes that sharing and sacrifice are something that God encourages. However, as she 
notes, she had not anticipated the rewards from God: she became the most trustworthy 
person in her class and was recommended to be monitor by her classmates. Xueyi told 
me emptionally with tears of joy: “If I solely relied on my own, I couldn’t make it. This 
is God’s love.”  
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Similarly, the 25-year-old worker Shenyi considered suffering loss as another form of 
wisdom and blessing in exchange for good guanxi with workmates or supervisors: 
 
Sometimes God can give you comfortable interpersonal guanxi. You know, guanxi is 
the most essential relationship between people. After I converted to Christianity, God 
gave me peace. I have no longer complained, even if I suffered loss or was taken 
advantage of [at the workplace]. Because God gives you the job. If you cannot change 
your circumstances, you just change yourself. These [sufferings or being taken 
advantage of] are God’s blessing. It can gradually improve your interpersonal guanxi. 
When I initially entered the factory, they were all indifferent to me … But now, if I 
can’t say they wholly open their hearts to me, they at least treat me very sincerely and 
speak freely to me.  
 
In this section, I have described a specific form of spiritual capital which is Christian 
wisdom, and how it was manoeuvred by young migrant workers to establish guanxi or 
interpersonal networks of influence in their transitions to adulthood. However, young 
Christian migrant workers’ establishment of guanxi in the workplace is not simply an 
instrumental enactment of existing Christian knowledge or cultural resources in strategies 
of everyday life. Instead, spiritual capital may emerge within the processes of 
performance and the “doing” of Christianity (Mahmood 2005) in line with “God’s will”; 
for example, in “living out the image of God Jesus”. Many young Christian workers 
emphasised the proper ways they performed God’s will more than the Christian teachings 
per se. From a secular-liberal perspective, the young Christian workers’ performance of 
Christian wisdom scarcely challenges or subverts existing power relations and even 
sometimes reproduces the neoliberal labour regime. Yet, if we think of postsecular 
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subjectivity or agency not as a synonym for resistance to structures of power but rather 
as a modality of action, young Christian workers’ acquisition and performance of spiritual 
capital indeed articulate a positive and spiritually coherent way of being beyond the 
chaotic, atomised, psychologically vulnerable personhood normalised by the neoliberal 
regime.    
 
9.6 Conclusion 
In an age of the neoliberal transformation of the economy in Shenzhen, the coalition of 
the state and free market regime appears to create more opportunities and hope for rural 
migrant youth in comparison to Mao’s era where the state strictly controlled the mobility 
of the rural population. Therefore, young migrant workers have high expectations for 
their careers, incomes, and social status and are willing to accept the neoliberal ideologies 
of self-responsibility and self-investment. The massive expansion of vocational education 
exactly meets young working-class labourers, and in particular rural youths’ aspirations 
for upward mobility. Echoing the findings of Koo’s (2016) and Pun’s (2018) research, 
this chapter suggests that the neoliberal regime of vocational education can scarcely 
secure their job security and proper employment but rather leads them to low-skilled 
cheap labour in tandem with the development of labour-intensive manufacturing industry 
in Shenzhen. Apart from the broader economic forces, I also suggest that the discursive 
power of suzhi and social relations of guanxi jointly shape the way rural youths survive 
the marketplace. Under the hierarchical and atomised labour regime, as I have repeatedly 
outlined in previous chapters, young migrant workers find it difficult to form their social 
capital and interpersonal relations, and thereby their aspirations and hope are 
detrimentally affected. 
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Following the intersectional approach outlined in Chapter 7 and 8, this chapter further 
examines the possibility of postsecular subjectivity and agency by focusing on young 
migrant workers’ transition to working-class adulthood. The concept of spiritual capital 
can contribute to this enterprise by providing a tool to analyse how religion can be utilised 
as a form of social and cultural capital that enables an alternative pathway to adulthood. 
I argue that postsecular subjectivity and agency emerge within and are embedded in the 
fabric of social capital and interpersonal relations (for example, in guanxi) that condition 
the way young migrant workers produce, consume and perform the spiritual resources of 
Christianity.  I argue that we cannot equate religious agency with religious practice per 
se while failing to analyse spiritual and social resources and the everyday sociability that 
condition the way individuals make sense of and manoeuvre religious meanings. In this 
chapter, spiritual capital is shown to enable young rural migrant workers to reformulate 
their jiazhiguan (values), form a religious community, and establish guanxi (interpersonal 
relations of influence). In this sense, young Christian workers are capable of cultivating 
spiritual capital to constitute a more emotionally coherent adulthood as an alternative to 
the personhood normalised by the neoliberal regime.  
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Now, at the end of this thesis, I would like to conclude with a summary of the key research 
findings, central arguments, and contributions presented so far by responding to the 
theoretical registers outlined in chapter 2. My essential efforts in this thesis are to provide 
a dialectical re-evaluation of secularity and postsecularity. Therefore, I begin by re-
visiting the chapters in this thesis. I then outline four central inquiries and contributions, 
which can be of benefit to an agenda for the geography of secularity and postsecularity. 
Finally, I consider the implications of this research for potential future directions in the 
geography of religion.  
 
10.2 Revisiting the chapters in the thesis 
I now revisit briefly the seven substantive chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 5-9) in this thesis.  
In chapter 2, I theorised secularity and postsecularity as mutually constituted 
epistemologies and conditions of being for the subsequent analysis and argued that human 
geography needs to consider how postsecular ethics and subjectivities articulate, and co-
evolve with, secular conditions of being in the world (Research Question 1). Moreover, 
by systematically reviewing the literature on postsecularity, I highlighted postsecularity 
as involving new religious subjectivities, ethics and agency that emerge from and are 
engendered by the secular conditions of being and in particular the neoliberal transition 
in Shenzhen (in association with Research Question 3). I also argued that secularity and 
postsecularity are both context-contingent and research therefore needs to examine their 
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variegated forms and spatial configurations in non-Western contexts (Research Question 
2). Finally, I developed a new approach that emphasises intersectionality among migrants 
to ground the understanding of secularity and postsecularity in specific social and power 
relations (Research Question 4).  
 
In chapter 3, I have provided a geo-historical account of secularity and secularism in 
China. As opposed to Western societies, in which secularism serves as a mediated effect 
between the state and religion, China’s secularity is a top-down political-ideological 
process that produces secular and governable subjects. In imperial, Republican and 
socialist China, individuals were required to be “emancipated” from religious or 
traditional orientations and communities such that they could be directly absorbed into 
the sphere of state power. In the post-reform era, as I have shown in the empirical chapters, 
neoliberal ideologies that emphasise atomised, self-responsible and productive subjects 
are actually in line with China’s historical legacies of secularity. Therefore, I argue that 
the spatial configuration of secularity in China is characterised by a combination of  
neoliberal governance, state developmentalism, and autocratic rule working in concert to 
produce productive, docile and governable subjects. On the other hand, I also situate the 
possibility of postsecularity in the nationwide religious revival in China, where religion 
plays an increasingly important role in “moral reconstruction” and in the making of civil 
society. In section 10.4, I provide more discussion of Research Question 2.  
 
In chapter 5, in response to Research Question 1, I have shown that Christian theo-ethics 
not only negotiate neoliberal secularity but also co-constitute the latter. On the one hand, 
neoliberalism has brought about a more flexible form of secularity that targets  the 
subjectivities, affects and psychological states of individuals. However, it is through these 
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neoliberal conditions of being that theo-ethics and hybrid expressions of faith-through-
praxis are made possible. In chapter 5, I argue that postsecular ethics do not necessarily 
resist neoliberal governance but also sometimes point to a more humanistic and coherent 
neoliberal order. This argument is further illustrated in Chapters 6-9 in that migrant 
workers reframe rather than simply challenge neoliberal lived experiences by drawing on 
religious ethics.   
 
Chapter 7 contributes to the postsecular critique that emphasises theology, affects and 
bodily technologies, which cannot be simply captured by “social explanation” and secular 
epistemologies. It also answers how new religious ethics – for example, the theologically 
mediated discourses of benfen and suzhi – are engendered through theology-by-praxis. 
While moving beyond “social explanation”, although migrant workers’ projects of self-
transformation do not critically challenge existing power relations, they nevertheless set 
conditions for processes of neoliberal subjectivation (Mahmood 2005) by reconstituting 
devalued and allegedly inferior labouring subjects as morally superior and faithful-
virtuous subjects. This argument is crucial for an understanding of the intersectional 
subjectivity and agency of migrant workers that I have discussed in Chapters 7-9.  
 
Chapters 7-9 collectively respond to Research Question 3 and 4 by looking at the 
intersections of religion, gender, class and particular life courses among migrant workers. 
As shown in chapter 7, Christian migrant workers’ masculinities are formed in such a 
way that gender, class and religion mutually constitute one another. I consider the moral 
manhood performed by migrant workers as a sign of postsecular subjectivities which 
enable them to claim a meaningful way of being men that might psychologically empower 
them and may set limits on secularist-neoliberal normalisation. In chapter 8, I have 
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offered a rethinking of women migrants’ religious agency beyond the limitations of 
Eurocentric and secular humanist theorising. I argue that research needs to be attentive to 
the intersectionality within which multiple oppressions operate but also from which new 
religious agency may emerge. Chapters 7 and 8 respond to Mahmood’s (2005) ethical 
reflections on religious piety, where agency and empowerment may not rely solely on the 
production of counter-subjectivity. Rather, subject formation is a process of autopoiesis 
or self-styling, involving multiple negotiations with dominant values or norms. In section 
10.6, I provide further analysis of how this thesis advances Mahmood’s argument. In 
Chapter 9, I have examined the intersections of religion, youth and class among migrant 
workers. In particular, I argue that postsecularity is mediated by and embodied in 
contextualised everyday sociability and spiritual capital (for example, in guanxi and 
jiazhiguan in China) in ways that help young migrant workers constitute an emotionally-
coherent working-class adulthood in the context of neoliberal precariousness. In what 
follows, I further discuss the contributions of this thesis in sections 10.3-10.6 and consider 
how future research might move forward in section 10.7.  
 
10.3 Re-visioning secularity and postsecularity  
This thesis responds to the “overly facile understanding” of the complexities and 
geohistorical contingencies of secularity in human geography (Kong 2010; Wilford 2010; 
Tse 2014:202; Gao, Qian & Yuan 2018). “Secularity” is often considered as a taken-for-
granted notion describing a regime devoid of religion and thus retains a very marginal 
place in the production of geographical knowledge. I have therefore attempted to re-
invigorate the notion of secularity in interpreting religious landscapes and modern 
conditions of being. In this thesis, secularity is examined as not only a political-
ideological agenda with an associated epistemic knowledge regime that is held 
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unreflexively as a normative structure of modern reality (Casanova 2011), but also as a 
condition of being phenomenologically inhabited by modern individuals (Taylor 2007; 
2010). In other words, I have focused on the spheres of governance and institutionality 
and, simultaneously, the lived conditions of secularity shaped by a diversity of 
social/power relations. Yet, these two aspects of secularity always-already imply 
geographical contingencies, as I have argued in Chapter 2. If we oscillate between seeing 
secularity as macro-social process or as individual consciousness, it becomes apparent 
that, at the same time as secularity operates as a macro-social force and imagery, it is also 
pervasively felt and performed at the level of the local and the everyday. 
 
On the one hand, instead of viewing secularity as a transcendent power or an absolute 
political doctrine that governs society,  I argue that the political-ideological project of 
secularity is better understood as a space of thought and practice that is assembled through 
flexible modes of governance (Ong 2007; Anderson 2016), infra-secular geographies 
(Dora 2018) and embodied responses in human lives (Holloway 2013). In this thesis, I 
have examined how secularity is articulated through the combination of and 
reconciliation between neoliberal and autocratic governance that work hand-in-hand to 
produce secular, docile, and governable modern subjects. In chapter 5, I situate the 
secularity within China’s neoliberal reform and context-specific autocratic and 
authoritarian governance in Shenzhen. Neoliberal ideologies are incorporated into 
China’s state developmentalism and autocratic rule to advance the secular project of 
modernisation and capital accumulation. This secular agenda operates through particular 
spatial politics or infra-secular geographies (for example, from the Special Economic 
Zone in Shenzhen to Foxconn’s labour camps) in order to govern migrant workers’ 
everyday lives and subjectivities. The alliance of the state and capitalism forces economy- 
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and profit-centred governance on migrant workers. For example, as I have shown in this 
thesis, local government has encouraged the expansion of the “factory dormitory regime” 
which accommodates large numbers of migrant workers yet simultaneously minimises 
their consumption of urban welfare.  This spatial patterning of secularity is also evident 
in Dubai, a city that uses a variety of labour camps as a spatial-fix for more flexible capital 
accumulation (Buckley 2013). However, I do not equate secularity with neoliberalism per 
se nor assume that neoliberalism embodies a new form of secularity that is based on a 
pure economic rationality; neoliberalism is not inherently secular but a mode of 
governance through which secularity is articulated. As Asad (2003: 183) notes, secularity 
does not exist per se but rather “emerged historically in a particular way and was assigned 
specific practical tasks”. In this sense, neoliberalism, autocracy and local disciplinary 
practices are all specific and flexible techniques that assemble secularity.  
 
In response to Casanova’s (2011) Foucauldian understanding of secularity as a epistemic 
knowledge regime that is held unreflexively as a normative structure of modern reality, I 
argue that an engagement with neoliberalism can help us to identify the multiple and 
intersectional subjectivities shaped by the ‘unthoughts’ of secularity. For example, in 
chapter 5, the discourse of psychological suzhi (quality) serves as a criterion to define 
“good workers”; in chapter 7, a hegemonic masculinity that emphasises hierarchical 
power and absolute submission becomes a normative behaviour and disposition that 
justifies the militarised management of the migrant labour regime; in chapter 8, the 
femininity which involves being submissive and tolerant was linked to the making of 
qualified workers; in Chapter 9, the massive expansion of neoliberal vocational education 
was accepted as a state-encouraged channel for young rural migrants’ struggle for upward 
social mobility. All of these ‘unthoughts’ address the ethical-ideological aspects of 
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secularity, which create a secularist and hegemonic narrative about what is good and 
desirable (Taylor 2007). Overall, a neoliberal form of secularity demands not only the 
coding, differentiation and cultivation of human life in line with the logics of rational 
optimisation, but also the refashioning of  people’s subjectivities, affects, and hopes 
(Anderson 2016; Cloke et al. 2019).  Neoliberalism has brought about a more flexible 
form of governance that binds together a diverse range of practices and powers, including 
the autocratic, discursive and affective, in durable alliances that collectively produce 
modern, secular, and governable subjects. 
 
On the other hand, this study also provides a grounded examination of Taylor’s (2007) 
theorisation of secularity as a lived condition. That is, I have intensively explored how 
migrant workers inhabit, sense, or experience the secular. Returning to Taylor’s (2007; 
2011) argument, secularity is not simply a political project located in or controlled by the 
state; it is a lived condition in which modern individuals always face “cross-pressures” 
that may constantly bring into question one’s lifeways and meanings. In this thesis, the 
introduction of global capitalism and neoliberal governance to Shenzhen has fuelled the 
Chinese state’s efforts to create a secularised and modern society. As I noted in Chapter 
3, the Maoist state’s iconoclastic power succeeded only to a limited extent in eradicating 
religion, especially in the light of the noticeable religious revival in the post-reform era. 
But this does not imply a decline of secularity and secularism, as I have shown in this 
thesis. The coalition of the state and neoliberal capitalism has more effectively elevated 
secularist values of efficiency, progress and market rationality to a hegemonic consensus, 
internalised not only by entrepreneurs and managers but also ordinary factory workers 
involved in the tides of the market economy. The coalition of the state and neoliberal 
capitalism has also precipitated class inequality, precarious and disciplined labour 
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regimes, and vulnerability to exploitation for rural migrant workers in China. In this sense, 
secularity is not simply a political-ideological project but an actually existing condition 
in which migrant workers make sense of their lives. For example, in Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 
9, disciplinary techniques such as intensive pre-work training, compulsory overtime, 
strict surveillance with monetary penalties, verbal violence, and collective dormitories 
are shown to work jointly to produce a sense of alienation and among migrant workers. 
Moreover, these workers are largely atomised as isolated subjects and deprived of 
emotional support from family and friends, therefore they suffer from a sense of 
uncertainty, uprootedness, and disembeddedness from social networks. These “structures 
of feeling” (Anderson 2016) of secularity also vary intersectionally, impacting on how 
migrant workers constitute their masculine, feminine, and youthful subjectivities. Above 
all, theorising secularity as a lived condition and in terms of embodied practices enables 
us to capture the intensities of secular power (Anderson 2017: 504); that is, how “power 
operate[s] by becoming part of an organizing experience”. In this sense, “actually existing” 
secularity surfaces in and is dispersed through multiple lived experiences.  
 
It is under such structural experiences of secularity that migrant workers are faced with a 
“cross-pressure” situation (Taylor 2007). The Foxconn suicide event indicates that some 
migrant workers are fully enclosed in a self-sufficient secularity within which they cannot 
find alternative modes of being. The Christian migrant workers, however, attempt to live 
out of the immanent frame by drawing upon a religious way of life. Paradoxically, 
however, the state’s political-ideological project of secularity, in tandem with the 
capitalist disciplining of labouring bodies, creates a fertile ground for Christian religiosity 
to be revived. In a situation of “cross-pressures”, secular modernity generates rather than 
undermines new demands for spirituality. From this point of view, I argue that the 
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postsecular approach in human geography can be enriched by considering how the secular 
and the postsecular are co-constituted and co-evolving.  
 
Departing from this standpoint, I now offer some further reflections on the geography of 
postsecularity. In this thesis, a contradictory dual process in Shenzhen, with the 
ascendancy of secular capitalism and simultaneously a noticeable religiosity flourishing 
among the new working class, has demonstrated that secularity is contested and hybrid, 
always-already implying postsecular reflexivity. Despite this religious resurgence, the 
immanent frame of secularity remains a real, tangible condition under which Christianity 
evolves and thrives in Shenzhen.  In this study, migrant workers’ religiosity is anchored 
in other-worldly redemption (such as in working for God and not capital) but concurrently 
in temporal and immanent concerns such as material support, emotional responses to 
alienation, subjective consolation and, ultimately, an alternative frame of migrant 
subjectivity in contrast to that framed by neoliberal governance. In this sense, the 
postsecular is an ethical and self-reflective project of secularity which, however, does not 
signify the decline or demise of the immanent frame. Following Cloke et al. (2019), I 
suggest that postsecularity is neither an epochal shift where society becomes more 
religious nor a reversal of secularisation but a possible condition of being in which the 
religious and the secular cohabit in such a way that new subjectivities and ethics may 
emerge. In this thesis, I have therefore mapped out a variety of postsecular subjectivities 
that are engendered by and co-constituted with secular conditions of being. In Chapter 5, 
the lived enactment of Christian theo-ethics in the everyday praxis of care and justice for 
marginalised migrant workers opens an ethical space that reconstitutes the subjectivities 
shaped by autocratic and neoliberal agendas. In Chapter 7, migrant workers’ performance 
of “moral manhood” serves as a tactical alternative for them to reframe their marginal 
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experiences and to claim a meaningful way of being men in negotiation with the 
hegemonic masculinity normalised by secular and neoliberal agendas. In Chapter 8, 
Christian spaces and pious ways of life allow women migrant workers to attain certain 
kinds of agency that reframe their experiences under the matrix of domination. In Chapter 
9, Christianity can also be understood as a form of spiritual capital that helps young 
migrant workers navigate working-class adulthood.  
 
In general, I agree with Cloke et al.’s (2019) and Williams’s (2015) arguments that 
postsecular ethics can create a political and hopeful space that may serve as active 
resistance to secularist ethics and the neoliberal logics of subject-formation. However, 
what these authors are less concerned with is the question of in what sense do postsecular 
subjectivities themselves relate to, and thereby reproduce, secularities and neoliberal 
sensibilities?  Although Cloke et al. (2019) confine postsecularity to the positive and 
“good” side of religion, the formation of postsecular subjects nonetheless cannot be 
separated from the process of subjectivation, in which one wants to affirm him or herself 
in a certain way or in certain normative modes of the self (Foucault 2009). As I have 
shown in this thesis, and particularly in Chapter 6, the constitution of the religious selves 
of Christian migrant workers resists and simultaneously reproduces secular and neoliberal 
sensibilities. For example, while Christianity is a source of comfort and communal 
solidarity for migrant workers, and even offers them a postsecular ethical imaginary that 
re-works the state discourses that define them as inferior subjects, the theological 
interpretations of benfen and suzhi presented in Chapter 6 only elude, or even re-
legitimise rather than contest, the realities of secular modernity and the local political 
economy. Therefore, migrants’ efforts at self-transformation through Christian ethics and 
discourse, and their theologically mediated interpretation of alienation, labour 
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exploitation and social inequality, overlap with, and reinforce, the secularist agenda of 
producing the docile, productive bodies of migrants, an agenda itself endorsed by the 
state–capital coalition. In Chapter 7, I have also argued that migrant workers’ 
performance of moral manhood is itself hegemonic as it is conditioned by a set of 
normative religious moralities and codes of conduct, such as connecting Christian 
masculinities to being hardworking and “good workers”. However, I do not argue that 
Christianity always inescapably co-opted into the project of neoliberal secularity but that 
the postsecular must be rethought in light of the question of how situated religiosities and 
new theological thoughts and practices constitute, entrench, or reproduce the orientations 
and sensibilities of secularity. More critical reflection on religious subjects must delve 
into and analyse the complexities of power and the ways in which individuals exercise 
agency (as I consider later).  
In addition, this thesis also offers a critique of the Habermasian approach to postsecularity 
that considers religion in terms of strategic moral resources contributing to the cultivation 
of more healthy public relationships. Instead, I respond to Holloway’s (2013)  call for an 
engagement with the theological and faithful sensibilities of individuals as postsecular 
critique that avoids reducing inquiries into religion simply to social dynamics. In Chapter 
6, I emphasise the embodied knowledge of theologies, the affective presence of 
transcendence and the technologies of the self through which faithful subjectivity is 
formed. However, faithful subjectivity is not simply determined by discursive or affective 
knowledge but is constituted through what Sunderland (2016) calls “theologies-by-
praxis”. The Christian theology of valued bodies, work ethics and holy spirit (in Chapter 
6) and Christian wisdom (in Chapter 9) does not represent an enactment of Biblical 
knowledge but rather the reframing of theology in responses of subjects to secular 
conditions of being.  
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10.4 Spatial conditions: rethinking secularity and postsecularity in 
China  
In this part of the conclusions, in response to Casanova’s (2013) and Taylor’s (2011) call 
for a global comparative study of religion beyond the normative trajectory of Western 
modernity, I provide some reflections on the spatial conditions, particularly in the context 
of China, in which secularity and postsecularity are reconfigured. Overall, I argue that an 
engagement with the scholarship concerning secularity and postsecularity can lead to a 
new paradigm for studies of religion in China and, likewise, an understanding of 
secularity and postsecularity can also be enriched by engaging Sonological knowledge.  
 
In this study, a contradictory dual process has been witnessed in Shenzhen of the 
ascendancy of secular capitalism and, simultaneously, a noticeable religiosity flourishing 
among the new working class. On the one hand, the nationwide religious resurgence and 
its localisation in Shenzhen has challenged the “hegemony of the mainstream master 
narrative of secularization” (Taylor, 2007: 534). Yet, if we revisit Casanova’s (1993; 
2011) three dimensions of secularisation, which are differentiation, privatisation, and 
decline of religion, in the context of China, we can hardly say that China is becoming 
more religious. In terms of the differentiation thesis, as I have noted in Chapter 3, the 
category of “religion” emerged in China’s encounter with Western imperialism and 
therefore relied heavily on European ideas. It was not until 1949 that Christianity became 
a distinctive sphere under the state’s governance. In China, restricting religion to a 
specific domain is not a latent function of modernisation but rather a deliberate state-led 
project that created a secular society as part of the transition to modernity. In the post-
reform era, despite the easing of religious policy, secularity evolved from an anti-religious 
sentiment to a less coercive secularism that upholds secular values of reason, progress 
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and efficiency along with state-sanctioned capitalist ideologies as the moral basis for 
state-developmentalism. In this sense, state-led modernisation and China’s integration 
into neoliberal capitalism have, at the macro-level, set in motion secularism and secularity 
as an ideological and cultural movement. This has created, at the local scale, a condition 
akin to what Taylor (2007) theorises as a stadial consciousness. The neoliberal migrant 
labour regime is precisely the localisation of this political-ideological project of secularity. 
In terms of the privatisation thesis, it is quite questionable whether or not a public sphere 
of religion has ever existed in China. Instead, the religious revival among the working 
classes and the theo-ethics that involves into the social service reflect a certain degree of 
de-privatisation. Christianity has played an increasingly important role in shaping labour 
relations and working-class culture in Shenzhen, in ways similar to E.P. Thompson’s 
(1963) description of the wide spread of Methodism among working-class communities 
in early nineteenth-century England. Nevertheless, the revival of religion described in 
this study has indeed becomes the animus of orders of existence inside, and not outside, 
neoliberal-capitalist secularity.  
 
Overall, unlike in liberal and pluralist societies in the West, Chinese secularity is 
characterised by a combination of neoliberal governance, state developmentalism, and 
autocratic rule, which work hand-in-hand to produce secular, productive, docile, and 
governable subjects. It is noteworthy that neoliberal and disciplinary practices in 
Shenzhen are subject to a larger moral discourse of Chinese secularity that legitimises the 
social and political hierarchy and the differentiation of human bodies through secular 
values of reason, progress  and efficiency.  For example, in this study, the pervasive suzhi 
discourse (Kipnis 2007) that champions the distinction between superior and inferior 
migrant bodies serves as a part of this larger moral discourses of secularity.   
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However, in what sense can we understand China’s religious revival as a form of 
postsecularity, given the entrenched secularity in contemporary China? Or, on the other 
hand, how does a postsecular approach enrich our understanding of China’s religious 
revival?  As I have argued, postsecularity is better understood as a possible space in which 
religion and secularity cohabit in such a way that new and hybrid subjectivities and ethics 
may emerge. In this sense, my point is that questions about the postsecular religious 
revival in China are not simply about people becoming more or less religious, but rather 
concern how religion is implicated in the project of cultivating moral subjects suited to 
development aspirations and new zeitgeists.   
 
By deploying a postsecular approach, this thesis challenges the mainstream perspective 
in China’s religion studies which unwittingly or deliberately emphasises an anti-secular 
and antihegemonic sensibility, and in which China’s modernisation is sometimes 
uncritically associated with the domination of secular and capitalist ethics. Instead, this 
thesis has argued that religiosity is not merely a strategic cultural resource for people to 
cope with perplexing social changes and state power, if only in vain. Rather, religiosity 
is integral to, and even constitutive of, local political and economic conditions. As in Cao 
Nanlai’s (2010) argument, the postsecular religious revival in China is rather contested 
and hybrid, and cannot simply be reduced to a symbolic universe that is inherently anti-
secular and anti-hegemonic.  Instead of assuming that Christian values and ethics enable 
a space in which Chinese people negotiate and reclaim their autonomy from an 
authoritarian state, I argue that Christian values actually overlap with the state’s project 
of maintaining power and moral legitimacy. In this study, the theo-ethics of love and 
unconditional care and the Christian work ethic in relation to discipline are compatible 
with the state’s efforts to construct a “harmonious society” by filling the gap in social 
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welfare and service provision and fostering self-disciplined, law-abiding and productive 
citizens. This is consonant with Cao’s (2010) argument that “Christianity certainly has 
gained recognition from the state as a useful source in local governance.” However, I am 
not going to argue that religion is being co-opted into the state’s regulation and neoliberal 
governance; rather, I suggest that the postsecular religious revival in China always 
reproduces the moral discourse of secularity. The flourishing of religion in this form, as 
Wang Gungwu (2004) suggests, does not indicate that China’s social transformation is 
shifting from a secular state to a religious one, but rather from militant secularism to a 
more hybrid form of secularism that integrates secular ideologies with new formations of 
identities and subjectivities, with people seemingly acting as free subjects applying self-
governance and self-cultivation under a situation of cross-pressure (Taylor 2007). This is 
not to argue that China’s emerging secularity produces “inauthentic” forms of religiosity. 
Rather, I contend that there are hybrid cultural formations in current Chinese society, 
whereby people make sense of the religious by making reference to the secular, and vice 
versa. It is cultural formations of this nature that give rise to new aspirations for, and 
discursive formulations of, Protestant faith among migrant workers and the possibility of 
postsecular reflexivity.  
 
10.5 The religiosity of migrants 
This thesis also brings migrants’ religiosity into dialogue with existing discussions on 
secularity and postsecularity. This thesis argues that migrants’ bodies become an 
important site through which secular and neoliberal governance circulates and reproduces. 
Regulating migrants’ bodies, in particular through neoliberal techniques that maximise 
the economic utility of migrants but simultaneously minimise their labour costs and 
consumption of urban welfare, is an crucial approach in understanding China’s agenda of 
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secular modernisation. This demands not only the coding and differentiation of migrants’ 
bodies but also the refashioning of migrant workers’ subjectivity, hope, and affect so that 
they become governable and durable labouring subjects. For example, in Chapter 9, it 
young rural migrants’ hopes and aspirations for upward social mobility were shown to be 
manipulated to enhance the neoliberal “vocational school to factory” system that in turn 
reduces young migrants to cheap labour.  Overall, migrants’ bodies and affective life 
become an “object-target” for the state’s efforts to reconcile its neoliberal and autocratic 
agendas. It is in this context that this thesis theorises new religiosities of migrant workers 
as responses to perplexing neoliberal social changes, or a coping mechanism under 
oppressive conditions. Christianity provides migrant workers with material, cultural and 
symbolic resources which not only enable them to negotiate the existential conditions of 
uprootedness, labour alienation and incarceration, but which also empower community 
participation by this marginal group. In this study, migrant workers’ religiosity is 
constituted by embodied practices, emotionalised narratives, a subaltern subjectivity 
aspiring to empowerment, and theological interpretation of social inequality and labour 
alienation.  
 
Moreover, this thesis also provides an empirical study in response to Kong (2010) and 
Ley’s (2010) call for research to examine how migrants reshape the changing landscape 
of religion. It is suggested in this thesis that migration has brought new insights to the 
rethinking of secularity and postsecularity. Secularity and postsecularity are  not 
homogeneous social processes, but are subject to the increasing mobility of migrants. As 
I have discussed in Chapter 7, rural churches in some areas of China have undergone a 
drastic loss of young members because the majority of rural “surplus labourers” have 
become seasoned rural-urban migrants, leaving only the children and the elderly in the 
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churches. On the other hand, rural-to-urban migration has re-mapped urban religious 
scenes (such as in the churches in Shenzhen in this study)  through the translocal mobility 
of religiosity and situated religious conversion, where migrant workers constituted more 
than 80 per cent of attendance in the churches I have investigated. These churches serve 
as ‘homes away from home’ (Ley 2008) that maintain religiosity, provide networks of 
social support and employment opportunities, and help migrants integrate through 
friendship with local Christians. Meanwhile, through the church, migrants gain access to 
communal participation, which empowers this marginal group.  
 
This thesis has shown that rural-to-urban migration in China has substantially remade 
geographies of faith and spirituality. The massive inflows of migrant workers to cities 
have altered the geographic location of the Christian population, giving rise to what 
Huang Jianbo (2014) has called the “rural church in the city.” However, despite rural 
migrants constituting the great majority of attendance in the churches I researched, I do 
not simply label them as “rural churches”. Huang (2014) emphasises rural Christians’ 
conflicted experiences of religiosity in urban churches in terms of “moral torment,” 
identity tension and different epistemological styles that are caused by difference between 
the rural Pentecostal and urban evangelical.  Similarly, Huang Ke-Hsien (2015) suggests 
that there is a distinctive religious hierarchy in urban churches between migrant workers 
and those high-suzhi (quality) urban Christians and educated migrants.  However, it is not 
clear that rural and urban religiosities are truly distinctive and mutually exclusive, as has 
been claimed, since this thesis has shown that migrants’ religiosity is hybrid and 
constituted in specific contexts. For example, the Christian theologies of the work ethic, 
masculinity and femininity (in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) as well as Christian wisdom (Chapter 
9) are less likely to be structured by the rural Pentecostal or urban evangelical styles but 
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emerged in response to their lived circumstances and new socio-economic conditions in 
the secular realm. This is consistent with Casanova’s (2007) argument that migrant 
religiosity is not a residue of traditions brought from a place of origin, but rather an 
adaptive response to a new world.  In other words, migrants’ religiosity rarely relies on a 
stable, pre-given religious identity but instead represents an ongoing, hybrid construction 
as migrants live out and negotiate their religious selves to achieve self-awareness and 
self-governance in new socio-economic environments. In this sense, migrant workers’ 
religiosity in this study is neither rural Pentecostal nor urban evangelical in a strict sense, 
but instead a situated, lived response to secular modernity and neoliberal capitalism in 
the new social-economic environments of the city.  
 
However, religion is just one dimension of migrants’ subjectivity. As Kong (2018: 5) has 
recently noted, “Religion is just one aspect of the assemblage that makes up an 
individual’s identity”. Existing scholarship has, however, tended to privilege (or, worse, 
inflate) the role of religion relative to others. The fact remains that a range of identifiers, 
such as ethnicity, race, gender, language, tastes, preferences and religion, amongst others, 
all coalesce into one ever-shifting assemblage, with migrants having to negotiate 
“multiple pathways to incorporation simultaneously in different configurations at 
different times” (Levitt, 2012: 495).  This thesis has also contributed to the inquiry into 
the intersectionality of migration. In this thesis, migrant workers religiosity is not 
homogeneous and coherent but varies in accord with different lived experiences and 
different system of oppression and social inequality. I provide more reflections on this 
issue in the next section.  
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10.6 An intersectional approach to secularity and postsecularity: 
power and religious agency  
One of the most important contributions of this thesis has been to develop an 
intersectional approach to secularity and postsecularity. In Chapter 2, I proposed three 
forms of intersectional thinking that shed light on issues of secularity, neoliberalism and 
postsecularity: (1) the intersectional nature of secular power; (2) intersectionally 
mediated lived experiences; and (3) intersectional subjectivity and agency. I now re-
examine this analytical frame by revisiting the research findings in this thesis.  
 
Firstly, the use of the concept of intersectionality produces new knowledge about how 
power relations are intertwined and mutually constructed through multiple 
categorisations of human subjectivity. In this study, secular neoliberalism is not only 
embedded in the class-based, gendered and age-specific structures that classify human 
bodies for different logics of optimising rationality, but also relies on the “techniques of 
intervention” (Anderson 2016) that produce particular intersectional affects. For example, 
in Chapter 9, the alliance of state power and neoliberalism is shown to not only target 
specific youth bodies to feed the factory labour regime but also creates a “structure of 
feeling” that propagates what is desired and hopeful trajectories to adulthood for young 
rural migrants. This is also illustrated in the hegemonic masculinity in Chapter 7 in which, 
for low-status managers, being aggressive and coercive was even viewed as a valuable 
asset that signalled a male supervisor’s capacity to discipline recalcitrant and rebellious 
workers and contributed to a better chance of being promoted. In turn, for production 
workers, being submissive, autonomous, self-responsible, and durable in the face of 
exploitation is associated with being qualified a worker. In Chapter 8, I showed that 
Christian migrant women are subject to an intersectional network of power weaviong 
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together the state’s hegemonic discourses and ideologies, urban-rural dualism, the 
legacies of traditional familial and patriarchal culture, the gendered disciplinary labour 
regime, and the patriarchal institution of Christianity, which work collectively to create 
the subaltern femininity of migrant women. Overall, the political-ideological project of 
secularity is always materialised through intersectional subjectivation. This argument 
resonates with Asad’s (2003: 5) critique of Charles Taylor’s understanding of secularism 
as a political process that produces a unified identity:  
 
When Taylor says that the modern state has to make citizenship the primary principle 
of identity, he refers to the way [the state] must transcend the different identities built 
on class, gender, and religion, replacing conflicting perspectives by unifying 
experience. In an important sense, this transcendent mediation is secularism. 
Secularism is […] an enactment by which a political medium redefines and transcends 
particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, 
gender and religion. 
 
In this sense, state secularism is not only a transcendent power that produces normative 
subjectivities but is also articulated and embodied through intersectional subjectivities. I 
therefore insist that secular power is also characterised by the production of multiple 
discursive and affectual regimes that justify social hierarchy and differentiation of 
individuals’ utility. Overall, I argue that the political-ideological project of secularity 
relies on what Collins (2000) calls a “matrix of domination” that grounds the basis for 
differentiating, engineering and stratifying human beings, which constitutes an 
overarching structure of inequalities and power that cannot be challenged by singular 
anti-oppression force.  
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Secondly, I have theorised both secularity and postsecularity as intersectional lived 
experiences. By this I mean that secularity operates by becoming part of and organising 
multiple lived experiences (Anderson 2017) and, correspondingly, religion reframes the 
embodied experience of secularity by mediating and conditioning the ways power 
operates. In this thesis, Christianity is conceived by migrant workers as not simply 
institutional beliefs and ethics but also communal life and leisure, an embodied 
spirituality that reframes suffering, disease and labour exploitation, and a life strategy to 
smoothe interpersonal relationship in the workplace. In this sense, Christianity is ‘lived’ 
and practised in the realms of everyday life and intersectional embodied experience. It is 
through this intersectional lived experience that the transition from faith-by-dogma to 
faith-by-praxis (Cloke and Beaumont 2012; Williams 2015) is made possible.  
 
Thirdly, the intersectional approach helps to produce new knowledge about what counts 
as postsecular subjectivity or agency.  In Chapters 2 and 8, by engaging with the literature 
on postsecular feminism inspired by Mahmood (2005) and Braidotti (2009), I have argued 
for research into multiple understandings of religious agency beyond the secularist and 
normative-liberal epistemologies that locate agency primarily in resisting and subversive 
subjectivities. In this thesis, multiple forms of religious agency are mapped out. In 
Chapter 5, the lived enactment of theo-ethics has produced various somewhat counter-
hegemonic effects, since the ethics of love, transformation and Christian entrepreneurship 
resist and may even rework the domination of secular neoliberalism. Also, migrant 
workers’ religiosity can be associated with an empowerment and instrumental agency that 
they accrue, utilising religious discourse and practice in response to their lived 
circumstances. For example, migrant workers manoeuvre religion as a cultural, symbolic 
and discursive resource that help them to mediate labour exploitation, establish a 
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“comfort zone” and improve interpersonal guanxi in the workplace. However, it is the 
third kind of religiosity, which involves migrant workers’ inhabiting of religious norms 
and their project of self-transformation, that deserves more careful analysis in terms of 
the extent to which it can be read as a form of (postsecular) agency. As I have noted above, 
migrant workers’ project of self-transformation and their theologically mediated 
interpretation of alienation, labour exploitation and social inequality overlap with, and 
may even reinforce, the state’s agenda of the production of docile, productive bodies of 
migrants. This argument is true insofar as we consider it as a factual judgement in the 
logic of “social analysis”, but it does not mean that migrant workers’ religiosity in this 
form is simply a co-option into the political ethos of state-led governmentality, one that 
thwarts migrant workers’ struggling impulses with moral discipline (Thompson 1963). I 
contend that more nuanced analysis should be applied to migrant workers’ moral/ethical 
formations embedded in intersectional subjectivities. I therefore agree with Mahmood’s 
(2005: 15) argument that “agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist 
norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms”. In this thesis, migrant 
workers’ performance of religious way of life, which is especially evident in the norm to 
“live out the image of Jesus”, contributes to the formation of an ethical disposition and 
valued and superior moral subjectivities. This mode of self-transformation works by 
disciplining the body and by bodies’ reframe of theologies (see chapter 6), which becomes 
the necessary means through which faithful-hopeful subjectivities, godly manhood, 
Christian femininity, and psychologically-coherent adulthood are both created and 
expressed.  
 
However, in what ways can these intersectional-ethical subjectivities be considered to be 
political? Here, instead of presupposing an ontological form of agency that is counter-
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hegemonic, I focus instead on intersectionality, a nexus of social relations and articulated 
power structure from which different forms of postsecular agency may arise. In essence, 
migrant workers are subject to an intersectional and overarching structure of inequality 
and power that cannot be challenged by a singular anti-oppression force. This is an 
existential condition in which Christianity persists. Therefore, migrant workers’ religious 
assiduity, such as in their advocacy of submission, hard work and docility, does not mean 
that they voluntarily uphold the exploitative structure; instead, it is a necessary part of 
their “techniques of the self” to attain faithful-virtue subject. However, it is noteworthy 
that, although migrant workers’ project of self-transformation does not overtly challenge 
the existing power structure, it nevertheless produces a religious “structure of feeling” 
that exerts pressure and sets conditions on the ways that and extent to which secular 
powers and normalised subjects actualise as a part of migrant workers’ everyday life. For 
example, migrant workers’ emphasis on self-controlled bodies and a respectful 
disposition help them fend off the state’s label of “low suzhi” at a safe distance by 
cultivating a morally superior and self-valued masculinity, womanhood or adulthood. In 
Chapter 7, migrant workers’ performance of moral manhood helps them repel the 
homogenising and aggressive masculinity and the neoliberal “jungle law” in the 
workplace. In other words, migrant workers’ ethical formation conditions how secular 
and institutionalised subjectivities are translated, embodied, and affectively felt in the 
domain of everyday life, and thereby reframe the ways power operates. It is in this sense 
that this form of postsecular subjectivity is political. Overall, this thesis has developed an 
intersectional approach that demonstrates how new understandings of postsecular agency 
can be attained by a concern with interlocking power structures and socio-historical 
specificities.  
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10.7 Future research  
Finally, three avenues of inquiry in secularity and postsecularity can be put forward for 
future geographical research. Firstly, I call for critical research to explore how the 
political-economic project of secularity and in particular neoliberalism operate through 
the realms of affect and spirituality. As Cloke et al. (2019: 202) suggest, “understanding 
neoliberalism as an affective politics that shapes ethical relations is not new per se; yet 
the contestation of neoliberalism through spiritual activism is rarely understood”. Recent 
research in Foucauldian studies has noted that neoliberalism, like the exercise of pastoral 
power, often relies on a particular spirituality that reconciles contested processes of truth-
telling and enchantment (Gamez 2019). The ways in which neoliberal logics shape 
individual subjectivities are not only about truth-telling in the game of knowledge/power, 
but are also about the mystery and sacralisation that re-enchant desires and aspirations 
entrenched by late-capitalist society. In this sense, the geography of religion needs to be 
attentive to the re-intervention of theologies and religious ethics that may resist or overlap 
with re-enchantment in the neoliberal economy, in which the souls of individuals are 
increasingly enlisted in the regime of social governance (Rose 2017; Cloke et al. 2019).  
 
Secondly, one of the important contributions of this thesis has been to examine how 
postsecularity emerges through intersectionality; however, how postsecularity and 
intersectionality can be reconciled in a new form of critical inquiry and praxis that brings 
the possibility for social change deserves further theorisation.  In essence, Collins’srecent 
book Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory (2019) represents such an attempt. 
Collins contends that developing intersectionality as a critical social theory involves not 
only intersectionality’s internal dynamics but also its connection to established critical 
social theories such that it can open up new ways for social action. In this sense, bringing 
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postsecular theories into faith-based praxis and activism in countering oppression and 
social inequality requires a sensitivity to knowledge of intersectionality.  
 
Thirdly, geographical research can significantly contribute to the spatialities of secularity 
and postsecularity beyond the normative trajectory of Western modernisation. As I have 
argued, existing research on secularity and postsecularity has predominantly been placed 
in the contexts of Europe and North America, and therefore is insufficient to capture the 
variegated and contested geographies of religion across the world. Therefore, future 
research needs to adopt a global comparative perspective in exploring how multiple 
patterns and configurations of secularity and postsecularity come into interaction in an 
age of global shift (Kong 2010).  
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Appendix 1:   Consent form 
 
Dear interviewee:  
 
My name is Quan Gao and I am currently a PhD student in the School of Geography, 
Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, UK. My PhD research focuses on the 
everyday life of Christian migrant workers and how they make sense of Christianity. With 
this form I am cordially asking for your consent to be an interviewee in this research. I 
am also hoping that you would kindly lend me permission to use the materials from the 
interviews in writing up my PhD thesis. 
 
This research is for academic purposes and serves no business interests. All the materials 
and data collected from the research will only be accessed by me (and my supervisors if 
necessary). I promise to do my utmost to respect the confidentiality of the interview data 
and your personal information as well. Please also note that this consent form is NOT a 
legal document subject to any legal prescriptions of the People’s Republic of China. It is 
concerned only with an inter-personal agreement between you and me. 
 
All participants are guaranteed anonymity. This will be done by using a pseudonym for 
the name of each participant and a code for the place in which the research took place.  
You should know in advance that: 
 
(1) All interviews will be tape-recorded  
(2) All information will be treated in absolute confidence  
(3) You are guaranteed confidentiality. That means no information in the report 
will be linked to any individual participant. Any private data will not be reported 
without the permission of the participant (all names will be given anonymous 
replacements)  
(4) You are free to refuse to answer any questions.  
(5) The interviewer will stop the interview at any point if you ask me to. 
 
 
 
Confirmation of consent (please give your signature) 
 
 
 
Date: 
 
Contact details 
 
Quan Gao (project director)  
e-mail: q.gao2@newcastle.ac.uk 
telephone: 13710374740 
 
Peter Hopkins (supervisor)  
e-mail: peter.hopkins@newcastle.ac.uk  
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